THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S WORKS

VOLUME I

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THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S WORKS

VOLUME I

THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S WORKS

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PLUTARCH SOCIETY

Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1-5, 2002

VOLUME I: PLUTARCH'S STATESMAN AND HIS AFTERMATH: POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND LITERARY ASPECTS

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AND FRANCES TITCHENER

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PREFACE

This volume presents the first half of the Acta of the sixth international conference of the International Plutarch Society, which was held from May 1 to 5, 2002 in The Netherlands, at the University of Nijmegen (May 1) and Castle Hernen[1] (May 2–5). The theme of the conference was "The Statesman in Plutarch's Works". The proceedings of the conference are published in two volumes, one on Plutarch's statesman and his aftermath (political, philosophical, and literary aspects), and another one on the author's Greek and Roman Lives.

The conference was funded by the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (N.W.O.), the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (K.N.A.W.), the Cornelia de Vogel Foundation, the University of Nijmegen, the Free University of Amsterdam and the A.A. Bredius Foundation, which hosted the conference at Castle Hernen (May 2–5).

Lukas de Blois (Nijmegen), Jeroen Bons (Utrecht), and Gert-Jan van Dijk (Amsterdam/ Nijmegen) acted as organisers for the conference, with the aid of Victoria van Aalst (A.A. Bredius Foundation) and Jacqueline Berns (Congress Bureau of the University of Nijmegen). They wish to thank Mary Bluyssen (of the same congress bureau), Werner Gelderblom, Martijn van Helvert, Paul Peters, and Fedor van Rijn for their assistance.

Lukas de Blois, Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp (Bonn), Aurelio Pérez Jiménez (Málaga), Sven-Tage Teodorsson (Göteborg), Joseph Geiger (Jerusalem), Christopher Pelling (Oxford), Frances Titchener (Logan, Utah), Luc van der Stockt (Leuven), Frederick Brenk (Rome), André Lardinois (Nijmegen), Alexej Zadorojnyi and Jeroen Bons chaired the various sessions of the conference.

Lukas de Blois, Jeroen Bons, Ton Kessels, and Dirk M. Schenkeveld (Amsterdam, Free University) act as editors of the proceedings, with the aid of Jan Maarten Bremer (University of Amsterdam), Michiel Klein Swormink (Brill Academic Publishers), Edwin van Meerkerk (Nijmegen), Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, and Luc van der Stockt.

[1] Castle Hernen is situated just a few kilometers West from Nijmegen and is the seat of the A.A. Bredius Foundation for the promotion of Byzantine studies.

Carolyn Doyle and Frances Titchener (Logan, Utah, USA) kindly corrected the English of some of the contributions.

The editors

INTRODUCTION

In Plutarch's view politics is an essential human activity. In *An seni* 791C he says:

> ….for engaging in public affairs is not a special service which is ended when the need ends, but it is a way of life of a tamed social animal living in an organized society, intended by nature to live throughout its allotted time the life of a citizen and in a manner devoted to honour and the welfare of mankind.

In Plutarch's opinion, politics forms part of ethics, and political *aretè*, based on correct philosophical insights, occupies a central place in public life. In the same treaty he observes:

> But above all things we must remind them that statesmanship consists, not only in holding office, being ambassador, vociferating in the assembly, and ranting around the speakers' platform proposing laws and making motions. Most people think all this is part of statesmanship, just as they think of course that those are philosophers who sit in a chair and converse and prepare their lectures over their books; but the continuous practice of statesmanship and philosophy, which is every day alike seen in arts and deeds, they fail to perceive … Now being a statesman is like being a philosopher (*An seni* 796CD).

According to Plutarch, philosophy, as a law implanted in the ruler, neutralizes the moral risks involved in the exercise of power (*Ad princ.* 779F; 780C; *Max. c. princ.* 779B). Plutarch was not a historian, although he borrowed a great deal from the works of earlier historians. He arrived at the genre of biography from a philosophical background with the intention to give examples of the deeds of important men in public and private life. He wished to reform himself and others and provide a better founded public behaviour (*Timol. – Aem. praef.* 1ff.) by showing himself and others the *bios* and *ethos* of great men.[1]

So it is not outlandish to dedicate two volumes of over 300 pages each to Plutarch's views and descriptions of statesmanship, politics, political philosophy, the careers of important politicians, and their philosophical and ethical backgrounds. Those are main topics in Plutarch's works, which constitute a literary heritage that exerted a profound

[1] See De Blois (1992) 4568f., and 4572. Translations of Plutarchan passages into English are borrowed from the Loeb edition.

influence, not only in his own times, but probably even more in later ages of western culture.

Plutarch was also a creative writer, who stood in an age-old tradition of literary craftsmanship, and tried to influence his audiences by all kinds of literary devices, the study of which is indispensable in any enquiry into the Plutarchan corpus.

It is this width of the subject that makes it impossible for one person to incorporate all aspects of Plutarch's writings on the statesman and statesmanship in one individual masterpiece. These proceedings, therefore, bring together scholars specialising in different subjects, each approaching the main theme of the conference—the statesman in Plutarch's works—from different professional backgrounds and various scientific points of view.

The first two sections of volume I contain contributions on Plutarch's own political activities, his views of contemporary Greek politics, and his presentation of statesmen. In section I, 1 Philip Stadter and Jeremy McInerney study the close relations that Plutarch had with Delphi, whereas María de los Ángeles Durán López and Lukas de Blois concentrate on Plutarch's views of the position and latitude of Greek politicians within the Roman Empire of his own times. In section I, 2 Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp and Christopher Pelling focus on the way in which Plutarch presents statesmen, Mark Beck treats Plutarch's observations on the stateman's independence of action, and Ewen Bowie pays attention to poetry and music in the lives of Plutarch's politicians. Section 3 of volume I contains a series of ten contributions on political, philosophical, ethical and literary aspects of Plutarch's representation of the statesman and statesmanship, by Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, Luc van der Stockt, Jack Hershbell, Ines Calero Secall, Abraham Bos, Michael Trapp, Jacques Boulogne, Thomas Schmidt, and Jeroen Bons. In this section attention is also paid to the orientation and sources of Plutarch's political philosophy. He may be regarded as an adherent of the Academy and—to a lesser extent—the Lyceum, but he was also an eclectic, who borrowed from various other schools of thinking and from the common erudition, which resulted from Greek rhetorical education of his own times.

The last section of this first volume concentrates on Plutarch's influence on the Latin West and on his "Nachleben" in later western culture. Contributions by Vincent Hunink and Wytse Keulen treat (non)-existing relations between Plutarch and Apuleius, Yitzhak Dana proposes a new theory about connections between manuscripts and early

printed versions of Plutarch's works, and Joseph Geiger, Pau Gilabert Barberà, Susanne Gippert and Guillaume van Gemert focus on various aspects of the aftermath of Plutarchan opinions about the statesman in painting and literature in France, Great Britain and Germany.

Lukas de Blois

ABSTRACTS AND BIOGRAPHIES

Philip A. Stadter, *Plutarch: Diplomat for Delphi?*

Plutarch is reticent about his own political roles, but this paper assembles evidence suggesting that he was active as a diplomat for Delphi, cultivating a close relation with the Flavians especially. He may have met Vespasian in Greece, and again while the emperor was at Alexandria. His close contact with Mestrius Florus, an intimate of Vespasian's, may have helped him win concessions for Delphi, and led to Titus' decision to serve as *archon* of that city in 79 and even Domitian's restoration of the temple of Apollo in 84. Later he may have encouraged Avidius Nigrinus in rendering a decision to Delphi in his judgement recorded on the famous bilingual description of the first decade of the second century. Plutarch put into action on behalf of his adopted city of Delphi the words he addresses to Menemachus in his *Political Precepts* (= *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae*): "one should always have a friend among the really powerful people." Plutarch used his friends to help his city and the sanctuary of Apollo.

Philip A. Stadter is Falk Professor in the Humanities at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published extensively on Greek historical authors, especially Plutarch, including *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill, 1989), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London 1992) and introductions and notes to *Plutarch, Nine Greek Lives* (Oxford, 1998), and *Plutarch, Eight Roman Lives* (Oxford, 1999).

María de los Ángeles Durán López, *Plutarco, ciudadano griego y súbdito romano*

Plutarch was born in Chaeronea. He was a student in Athens and became a priest at Delphi later on and he was also appointed administrator at the Delphi shrine. He was admired in Rome where he had friends in very high places. Plutarch appreciated Roman virtues and achievements, but in spite of the fact that the Roman citizenship was given to him, he always felt himself a Greek: With the exception of a few trips to Italy, Plutarch spent his mature years between Chaeronea and Delphi, as well as frequent sojourns in Athens. He never got concerned with political affairs beyond tasks in municipal administration and an embassy to the proconsul of the province of Achaea. It seems to me that his neglect of having become part of the imperial power structure is shown by his uneasiness of being a Greek citizen and simultaneously a subject of the Roman Empire. In fact, in his *Political Precepts* he recommends to leave patriotic eulogies to rhetorical usage, although most of his treatises were implicitly written for the sake of keeping the flame of valuable feelings of freedom.

María de los Ángeles Durán López, is a Profesor Titular at the Department of Greek Philology at Málaga University. She is a member of the following scientific associations: Sociedad Española de Estudios Clásicos, Sociedad

Española de Lingüística, Sociedad Española de Literatura General y Comparada, International Plutarch Society and Asociación de Estudios históricos sobre la Mujer. She is a reader about Plato, Sophistic and Plutarch.

JEREMY MCINERNEY, *"Do you see what I see?": Plutarch and Pausanias at Delphi*

This paper deals with the place of Delphi in the work of Plutarch and Pausanias, both of whom were familiar with the site. Both authors demonstrate a curious aversion towards naming or describing any dedications from the Hellenistic period. Even the generosity of the Romans is passed over in silence. When contrasted with the archaeological record of the site this silence becomes even more remarkable: the center of the sanctuary was thickly populated with the dedications of Hellenistic princes and Roman generals. Both authors systematically filter the Hellenistic and Roman periods out of Delphi's past. The reason for this is that both authors are examples of the creation of a distinctive cultural memory under the Second Sophistic. The glories of Classical Greece are made vividly present so that the Greek cultural zone, the *oikoumene*, can be made an equivalent of the Roman empire.

Jeremy McInerney is Associate Professor of Classical Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of *The Folds of Parnassos. Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis* (Austin, 1999), as well as articles on Greek epigraphy, archaeology and history.

LUKAS DE BLOIS, *Classical and Contemporary Statesmen in Plutarch's* Praecepta

Plutarch's portrait of the ideal statesman, given in treatises such as the *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae*, the *An seni res publica gerenda sit*, the *Ad principem ineruditum*, and the *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, is one-sided and does not sufficiently take into account the position of the Roman military apparatus. In one short sentence about the boots of the military viewed from the *strategeion*, in *Praec*. 813E, however, Plutarch betrays that he knew real power structures and relations. Centurions, *beneficiarii* and other military personnel represented Roman power in every day practice and constituted a permanent potential threat to the status and power of local notables, who only could try to maintain concord and peace in their communities, to forestall military interference, which would show their impotence towards soldiers and officers.

Lukas de Blois is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He has published on the crisis of the Roman republic in the first century B.C., the history of the Roman empire in the third century A.D., ancient historiography (Sallust, Tacitus, Cassius Dio), Plutarch's Greek and Roman Lives, and the history of ancient Sicily in the fourth century B.C.

H.G. INGENKAMP, *How to Present a Statesman?*

Besides the well-known prefaces to some Lives, there are some chance-phrases in Plutarch that seem to be helpful to throw light upon how his biographies are written. Two of those passages could be *Publicola* 6.6 and *Cato Minor* 9.10.

From the *Publicola*-passage we learn that it is the reputation of a person that inspires the author 1) to decide, in case of doubt, a) if an action was good or bad or even b) if an action happened at all, 2) to fill up his material. In *Cato Minor*, Plutarch says that real praise will always be combined with affection. Taken as clue for understanding Plutarch's own way of writing, this passage may help us, e.g., to see the difference between passages written by Plutarch and by other authors on the same subject that depend on the same source(s). As an example, a short interpretation of his and Tacitus' obituaries of Galba is given.

Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp is Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Bonn. He published particularly on Plutarch including *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Göttingen 1971) and "Plutarchs Leben der Gracchen. Eine Analyse" (ANRW 1992).

Christopher Pelling, *Do Plutarch's Politicians Never Learn?*

How far does Plutarch think political wisdom can be learned from books? Many passages suggest that a good deal can be learned from history, and his own *Lives* should be seen as conveying important lessons to their readers. Yet his narratives themselves often complicate that picture. In many cases people who have learnt from the past, either from history or from their own experience, find it difficult to apply those lessons or convey them to others.

In particular, *Dion* points out the difficulties of applying philosophical wisdom to politics, and the need to temper idealism with a realistic eye to possibilities. *Solon–Poplicola* investigates the way in which wise figures may learn and apply lessons about tyranny, but there is a hint of over-learning, over-reacting to past experience. Solon also explores the way in which literature—Solon's own poetry, Thespis' plays—can improve, admonish, or corrupt.

So in various ways the applicability of wisdom to the practical world seems multifaceted and problematic.

Christopher Pelling is Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University. His books include a commentary on Plutarch's *Antony* (1988), *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian* (2000), and most recently *Plutarch and History* (2002), which collected eighteen of his papers on Plutarch.

Mark Beck, *Plutarch on the Statesman's Independence of Action*

Plutarch's *Lives* and *Moralia* contain much information about the conduct of statesmen. Sometimes it is descriptive, sometimes prescriptive. This paper will examine the dynamics of the interactions between political and military figures and the common people discussed in Plutarch's *Political Precepts* and several key *Lives*. In particular the responses of leaders to protest or opposition will be investigated. Under what circumstances is a politician's independence of action commendable, or a liability? How are politicians influenced by displays of passive opposition, verbal protests and attacks in public, spontaneous demonstrations and riots? When, if ever, can politicians safely ignore their people? What circumstances compromise a politician's independence of action?

In conducting this analysis, the role and importance of oratorical ability will be assessed, as well as other techniques employed by leaders to influence popular opinion, such as religion, propaganda, and the formation of political coalitions.

Mark A. Beck is Visiting Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of South Carolina at Columbia. He has published several articles on Plutarch's *Lives*.

Ewen Bowie, *Poetry and Music in the Life of Plutarch's Statesman*

Plutarch's views on poetry and music in the life of the *pepaideumenos*, at any rate, are clear if not wholly consistent. Music is fine at the right time and place—for relaxation in a *symposion*, or in a public religious ritual. Poetry is also an inevitable component of literary culture, but it must be approached circumspectly. On the other hand the composition of poetry seems to cause Plutarch little discomfort. Music does seem to be different: the Alexander story may suggest that Plutarch saw it as a bad use of time with possible bad effects on personality. That seems to be how Plutarch saw the place of poetry and music in the life of a *pepaideumenos* in general. In the absence of explicit statements by Plutarch I would infer that for him all this applies to the statesman's life, but in spades.

Ewen Bowie is E.P. Warren Praelector in Classics at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and Reader in Classical Languages and Literature in the University of Oxford. He has published widely on the Greek literature of the High Roman Empire, and is currently completing a commentary on Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*.

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, *Los héroes de Plutarco y su elección entre la justicia y la utilidad*

In this article, we analyse the choices of politicians between justice and utility, as seen in Plutarch's Parallel Lives. As for Plutarch's interest in and moral interpretation of conflicts between justice and utility, we could isolate the following situations:

1. The heroes who prefer private utility (τὸ συμφέρον) to justice are criticised only because they neglect the βεβαιότης (a condition for the good politician) or because their actions can damage the *patria*.
2. When a just action implies a choice between the private and the public interest, Plutarch approves only the preference for public utility.
3. But, when justice and public utility are implied in the choice, there are two possibilities: a) If a just action would endanger the common good, safeguarding it is preferable to just action. b) If unjust actions are not required to defend the *patria*, though they will produce additional profits, justice is preferable to unjust advantage.

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez is Professor of Greek Philology at the University of Málaga (Spain). His main fields of research are Plutarch, Greek myth and religion, and ancient astrology. He has translated into Spanish Hesiod's works

(1978), Aristotle's *Politics* (1986), and ten of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* (1985, 1996). He has founded *Mediterranea* and *Supplementa Mediterranea*, two series of monographical studies on ancient Mediterranean Culture, and *MHNH*, a journal on ancient Magic and Astrology. He is President of the *Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas* from its foundation (1987) and President of the *International Plutarch Society* for the period 2002–2005.

Luc van der Stockt, *"With followeth Justice always" (Plato,* Laws *716a). Plutarch on the "Divinity" of Rulers and* Laws

Plutarch's opinion on the divinity of rulers and laws is revealed through a detailed analysis of "clusters of parallels" which occur in several of his writings (*Against Colotes*, *On exile*, *On Isis and Osiris*, *Progress in virtue*, *To the uneducated ruler*). These "clusters of parallels" constitute an originally Plutarchan format for the ideas he develops. In the case at hand, a quote from Plato, *Laws* 716a is at the centre of a number of items (such as "the beard and gown of the philosopher", "initiation into Mysteries", "the thunderbolt of Zeus", "empty vessels"). A contrastive reading of these items in the writings involved brings out that *To the uneducated ruler* §3 and 5, where *Quellenforschung* detected Stoic and Pythagorean sources, are actually permeated by Platonic inspiration. Plutarch constantly opposes outward appearance to inner and authentic self. This argumentative strategy is applied to the devotee of Isis, the exile, the young philosopher, and the uneducated ruler alike. The latter, then, should realize that he is divine only inasmuch as he "becomes like God", and does away with the mere external paraphernalia as a claim to any divine status.

Luc van der Stockt is Professor of Greek language and literature at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. He has published extensively on Plutarch including *Twinkling and twilight. Plutarch's reflections on literature* (Brussels, 1992).

Jackson P. Hershbell, *Plutarch's Political Philosophy: Peripatetic and Platonic*

Although considered a Platonist, Plutarch used Aristotelian and Peripatetic sources in formulating his own political ideas. For Plutarch Aristotle was essentially a Platonist, and though it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that Plutarch had direct knowledge of Aristotelian and Peripatetic works on ethics and politics (the two were closely connected in his mind as they were for both Plato and Aristotle), Plutarch probably drew from Peripatetic sources in his *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae* and *An seni res publicae gerenda sit*, his major works on politics. Plutarch also had several Peripatetic friends, e.g. Favorinus, who probably informed him about Peripatetic beliefs. Like Aristotle, Plutarch's approach to politics was essentially pragmatic, and based on experience, not on theory. After all, Plutarch was himself involved in politics, and at a time when Rome dominated the "inhabited word." He thus lived and thought in a very different era from that of Plato.

Jackson P. Hershbell is Professor Emeritus of Classical and Near Eastern Studies, the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He has written numerous

articles mainly on Plutarch and Epictetus, and has, in collaboration with J. Dillon, translated Iamblichus' *De vita pythagorica* and *De mysteriis*.

Inés Calero Secall, *Presencia de las ideas políticas de Aristóteles en Plutarco*

Aristotle and Plutarch have many similar political ideas. Plutarch took some conceptions of Aristotle through the reading of Plato, others from Aristotle himself. Although the *Politics* was known to Plutarch, there is not any decisive evidence to show a direct reading neither in his expressions nor in his commentaries. What is more, if Plutarch would have known the *Politics*, he ever might have mentioned it, but he did not. Both authors agree with repulse of the tyranny and the domination of the commons as system of government or *politeia*. They also are in agreement with the politic principle: to learn to rule and to be ruled. Aristotle and Plutarch thought that all revolts are rooted in small conflicts and it is the role of the ruler to avoid them and both of them considered that a statesman had to share his duties with others. They also doubt of the capacity of the young to rule.

However, it seems to me that these parallels in their way of thinking can not be considered quotations as Helmbold-O'Neil seem to propose. I also suggest the same approach for the *Rhetoric*.

Inés Calero Secall is Professor of Greek Philology at Málaga University. She has published on Greek literature, specifically Euripides and Quintus Smyrnaeus, and she has written *Consejeras, confidentes cómplices: la servidumbre femenina en la literatura griega antigua* (Madrid, 1999). Furthermore she has studied Greek laws: *Leyes de Gortina* (Madrid, 1997).

Abraham P. Bos, *The Dreaming Kronos as World Archon in Plutarch's* De facie in orbe lunae

Plutarch in his myth at the end of his *De facie* presented the god Kronos as bound by Zeus with "the bonds of sleep" and as participating through his dreams in the council of Zeus, which he then reveals to the world-ruling demons around him.

Kronos is opposed here to Zeus as a ruler to a philosopher, as a practitioner to a theoretician, as a cosmic *archon* to a transcendent sovereign, and finally as soul to intellect.

The way this opposition has been worked out in Plutarch's dialogue is a typical result of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of the (World-)soul. This criticism was central in Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *De philosophia* (fr. 26 Ross), and has strongly influenced not only Plutarch, but Hellenistic and Gnostic theologies as well.

Abraham P. Bos is Professor in Ancient and Patristic Philosophy at the Free University at Amsterdam. He has published extensively on Aristotle. A new monograph *The soul and its instrumental body. A reinterpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of living nature* is due to appear in 2003.

Michael Trapp, *Statesmanship in a Minor Key?*

There is a tendency in discussions of Plutarch's *An seni* and *Praecepta* to concentrate on the "realism" with which they depict the reduced scope and day-to-day manipulations of Greek civic politics under the Roman Empire. While not wholly false, this view is at least incomplete. Though he speaks with the authority of an experienced practical politician, Plutarch is also committed to the values and aims of philosophy, and this too shows up strongly in the advice he gives. Indeed, the view he offers of the nature and aims of political engagement is so heavily philosophized that it risks collision with some central elements in the civic values and assumptions of his age, particularly as concerns such key aspects as benefaction—euergetism—and competition for civic honour. It is not clear that his contemporaries would have been as convinced of the "realism" of his political advice as modern scholars. At the same time, there are limits to the extent to which Plutarch is willing to extend his implicit philosophical critique of conventional politics, in spite of the encouragement to do so that he might in theory have derived from his reading of Plato.

Michael Trapp is Reader in Greek at King's College London. He specializes in Greek thought and literature of the first two centuries AD, and is preparing a book on *Ethics, politics and society under the Roman Empire*.

Brad L. Cook, *Plutarch's "Many Other" Imitable Events:* Mor. *814B and the Statesman's Duty*

In *Political Precepts* Plutarch directs an aspiring politician not to praise or attempt to emulate the glorious victories of the Hellenic past. In place of such events as Marathon and Plataia, Plutarch strongly recommends that modern Hellenic statesmen, mindful of Roman rule, will govern their local communities most successfully by calling to mind five events from Athenian history of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.: the amnesty of 403, the fining of Phrynikhos in the 490s, the celebration at the refounding of Thebes in 316, the purification of the Assembly after violent civil strife in Argos in 370, and the scrupulous respect for the house of a recently wed suspect in the Harpalos affair in 323. Plutarch does not explain the meaning of these five episodes and they are difficult to find elsewhere in Plutarch. Examination of these five episodes in their rare occurence in Plutarch's writings, and his likely sources, reveals that Plutarch carefully selected these *exempla* to illustrate his dominant theme that Hellenic statesman must shun civic strife and maintain local harmony through individual and public mildness and self-control (*praiotes*).

Brad L. Cook is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Classics at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio. He has published articles on Plutarch and is working on the ancient biographies of Demosthenes.

Jacques Boulogne, *L' imaginaire politique de Plutarque*

In Plutarch's political view, the free man should be committed to public life wherein one man of reason rules and where Roman rule is widely accepted. In that respect, the sun is the basis of an anthropological and cosmological

system. In his very essence, man is light, which prompts him to take part in public life so as to fulfil his blooming serenity. The ontological pre-eminence of this way of life is justified by its analogy with the cosmic structure and the sun is its distinctive feature in man's life. It is in the sun's region that the Intellect links together the two primal principles of Life and Movement to the third principle of Generation. The sun is thus the core from which life circulation proceeds between the supra- and the sub-lunar worlds; the solar vital force fertilizes the moon by sending her the intellect that she needs to create souls who, in turn, take shape. The intellect is the sun's offspring; as long as its incarnation lasts, it longs for anything luminous, especially clarity of reason. Nothing is therefore more noble nor more in harmony with cosmic order than promoting its spreading on the earth; the latter's degree of humidity favours irrationality. According to Plutarch, such an effort should be encouraged at all levels, from the individual free man to the Roman Empire itself and statesmen.

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Thomas S. Schmidt, *Barbarians in Plutarch's Political Thought*

Although the barbarians are not central to Plutarch's political thought, they nevertheless offer an interesting insight into certain aspects of it. They are generally represented either as "lawless" people or as paradigms of an absolute monarchy, and thus constitute a negative pole in Plutarch's works. As such, they function as a standard against which Greek and Roman leaders and institutions may be measured and judged. As in the case of Alexander, the image of the savage and lawless barbarians works as a foil to bring out the superiority of the Greek political system. The action of Timoleon in Sicily is another such example of the triumph of Greek political culture. Furthermore, the negative image of the barbarian monarchy generates an anti-model of the "good" monarchy. This leads to an explicit discussion of the theme of "good" king in the case of Alexander, but may also function as an implicit reference to the political system of the Roman empire.

Thomas S. Schmidt is Professor of Greek at the Université Laval (Québec). He is the author of an extensive study on the image of the barbarians in Plutarch's works (*Plutarque et les barbares*, 1999).

Jeroen A.E. Bons, *Plutarch as Source for Early Greek Rhetoric. The Case of Gorgias Frg. 23 DK*

With regard to its content, fragment 23 of Gorgias on tragedy fits well in his overall thought on the persuasive use of language, especially as it is set forth in his *Helen*. It can be accepted as authentic and be interpreted as a

serious attempt by Gorgias to apply his doctrine of epistemological *apatê* to the problem of dramatic illusion. In the way Plutarch introduces and evaluates Gorgias in his discussion of the problem of exposing young students on their way to education in philosophy to the dangerous charms of deceitful poetry, he reflects the relevance of the Gorgianic notion to his argument. On the basis of this it can be concluded that Plutarch proves to be a reliable and faithful "reporter" of the fragment under consideration.

Jeroen Bons is Fellow of University College Utrecht and Senior Lecturer in Classical and Comparative Literature at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. He has published on the history of classical rhetoric and classical literary theory.

Vincent Hunink, *Plutarch and Apuleius*

Plutarch and Apuleius are sometimes associated on a number of thematic points. In this paper direct influences by Plutarch on Apuleius are rejected, as they are not supported by sufficient evidence in the texts. Mostly, other factors, such as the general state of philosophy can adequately explain any parallels.

This point is elaborated for the subject of Apuleius' demonology, as expressed in his *De deo Socratis*, which may be compared to Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*. Both texts appear to be not only different in literary genre and in their approach of the audience, but also show significant differences in their philosophical content.

On two occasions Apuleius actually names Plutarch. In his novel *Metamorphoses*, "Plutarch" is mentioned as the ancestor of the protagonist Lucius. This is commonly interpreted as a tribute by the author to the Middle Platonist philosopher. However, we may also interpret it in a more humorous sense, in accordance with Apuleius' common practice with names in the novel. Thus, "Plutarch" is ironically brought into the morally dark world of the Roman novel, much as another disreputable character in book one is called "Socrates". This does not imply criticism, but is a literary play intended for the erudite reader.

Vincent Hunink reads Latin and Christian Latin and Greek at the University of Nijmegen (Netherlands). He has published extensively on Apuleius, a.o. editions with commentary of the *Apologia* (1997) and the *Florida* (2001).

Wytse Keulen, *Lucius' Kinship Diplomacy: Plutarchan Reflections in an Apuleian Character*

Plutarch's moral writings, including his *Table Queries*, form an invaluable frame of reference to understand and judge Apuleius' literary use of the symposium and his technique of portraying immoral character types in the *Metamorphoses*. In his *Moralia*, Plutarch tried to cure his audience of vices such as curiosity, superstition, boorishness, gluttony, or false modesty. Lucius, the hero and main narrator of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, who boasts descent from Plutarch (1.2.1; 2.3.2), seems to reveal the very symptoms of the moral ailments of which his so-called ancestor wanted to cure his readers. Both Lucius (*alter ego* of the

author, Apuleius) and other characters from the *Metamorphoses*, appearing as dubious storytellers in degraded symposium situations, can be diagnosed as cases of contagious illnesses like curiosity (πολυπραγμοσύνη) and superstition (δεισιδαιμονία), which often seem related to their activities of invention and storytelling.

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Yitzhak Dana, *The First Printing of the* Lives *in 1517. A Possible Link with the Distant Past*

Since its initial steps in the first half of the nineteenth century, the critical study of the Greek and Roman texts focused its attention mainly on their hand-copied transmission, thereby almost entirely ignoring the early printed editions. Contemporary scholars very likely trusted the printed editions to have preserved the ancient text exactly as handed down by the manuscripts. This approach, which has been inherited by the subsequent generations of Classical scholars, explains the continuous lack of interest in those editions. However, in the case of the second volume of Plutarch's *Lives*, a review of the first three printed Greek editions (1517–1533) reveals that the long process of transmission by no means reached its end in the year 1517. On the contrary, with regard to both the form and contents of the hand-copied text, the early printed editions appear to have introduced further and significant changes. Thus a study of the first three printed Greek editions of the Plutarchan Biographical corpus, as compared with the tradition of the relevant codices, appears to be called for. This review may offer a deeper insight into a decisive chapter of the long process of the transmission, and into its implications for the possible interpretation of the ancient text.

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Joseph Geiger, *Death of a Statesman: Poussin's Phocion*

Two of Poussin's most famous paintings, "Landscape with the Funeral of Phocion", and "The Ashes of Phocion Collected by his Widow", both of 1648, treat the events described in the last chapter of Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*. This story has never been used as a subject by artists before Poussin (and very rarely after him). The narrative as well as the landscape and architectural elements in the two paintings are compared with those in other Poussin paintings, among them the death-scenes "The Death of Germanicus" and the drawing of "The Death of Cato" and the two versions of "Titus Destroys the Temple of Jerusalem". Poussin's dependence on Plutarch and other influences are discussed: Neo-Stoicism on the one hand and the political events of 1648 in

Europe on the other. The statesman Phocion as described by Plutarch is both an ideal and a vehicle for Poussin's ideas and his views of his times.

Joseph Geiger is Shalom Horowitz Professor Emeritus of Classics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published extensively on Plutarch as well as on ancient historiography and biography, ancient Judaism and the *Nachleben* of the classics.

Pau Gilabert Barberà, *John Addington Symonds.* A Problem in Greek Ethics. *Plutarch's* Eroticus *quoted only in some Footnotes? Why?*

John Addington Symonds' *A Problem in Greek Ethics* was an audacious book on Greek pederasty published in the Victorian age. It contains all sorts of sociological reflections in order to explain not only why women among the Greeks were in fact "uneducated and uninteresting" but also why, as a consequence, Greek men had a predilection for masculine love. However, it shows a great incoherence as well: Plutarch's *Eroticus* is certainly one of its main ancient references, since it is a philosophical dialogue in which pederastic and conjugal love are compared, but it is quoted only in some footnotes leaving unmentioned Plutarch's argument, which makes any sexual discrimination completely absurd. This brief contribution, then, intends to analyse both the human and intellectual reasons for such a biased interpretation.

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Susanne Gippert, *The Poet and the Statesman: Plutarchan Biography in Eighteenth Century England*

The translation of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* by Sir Thomas North (1579) was widely read in England through the centuries, and had a considerable influence, not only on Shakespeare, but also on Seventeenth Century biographers. Throughout Eighteenth Century England, however, Plutarch's *Lives* were most widely acclaimed as the ideal biographical model. As a literary genre, biography began to develop a substantial body of critical assumptions and terminology. The most significant biographical criticism of the time was voiced by Samuel Johnson (1709–1784) in two essays on biography, which he published in his periodicals The Rambler (Nr. 60) and The Idler (Nr. 84). Johnson's theory of biography was put into practice in his *Lives of the English Poets* (1779–1781), originally biographical prefaces for an edition of the works of various English poets, from the period of Milton onwards. Johnson's work includes the most influential literary personalities of the time: Milton, Dryden, Pope, Addison, Swift, and Gray. Against the background of Plutarchan and Johnsonian biographical theories, Johnson's *Life of Addison* is finally compared with Plutarch's *Life of Solon*, since both lives provide a similar subject: the poet and the statesman.

Susanne Gippert is a PhD student of Classics at Bonn University. She has mainly worked on Joseph Addison and his translations from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

Guillaume van Gemert, *Plutarchus in den deutschen Landen in der Frühen Neuzeit*

Frühneuzeitliche deutsche Chroniken, wie die von Hartmann Schedel und Sebastian Franck, stufen Plutarchus vor allem als Morallehrer und weniger als Geschichtsschreiber ein: Bis weit ins 17. Jahrhundert hinein gilt er hier nicht zuletzt als Verfasser der (apokryphen) *Institutio Trajani*. Die frühe deutschsprachige Rezeption im 16. Jahrhundert greift vor allem auf die von Erasmus ins Latein übertragene *Moralia*-Traktate zurück. In welchen Kontext der so verstandene Plutarchus eingebunden wurde, wird an Hieronymus Emsers Übertragung von *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* (1519) und Georg Spalatins Verdeutschung von *De discernendo adulatore ab amico* (1520) dargetan. Alles in allem dürfte Plutarchus in den deutschen Landen einen wesentlichen Beitrag geleistet haben zur Herausbildung der Bildungsideale der *prudentia politica* und der *prudentia civilis*, die im 17. Jahrhundert nach und nach zum Tragen kamen.

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PART ONE

PLUTARCH, HIS LIFE AND HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

PLUTARCH: DIPLOMAT FOR DELPHI?

Philip A. Stadter

Plutarch had deep ties of heritage and affection to Chaeronea. "We live in a small town, and remain there, lest it become smaller," he writes in his *Demosthenes* (2.2). Yet he was a citizen of three other cities, each of which had claims on his mind and heart. Although he had been honored with both Athenian and Roman citizenship, he never seems to have taken up permanent residence in either city, useful though they might have been for his scholarship and teaching.[1] The fourth city, Delphi, was his second home, and he served there as priest of Apollo for decades. In this paper, I would like to suggest that Plutarch's role at Delphi was more active and more significant than has been recognized.[2] His connection with the city and its sanctuary lasted over fifty years, from the first mention of his presence in Delphi at the time of Nero's tour of Greece in 67 (*De E* 385B) to the reign of Hadrian, when as priest and epimelete of the Amphictyonic Council he erected a statue of the emperor (*CID* 4, no. 150 = *SIG*³ 829A). After his death Delphi and Chaeronea combined to honor him with a statue (*CID* 4, no. 151 = *SIG*³ 843). His service to Delphi clarifies his bonds with the emperors and leading Romans. Delphi is essential to understanding Plutarch in his historical and social context.

The sanctuary at Delphi was central to the Romans' construction of Greece. Along with Athens and Sparta, and more than Olympia, Delphi represented for the conquerors the greatness of the Greek past. Its monuments formed a treasury of art and memory, a "lieu de memoire," which the Romans admired, added to, and not infrequently pillaged.[3]

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[1] Cf. *De E* 384E, noting that Sarapion, living at Athens, had more books, friends and discussions at his disposal. Jones (1971) 3 notes how unusual it is for a prominent Greek of this period to remain in a small town. I am grateful to the participants of the Nijmegen conference and to Anne Jacquemin and Françoise Frazier for their comments on the oral version of this paper.

[2] The fundamental study for Plutarch's life is Jones (1971); for his relation to Delphi, see the numerous studies of Flacelière. For recent overviews, see Swain (1991) and Zagdoun (1995). For relevant recent work on Roman Delphi, see Vatin (1965), Pouilloux (1980a), Lefèvre (1998), Puech (1998), Jacquemin (1999), Sánchez (2001), Rousset (2002).

[3] Cf. *Flam.* 12.11–12, *Aem.* 28.4, *Sull.* 12.6–9. For Delphi and the Romans cf. Pouilloux (1980b); for dedications by and in honor of Romans, Jacquemin (1995) and (1999);

To consider just the empire, although Strabo spoke of Delphi's poverty, Augustus granted to his new foundation Nicopolis 10 of the 24 seats in the Delphic Amphictyony, the council that governed the shrine, and his wife Livia dedicated a great golden E to be hung on the temple.[4] Claudius took a personal interest, urging the Delphians to accept new colonists to their city,[5] and, according to a recent discovery, serving as archon of the city.[6] Nero competed at the Pythian games as well as other major games in Greece. A long history of Roman intervention prepared for the special interest Titus, Domitian, and Trajan took in the sanctuary in Plutarch's day.

However, Plutarch's political role at Delphi is difficult to discover. Although he often mentions himself and his friends in his works, he grants us only fleeting glimpses of his own life and activities, which must be pieced together from short and unsystematic notices. This is particularly true concerning dealings with the Roman elite whom he mentions as friends but almost never in their official capacity.[7] In this he follows his own prescription in *On Self-Praise*, which discourages mentioning successes in political affairs or with imperial officials (*hegemosi*), and notes how invidious it is for ambassadors, on returning from conducting important business with imperial officials, to recall the compliments which these famous and powerful men had made about them.[8] Despite this reticence, and without attempting to be complete, I believe we can identify several moments in Plutarch's diplomatic activity for Delphi, first with the Flavian emperors, then with Trajan.

An indication of political prominence can be deduced from one of the most secure facts of Plutarch's life, his service as priest of Apollo at Delphi for many years. Inscriptional evidence reveals that most

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for Delphi as *lieu de mémoire*, Jacquemin (1991), and cf. Cartledge and Spawforth (2001) 180, 207–211 on Roman Sparta.

[4] Augustus: see Lefèvre (1998), 127–128 and Sánchez (2001) 426–428. Livia: *De E* 385F. Her dedication replaced others going back to the archaic period; the meaning of the E is the subject of Plutarch's treatise. Cf. Jacquemin (1999) 179. For its position, see the coins of Hadrian and Faustina reproduced in Flacelière (1974) 3.

[5] Cf. *FD* 3.4 (Plassart 1970) no. 286 (= *SIG* [3] 802).

[6] See Mulliez (2001) 301–303. Not only was Claudius archon, but Mulliez argues that a manumission document with Claudius as witness proves that Claudius himself was present at Delphi, something previously unattested.

[7] See Jones (1971) complemented by Puech (1992).

[8] *De se ipsum laud.* 546DF. The precise meaning of *hêgemosi*, *hêgemonikôn*, *epiphanôn kai basilikôn*, is uncertain here, but would seem to refer to imperial officials such as the proconsuls or court officials in Rome.

men known to have held this priesthood had also held major offices at Delphi.[9] Almost certainly, therefore, Plutarch had been politically prominent at Delphi as well, and for this reason, without denying the possibility that he also represented Chaeronea and Boeotia before imperial officials, we should look especially for Plutarch's activity on behalf of Delphi. We can begin with the year 67, when Nero on his tour of Greece visited Delphi and competed in the Pythian games.

At this time Plutarch, according to one of his dialogues, was present in Delphi, along with his teacher Ammonius, his brother Lamprias, the priest Nicander, and others.[10] Ammonius, besides being a Platonic philosopher, was a prominent politician in Athens, and no doubt had traveled to Delphi in an official capacity,[11] and Plutarch may have done so too. At this time he was about twenty-five years old,[12] and had perhaps already served on a mission to the proconsul, which he handled well despite the absence of his older colleague.[13] He probably also attended the ceremony at the Isthmian games when Nero proclaimed the freedom of Greece.[14] Nero's visit not only allowed the philhellene emperor to indulge his theatrical tastes, it offered an exceptional opportunity for ambitious Greeks to enter into close contact with major figures in imperial affairs. We know, for example, that among those in Nero's entourage was the future emperor Vespasian,[15] who may have been introduced to the bright young Greek rhetorician and philosopher at this time.

Nero's visit, according to our reports, was both boon and curse: he gave a large gift, but pillaged the art, and more importantly for the sanctuary confiscated "the territory of Cirrha"–which should mean the

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[9] Of the eleven known priests of the first century A.D., as listed by Daux (1943), eight are known to have been archons, seven to be bouleutes, and five secretaries.

[10] *De E* 385B. The presence of the group seems probable, though we cannot exclude that the setting is as fictional as those of Plato's dialogues: cf. Flacelière (1974) 4. On Nero's tour of Greece, see Alcock (1995) and Kennell (1988) 242–250. Delphi apparently was refurbished for the visit: see Jacquemin (1985) and Weir (1999). According to Philostratus, Nero won the heralds' and citharodes' contests at Delphi (*Vit. Apoll.* 4.24).

[11] It is quite likely that Ammonius, an extremely prominent Athenian (he served three times as hoplite general) as well as a philosopher, should be required to attend the games, and that he would take students with him: cf. Jones (1971) 16–17; Puech (1992) 4835–36; Swain (1997).

[12] We have no clear indication of his birth date: he has Ammonius speak of him as young (*neos*) at *De E* 391E, set in 67. The term could cover any age in the twenties.

[13] *Praec.* 816CD. At the time of the mission Plutarch was "still young" (*neon eti*).

[14] Cf. *Flam.* 12.13.

[15] Suet. *Vesp.* 4.4; Cassius Dio 62.10.

sacred land of Apollo, the main source of income for the sanctuary–for his veterans.[16] But the triumphant progress of the imperial performer-competitor was followed within a few months by Nero's suicide and the brief reigns of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. All Greece must have watched in terror, trying to guess which man might come out on top, and fearing the possibility that the final battle for empire, like those of Pharsalia, Philippi, and Actium, would be fought in their peninsula.

The troops in Alexandria proclaimed Vespasian emperor on July 1, 69; within six months he controlled the empire. Nevertheless, Vespasian remained in Alexandria, not returning to Rome until late in 70. Plutarch tells us that as a young man he had journeyed to Alexandria and was welcomed back to Greece by a round of grand parties given by his friends for many guests, then by an intimate dinner for close friends and relatives.[17] He might have gone as a student,[18] but the circumstances of his return suggest rather a successful diplomatic mission. It is likely that Plutarch traveled to Alexandria in A.D. 69 or 70 on an embassy to Vespasian's imperial court.

Plutarch's relation with L. Mestrius Florus, the man who obtained Roman citizenship for him, is well documented.[19] Plutarch made at least one visit to Rome during Vespasian's reign, during which Florus took him along on a trip to the Po valley and showed him the battlefield of Bedriacum, where he himself had fought for Otho–unwillingly, he said–and the monument of Otho at Brixellum.[20] Plutarch must have been on especially good terms with Florus: we may imagine that the senator admired Plutarch as a bright and engaging young philosopher and speaker. Florus may have accompanied Nero to Greece, and met him at that time, or sometime soon after. Florus himself was close to Vespasian—close enough to correct his Latin pronunciation. Far from being angered, Vespasian responded with a joke.[21] About A.D. 75 Florus was made suffect consul; some years later, under Domitian, he would be honored with the proconsulship of Asia. What is significant

[16] Cassius Dio 63.14.2; cf. Sánchez (2001) 453; Rousset (2002) 275, 278–279 arguing against earlier skepticism that it was indeed confiscated; see below.
[17] *Quaest. conv.* 678CD.
[18] Cf. Jones (1971) 15.
[19] His Roman name became L. Mestrius Florus Plutarchus, cf. *CID* 4, no. 150 (*SIG*³ 829).
[20] Plut. *Otho* 14.2, 18.2. Cf Jones (1971) 21–22.
[21] Suet. *Vesp.* 22. When Vespasian used the word plostra, Florus noted that the correct pronunciation was plaustra. Next day, Vespasian greeted Florus as Flaurus.

here, I think, is that at an early age, sometime in the seventies A.D., when Plutarch would have been thirty or a bit more, he had entered into the circle of a prominent Roman senator, a consular and friend of Vespasian. This implies an active effort by the young Plutarch to make friends at the highest level of Roman society and imperial power. Taking together the three items considered so far, we may imagine that this effort had begun already at the time of Nero's visit to Greece and was encouraged by his teacher Ammonius. When Vespasian came to power in 69, Plutarch immediately was sent on a mission to his court in Alexandria, and within a few years had traveled to Rome and accompanied Florus to northern Italy.[22]

His first journey to Italy probably combined three purposes: to increase his reputation by speaking on philosophical and rhetorical subjects, to strengthen and enlarge his circle of Roman friends, and to represent Delphi or Boeotia at the imperial court. His friendship with Florus indicates his success at the second and perhaps the first goal.[23] As for the last, Delphians had several reasons to speak before Vespasian: Nero had granted freedom to Greece, given money to Delphi (later blocked by Galba), removed works of art from the sanctuary, and probably confiscated sacred land. Delphic diplomacy achieved two victories. First, Vespasian repealed Nero's grant of freedom, but allowed Delphi itself to remain free and autonomous. Then at some point he sold to the Delphians a harbor and pasturage, which seems most likely to have been the sacred land of Apollo confiscated by Nero. If this interpretation is correct, the Delphians acquired direct control over the land of Apollo, which formerly had been under the oversight of the Amphictyonic council, though often administered by Delphians.[24]

In addition, two inscriptions reveal that Titus served as archon at Delphi. It was a significant diplomatic coup for the Delphians to persuade the ambitious son of the emperor, the co-ruler and heir apparent,

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[22] Cf. Jones (1971) 21–25, who cautiously suggests one visit to Rome under Vespasian, and others in the winter of 88–89 and in 92–93.

[23] Plutarch's *Lives of the Caesars* may result from his effort to reach Romans intellectually. This extraordinary yet underappreciated initiative, often dated under Domitian, or even later, could already have been written under Vespasian.

[24] Nero's gift: Cassius Dio 63.14 (with other dubious notices); the harbor: *CID* 4, no. 152 (= Rousset [2002] no. 43; Plassart [1970] no. 302; Oliver [1989] no. 75), col. II. 31–40, on which see Rousset (2003) 275–279, Sánchez (2001) 453–454. Evidence for a Delphic delegation in Rome during Vespasian's reign might be found in the remark attributed to Aristotimus, a Delphian (cf. 965C), in *De soll. an.* 973E–974A, speaking of a dog performing in the theater of Marcellus in the presence of Vespasian.

to agree to serve as chief magistrate of their city in A.D. 79/80, the year of the quadrennial Pythian games.[25] They could not know, of course, that in that year Titus would also be emperor, following upon the unexpected death of his father on June 23, 79.[26] Clearly the acceptance of the honor was a sign of imperial favor and of respect for the sanctuary. However, it is extremely unlikely that Titus was able to visit Delphi during his magistracy: apart from the preoccupations associated with becoming emperor, the eruption of Vesuvius on August 24, 79 devastated Campania, a ruinous fire swept through Rome, a plague struck the city, and in 80 Titus dedicated the enlarged Flavian Amphitheater.[27] Nevertheless, it is probable that the Delphians hoped for some generous support from the new emperor.

That hope was temporarily confounded when Titus unexpectedly died (Sept. 1, 81), after little more than two years of rule.[28] The whole process had to begin again. Embassies undoubtedly went at once to the new emperor Domitian to offer sympathy and congratulations, and press the needs of city and sanctuary. We can suppose that the Delphians' request was money to rebuild the ancient temple of Apollo, which apparently had fallen into disrepair.[29] The evidence is an imposing inscription, finely cut in grand letters, which perhaps sat on the floor of the East pediment,[30] stating that Domitian had rebuilt the temple at his own expense.[31] The emperor's titles fix a date between January 6 and September 13, 84. Though the temple was completed in 84,

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[25] *FD* 3.4 (=Colin [1922]), nos. 34 (=*SIG*³ 817) and 35. This honor for cities is relatively infrequent: see the list in Robert (1938), 143–150, updated at Robert (1978) 529 and Devreker (1982) 515.

[26] Titus was archon while emperor, since he is identified as Augustus, a title he took only after his accession. Cf. Levick (1999) 197. A much less likely reconstruction is that Vespasian had agreed to serve, and Titus allowed himself to be substituted after his accession. Pomtow's idea (in *SIG*³ 817) that the Delphians asked Titus only after his accession rushes events too much.

[27] Suet. *Tit.* 7.3, 8.3; Dio Cassius 66.25.

[28] Plutarch refers obliquely to Titus' death and quotes an oracular verse which characterizes him as "noble" (*esthlos*) in *De ser. num. vin.* 566E, a dialogue set in Delphi and dedicated to T. Avidius Quietus.

[29] A recent landslide and/or earthquake may have been immediate cause of the damage needing renovation: an earthquake had struck Corinth in June of A. D. 77.

[30] The original position of the inscription is uncertain, and several locations have been suggested: see Weir (1998) 388–390.

[31] Flacelière (1954) no. 120 (=*SIG*³, 821, *ILS* 8905, McCrum and Woodhead [1961] 463a): Imp. [C]aesar Di[vi Ves]pasiani f. [D]omitianus / Aug. [Germ]anic[u]s p[ont. max]im. tr[ib. po]test. III p.p. imp. VII cos. X des. [XI] / tem[plu]m Ap[ollinis] sua im[p]ensa reficit.

it is likely that the work, or at least the planning had begun with Titus, and is the end result of diplomatic efforts begun while Vespasian was still living.

In any case, Delphi's representatives in Rome, of whom Plutarch would have been one, had won a significant victory. Plutarch's cultivation of Mestrius Florus, and perhaps his early contact with Vespasian in Delphi and Alexandria, had helped him gain the ear of Vespasian and his sons.[32]

Domitian's refurbishing of the temple began a series of imperial actions regarding Delphi, including the restoration of the Dodecais procession from Athens to the sanctuary and letters to the proconsul, the Delphians, and the Amphictyons ordering them to continue holding the Pythian games of 91 according to the ancient rules.[33] Plutarch would have supported both moves.[34] There followed also a remarkable period of construction at Delphi. About A.D. 90 the epimelete T. Flavius Megaleinos rebuilt "the fountain, the aqueduct, and the walls from the income of the god."[35] Then between the last years of Domitian's reign and the first of Trajan's, Plutarch's friend Flavius Soclarus was responsible as epimelete of the Amphictyons for building, "from the money of the god," a house (*oikia*) for the Pythia, a library, and a third building of uncertain use called a "structorium."[36] Plutarch now was

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[32] Pace Jones (1971) 25, who argues that Plutarch's relation with the Flavians was "notably hostile". Plutarch's references to Vespasian and Titus do not require this interpretation. The significant passage is *Amatorius* 770C–771C, the story of Empona the wife of the Gallic rebel Julius Sabinus, who taunts Vespasian and declares herself more satisfied than he, enraging him. This was a bad moment, but hardly means that Plutarch saw Vespasian as a tyrant. Plutarch follows a common Roman theme in speaking of Vespasian's good luck at *Publ.* 15.2. For his opinion of Titus, see n. 26. For his attitude toward Domitian see below.

[33] The Dodecais was reestablished when Domitian was archon at Athens, between 84 and 92 (*FD* 3.2.65 = Colin 1909–1913). A second Dodecais was held some time later, also under Domitian. For the Pythian games, cf. Bourguet (1905) 67–69; *SIG*[3] 821 B-E; Oliver (1989) no. 42, McCrum and Woodhead (1961) 463; *CID* 4, no. 142. In 86 Domitian also instituted the Capitoline games at Rome, which imitated the Pythian games in incorporating musical contests: cf. Caldelli (1993) especially pp. 68–71 on the musical contests.

[34] Plutarch defends the traditional organization of the Pythian games at *Qu. Conv.* 675 AB, referring to his own statement before the Ampictyonic Council.

[35] *CID* 4, no. 141 (=*SIG*[3] 813C). The identity of the fountain is disputed: Pomtow, followed by Vatin, suggests Cassotis, but evidence is lacking. See Pouilloux (1980a) 289, n. 35. Megalinus was epimelete in 87–91, according to Puech (1998).

[36] *CID* 4. nos. 146–148 (=*SIG*[3], 823A–C). According to Puech (1998), Soclarus was epimelete from 95 to 99. The meaning of *structorium* in this context is uncertain. Lefèvre in *CID* thinks of the substructure for a water channel; others have suggested a dining

confident that Delphi was flourishing as never before. Writing in *Why are Delphic Oracles no longer given in Verse*?, which probably belongs early in Trajan's reign, Plutarch praises the new burst of building in Delphi and at the Amphictyonic Council's other meeting place near Thermopylae. The truthfulness of the oracle has filled Delphi with dedications and gifts, he writes, and

> has adorned it with beautiful buildings and the rich possessions of the Amphictyons. You all see yourselves many new buildings where there were none before, and many ruined and desolate buildings now restored. And as young trees grow up beside those that are already flourishing, so does Pylaea share in Delphi's vigor and prosperity. Our wealth here has given her form and beauty and splendor of temples (*hiera*) and meeting-houses (*synedria*) and water-courses (*hudata*) such as she has never had in a thousand years (409A).[37]

Plutarch was overjoyed by what he and his friends at Delphi had been able to accomplish. In the next paragraph of the same dialogue, he writes, in the words of his friend Theon,

> I [Theon] love myself for my zeal in the service in this cause, with Polycrates and Petraeus. I love also the initiator (*kathegemon*) of this policy, who takes thought and cares for most of these achievements. [lacuna] But so great a change cannot have happened in so short a time by mere human effort, without the presence of the god among us and his divine guidance of the oracle.[38]

There would be no need for such exuberance if the "money of the god" could regularly afford to build and maintain the buildings of the sanctuary. From Plutarch's words it is clear that there has been a major increase of funds in the sacred treasury. While some money no doubt came from Greek patrons of Delphi such as Theon, Polycrates, and

room or processional hall (*pompeion*). Trajan may have provided at least some of the money, as he did elsewhere in the provinces: see Boatwright (2003).

[37] *De Pyth. or.* 409A, trans. Russell (1993). The date hinges in part on the identity of the leader or initiator (*kathegemon*) of the revival praised in 409C: see the following note. Plutarch's friend Florus, who had a villa near Thermopylae (*Qu. conv.* 734D), may have contributed to enhancing the Amphictyonic meeting place at Pylaea.

[38] *De Pyth. or.* 409C, trans. Russell. Flacelière (1971) argued that the unnamed *kathegemon* was Hadrian, but this seems impossible. It may refer to Plutarch himself; other possibilities are an emperor (Trajan or Domitian) or an unknown epimelete. Jones (1966) 63–65, 72 (= [1995] 100–104) and Swain (1991) argue for Plutarch. Cf. also Weir (1998) 416–418 (Domitian); Schröder (1990) 15–22 (someone unknown). Soclarus, as supervisor of the most recent wave of building, is also a possible candidate. The lacuna in the manuscripts indicates space for about 25 letters in E, 30 in B. The lacuna may have contained a name, but that is not certain. Cf. also Frazier (forthcoming).

Petraios, Plutarch certainly thinks also of imperial gifts: perhaps not only Domitian's rebuilding of the temple, but other grants.

Trajan continued the Flavians' support of Delphi. In the last months of 98, the year of his accession, and no doubt in response to a congratulatory embassy from Delphi, he wrote a letter confirming the freedom and autonomy of the city, based on the grants of earlier emperors. The Delphians took care to have the letter beautifully inscribed on an orthostate of the temple, along with other documents of this period.[39] Although apparently a rather routine administrative measure,[40] its elegant presentation on the stone suggests its importance for the city and the sanctuary. As part of the same letter, Trajan writes that he has instructed the proconsul Herennius Saturninus to send him the full dossier regarding the case of a certain Pythodorus, so that he can render judgment. Trajan, then, who at this time was still on the northern frontier, is assuring the Delphians that he will interest himself in the case.[41] A second letter, of the following year, inscribed immediately below the first, perhaps gave the resolution of the case.[42] The Herennius Saturninus named as proconsul and friend of the emperor is no doubt the Saturninus to whom Plutarch dedicated his work *Against Colotes*. It is apparent that Plutarch knew Saturninus not only in his official role as proconsul, but had had some occasion to discuss philosophy with him, perhaps at a dinner or during a visit to Delphi.[43]

By far the most important decision for Delphi, however, was Trajan's resolution of a dispute almost three hundred years old. In 190 B.C. Manius Acilius Glabrio had punished the Aetolians who to that point had controlled Delphi by confiscating their property and donating some to the city of Delphi and some to the sanctuary of Apollo. The matter came up for discussion c.117 B.C., and the Amphictyonic Council's decision was inscribed at that time on the orthostates of the interior south wall of the *pronaos* of the temple.[44] Nevertheless, other cities disputed the exact boundaries of the land Glabrio had granted.

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39 *FD* 3.4 (Plassart 1970) no. 287 and plate VIII; cf. Flacelière (1976) 98–99.

40 Cf. Hammond (1959) 363–369 on renewal of imperial *acta* and *beneficia*.

41 *FD* 3.4 (Plassart 1970) 35–36.

42 *FD* 3.4 (Plassart 1970) no. 288.

43 Cf. *Adv. Col.* 1107DE, where he is described as "a lover of beauty and of antiquity, one who considers recalling and handling the writings of the ancients a royal pursuit." He became suffect consul in 100, and later served with Trajan in Dacia.

44 For Glabrio's letter, see Sherk (1969) nos. 1 and 37; Rousset (2002) 250–269. On the affair of c. 117 BC (previously 125 B.C.), see Daux (1936) 372–386; *FD* 3.4 (Plassart 1970) no. 280; Sánchez (2001) 408–415, Rousset (2002) 128–142.

Finally, Trajan acted to resolve the dispute, and sent Avidius Nigrinus the Younger to Greece as *legatus pro praetore*, with special instructions regarding the situation at Delphi, about A.D. 110.[45] Plutarch would have welcomed him warmly as the son and nephew of old friends. Plutarch had known his father Nigrinus and uncle Quietus, and dedicated two treatises to them: *God's Slowness to Punish* to his uncle and *Brotherly Love* to both together. The elder Quietus had been proconsul of Achaea, perhaps in 91/2 and received honors from the Amphictyons for his piety toward Apollo, an indication that he made donations or rendered decisions that were favorable to the sanctuary.[46] Writing later, Plutarch recalled speaking of him at a dinner party with Sosius Senecio, calling him "our Quietus," and confidently reports a joke made at a party in Rome when Aufidius Modestus had spoken ironically of Quietus having returned "hot-handed" from the province.[47] The elementary rules of friendship would have required the younger Nigrinus to meet the friend of his father and uncle, who now held the position of priest of Apollo.[48] It is likely that he already knew Plutarch from his uncle's term in Achaea, or afterwards during Plutarch's visit to Rome.

When the younger Nigrinus arrived in Achaea, therefore, with Trajan's instructions to confirm the earlier decision of the Amphictyonic council,[49] he would have looked to Plutarch as an old family friend whose support would make his own job easier. As priest and citizen

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[45] Rousset (2002) 145–147. The precise date is uncertain. This Nigrinus was suffect consul in 110 (Rousset [2002] 144, with bibliography), and later held a consular command in Dacia. Nigrinus' function was similar to that of later *correctores*: see Ferrary and Rousset (1998) 294 n. 37; Rousset (2002) 144–145. The use of the title Optimus Princeps for Trajan, a title which became official between 10 Aug. and 1 Sept. 114, makes Plassart place the documents in 114. However, the title had been used on coinage, by Pliny, and in inscriptions as early as A.D. 100: cf. Bennett (1997) 106. The expression in Rousset (2002) no. 11 (=*FD* 3.4 [Plassart 1970] no. 294), *beneficio optimi principis*, does not necessarily express official titulature.

[46] *CID* 4 no. 143 (= *SIG*³ 822=*FD* 3.1.538; McCrum and Woodhead [1961] 318). Plutarch quite probably was on the Amphictyonic Council at this time. On the two brothers, see Jones (1971) 51–53 and Puech (1992) 4840–841. It is possible also that Nigrinus while proconsul supported Plutarch's appointment as priest of Apollo.

[47] *Qu. Conv.* 2.1, 632A. Plutarch apparently was present. As Plutarch observes, Quietus laughed at the witticism, though for a thieving proconsul it would have been a sharp rebuke. Plutarch may have accompanied Quietus to Rome on his return from his proconsulship.

[48] Plutarch probably sat on the Amphictyonic council at this time as well.

[49] The emperor had sent him expressly to resolve the disputes. Cf. e.g. Rousset (2002) 100, no. 11 (=*FD* 3.4 [Plassart 1970] no. 294), lines 5–6: "inter Anticyrneses quoque et Delphos quibus iudex datus sum ab optimo principe."

of Delphi, Plutarch would have been especially interested in assuring that the revenues from the Delphic land (including what formerly had been sacred land) were not diminished. Plutarch himself probably had been one of those actively petitioning Trajan for a solution to this continuing litigation, and perhaps even had suggested that Nigrinus would be an excellent person to carry out the decision. After Nigrinus arrived in Delphi, he heard the claimants, had the boundaries inspected, and finally rendered a series of decisions on the claims of each city against Delphi. The decisions are partially preserved in the famous bilingual inscription found at Delphi, with separate documents on the frontiers of the city with Ambryssos, Amphissa and Myania, and Anticyra. Fragmentary letters of Nigrinus to Delphi follow.[50] The decisions in the dossier stress the care taken by Nigrinus to hear all the evidence, to go over the boundaries, and to consult the earlier judgments of the Amphictyons and a second inquiry under Cassius Longinus.[51] Noting that one cause of the disputes is the changing of names over time, Nigrinus takes care to give current names for boundary landmarks. The judgment reaffirmed the earlier decisions on Delphic boundaries, with the incorporation of the sacred land into Delphic territory.

Nigrinus' confirmation of the earlier decisions regarding the land of the city of Delphi against those of the neighboring cities was a victory for Plutarch and for the sanctuary. The prominent, sacred, and historically fitting position chosen by the Delphians, surely after consultation with Plutarch as priest of Apollo, indicates their pride and satisfaction at the vindication of their claims. The texts of the decisions were inscribed in both languages, in parallel columns of Latin and Greek, on three orthostates of the south interior of the pronaos of the temple, on the left of those entering the temple, directly beneath the earlier inscribed text of the judgment made c. 117 B.C., but in much larger letters. The dossier, with a heading in even larger letters proclaimed the issuing authority: "C. Avidio Nigrino leg. Aug. pr. pr.",

[50] Newly reedited in Rousset (2002) 91–108, nos. 7–15 (=*FD* 3.4 [Plassart 1970] nos. 290–299): Ambryssos: nos. 7–8 (=290–291); Myania: 9–10 (=292–293); Anticyra: 11–12 (=294–295); letters, 13–15 (=296–299). Ambryssos and Anticyra are southeast of Delphi, Myania to the west. Cf. also Daverio-Rocchi (1988).

[51] The decisions of the Amphicytons are clearly the records of c. 117 BC inscribed above this dossier, cf. Rousset (2002) 82. Nothing is known of Longinus' decision, cf. Rousset (2002) 143.

ran for six columns, almost 7 meters (6,837 m.). Their size, position, and dual languages all proclaim their importance to Delphi.[52]

Nigrinus' decisions insured that the city of Delphi (and with it the sanctuary of Apollo) would keep its land and its income in perpetuity, guaranteed by the full authority of the emperor. Foreseeing that some parties would be dissatisfied with his decision, the legate wrote in one document, "Even if in some way the hope of each party was curtailed, it will be clear that this decision was made in the best interests of both parties when in the future, by the generosity of the Best Prince (*Optimus Princeps*), their ownership is found to be sure and without litigation."[53] Peace, assured by the judgment–backed up by the force, needless to say–of the emperor is more valuable than any land won by petty disputes.[54]

The arguments that I have presented are necessarily speculative, but if they are correct they yield some significant results. First, we find that Plutarch worked closely with the Flavian emperors, despite the negative comments he later made about Vespasian and Domitian.[55] Faults in an emperor, such as Domitian's mania for building, did not mean that he could not be persuaded to do good works as well.[56] Second, we

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[52] For the placement of the inscription, see Rousset (2002) 81–83 and fig. 8, improving on the arguments of Courby and Plassart for a location on the southwest exterior corner of the temple. The use of the two languages is rare and a testimony to the double audience the inscription anticipated: note the use of Greek and Latin on the Philopappus monument to identify the royal consular: cf. Kleiner (1983) and Smith (1998) 70–73.

[53] Rousset (2002), no. 11 (=*FD* 3.4 [Plassart 1970] no. 294), lines 12–13: "etiamsi utrorumque spei aliquid apscisum est, poterit tamen videri utrisque consultum quom [in] posterum beneficio Optimi Principis certa possessio eis et sine lite continget."

[54] It is not surprising that Plutarch's friend L. Cassius Petraios, one of those praised in the above passage from *de Pyth. or.*, erected two statues of Trajan, the first after 102 on behalf of the Amphictyons, as epimelete, the second perhaps after 114, with his own money: *CID* 4. no. 149; *SIG*^{3} 825A–B. In the first, Trajan has the title *Dacicus*, in the second *Dacicus* and *Optimus* (*Aristos*). This Petraios, L. Cassius Petraios, from a distinguished Thessalian family of Hypata, was twice *agônothete* and *syndikos* of Pythian Apollo as well as epimelete of the Amphictyons (*SIG*^{3}, 825A–C, cf. Bowersock (1965); Pouilloux (1980a) 290–291; Puech (1992) 4867–8. His *agônothesiai* most probably were in 99 and 103.

[55] The passages are collected in Jones (1971) 25. The clearest criticism of Domitian is at *Publ.* 15.3–6, on the extravagance of the Domus Flavia. Plutarch never mentions the expulsion of philosophers from Rome in 92, or the executions of prominent senators, although Arulenus Rusticus at least had heard his lectures (*De cur.* 522 DE).

[56] On Plutarch's ambivalent attitude toward Domitian, reflected in the figures of Solon and Peisistratus, see Stadter (2003) 232–239. Plutarch's *Lives* often feature flawed

see Plutarch putting into practice the advice which he gave to young Menemachus, "one should always have a friend among the really powerful people up there…The Romans themselves are very keen to support their friends' political interests. One can also reap a fine harvest from the friendship of the great." Working closely with Romans at the highest level brought prosperity to Delphi. Third, Plutarch does not explicitly praise Romans, whether emperors, proconsuls, or visitors, for the favors they have done for Delphi. He speaks of Romans as friends, not patrons.[57] Fourth, he follows his own advice in not boasting about his achievements: he never takes credit for the services he has rendered, but praises the activity of his friends. Finally, despite the simple and apparently direct manner of his writing, understatement and indirection is a significant feature of his authorial personality. Frequently there is more in what he is saying than meets the eye.

Throughout his life Plutarch actively worked to build friendships with powerful Romans. Although there is no direct evidence, it appears that he used his friendships and his trips to Rome to win favors for Delphi: the archonship of Titus, the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo, the construction of new buildings in the sacred precinct, and Nigrinus' decision on the boundaries of the civic land. The presence and active participation of prominent Romans were essential to the fame and well-being of the sanctuary. Plutarch realized this and did everything he could to make Roman friends and to interest them and through them the emperors in the needs of the sanctuary.[58]

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heroes: see Stadter (2000). On how a philosopher should deal with powerful people, see his statements at *Ad princ. inerud.* 778B.

[57] He is also discreet, never mentioning any oracles sought or received by Roman imperial officials.

[58] *Pace* Swain (1991) 329–330, Plutarch at *De Pyth. or.* 409A–C considers the wealth and honor which flows to Delphi not as purely Hellenic, but universal. Plutarch's diplomacy renders much less surprising the late and garbled notices that Plutarch was given consular *ornamenta* and some kind of consultative role in the affairs of the province: Jones (1971) 29–30, questioned by Swain (1996) 171–172.

PLUTARCO, CIUDADANO GRIEGO Y SÚBDITO ROMANO

María de los Ángeles Durán López

Las circunstancias históricas en las que se desarrolla la vida de Plutarco no ofrecen, en principio, a los súbditos del imperio el margen de actuación política que nuestro autor hubiera podido desear: En esto podría verse un punto de analogía con su admirado Platón al que, según dice él mismo en la *Carta* VII, la decepción que le produjeron los distintos gobiernos que llevaron las riendas de Atenas y, según creo yo,[1] las circunstancias políticas y sociales de la etapa en la que vivió, le impidieron intentar siquiera intervenir en los asuntos políticos de su patria. Le quedó la vía de la reflexión sobre Política. Como es de sobra sabido, Platón se embarcó en la construcción de una utopía en cuyo marco, a la par que diseña la estructura de lo que concibe como ciudad ideal, va haciendo la crítica de las distintas formas del Estado históricamente conocidas.

Plutarco, en cambio, pudo intervenir en la actividad política que la sumisión de Grecia a Roma permitía: Al margen de las distintas funciones municipales de mayor o menor importancia que desempeñó en Queronea sabemos, en efecto, que fue, entre otras cosas, arconte epónimo[2] y *agoranomo*, lo vemos desempeñar funciones diplomáticas como enviado de su ciudad ante el procónsul romano de Acaya[3] y en Roma. No parece plantearse, en cambio, la necesidad de idear nuevos sistemas teóricos para ordenar la vida política, y de hecho, por más que intentemos justificarlo en el azar que sólo nos ha transmitido cuatro páginas del tratado en que podríamos esperar alguna reflexión personal sobre teoría política, el *Sobre la monarquía, la democracia y la aristocracia*, lo cierto es que la lectura del mismo produce cierta decepción, ya que se limita a resumir las ideas de Platón y Aristóteles.

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[1] En mi opinión, junto al factor subjetivo de la decepción mencionada por Platón, hay un factor objetivo en el desprestigio político que debió causar a su familia la significada actuación de sus parientes Critias y Cármides en el régimen de terror de los Treinta.

[2] *Quaest. Conv.* 642F y 693E–694A.

[3] *Praec.* 816C.

Plutarco se ve mejor en el papel de consejero. Esto puede inducirnos a evocar la función que Platón intentó desempeñar en Siracusa; pero, si vamos al modo de abordarla, veremos que el paralelismo es escaso. En efecto, el objetivo de Platón era convertir a Dionisio a sus ideas políticas y morales para que éste, en la medida de lo posible, hiciera realidad el proyecto que él no pudo llevar a la práctica en Atenas. Por el contrario, Plutarco no aspira a promover cambios radicales, sino a brindar a aquél a quien dirija sus consejos una serie de reflexiones, en mi opinión, tanto o más morales que políticas, sobre los motivos que deben presidir la elección de dedicarse a la vida pública, sobre el prioritario objetivo que debe orientar su conducta, el bien común, la armonía, la concordia y la unidad del Estado o, como apunta Jones,[4] de la clase dirigente. Esta actitud puede explicar por qué, incluso cuando toca temas políticos, nos parece seguir oyendo al director espiritual,[5] como nos ocurre a tantos al leer los tratados *A un príncipe ineducado* o *Sobre si debe un anciano ocuparse de los asuntos políticos*, por no mencionar el *Sobre el exilio*, carta consolatoria que, en realidad, es una plática sobre la virtud de *tlemosyne*. Lo mismo ocurre con la lectura de las *Vidas*, en las que los juicios sobre la práctica política no suelen cuestionar el sistema, sino los motivos que mueven al héroe a actuar como lo hace. El objetivo fundamental de las mismas puede resumirse en ofrecer ejemplos y contraejemplos de conducta que afectan a todas las coyunturas en las que se desenvuelve la vida del personaje: relaciones familiares, de amistad y vecindad, conducta como ciudadano, como militar o como político. Y es que, como dice J. Boulogne al comentar el principio de la *Vida de Alejandro*, "Ce qui l'intéresse c'est le comportement humain. L'orientation est donc clairement d'ordre éthique".[6] Precisando un poco más, podríamos decir que lo que le interesa es la ética del político.

En los *Preceptos políticos*, la obra de Plutarco más interesante desde este punto de vista, el polígrafo confirma la prioridad de la vertiente práctica, abiertamente admitida por el autor que, para evitar la censura que le merecen los filósofos, a quienes compara con los que espabilan las lámparas, pero no les echan aceite,[7] ya que animan a dedicarse

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[4] Jones (1971) 111.

[5] *Ibidem.*

[6] Boulogne (1994) 23.

[7] *Praec.* 798B. Sobre la política como modo de vida, véase *An seni* 791C. Sobre la controversia entre los partidarios de una filosofía práctica y los que defienden una reflexión dogmática, véase Carrière (1984) 4–5.

a la política sin proponer pautas concretas, acepta dar a Menémaco, el joven destinatario del tratado, lo que Platón negó a Dionisio, que también quería las soluciones sin la teoría.[8]

A pesar de ello, la vocación didáctica de Plutarco, que solemos considerar desde una vertiente exclusivamente moralizante, ha podido doblarse en algún momento de intenciones políticas veladamente propagandísticas. A esta conclusión ha llegado muy recientemente A. Pérez Jiménez, en un trabajo en el que aborda el nudo de contradicciones que se desprenden de la actitud de Plutarco, encendido admirador de los valores de la Democracia griega y de la República romana, pero abiertamente hostil a la intervención directa del pueblo, oportunamente degradado en *ochlos*. A la vez, Plutarco se nos muestra como un hombre que abomina de toda tiranía, pero que contemporiza con el Imperio.[9] Reflexionando sobre las características del poder ejercido por los emperadores que reinaron en esta época, Pérez Jiménez nos lleva a comprender la contribución de las *Vidas Paralelas* al ambiente propagandístico que rodea a Nerva y a Trajano; no obstante, esta contribución tiene un sesgo particular por cuanto pone el acento en los comportamientos de los que debe huir un político y en las virtudes y cualidades que deben encarnarse en un buen rey, que son, en buena medida, las que efectivamente encuentra Plutarco en Trajano. Sólo en muy contadas ocasiones es posible detectar una sutil recomendación directa, por ejemplo, la de compaginar las exigencias de la hegemonía romana con un trato liberal a los pueblos sometidos.[10]

A estas contradicciones podría agregarse alguna más, por ejemplo, la que se desprende del tema de la libertad de la patria, clamorosamente ausente en la relación de virtudes que, de acuerdo con Th. S. Schmidt, definen la *identidad griega* por oposición a los bárbaros en Plutarco,[11] cuando, como todos sabemos, la oposición libertad/ esclavitud era parámetro obligado en la oposición griegos/ bárbaros desde las Guerras Médicas y que el propio Plutarco no deja de celebrar, tanto en las *Vidas* como en los *Moralia* los muchos peligros que arrostraron tanto griegos como romanos por asegurarla. Me limitaré a mencionar en este sentido el homenaje que tributa al amor por la libertad de sus paisanos

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[8] Platón, *Epist.* VII.

[9] Pérez Jiménez, en prensa. Hemos tenido acceso al original por gentileza del autor.

[10] Pérez Jiménez, *loc. cit.*, sustenta esta recomendación como *desideratum* planteado al emperador por medio de la figura de Paulo Emilio.

[11] Schmidt (1999) 327.

con la doble narración, en la *Vida de Pelópidas* y en *El demonio de Sócrates* de cómo consiguieron los tebanos expulsar a la guarnición espartana que ocupaba su ciudad.

El entusiasmo que pone Plutarco en esta descripción, llena de vida y sentimiento, choca frontalmente con la amargura que rezuman los *Preceptos políticos* donde tras haber afirmado que los bienes más importantes de los que pueden gozar las ciudades son paz, libertad, prosperidad, población abundante y concordia, dice Plutarco que sólo esta última compete al político. En efecto, no debe preocuparse de la paz, porque ha desaparecido la guerra, ni de la prosperidad o la demografía, porque dependen de los dioses. En cuanto a la libertad, "tienen los pueblos tanta cuanta les conceden los que mandan, y, posiblemente, más no fuera mejor[12]". Aunque, como ha demostrado A. Caiazza, esta expresión sea un eco de la opinión dominante en el imperio romano que, ante la imposibilidad de restaurar la antigua república, acepta el imperio como mal menor,[13] creo que se tiñe de especial amargura en Plutarco; me da, incluso, la impresión de que, al recogerla, pretende, en un ejercicio de autocensura, corregir la mención a la libertad entre los bienes mayores, mención que algunos de sus lectores romanos podrían estimar impertinente.

La nueva situación,[14] que dura ya un par de siglos, ha restringido la libertad de los griegos a los temas municipales y, aún ésta, es una libertad que unos emperadores otorgan y otros niegan y que, incluso cuando se concede, sigue supeditada a la intervención de las autoridades romanas; éstas, que actúan por sí mismas en casos de disturbios, intervienen otras veces a petición de los propios ciudadanos griegos para que los romanos diriman las diferencias internas de los helenos. Por eso Plutarco no deja de amonestar a sus compatriotas sobre la necesidad de evitar las pequeñas disensiones, en las que ve el germen de los grandes tumultos y revueltas, como ejemplifica con la sublevación de Pardalas contra los romanos, que fue contundentemente reprimida.[15] El mismo énfasis pone en advertir que el político griego no debe someter a los delegados del Imperio la autorización para cualquier actividad, obligándolos a intervenir más de lo que quisieran. En

[12] *Praec.* 824C.

[13] Caiazza (1993) 285, n. 417, quien trae a colación las palabras de Galba en Tácito, *Hist.* I 16, 4: "… imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam seruitutem pati possunt nec totam libertatem".

[14] Cf. *Praec.* 813E. Este cambio es un tema recurrente en Plutarco.

[15] *Praec.* 813F y 825C–D.

este momento Plutarco deja que afloren sus más profundos sentimientos: En esta única ocasión describe la situación de los griegos como una esclavitud que agravan los pusilánimes o aduladores que no dan un paso sin el permiso expreso de los amos, ya que "además de las cadenas que le sujetan el pie, le agregan otra al cuello".

Hay, pues, una situación de hecho que no es posible alterar. No es posible hoy sacudirse el yugo como hicieron antaño los antepasados de los tebanos con la guarnición espartana. Un verso de las *Traquinias*

> Estos no son campos de batalla[16]

Sirve para sintetizar la renuncia a emular las grandes gestas del pasado; todo intento de insurrección está condenado al fracaso, como le ocurrió a Pardalas en Lidia y a otros más en distintos lugares, que fueron ejecutados o exiliados, y cuyas intentonas, en vez de recuperar la libertad de la patria, agravaron su subordinación.[17] Queden, pues, para las escuelas de sofistas los encendidos encomios a Maratón, Eurimedonte y Platea, que llenan de orgullo retrospectivo a la gente. Más aún, renegando por un momento de su propio proceder en su actividad biográfica y en muchos pasajes de los *Tratados morales y de costumbres*, Plutarco llega a recomendar que, en vez de celebrar los antiguos hechos de armas, se le pongan al pueblo los modelos de la amnistía promulgada tras la caída del régimen de los Treinta, la multa impuesta a Frínico por haber representado en una tragedia la toma de Mileto, etc., con los que se le irá formando el carácter e inculcando *sophrosynê*.[18] Las actividades que actualmente constituyen un timbre de gloria para el político son de otro tipo: la buena gestión de la ciudad, las medidas que propician concordia y armonía, el poner a contribución para estos fines el recurso a amigos, especialmente a los que el político debe tener en las altas esfera del poder en Roma.[19]

Por estas reflexiones Plutarco ha podido dar la impresión de formar parte de la *quinta columna* de Roma en Grecia. En mi opinión, en cambio, hay en ellas mucho de dolorosa renuncia, de resignación. La situación actual, que no es concebida como un castigo a los pecados de generaciones anteriores, sino como una consecuencia del ciclo de la Historia, no permite otra cosa. En vez de amargarnos por la ausencia de lo que, hoy por hoy, es un imposible, practiquemos pensamiento

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16 Sófocles, *Tra.* 1058.
17 *Praec.* 814A.
18 *Praec.* 814B.
19 *Praec.* 814C–E.

positivo: la situación actual también tiene su lado bueno que, para Plutarco, se cifra, sobre todo, en la paz duradera que Grecia disfruta. De sobra conocidos son sus reiterados elogios a la *Pax Romana* que viene ahorrando a los griegos los horrores de la guerra y prodigando sus bienes.[20] La *Pax Augusta* podría ser reflejo en lo cotidiano de la añorada Edad de Cronos si no hubiera una sombra en tan idílico cuadro, la exclusión de la libertad, que pesa en la advertencia que Plutarco dirige a Menémaco

> Al acceder a un cargo es menester que el político no sólo ponga en práctica las recomendaciones que Pericles rememoraba mientras se ajustaba la clámide: "Ten esto presente, Pericles, mandas sobre hombres libres, mandas sobre griegos, mandas sobre ciudadanos atenienses", sino que también debe decirse esto otro: " Mandas obedeciendo, porque la ciudad está sometida a los procónsules delegados de César"… No… debe el político… confiar ufano en su corona, cuando está viendo sobre su cabeza el *calceum*, sino imitar a los actores, que, aún poniendo en la interpretación sus propios sentimientos, su carácter y prestigio, atienden al apuntador y no sobrepasan en los ritmos y metros el margen concedido por los que los dirigen…

Se deduce sin dificultad que, incluso sin especiales ingerencias por parte de las autoridades imperiales, los políticos griegos son, en lo fundamental, subalternos del César. Más positivo es, en general, el cuadro si de la *Libertad* pasamos a las *libertades*, esto es, si, dejando a un lado la libertad del Estado, nos centramos en las del individuo. Recordemos, por ejemplo, ese conocido pasaje del *De tranquilitate* en el que Plutarco afirma

> Los que quieran pueden dedicarse a cultivar el campo o recorrer sin temor el mar: puede uno hablar, actuar, callarse o disfrutar del ocio.[21]

Admitido que, como ha visto Boulogne, este ocio incluye la dedicación a la filosofía,[22] el optimismo de Plutarco con respecto a esta libertad puede explicarse por la fecha del tratado, que suele datarse en el año 90, porque poco después tuvo ocasión de constatar que las autoridades romanas no siempre vieron con buenos ojos a los filósofos. El propio Plutarco pudo ser testigo de las condenas a muerte o al exilio que Domiciano impuso a los seguidores de Trasea, un grupo en el que Plutarco tenía conocidos y amigos, y de la expulsión de Roma y de

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20 *Praec.* 824C; *An seni* 784F; *De Pyth. Orac.* 408C–D; *De foro. Rom.* 317C.
21 *De tranq. an.* 469E.
22 Boulogne (1994) 38–39.

Italia que dictó contra los filósofos.[23] No sabemos si Plutarco había regresado ya a Queronea, como sostiene R. Flacelière,[24] o si se libró de la expulsión y demás dificultades gracias a la protección de sus amigos bien situados, para regresar voluntariamente poco después, de acuerdo con la sugerencia de C.P. Jones.[25] Y no cabe pensar que las cortapisas a la actividad de los filósofos afectaran exclusivamente a Italia, porque el mismo Jones encuentra una de las razones que pueden justificar la escasa producción escrita de Plutarco en la época de los Flavios en el riesgo de que el texto más inocente pudiera ser considerado un ataque al emperador.

Este es el contexto en el que me he planteado la pregunta: ¿cómo vivió Plutarco su doble condición de ciudadano griego y súbdito del Imperio romano?

Plutarco es y se siente, ante todo, ciudadano de su querida Queronea, ciudad "pequeña y pobre[26]", que se complace en mencionar, especialmente para recordar sus gestas militares. Plutarco es y se siente beocio se presume que pudo ser nombrado beotarca[27] y no pierde ocasión de celebrar su tierra. Así, por lavar la honra de sus antepasados, acusados por el historiador de ser *philobarbaroi*, escribió su tratado *Sobre la malignidad de Heródoto*. Plutarco es y se siente griego. Su defensa de los valores griegos es perceptible en todo momento,[28] y de un modo particular en las *Vidas Paralelas*, no sólo por comparar griegos y romanos, sino, sobre todo, porque la escala de valores conforme a la cual son juzgados todos, es griega. Al margen de los ejemplos de conductas concretas que suministran las *Vidas*, los valores de la Hélade se concentran en el sentir de Plutarco en dos polos, Atenas como foco cultural y filosófico y Delfos como centro religioso en el que Plutarco asienta su modo personal de sincretismo religioso,

En Atenas recibió la ciudadanía; en Delfos, además de recibir la ciudadanía, fue honrado con diferentes cargos, especialmente con el de sacerdote de Apolo Pítico. Roma, por su parte, le concedió la ciudadanía y honores consulares. No da, sin embargo, la impresión, en ningún momento, de que Plutarco se sintiera romano; no parece

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[23] Cf. Jones (1971) 24–25.
[24] Flacelière (1987).
[25] *Ibidem.*
[26] *Dem.* 2. 2 y *Cim.* 1. 3.
[27] Cf. Flacelière (1987) XXXIX.
[28] Cf., por ejemplo, *De Alex. fort.* Alejandro es el hombre más grande que haya conocido el mundo.

que se haya integrado en ese mundo que parece considerado desde la alteridad incluso cuando reconoce su superioridad o su perfecta organización. Tampoco manifiesta aversión o inquina, porque, para Plutarco, el otro no es necesariamente un enemigo.

Su actitud frente a Atenas y frente a Roma puede ser exponente de sus sentimientos como súbdito del Imperio. Por lo que respecta al pasado, puede hablarse de similitud: en ambos casos Plutarco elogia todo lo elogiable y, como buen moralista, censura lo que estima reprobable. Las disparidades afloran cuando trata de la Roma actual y de la Atenas actual. Por ésta muestra todo el afecto que tiene por la ciudad en la que vivió sus años de estudiante, en la que tiene muchos amigos y a la que viaja con frecuencia. La describe como una ciudad del mayor nivel cultural,[29] en la que asiste a fiestas[30] y *symposia* en los que se discute de toda clase de temas. Conoce los defectos de los atenienses[31] y aprecia sus virtudes, en particular, su humanidad y bondad.[32] La impresión que nos dejan los pasajes en los que Plutarco habla de la Atenas actual es de amistad y afecto, de la familiaridad que sustenta un trato de tú a tú.

Con respecto a Roma, ciudad en la que estuvo por lo menos dos veces, sabemos que contó en ella con numerosos amigos, que parece bien recibido y que la elite asiste a sus conferencias; pero no por ello deja de dar la impresión de sentirse como un invitado extranjero que no debe entrometerse en los asuntos de sus anfitriones. Elogia sinceramente sus cualidades y muchas de sus realizaciones, pero también critica abiertamente algunas de sus instituciones culturales como los combates de gladiadores, el trato dado a los esclavos o la divinización del emperador en vida. Jones ha mostrado que estas críticas son comunes no sólo a otros autores griegos de la época, sino también a la elite intelectual romana, viendo en esta coincidencia la primera manifestación de un nuevo ideal cultural en el que los hombres educados se puedan definir como grecorromanos,[33] idea que en términos más o menos próximos es recurrente en la mayoría de los autores que en nuestros tiempos se han ocupado de las relaciones de Plutarco con Roma. Esta conclusión es indiscutible en lo cultural, pero, tal vez requiera alguna puntualización en lo político.

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[29] Cf. *Quaest. Conv.* 720C y *De E* 384D–E.
[30] *Quaest. Conv.* 628A.
[31] *Praec.* 799C.
[32] *Cf. Arist.* 27. 7 y *De sera* 559B.
[33] Jones (1971) 122–130.

Volvamos al tema de la Libertad. De lo que hemos visto podemos deducir que Plutarco ha planteado en los *Preceptos Políticos* Paz y Libertad como términos antitéticos: en su glorioso pasado Grecia gozaba de esta última, pero las guerras eran constantes; actualmente disfruta de los beneficios de la paz, pero es al precio de su libertad. ¿Será posible una síntesis que las preserve a ambas? La Historia contesta afirmativamente al mostrarnos esa síntesis en la extensión de la ciudadanía romana a todos los hombres libres del Imperio. El proceso fue lento y Plutarco vive en un momento en el que todavía Roma otorgaba su ciudadanía a cuentagotas, distinguiendo con tal honor a los miembros de las familias más importantes. Según parece fue Caracalla el que, un siglo después de la muerte de Plutarco, adoptó esa trascendente medida pensando al dictar esta disposición en aplicaciones fiscales. Como si intuyera ese futuro en que paz, unidad y libertad pudieran afirmarse a la vez y contra las recomendaciones que hizo a Menémaco, Plutarco contribuyó a mantener vivos en sus lectores la idea y el sentimiento de que la libertad es uno de los bienes mayores. Esto es lo que me lleva a pensar que Plutarco hubiera podido suscribir, por lo menos, el principio del largo y famoso poema de L. Aragon

Sur mes cahiers d'écolier,
J'écris ton nom.
Sur toutes mes pages lues,
Sur toutes mes pages blanches,
J'écris ton nom.

Y el final

Car je suis né pour te nommer,
Liberté.

"DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE?": PLUTARCH AND PAUSANIAS AT DELPHI

Jeremy McInerney

Around 92 AD, Plutarch made the smartest move of his career: he quit Rome. The mood in the imperial capital was becoming unsettled, and affairs would come to a head with the assassination of the emperor Domitian in 96. Plutarch apparently felt that the time was right to trade the excitement of Rome for a place more conducive to philosophy and reflection. He was offered the priesthood of Apollo by the people of Delphi, and he returned to central Greece. The local lad from Chaironeia who had become a successful intellectual and friend of emperors was going home. For the next thirty years Plutarch would serve the god at Delphi faithfully and loyally, never tiring of his position. In his essay, *An seni respublica gerenda sit* (= *Moralia* 792F), he writes: "You know I've served Apollo for many years, but you won't hear me say, 'Plutarch, you have had enough sacrifices, enough processions, enough choirs.'" Plutarch loved Delphi, and unlike Pausanias, whose description of the site has all the hallmarks of a tourist's hasty visit, Plutarch knew every stone, every inscription and every dedication as well as the back of his own hand.

Delphi was no backwater in Plutarch's day. One hundred years before Plutarch's time, Strabo could describe Delphi as rich in monuments but poor in silver.[1] But the first century AD was a time of prosperity, and the sanctuary had benefitted from the largesse of emperors such as Nero and Domitian, who paid for renovations on the temple and visited in 84. The time of Plutarch's return coincided with an period of unparalleled prosperity, linked to the Pythia's accuracy:

> The Pythia's words, going straight to the truth, pass every test, and have never yet proved false when examined. They have filled the shrine with the richest offerings, Greek and barbarian, and adorned it with fine

[1] Strabo 9.3.8. I wish to thank the organizers of the Sixth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society for their tireless work, and the participants at Nijmegen who made helpful suggestions for the improvement of this paper. A second version of the paper was read to the Classics Department at Swarthmore College, and I thank the faculty and students there for their comments. My thanks also go to Ineke Sluiter for discussing with me her work on memory in the Second Sophistic.

> buildings and Amphiktyonic possessions. You yourselves can see many structures where there were none before, while many that were in ruin have recently been restored. Just as others grow next to healthy trees, so too, Pylaia is just as flourishing and properous as Delphi. Thanks to the wealth here she has not looked so lovely in a thousand years.
>
> (Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 408F–409A)

Delphi's prosperity coincided with a very productive phase in Plutarch's own writing. It is to this time in the late first and early second century that we can date his so-called Pythian Logoi, three essays set at Delphi. They are charming pieces, reflecting Plutarch's thought at its most humane and sympathetic. Delphi is especially appropriate as a setting for these particular essays because each advocates a marriage of theology and philosophy, and it was at Delphi that Plutarch himself combined the roles of philosopher and priest. Yet Delphi is more than just a convenient setting for Plutarch's philosophical musings. In Plutarch's writings Delphi serves as a monumental evocation of cultural memory, a place reverberating with multiple meanings. It is a place where past and present meet, where Greece and Rome face each other, and where hegemony is redefined in terms entirely favorable to the Greeks. In this paper I propose to argue that in Plutarch's work the natural and human landscapes of Delphi are used to give substance to a new definition of Greek culture.

This redefinition of Delphi begins in the introductory chapters in *De E apud Delphos* when Plutarch speaks of sending his Pythian Logoi to Sarapion in Athens as *aparchai*, first fruits. The passage reads as follows:

> So I am sending to you, and through you to our friends there (*i.e.*, in Athens), some of my Pythian Essays (*Pythikoi logoi*), like first-fruits (*aparchai*), but I must confess that I am expecting many better essays from you, since you of course have all the resources of a great city at your disposal and enjoy greater leisure amid all those books and all that philosophical discussion. (Plutarch, *De E apud Delphos* 384E)

Now, as any educated reader will know, the most famous *aparchai* received in Athens were taken from the *phoros*, or tribute, submitted by Athens' allies. Plutarch's language evokes memories of Athens in the 5th century. By this formulation Delphi would be subordinate to Athens, where, Plutarch says, his friends can enjoy all the advantages of a great city. These are not measured by imports or tribute but in books and discussions. So the university town of the late 1st century is a match for Athens in its imperial heyday. But then the discussion immediately shifts

to Apollo's role in stimulating philosophical inquiry. In those terms, of course, Delphi can claim a status that far exceeds that of Athens, since all of Delphi is sacred to Apollo and all discussions that take place here are infused with the god's presence. Athens drops out of the picture and we find ourselves firmly located in the god's sanctuary. Delphi's numinous present is more than a match for Athens' glorious past.

Imitating Plato, Plutarch casts the dialogue as the report of a conversation that took place years earlier when Nero visited, but it is not the presence of a Roman emperor that prompts either the earlier conversation or his recent recollection:

> So, sitting them down by the temple, I began to inquire, and asked them questions; thanks to the place and their responses, I recalled some things which I had heard on another occasion many years earlier, when Nero was here, and Ammonios and some others were talking, and the exact same question had arisen. (Plutarch, *De E apud Delphos* 385B)

It is the place itself, says Plutarch, along with questions posed and answers given that cause him to recall the conversation with Ammonios he had witnessed years earlier. Plutarch's language is deliberate: references to inquiries and responses, and a spot that inspires utterance, unmistakably evoke images of consulting the oracle of Apollo. Plutarch is functioning not just as a philosopher, but also as a suppliant, making inquiries and receiving answers, and, by now recalling that episode and putting it into words he is behaving somewhat like the Pythia, or at least as the priest of Apollo should, recalling utterances inspired by the god in his holy sanctuary, and reporting them, just as the *prophêtês* would report the words of the Pythia. But the substance of what he reports is not an enigmatic oracle. Rather, it is a philosophical discussion about enigmata. The role of priest and the role of philosopher are elided. This is a tremendously important move on Plutarch's part, because it means that all the philosophy that follows is imbued with an aura of sanctity. Or, put another way, philosophical enquiry becomes a holy and venerable activity.

This merging of philosophy and religion takes place in a disquisition on the meaning of the famous E at Delphi. The E was a dedication, the exact form of which is unclear to us, and the exact meaning of which was opaque to Plutarch's contemporaries. It was and is an enigma, a suitable topic for Plutarch who saw enigmata as challenges posed by god to mortals. Enigmata, in fact, allow the differences between philosophy and religion to be elided. Plutarch works his way through a whole battery of explanations for the meaning of the E—it's a refer-

ence to the five wise men, it's a Chaldean code for the planets, it's a Pythagorean metaphor for perfection, it stands for the optative, it really means "if", the word used by inquirers, and so on. Finally, standing all these readings on their head, Plutarch brilliantly contrasts them with the absolute unity of the god's essence, conveyed by what could be called the ontological E, *εἶ* ("You are"). Philosophy as exemplified in this *logos* becomes a discourse that begins with the contemplation of an enigma—what is the E—and by the application of rational thought leads the reader towards an appreciation of the complete unity of the universe.

Delphi is crucial to Plutarch's philosophy for two reasons: the specificity of Delphi's location and the power of its monuments. The first of these is, of course, an element of Delphi's propaganda going well back to the Archaic period. Apollo's flight from Delos, his slaying of the dragon, his guiding of the Cretan priests right to the shores of the Krisaian Gulf below Delphi, are all part of a long tradition that transformed a local cult in the foothills of Parnassos into a Panhellenic shrine. But Plutarch is a vigorous proponent of an even more dramatic claim regarding Delphi's location, namely, that it is the centre of the world. In the opening of *De defectu oraculorum* Plutarch makes reference to the many stories of eagles flying from opposite ends of the earth and meeting at Delphi. He then uses a modified version of the same story to introduce the interlocutors in the *logos*:

> Not long ago, just before the Pythian Festival in the archonship of Kallistratos, in our own day, it so happened that two holy men came to Delphi from opposite ends of the inhabited world. Demetrios the Grammarian was coming home to Tarsos from Britain, while Kleombrotos of Sparta had travelled a good deal in Egypt and through the land of the Troglodytes, after having sailed even beyond the Red Sea.
> (Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 410A)

These high-flying philosophers have come from what Plutarch calls the opposite ends of the *oikoumenê*, the borders of which are suspiciously close to those of the Roman empire. But there is no mention here of *imperium* or *archê*, *provinciae* or governors. The *oikoumenê* is the world of the Roman Empire reconfigured as a Greek cultural zone, its borders defined by the expeditions of philosophers, not legions, and its centre located at a venerable Greek shrine, not Rome.

The theme of this dialogue is the supposed decline of oracles. At the heart of the inquiry is the question, why have oracles declined? The answers proposed in the dialogue all draw attention to the physical

decline of Greece under the Romans. At Ptoon, once a flourishing sanctuary of Apollo, one is now likely to run into a solitary shepherd, a sure sign that the area is now a wasteland.[2] It is one thing to see the contemporary world of Roman Greece as inferior to the past, but Plutarch is faced with the dilemma of explaining the concomitant decline in religious activity without disparaging the gods. To do this, he posits a middle layer between gods and men: *daimones* or demigods. They interact with the world and when they forsake sanctuaries oracles fall silent. God arranges prophesy, but oracles are subject to the same general decay as the rest of the material world. As Sophocles says, "Gods' works die, though they do not."[3] This may be enough to save Plutarch's piety but it does not satisfy a skeptical Ammonios. When pressed Plutarch turns from *daimones* to the earth itself to explain how prophecy works:

> The earth, what is more, sends out many other streams of power that affect mankind. Some are harmful, bringing madness, sickness and death, others are good, kindly, and beneficial. They become apparent to us when we happen to come upon them. The prophetic stream and spirit is the holiest and most divine, whether it comes by itself through the air or is mixed with a stream of water. When it is combined with the body, it creates a mixture that is unfamiliar to the soul, and peculiar, the exact nature of which is difficult to explain clearly…
>
> (Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 432D–E)

The trouble with this explanation is that it takes us so far from the traditional gods that it threatens to make the procedural side of the oracle appear to be no more than so much mumbo-jumbo. After all, if it is just gas and possession then any one could be Pythia. Was Koretas, the original enthusiast, any different from any other shepherd? The answer to this takes us to the heart of Plutarch's argument. Plutarch postulates that any inquiry into first causes threatens to miss the specific conditions and causes that distinguish one phenomenon from another. For example, if you are trying to explain Polygnotos' painting, or the famous mixing bowl of Herodotus, you can inquire into the mixing of paints or the forging of metal, but such inquiries will not explain these particular masterpieces. This is because, according to Plutarch, there are two general causes of coming into being: first causes, and necessary or natural causes. In such a scheme, Delphi is a unique location. It

[2] Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 414A (Ptoon) and 414C (shepherds as indicators of wasteland).

[3] Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 414D. See Nauck, *TGF s.v.* Sophocles 766.

is the place where the earth and the gods join to provide oracular guidance. Put another way, the place itself is a first cause of oracular activity.

But there are other oracles, and other places where heaven and earth meet: the cave of Trophonios, the oak tree at Dodona, the sacred pool at Klaros. What makes Delphi different and what is specific to Delphi is the human articulation of the sanctuary, the human environment that grows up precisely here around this one prophetic stream: temple, altar, Pythia, Lesche, paintings, dedications and treasures. Furthermore, the procedures of the sanctuary become the means by which humans connect with this world of first causes. We sprinkle the victim so as to get a sign, to open the lines of communication with god. It is our way of setting up a system that allows us to connect with the primal forces of earth and heaven. In such a setting the Pythia is a key figure, since it is she who must be possessed by and endure the god. But because the human environment at Delphi, notably its monuments, is our link with the sacred landscape, the very monuments of Delphi share in its holiness. Plutarch makes this point over and over as he leads his guests up the Sacred Way pointing out many miraculous events, all tied to objects: the statue of the tyrant Hiero, that had fallen over on the day of the tyrant's death, the eyes that fell out of a Spartan statue before Leuktra, the disappearance of Lysander's stars and the appearance of rough vegetation on his statue's face, gold dates falling off the Palm Tree at the time of the Athenian disaster in Sicily and the death of the dancing girl Pharsalia because of a crowd rushing to grab the crown she was wearing, a gift to her from Philomelos when he plundered the sanctuary. These episodes lead Plutarch to contend that the dedications at Delphi share in the god's spirit:

> Aristotle used to say that only Homer could compose poetry in which the words moved thanks to their energy. I would have to say that among dedications, too, the ones made here also can move and giving signs in accordance with the god's foreknowledge; no part of them is empty or senseless; rather, all are full of the divine.
>
> (Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 398A)

One might add that these episodes often presage the collapse of empires, a point that Plutarch may have wisely chosen not to underscore to his contemporary audience. It is also notable that all these dedications were made centuries earlier. If Delphi is to serve as the centre for a Greek culture that is worthy of parity with Rome's power it is a Delphi in which the deep past is vividly present.

Given the importance of Delphi to Plutarch's programme, and indeed to his own experience, it is striking that the archaeological record at Delphi does not at all fit Plutarch's descriptions of the site. In the early second century Delphi was adorned with hundreds if not thousands of major dedications, yet Plutarch systematically ignores these in favour of classical structures. In fact, in the immediate vicinity of the temple and the Lesche of the Knidians, various Hellenistic kings and Roman dignitaries had erected monuments that often replaced earlier Greek dedications as they jostled for space in the area Daux called the *topos epiphanestatos*.[4] The early excavator of this section of the sanctuary, Bourguet, remarks: "Toute la terrace devant le façade du Temple a été peuplée dès le debut de l'époque romaine, puis sous les empereurs, de statues pour lesquelles on ne s'est pas toujours contenté de faire de la place en serrant les piédestaux les uns contres les autres. En cette région, plus qu'en aucune de celles que nous avons parcourues, les monuments de l'époque romaine et impériale ont chassé ceux qui y existaient antérieurement."[5] By "l'époque romaine" Bourguet means the second and first centuries BC, covering the age of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus, but his remarks also pertain to monuments erected by Hellenistic rulers such as Prusias of Bithynia, and Eumenes of Pergamon, as well as the large pillar monument erected by a Roman emperor (probably Nero or Domitian) at the eastern end of the temple. These men carved out their prime locations at the expense of some of the very Amphictyonic monuments whose restoration was celebrated by Plutarch.

Furthermore, Plutarch ignores conspicuous earlier dedications by monarchs such as Alexander I of Macedon, and makes no mention of such famous dedications as the shield and crown offered by Flamininus in thanks for his victory at Cynoscephalae, the equestrian statue put up by the Delphians in honour of Flamininus, or the gold statue put up by Perseus.[6] Plutarch was certainly aware of these since it is his *Vitae* of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus that supply some of our best evidence for these dedications.[7] It is possible that some of the

[4] Daux (1936) 159–162.

[5] Bourguet (1914) 206.

[6] On Alexander I of Macedon at Delphi, see Miller (2000) 265. On the dedications of (and to) Flamininus and Perseus, see Miller (2000) 279.

[7] Plutarch, *Flamininus* 12.6–7 (Flamininus' shield and crown); Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 28.4 (Perseus' gold statue, but see also Livy 45.27.7 for multiple dedications by Perseus); for the equestrian statue of Flamininus see *FD* III 4, 244.

second century dedications by Hellenistic kings had been appropriated by Sulla, but their pillar-bases were certainly still there, as were the imperial dedications. Yet despite his knowledge of the Hellenistic and Roman monuments on the temple terrace, none figure in Plutarch's topography. This is all the more remarkable since Plutarch goes out of his way in *De defectu oraculorum* to connect the philosophers' conversion to their surroundings. They travel up the Sacred Way, past the Temple and on to the Lesche of the Knidians.[8] The monuments they pass, therefore, as they discuss the decline of oracles, are the Roman and Hellenistic ones located close to the altar and temple.

Consistent with this systematic exclusion of the recent past, when Plutarch does refer explicitly to the big men of the post-classical period who consulted the oracle, his remarks are scathing. In explaining the vagueness of oracular language Plutarch says that the oracle had to protect itself when powerful cities, kings and ambitious tyrants consulted it:

> I wouldn't be surprised if in former days there had been a need for some ambiguity and obfuscation, because it wasn't just anybody going down to inquire about buying a slave or some business matter. No, it was very powerful cities and kings and tyrants full of ambitious plans who used to consult the god. It was scarcely to the advantage of those running the oracle to annoy or provoke such people by having them hear things that they didn't want to hear… (Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 407D)

Plutarch goes on to explain that, in order to protect those in his service, the god took pains to deflect the less unattractive aspects of the truth by using poetry to distort his meaning. "There were, of course, things that it would be better a tyrant did not know," according to Plutarch (407D). Knowledge that could help the impious he concealed by means of allegories and ambiguities. If the men who consulted Delphi were unworthy of the oracle, then it goes without saying that their dedications could hardly be thought to enhance the sanctuary, no matter how valuable they were as mere objects. This is more explicitly stated when Sarapion draws attention to the statue of Mnesarete, or Phryne, the mistress of Praxiteles. Her statue is to be found, as Sarapion says, "among the generals and kings."[9] Plutarch has just told us that the speakers had passed the house of the Akanthians and Brasidas, and the

[8] Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 412D.

[9] Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 401A: "Look up there and see golden Mnesarete amid the generals and kings."

next stop on their itinerary will be by the south side of the temple, so we are clearly in the immediate vicinity of the east end of the temple terrace. The generals and kings, then, are those commemorated on the Hellenistic and Roman monuments clustered around the temple's east porch. It is hardly complimentary, then, when Theon defends Phryne's inclusion in such rarified company saying that Praxiteles should have been commended, instead of criticised, for putting Phryne here:

> Krates should have praised Praxiteles because next to these golden kings he erected a golden whore, thereby reproaching their wealth as worthless and unholy. The dedications of kings and rulers to the god should be offerings of justice and moderation and a generous heart, not monuments to the conspicuous consumption typical of the way of life of the worst sort of people. (Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 401D)

When it comes to charging the Greeks with disgraceful conduct, for making dedications that commemorate victories over other Greeks, Plutarch is quite specific: "The Phokians from the Thessalians", "The Amphiktyons from the Phokians" and so forth, but there is a studious silence when it comes to the Hellenistic and Roman dedications. Plutarch resists naming specific monuments, relying instead on a blanket condemnation. The Pythian *logoi*, in fact, excise Delphi's recent past, quite an accomplishment since there were physical reminders of that past all over the sanctuary. Plutarch is often seen as unusually accommodating towards Rome, but that accommodation stopped at the doors of Apollo's sanctuary.

A similar attitude towards the Roman presence at Delphi can be seen in Pausanias' description of the sanctuary of Apollo. When Pausanias visited Delphi in the second century AD he saw the sanctuary in much the same state as it must have appeared to Plutarch. Like Plutarch, Pausanias managed to expunge the Roman presence from Delphi almost entirely. He names 77 separate dedications and offerings at Delphi, and not one of them is Roman. Arafat has noted that Pausanias only mentions ten Roman dedications in the entire work.[10] In fact he may have actively suppressed mention of some, because he states explicitly, "We know of no Roman before Mummius whether private person or senator, who dedicated an offering in a Greek sanctuary", but Mummius dedicated a bronze Zeus in Olympia from the spoils of Achaea in 146 BC.[11] Yet, as we have seen, immediately in front of the

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[10] Arafat (1996) 211.
[11] Pausanias 5.24.4.

temple of Apollo at Delphi stood the Aemilius Paullus monument, a pillar originally erected by Perseus and rededicated by Aemilius Paullus after his victory at Pydna in 168 BC. Furthermore, Plutarch says of T. Flamininus, Manius Acilius and Aemilius Paullus that "they had not only kept their hands off the sanctuaries of the Greeks but had given them gifts and added a great deal to their reputation and sanctity."[12] It is very clear from Pausanias' text that he walked right past the Roman monuments. His silence on these dedications contrasts with the almost manic detail of his description of Greek dedications in the vicinity of the altar: the wolf of the Delphians, the statue of Phryne, two Apollo statues, the Plataean ox, two new Apollos, statues of Aetolian generals from the time of the Gallic invasions, Pheraian cavalry statues, plus nine other separate dedications.[13] It is undeniable, therefore, that, like Plutarch, Pausanias simply filtered out those periods of the past that did not evoke the days of Greece's independence. As Chr. Habicht has noted, Pausanias rarely mentions any art work or monument more recent than the mid 3rd century BC, the very time when Delphi came under the direct control of outside powers such as the Aetolians and Macedonians.[14]

There are other correspondences between Plutarch and Pausanias suggesting that both exemplify a crystallizing of cultural memory. For example, although he appears to have begun his project as a skeptic, Pausanias came round to a point of view concerning the enigmatic stories of the past that Plutarch would have thoroughly endorsed. Discussing the story of Rhea and Poseidon, he remarks,

> As for these stories of the Greeks, when I began my work I regarded them as full of nonsense, but now that I have reached the Arkadian material I have begun to think about them this way: in the olden days those of the Greeks who were considered wise spoke in enigmas, and did not offer straightforward explanations, and so I think that this story about Kronos is a piece of Greek wisdom. (Pausanias 8.8.3)

He doesn't attempt to explain what this bit of philosophy might be, but the land itself—here Arkadia, the most ancient part of Greece—has persuaded this Greek who is not from Greece that ancient lore is wisdom. In other words, the power of antiquity continues to operate in the present. As with Plutarch, the landscape exists both in space

[12] Plutarch, *Sulla* 12.6.
[13] On the itinerary through here see Amandry (1992) 178 n. 4.
[14] Habicht (1998) 7.

and in time, and provides meaning to the traveller who, by crossing the landscape, connects to the stories that take him into the past. For Pausanias this is especially important because it is the location of meaning in the landscape that distinguishes periegetic literature from travelogue. Pausanias' work does not include either Macedon, Aitolia, Epiros, the islands of the Aegean or the Greek cities of the coast of Asia Minor. It begins in Attica and ends in central Greece, a grand tour, full of digressions, from Athens to Delphi. In short, Pausanias' journey is from the political centre of what was once independent Greece to the religious centre of what is eternal Greece. In effect, both Plutarch and Pausanias merge the glorious past with a timeless present.

With Delphi cut off from the usual flow of time it is also released from the inevitable decline that time brings. Pausanias shares with Plutarch the commonplace sentiment that "the affairs of men are transient and frail."[15] Mycenae, Nineveh and Boeotian Thebes have all fallen into decline. Even Delos is no more than an outdoor museum guarded by a few Athenian officers. On the other hand Alexandria and Seleukia on the Orontes, "founded but yesterday" have risen to prominence, illustrating the way Fortune now levels now elevates. The theme, *sic transit gloria mundi* hardly makes for a unique connection between Plutarch and Pausanias, but both writers appear to exempt Delphi from the process of inevitable decline. For Plutarch it is a holy spot where the god makes his presence felt, and for Pausanias it is the living centre of a venerable Greece. In both cases the impact of Hellenistic and Roman times is inconsequential.

The most obvious way of explaining the peculiarities of these accounts would be to assert that the authors are writing Rome out of the picture as a way of protesting the Roman domination of Greece. Certainly Pausanias was no fan of Sulla or Nero, but by the same token he readily acknowledged the generous benefactions of Hadrian. In Plutarch's case, it is simply not possible to make the case that he despised Rome, and so in neither case can we rely on an explanation as simple or banal as a Greek resistance to the Roman presence. Instead the past is being divided into discrete phases, corresponding to the different treatments of the past identified in Assman's work on cultural memory. In Assman's formulation oral societies employ the memory of the past in three registers: the distant past, which is remembered in

[15] Pausanias 8.33.4.

detail (if not accurately), the recent past, which is also relatively accessible, and an intermediate stage, the floating past, which is both contested and unclear.[16] Pausanias' awareness of the past splits into three such registers: the deep past, rich in detail and myth, embedded in the rituals and holy places of the entire Greek countryside, brought vividly alive for him by his travels; the contemporary world, of Greece under Roman control, stretching from the time of Hadrian to Marcus Aurelius, a time of renewal, best illustrated by Hadrian's building programme in Athens; and in between, corresponding to Assman's floating time, the era from the Aitolian victory over the Gauls up to the recent past. This is the period that is still contested.[17] In a revealing passage, Pausanias writes

> The ages of Attalos and Ptolemy were so long ago that no familiarity with those times survives, while the historians who were attached to those kings to write accounts of their actions fell into neglect even sooner.
> (Pausanias 1.6.1)

In one sense, the period from the 3rd to the 1st century was further away, less known, than the glorious past commemorated by Herodotus. Indeed, in narrating the story of the Gallic invasions Pausanias is able to take up the mantle of Herodotus and even reclaim for the Phocians some of the honour that they had forfeited by their pillaging of the sanctuary in the 4th century. Graham Anderson has rightly remarked that the Second Sophistic had a cult of the Greek past, but attitudes to the past distinguished between what we would call the classical age and the periods that came after.[18] In that second phase Greece lost its independence, and it seems not coincidental that it should be the monuments of individuals like Prusias, Eumenes and Aemilius Paullus that would be passed over.[19] These were reminders of the political demise of Greece and so did not warrant attention. As Arafat points out, though there appears to be a sense of inevitable decline and fall operating in Pausanias, it is in fact in the time of Mummius that he locates the nadir of Greece's fortunes. Since then conditions have improved. Modern critics have referred to Pausanias finding an explanation for the shipwreck of Greece, but the shock of Rome's triumph had engaged

[16] Assmann (1992). The subject of attitudes to the past among Greeks in the second century is also treated by Swain (1996), Bowie (1974) and Sluiter (forthcoming).

[17] Arafat (1996) 185.

[18] Anderson (1993) 180.

[19] Heer (1979) 289.

Greek thinkers as early as Polybius in the 2nd century BC.[20] To suggest that Pausanias was still reeling 300 years later perhaps misconstrues the point of his and Plutarch's work. The struggle of Second Sophistic writers was not with Rome, but with their own identity, and in that enterprise the sacred topography of Greece offered vastly greater riches than Rome could muster.

A story in Pausanias perhaps will illustrate the point. At Olympia, between the altar and the temple of Zeus there stood an ancient structure called the pillar of Oinomaos. It was believed to be the last remnant of the house of Oinomaos, the legendary king whose daughter Pelops had won fraudulently by cheating in the chariot race against her father. Pausanias says:

> The following incident took place in my day. A Roman senator had won an Olympic victory. He wanted to erect a bronze statue with an inscription as a memorial of his victory, so a foundation was dug. The excavation took place close to the pillar of Oinomaos, and while they were digging they found there fragments of arms, bridles and curb chains. I saw these objects myself as they were being excavated.
>
> (Pausanias 5.20.8)

Pausanias's narrative then picks up at the next monument, the Metroon, and we hear nothing further of the Roman senator or his statue. Nor should we expect to. Why would Pausanias bother to record the victory of some parvenue Roman when he had seen for himself the actual equipment used by Oinomaos? In a place where one could encounter the past as vividly as one encountered god, the majesty of Rome looked very insignificant indeed.

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[20] Heer (1979) 313–314.

CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY STATESMEN IN PLUTARCH'S *PRAECEPTA*

Lukas de Blois

In Plutarch's view politics is an essential human activity, a kind of practical philosophy.[1] In his political writings, mainly in the *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae*, the *An seni res publica gerenda sit*, the *Ad principem ineruditum*, and the *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, Plutarch pays a lot of attention to statesmanship, leadership and the character of those who are called to lead.[2] In Plutarch's eyes a statesman is someone who makes his entry into public life out of the right political choice, to serve the public interest, and not by accident or out of ambition and a desire for profit; he is a man with a good education and with a kind of built-in law which has been implanted in him by philosophy, a striving for virtuousness and respect for the deities.[3] He starts his career in a calm, sound manner, following the footsteps of a good, renowned politician, and does not abruptly attract attention with a spectacular lawsuit or some other conspicuous deed.[4] The statesman should be wise and efficient also in his private life and have put his own house in order, so that he serves as an example to other people and inspires confidence by his way of life.[5] He is a good and dignified speaker and not a dem-

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[1] In *An seni* 791C Plutarch says: "… for engaging in public affairs is not a special service which is ended when the need ends, but it is a way of life of a tamed social animal living in an organized society, intended by nature to live throughout its allotted time the life of a citizen and in a manner devoted to honour and the welfare of mankind'. In *An seni* 796CD he observes: "But above all things we must remind them that statesmanship consists, not only in holding office, being ambassador, vociferating in the assembly, and ranting around the speakers' platform proposing laws and making motions. Most people think all this is part of statesmanship, just as they think of course that those are philosophers who sit in a chair and converse and prepare their lectures over their books; but the continuous practice of statesmanship and philosophy, which is every day alike seen in arts and deeds, they fail to perceive… Now being a statesman is like being a philosopher".

[2] On Plutarch's opninons about politics, political leadership, and statesmanship see De Blois (1992) 4568f.; 4600f.

[3] *Praec.* 798C–799A; *Ad princ.* 779F and 780C.

[4] *Praec.* 804C–806E.

[5] *Praec.* 800C–801B.

agogue who stirs up the masses. He mounts the orators' platform as if it were a temple, leaving pursuit of profit behind him in the marketplace.[6] He knows how to sensibly delegate tasks; he treats his colleagues with respect and grants his friends opportunities and advantages without being corrupt.[7] And he has friends, knowing that without them he cannot fulfil his duties. A statesman is on his guard against extravagant honours, but draws strength from the *eros* that his *aretè* inspires in the people. He grants the people some amusement without spoiling it with common games and distributions as demagogues and mob flatterers do.[8] When he gives something away, he does so with dignity and without going beyond his means.[9] A statesman does not despise public functions like overseeing the sewers or repairing the streets, tasks that do not bring great repute, but are nonetheless very useful and necessary. By taking care of such functions he lends them his own dignity, not the other way round.[10] A good statesman cultivates *homonoia* in the community, if only to forestall discord, violence and Roman interventions that may do considerable harm to the community.[11] For the days of Greek independence were gone. Plutarch repeatedly shows that he realizes that contemporary Greek statesmen had less latitude than their predecessors from archaic and classical times had had and that his contemporaries could not lead their peoples into great political adventures. Besides the inhabitants of Achaea had to contribute to the needs of nearby Roman armies. Under the emperor Tiberius Achaea, like Macedonia, had temporarily been transferred to the authority of the governor of the military province of Moesia, probably in reaction to protests against heavy taxation.[12] In Moesia, armies were stationed, which benefited from tax returns from Macedon and Greece and which were required to see to it that political unrest did not disturb the steady flow of goods and money that this taxation produced.[13] In *Praec.* 824C

[6] *Praec.* 801C–804C; 819EF.
[7] *Praec.* 806F–809B; 816A–817C; 819B—D; 823A–E.
[8] *An seni* 788C; 794C; 796EF; *Praec.* 819F–822A.
[9] *Praec.* 822A–F.
[10] *Praec.* 813CD.
[11] *Praec.* 823F–825F.
[12] See Alcock (1996) 22.
[13] In the Roman empire there was a tendency to spend the proceeds of taxation in cash and goods on the spot or in nearby regions. Roman government tried to limit transportation of cash, plate and requisitioned goods to far-off regions. See De Ligt (2002) 48–66.

Plutarch speaks about the share of liberty the rulers grant the Greeks, and in 824E he refers to the weak conditions of Greek affairs. In *Praec.* 805AB Plutarch observes:

> Nowadays, when the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrowing of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a conspicuous and brilliant public career could a young man find? There remain the public lawsuits and embassies to the emperors, which demand a man of ardent temperament and one who possesses both courage and intellect.

In a well-known passage Plutarch says:

> And when entering upon any office whatsoever, you must not only call to mind those considerations of which Pericles reminded himself when he assumed the chlamys: "Take care, Pericles, you are ruling free men, you are ruling Greeks, Athenian citizens", but you must also say to yourself: 'You who rule are a subject (*archomenos archeis*)', ruling a state controlled by proconsuls, the agents of Caesar; these are not the "spearmen of the plain, nor is this ancient Sardis, nor the famed Lydian power. You should arrange your cloak more carefully and from the *strategeion* keep your eyes upon the orators" platform, and not have great pride or confidence in your crown, since you see the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head (καὶ τῷ στεφάνῳ μὴ πολὺ φρονεῖν, μηδὲ πιστεύειν, ὁρῶντα τοὺς καλτίους ἐπάνω τῆς κεφαλῆς).[14]

Does Plutarch long for classical Greek politics, for the ancient world of polis—rivalry? This does not tally with another passage in *Praec.* 824C, in which Plutarch remarks:

> For observe that of the greatest blessings which states can enjoy—peace, liberty, plenty, abundance of men, and concord—so far as peace is concerned the *demoi* have no need of statesmanship at present; for all war, both Greek and foreign, has been banished from among us and has disappeared.

[14] *Praec.* 813E. In 813F–814A Plutarch continues: "No, you should imitate the actors, who, while putting into the performance their own passion, character, and reputation, yet listen to the prompter and do not go beyond the degree of liberty in rhythms and metres permitted by those in authority over them. Furthermore when we see little children trying playfully to bind their fathers' shoes on their feet or fit their crowns upon their heads, we only laugh, but the officials in the cities, when they foolishly urge the people to imitate the deeds, ideals and actions of their ancestors, however unsuitable they may be to the present times and conditions, stir up the common folk and, though what they do is laughable, what is done to them is no laughing matter, unless they are merely treated with utter contempt."

Plutarch knew the risks of complete polis autonomy and counted the blessings of Roman imperial authority (*Praec.* 824C).

Is Plutarch putting the glory of local government into perspective, reminding his readers, a good part of whom must have been Greek-speaking local notables, of a symbol of Roman imperial power, which was very well known in the provinces of the Roman empire, the boots of Roman military men who accompanied Roman governors and sat on platforms to which local notables had to look up? That is the traditional explanation of 813E and it is undoubtedly true.[15] Those soldiers cannot have been a threatening multitude, by the way. Achaea was a *provincia inermis*, occupied on a regular basis by only a small contingent of soldiers attached to the provincial governor and perhaps troops to oversee the management of the imperial marble quarries.[16]

But this is not all. In my view, by referring to Roman military boots Plutarch brought to notice the most important competitors for power and administrative authority that local notables had to fear, even within their own regions. Roman officers, centurions and specialised troops, like *beneficiarii*, did the most difficult jobs in Roman provincial administration. In papyrus texts from Egypt they are the people who give out receipts for requisitioned grain and for other foodstuffs and essential goods needed by the Roman troops in this province and beyond.[17] In the tenth book of Pliny's Epistles we see something similar. As governor of Bithynia-Pontus Pliny supplied his assistants with soldiers when they had to procure corn, *i.e.* when they went out *ad comparationem frumentorum*.[18] Apparently the detachments involved were not very big. One of Pliny's assistants, Gavius Bassus, prefect of the Pontic shore, had to limit himself to ten *beneficiarii*, two mounted soldiers, and one centurion from the troops which had been assigned to Pliny's command. According to Bassus this number of soldiers was not sufficient to carry out the requisitioning he had to do, but the emperor Trajan did not give in and refused to withdraw more soldiers from active service at the borders.[19] Bassus must have done well, though, since Pliny recommends him warmly in another, later letter to the emperor, in *Epistle* 10.86A.

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[15] See for example Millar (1981) 202.
[16] Alcock (1996) 17f.
[17] See Daris (1965) 131–157; Fink (1971) 241ff.; Alston (1995) 86–96.
[18] Pliny the Younger, *Epistles* 10.21, 22, 27, 28.
[19] Pliny the Younger, *Epistles* 10.21–22.

Roman troops did not only demand food and goods, they needed means of transportation too, and did not always obtain them in a friendly way. In a papyrus text, which contains a copy of a message issued by the *praefectus Aegypti* in the days of the emperor Hadrian we read:

> I (*i.e.* the *praefectus Aegypti*) am informed that without having a warrant many of the soldiers when travelling through the country requisition boats and animals and persons improperly, in some cases seizing them by force, in other obtaining them from the strategoi through favour or obsequiousness, the result of which is that private persons are subjected to insults and abuses and the army is reproached for greed and injustice.

The prefect then forbids furnishing to any person without a warrant any contribution for the journey.[20]

Complaints and petitions about military misconduct were recurring phenomena in Roman imperial history. There are examples from the reigns of Augustus, Tiberius, and Hadrian, to mention only some good rulers, who reputedly were able to discipline the soldiers.[21] In times of warfare within the borders of the empire military misconduct became much worse. In *Histories* I 63–69 Tacitus tells us how the Vitellian armies, led by Valens and Caecina, moved through Gaul and Switzerland to Italy. They took what they needed, humiliated local notables who gave the military what they needed in a very subservient way, and destroyed communities that seemed to put up some resistance. According to Tacitus at least one of the generals, Valens, became a very rich man through forced transactions with local proprietors.[22] Tac-

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[20] PSI 446 = Hunt and Edgar (1956) nr 221.

[21] See Suetonius, *Augustus* 24.2; Tacitus, *Annals* 1.16–30 and 31–52 (on the mutinies in the Rhine and Danube armies in A.D. 14); PSI 446 (see note 20).

[22] In *Histories* 1.63–66 Tacitus tells us how the army of Valens, one of the commanders of Vitellius in the civil wars of AD 69, travelled from the Rhine frontier through Gaul to Italy. Valens' troops had no trouble with the Treveri, whom they knew as trustworthy allies. But without any obvious reason they murdered 4000 people—the number is given by Tacitus—in Divodurum. From that moment onwards city magistrates and town councils of communities through which the soldiers passed were eager to offer anything that the army of Valens needed. His soldiery sought a pretext to plunder the Aedui, one of the next tribes they met, but they could not find any. The Aedui handed over weapons and money and provided food free of charge. Lugdunum welcomed the soldiers whole-heartedly. Of course it did. Rudolf Haensch demonstrates that many veterans of the Rhine armies retired to this place (see Haensch [2001] 101). The citizens of Lugdunum tried to persuade Valens and his army to punish Vienna, their fiercest competitor, but the Viennenses forestalled disaster by handing over their arms and procuring goods taken from the fortunes of rich fellow-citizens. Suddenly Valens

itus' report is highly rhetorical, but it gives us a clue. Passing armies demanded goods, food and facilities and could easily turn into looting mobs. So local magistrates gave them what they asked and could not resist. Local notables changed into subservient slaves of passing armies and must have lost face in the eyes of their fellow citizens. They must have lost a lot of money and supplies too. The generals of passing armies could become rich and do business on a large scale, demanding food and goods free of charge or at a low price.

The conclusion may be that specialised groups of soldiers, guided by centurions, were important executors of difficult administrative tasks like the raising of foodstuffs and other essential goods, and the requisitioning of means of transportation, including personnel, and that they often carried out their tasks in a rather high-handed way, which led to complaints and petitions to the emperors and governors. They were the ugly face of Roman domination. In this way the military successfully competed with local notables in the entitlement to food and essential goods and services, like transportation. In societies in which production of food is relatively low and precarious, like the Roman empire, entitlement to food is a fundamental precondition of survival and the main base of real power. In such societies power is dependent on the entitlement to food surpluses, other essential goods and services that contribute to the production of food, and on the right to distribute them.[23] This is exactly what local notables did, in Achaea and elsewhere. Being landlords they dominated surplus production and through *sitonia* and *euergesia* they distributed it within their towns. This, more than superior élite behaviour and a display of archaising *paideia*, determined and demonstrated power relations within their communities. If groups of soldiers, by taking what they needed and more, demonstrated that they were in power and not the local notables, this was a mortal blow to the real power of local notables and it undermined their facilities and their ability to distribute food and services. Plutarch's portrait of the ideal

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was a very rich man. Traversing the territories of the Allobroges and the Vocontii this general earned some more handsome profits through forced transactions with landed proprietors and local magistrates who had to procure food, goods and facilities. The other Vitellian army, commanded by Caecina, devastated the land of the Helvetians, who had risen in rebellion and were badly beaten. The conflict had started after soldiers of Caecina's army, of the twenty first legion, had stolen the money with which an Helvetian border garrison that was paid by the Helvetians themselves should be paid (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.67–69).

[23] See Sen (1981) 43. See also Erdkamp (2001) 334f.; 342f.; 349.

statesman, given in the beginning of this paper, is one-sided and does not sufficiently take into account the position of the Roman military apparatus. In this one short sentence about the boots of the military viewed from the *strategeion*, however, Plutarch betrays that he knew real power structures and relations. This short remark must have evoked harsh reality in the minds of his audience. Centurions, *beneficiarii* and other military personnel represented Roman power in every day practice and constituted a permanent potential threat to the real base of power of local notables, especially when the military passed by in force, as they did in times of war. So Plutarch can only advise Menemachus to maintain *homonoia* and keep his community quiet, so that the worst-case scenario at least will not materialise, and the military will limit themselves to normal taxation and requisitioning.

PART TWO

PLUTARCH'S PRESENTATION OF STATESMEN

HOW TO PRESENT A STATESMAN?

H.G. Ingenkamp

I. *The statesman as belonging to the group of* dokimoi

In the well-known preface to the Life of Demetrius, Plutarch calls virtue the "most precise of all arts", and, implicitly, of all sense organs.[1]

One possible way to understand the sense of this—at the first sight perplexing—formulation is to combine it with the Aristotelian ideas of ἀρετή and τέχνη, as exhibited in the Nicomachean Ethics. Both ἀρετή and τέχνη are ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου,[2] which means, among other things, that inherent in them there is a capacity to form judgments. So it is our ἀρετή, as a special form of τέχνη, which leads us to be brave and not to act cowardly in a certain situation. For someone displaying ἀρετή considers what conditions the situation imposes and then decides how to act, just as medicine considers the state of a person's health and then decides on a treatment. The correspondence between τέχναι and sense organs had been established in the first words of the preface to Plutarch's Life of Demetrius. It is based on the fact that both, τέχναι, as e.g., medicine, and sense organs, as e.g., the eye, deal with opposites (and formulate judgements on them): health and illness in the case of an art, and black and white in the case of a sense organ.

There is another possible explanation that leads to the same conclusion and is Aristotelian as well. The μέτρον and κανών of what is good and bad and of what is desirable and undesirable is the person who already is good, the so called σπουδαῖος.[3] So the reader of *Demetrius* 1 is allowed to understand the wording metaphorically. Ἀρετή (or, as Plutarch has it, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις) in this case means "the σπουδαῖος". Metaphors such as this one are part of daily conversation; cf. a sentence like "Aristides was justice itself".

[1] *Demetrius* 1.4.—I would like to thank Mark Beck for looking through my manuscript.

[2] *Ethica Nicomachea* 1140a4, b5, 20, 27, 30. Cp. Ingenkamp (1980) *passim.*

[3] *Ethica Nicomachea* 1113a29, 1176a15–19.

It seems to be in either this or the aforementioned sense that Plutarch says in *Demetr.* 1 that it is virtue which decides whether a person is virtuous or not. And, as it is expressed here, the judge, e.g., virtue, is independent. So Plutarch does not hesitate to present Demetrius and Antony as examples of bad characters. Either he himself judges in this moment as a σπουδαῖος, *i.e.*, as the μέτρον and κανών of what is good and not good, of what is useful and detrimental, and of what is desirable and undesirable, metaphorically taking ἀρετή as meaning "I, Plutarch, as a virtuous man", or he refers to the sense organ ἀρετή, which he is convinced he possesses, saying simply that he sees by means of φρόνησις that Demetrius and Antony are characters whose example may corrupt our morals just as clearly as he is able to distinguish between black and white. Most of Plutarch's readers will find that this intransigence is rather un-Plutarchan, but Plutarch in this case would perhaps respond by quoting several famous verses of Horace, saying that even according to common sense there *are* at certain points clear borders,[4] and that at least in these cases no doubt is admissible.

The implication of ἀρετή being a sense organ or a τέχνη may be, as was said before, that it and nothing else *decides* who is good or not. This decision may result in the *creation* of good and bad individuals in the same sense that a physician "creates" in the eyes of a patient an illness about which the patient himself has never thought before. This process of creation is something like the discovery of a new territory. Some patients leave a doctor with what they deem to be a *new* illness. Although it is not the *creation* of virtuous persons we are going to deal with, I would like to present an example of such a process of creation in Plutarch himself, as a backdrop for what follows.

The famous anecdote that I am going to relate does not allude to virtue but rather to εὐδαιμονία. In our Aristotelian context, however, this is quite insignificant, since εὐδαιμονία is the state that a σπουδαῖος, in as far as he is considered to be a social being (and not with reference to his relationship to the gods, e.g.), has reached. For the attribute εὐδαίμων means that the person to whom it is ascribed is "in a good way", that he has a good demon.[5]

Here is the anecdote. When Croesus asks Solon to tell him who he thinks is εὐδαίμων, hoping Solon might first of all call him εὐδαίμων or at least some other man who was even richer than he is (for riches

[4] *Sermones* 1, 106–107.
[5] *Ethica Nicomachea* 1097b22–1098a20, together with 1178b3–8.

were, for Croesus, a criterion of εὐδαιμονία), Solon answers by naming a group of exemplary men whose good qualities are quite different (Tellos; Kleobis and Biton) and then presenting the criteria that enable him to *establish*, to *create*, as it were, that group of εὐδαίμονες.[6] Certainly not only Croesus was surprised. Here we encounter ἀρετή as a sense organ in a very clear case. Croesus was apparently myopic, Solon demonstrated what healthy eyes could see.

This—let me call it—Platonist approach to the question of who is good or not (*i.e.* the approach by judging in the sense of "creating") is, as a rule, not Plutarch's way. For Plutarch, as for Aristotle, the attribution of the quality of virtue to a person has something to do with the *fame* of that person.

Fame and praise are consequences of virtue;[7] so, if we try to find exemplary statesmen,[8] we should first look at those individuals who are δόκιμοι, ἔνδοξοι, ἐπαινούμενοι, etc. The natural connection between virtue and praise is already clear from our passage in *Demetr.* 1. There Plutarch says that the most precise arts of all, the virtues, do not *praise* the form of goodness which is based only on the inability to be bad, but 〈...〉. Virtue as a τέχνη praises, as a physician cures (and it blames, as a physician cautions), or, as a sense organ, it praises, as the eye perceives "this is bright" (and it reproaches as the eye perceives "this is dark").

However, usually Plutarch sees this in another light. In the preface to Aemilius Paullus, we read that by writing biographies, Plutarch is able to receive as guests into his soul τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων *καὶ τῶν δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας* which almost seems to identify the cause, virtue, with its effect, praise, renown. Plutarch does not care to speak more correctly here, the correct form of what he means to say being perhaps what we find in chapter 9 of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the chapter on the *genos epideiktikon*.[9]

There Aristotle says that the "aim" (σκοπός) of praise and reprehension is virtue and vice.[10] By this, he seems to say either that every act of praise is protreptic, or that whenever we praise or blame someone we

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[6] *Solon* 27; cp. Herodot I 29 sqq.

[7] E.g., *Rhetorica* 1.9.

[8] As to the sudden switch to statesmen, see the 3rd paragraph from here.

[9] As to Plutarch's intention to imbue his readers with virtue and as to the concept of *praise* in the proems to his *Lives*, cp. Stadter (1988) 283, 285, 295.

[10] More simply, he says later ἔστιν 〈...〉 ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. Cp. *Ethica Nicomachea* 1101b12 sqq.

do so with the aim of making an act seem καλόν or κακόν. In this case, his use of the word σκοπός would border on the meaning of "definition". (So if someone says "I deny x" we could ask him "At what do you aim by that?" or, in nearly the same sense, "What do you mean by that? Could you define it?", and he could answer "I only would like to say, that x is not true".) By praising something our aim is to bestow upon it the honor of being καλόν. Praise is the "definitory" echo of virtue, as long as our criteria are sane.

In order to guarantee the sanity of the orator, Aristotle proceeds with gathering many instances of what may sensibly be called καλόν. Nearly all of them[11] are valid for Plutarch. Even his decision to choose *statesmen* for his gallery of outstanding men, which of course is not self-evident (there are some other classes of men that could lay claim to being included in such a gallery), tallies with Aristotle's list. For the καλόν is beneficial, and so the *greatest* virtues are *most* beneficial. Therefore, Aristotle says, it is ἀνδρεία and δικαιοσύνη that have the *highest* reputation.[12] But these two virtues are particularly the province of *statesmen*, far more, e.g., than of artists and philosophers.

There is one further rule in this passage of the *Rhetoric* that I would not like to omit here. Aristotle says that everything we would *suggest* or *propose* to other individuals can be converted into praise: Ask yourself what you would suggest, he says, and you have a criterion for what you may praise.[13] Sometimes, we find Plutarch himself in the position of someone who asks himself what to suggest to his hero. We will soon have the opportunity to examine some instances.

It is the ἄριστοι and δοκιμώτατοι whom *we*, as ordinary people, should host in order to be improved by their company. (The *nobleman* may take the fame of his own ancestors as a model for his own life[14]). The culture of which Plutarch is a part is so organized that not only every educated person actually strives for fame[15], but the very laws and customs of good states are arranged in a way that fame is a means and

[11] An exception is, e.g., Aristotle's opinion that the virtues of men are more καλά as those of women, *Rhetorica* 1367a17 sqq.

[12] *Rhetorica* 1366b3–8.

[13] *Rhetorica* 1367b37.

[14] *Aratus* 1.

[15] *Coriolanus* 4.5: ἡ δόξα τῆς ἀρετῆς τέλος. The connection of δόξα with ἀρετή is often found in Plutarch. Plutarch may blame a person if he/she appears to neglect δόξα: cp. *Alcibiades* 13.5 (speaking about Hyperbolos). Socrates encourages Alcibiades's φιλότιμον, *ibidem* 7.5. But cp. note 22.

an end to all actions of persons who want to have a status in society. To put it differently: the culture of a person or of a group of individuals is defined by what he or the group praises, as, e.g., *Thes*. 8.4 makes clear. So, as a rule, the δοκιμώτατοι are the best according to the standards of the society in which they live. There are plenty of instances of the idea that praise is the means of shaping a society or an individual character in the *Life of Lycurgus*, a statesman whom Plutarch respects in particular, but no other *Life* lacks explicit or implicit reference to it.[16] Plutarch himself time and again judges either by praising or blaming his hero or by referring to general praise, employing words such as ἐπαινεῖται, ἐπῃνέθη, οὐ μέμφομαι, (οὐκ) ἐπαινῶ, etc.[17]

But there are different cultures,[18] different classes, and different degrees of education in one and the same culture, so that praise alone cannot always be a sufficient criterion for good and bad: in one and the same society there is such a thing as ἔπαινοι τυχόντες,[19] there is wrong judgment by otherwise worthy men,[20] there is the possibility of applying wrong standards in an individual case,[21] there may be a quarrel over whether an action should be praised or not,[22] etc.

However, in the majority of cases by far, the underlying concept in Plutarch's treatment of the relation between ἔπαινος and καλόν is the Aristotelian principle of consensus.[23] This seems to be valid to such a degree that we are entitled to state that the question: "How does Plutarch, in his gallery, present a statesman?", can be answered: "Plutarch, as a sane and praiseworthy person (this is demanded by elementary rhetoric, see below, p. 82), presents the statesman as a man who is *de facto* an ἐπαινούμενος". In support of this statement, I would like to treat three cases that seem to demonstrate that ἔπαινος in the

[16] E.g. *Lycurgus* 14.5f., 21.2, 31.2, *Cato Maior* 8.6, 19.6, *Pericles* 38.4, *Flamininus* 12.8 etc.

[17] *Demosthenes* 22.4 sqq., *Numa* 17.5, *Pubicola* 12.3, *Solon* 21.1, *Themistocles* 6.3, *Syncrisis Nicias / Crassus* 3.2, cp. 4.1, *Syncrisis Lysander / Sulla* 3.7, *Syncrisis Pelopidas / Marcellus* 3.1, *Syncrisis Aristides / Cato Maior* 5.3.

[18] Cp. *Theseus* 6.4 about the different ἔπαινοι in different cultures.

[19] *Timoleon* 6.1, *Marcellus* 28.2

[20] Cp. *Dio* 36.3f., where Plutarch criticizes Philistos because he does not dispense praise and blame in the right way.

[21] Cp. *Syncrisis Nicias / Crassus* 4.4.

[22] Cp. *Lucullus* 38.3.

[23] "Plutarch, although generally a Platonist, derived his basic philosophy of ethics from Aristotle": so Stadter (1998) XV. Cp. Russell (1995) 81: "It has indeed long been common knowledge that Aristotelian ethical doctrines are the basis of Plutarch's views on character".

passive sense of "fame" is fundamental to Plutarch's presentation of statesmen. By chance, all three passages belong to one set of parallels, *Solon and Publicola*.

ἔπαινος may serve as a criterion for deciding if an action was good or not.

After having expelled the tyrants, the newly elected consul Brutus had to take cognizance of his sons' participation in a conspiracy in favour of the Tarquins. He publicly asked his sons if the allegations were true and, when their silence indicated their culpability, he ordered them put to death. He himself stood by, seemingly unmoved, when the miserable young men died and then left the place of the execution, apparently without a word.[24]

Of course this story has strongly impressed the fantasy of historians and political analysts. When Machiavelli refers to Brutus, he usually mentions this story.[25] In his opinion the deed was an example of clever, if cruel, statesmanship. Revolutionary ambitions were thereby stifled at the outset. Greeks and Romans were more impressed by the moral aspect of what Brutus did. There is no direct commentary in Livy, but the scene, as he presents it, leaves the reader with the impression that a deed has been accomplished which, in spite of its severity, must be seen as an example of virtuously sticking to principle. Inevitably, the notion of "Stoicism" will come to mind.[26]

In Dionysius, there is a commentary. Dionysius makes explicit what Livy's story conveys by itself: οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ἦν τὴν γνώμην καί βέβαιος τά κριθέντα διατηρεῖν.[27] In Plutarch, we have a more circumstantial reflection. His meditation runs as follows: What Brutus accomplished can neither be praised nor blamed appropriately. For either his virtue had reached such a sublime stage that it removed from his soul normal human feelings or his suffering was so great that he was numbed by it. In both cases, we are confronted with a phenomenon that is beyond the

[24] *Publicola* 6.

[25] In his *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, book 1, ch. 16, book 3, ch. 2, esp. book 3 ch. 3 that is dedicated to this event.

[26] 2.5.5–8.

[27] 5.8 fin., at the beginning of the chapter Dionysius was more distanced: ⟨…⟩ δέδοικα μὴ σκληρὰ καὶ ἄπιστα τοῖς Ἕλλησι δόξω λέγειν.

level of humanity. His attitude was either that of a god or of a beast.[28] Plutarch states clearly that the deed in itself leads him to an impasse. Without foreign help he cannot decide. By saying that, he renounces all rhetorical devices (other than Livy and Dionysius), but speaks to his reader simply as a person in trouble. He then continues by naming the maxim that guides him toward a solution. The momentous words are: Δίκαιον δὲ τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἕπεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσθενείᾳ τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀπιστεῖσθαι.[29] Plutarch says: "Because I, whose task it would be to be a judge in this matter, am too weak to do my duty, it is better to rely on the fame of the man than not to believe in his virtue". This speaks for itself.

There are cases where Plutarch hesitates to judge whether something (and if that, why not some*one*?) is virtuous. In these cases he may follow the general opinion about it or him / her. I think we have here one of the methods Plutarch employed initially when choosing a hero[30] and subsequently, in the next stage of composition, when deliberating on how to present him. He here presents Brutus as virtuous and graciously reveals one of the criteria he intends to follow.[31]

He seems to present Brutus as virtuous here, *because* the *Life* of Publicola deals with Brutus' history as well. Brutus, too, seems to have been one of those great men of the past by whom Plutarch invites us to be taught, although the *Life* has not *his* name as its title. But if the same person, as in our case Brutus, is not presented as a hero, e.g. in a *Life* not dedicated to him or to his history, the verdict on the same action may be different: Cp. *Brutus* 1.1: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος (sc. our Lucius Brutus) μέν, ὥσπερ τὰ ψυχρήλατα τῶν ξιφῶν, σκληρὸν ἐκ φύσεως καὶ οὐ μαλακὸν ἔχων ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἦθος ἄχρι παιδοφονίας (!) ἐξώκειλε (!) τῷ θυμῷ τῷ κατὰ τῶν τυράννων ⟨…⟩. So, ἔπαινος is a criterion if the person is presented *as a hero*, to be invited and to be studied in a συσσίτιον

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[28] As to the juxtaposition of θεῖον and θηριῶδες cp. *Ethica Nicomachea* 1145a22 sqq. ⟨…⟩ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ.

[29] *Publicola* 6.6. Plutarch's *following* words, citing Roman judgment on Brutus' achievements in general, evoke Machiavelli, *because he puts them here*: Ῥωμαῖοι γὰρ οὐ τοσοῦτον ἔργον οἴονται Ῥωμύλου γενέσθαι τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἵδρυσιν ὅσον Βρούτου τὴν κτίσιν τῆς πολιτείαις καὶ κατάστασιν.

[30] Cp. generally Geiger (1995) *passim*.

[31] If the questionable heroic deed is committed by a person who is not as δόκιμος as, e.g., Brutus, Plutarch can be much cooler and not eager to come to a result; cp. *Publicola* 14.8: Θαυμαστὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ (the consul Horatius) τῆς εὐσταθείας, εἴτε τὴν ἀπάτην ἐν καιρῷ βραχεῖ συνεῖδεν, εἴτε πιστευθεὶς ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐκίνησεν αὐτόν.

as described in *Aemil. Paull.* 1,[32] but it is not necessarily a criterion for Plutarch's purely *historical* remarks. ἔπαινος seems to have been an important criterion whenever Plutarch asked himself if a person *deserved* to be included in his gallery or to be invited to his συσσίτιον.[33]

ἔπαινος may serve as a criterion when deciding if something happened or not.

This small chapter is no more than a footnote to the foregoing one. It serves here as an a fortiori proof of what I have tried to establish there. For Plutarch may not only evaluate a *person* according to his/her fame, he may even take ἔπαινος or δόξα as a means to determine if something that was important for the portrait of his hero *has happened or not*—doing so even against objections from the side of pragmatic history. I think this is interesting enough to deserve—against the dictates of logic—a chapter of its own.

As to the encounter between Solon and Croesus, Plutarch does away with the chronological considerations (not without ridiculing them, as I have done just with logic) of some people (ἔνιοι) that this meeting cannot have taken place. He is not willing to sacrifice the meeting for reasons brought forward by a discipline whose innumerable representatives have not succeeded up to now in bringing their controversies to an end. Not one common agreement has been reached, Plutarch says scornfully. There are two reasons for Plutarch to accept the historicity of the meeting in spite of the doubts of the specialists: the second and, as he declares, more important one is that it agrees with Solon's character, his magnanimity and his wisdom, the first one being that the account is ἔνδοξον and that there are so many witnesses.[34] Most scholars will say that ἔνδοξον is used in the meaning of "generally admitted" here as is clear from the following reference to witnesses. But however sensible it is to separate the different meanings of such a word, it is impossible to verify what a speaker or his auditory has felt or understood when it was used in a context like ours. Here the sense "famous, notable, glorious" is by no means excluded, especially because ἔνδο-

[32] Cp. *Pericles* 1.
[33] Of course, Plutarch's *Lives* are not Ἔπαινοι (*i.e.* encomia). Ἔπαινος is a means for him to select and arrange the material for his biographies.
[34] *Solon* 27,1.

ξον appears *before* its meaning is possibly narrowed by the subsequent words. At the end of the phrase, most readers will think that according to Plutarch the *famous*, the *glorious* talk between the two men is *generally admitted*, as Plutarch immediately afterwards goes on considering Solon's outstanding personality and wisdom. So I am optimistic that we are entitled to regard this passage as supporting our argument.

ἔπαινος as a criterion when the writer is confronted by a lack of material.

At the end of their accounts of Publicola, both Dionysius and Livy mention his enormous fame.[35] Livy is short and impressive as usual, while Dionysius dedicates a long epideictic passage to the qualities of the man. He begins by saying that he was held to be the best of all Romans of his times κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν. This corresponds to Livy's simple *gloria ingens*. As to the details, Dionysius refers the reader to his previous account, summarizing Publicola's most memorable achievements. He then delivers a cumulative rebuke of the historians who have omitted the most admirable trait of his performance, to wit his restraint in financial matters. He now steps in to make up for that carelessness providing no more than a rhetorical extension of the report of Publicola's poverty[36] at the time of his death: His relatives could not afford to bury him and, when the senate noticed that, it was decided to bury him at public expense. More generally and, quite in Plutarchan fashion, Dionysius complains here that his colleagues, the historians, concentrate on politics and military achievements while neglecting the way of life of their heroes, εἰ μέτριοι καὶ σώφρονες καὶ μένοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς πατρίοις ἐπιτηδεύμασιν διετέλεσαν. The obituary takes up nearly two Teubner-pages.

Plutarch is not as verbose, but he is also not any less liberal in his use of superlatives. Publicola brought his life to perfection by all that (τοῖς νενομισμένοις) was considered admirable and magnificent, as far as this is possible for a human being (23.3). In his lifetime he was the most excellent Roman of his time in power and fame; after his death he was

[35] Dionysius, *Antiquitates Romanae* 5.48, Livy 2.16.7. As to Plutarch's knowledge of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, cp. Pelling (2002) 1, 16 sq.
[36] Cp. Livy, l.c.

revered as the ancestor of some of the noblest families up to Plutarch's times (*Syncrisis Solon / Publicola* 1.3). It was Publicola who found the end of life that Solon had glorified (*ibidem* 1.4). Myriads bewailed his death; he left tears, sorrow and regret and especially the women mourned for him as for a relative (*ibidem* 1.6.). If Solon was the wisest of men, Publicola was the most fortunate (εὐδαιμονέστατος) (*ibidem* 1.8). This, at least in the Aristotelian sense of the word, denotes the highest degree of moral and social status for a man as ζῷον πολιτικόν.

The problem is that what we know about Publicola hardly justifies this hagiographical fervour. The most impressive passages in Livy's account of Publicola's times are the anecdotes about Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, and Cloelia. Publicola, as an individual, plays no part in any of them. In Dionysius the matter is not different. It can be said generally that as long as Brutus is alive, Publicola is second to him. Afterwards he is the leading and most interesting person of the first years of the republic, but even so he seems more reactive than active, he seems to be the man who is at the disposal of the state, whenever it is necessary, but not the inspired central figure dominating political activities (as most of the other Plutarchan heroes are): he is called from behind the scenes whenever he is needed, but on the stage he never seems really alive but remains a shadowy figure. Even his legislation is reactive: he had been accused of aspiring to kingship—so he presents himself as a *popularis*: *latae deinde leges, non solum quae regni suspicione consulem absolverent, sed quae adeo in contrariam verterent ut popularem etiam facerent* (Livy II 8.1). In Dionysius the connection between suspicion and legislation is not as close as in Livy: there is no hint at the legislation in question being a *consequence* of base insinuation but there is only an enumeration of his actions immediately after he heard about it, but, as is the case in Livy, most of Dionysius' readers will also see the legislation as one of the measures Publicola takes to befriend the people after the unpleasant rumour surfaces concerning his ambition.

Plutarch cannot help mentioning the legislation immediately after the scandal, but he disconnects the two reports by tying the legislation exclusively to his hero's surname "Publicola" after explaining its meaning. In Plutarch, the story reads as follows: Publius Valerius was given the name "Publicola" after reacting to the anger of the people: *as a consequence* (ὥστε) of the generous manner, in which he reacted, they now called him Publicola, and Plutarch now continues "For (⟨…⟩ γάρ) he gave the consulate to everyone" etc., just as if the name had been a

consequence of the legislation. This obscure argumentation[37] may be intentional, as is suggested if we compare our other sources and as will be confirmed when we look at Plutarch's handling with the tradition at other places.

Monica Affortunati and Barbara Scardigli have collected some examples of Plutarch's attributing to Publicola major political measures that other sources ascribe to other individuals. They also have shown that there is information in Plutarch about Publicola that is not present in Dionysius and Livy.[38] The 8 items they cite, and Flacelière's observation that Plutarch makes Publicola a rich man while Dionysius and Livy let him die in poverty,[39] are important not only for our question that belongs to literary criticism and studies in rhetoric, but also for the historian. Plutarch seems to present his hero by choosing material that is apt to *make* Publicola a great politician, deliberately looking for other sources than Dionysius, whom he certainly had read.[40] The most convincing option is Valerius Antias who was notorious for doing what he could to amplify his own family.

Besides the additions that boost Publicola's achievements as a statesman, there are rhetorical devices, too, that lead us to the assumption that Plutarch either gathered all material in which at least *something* was said about Publicola to fill in the gaps in what otherwise could scarcely be viewed as a biography, or that he supplemented the story himself by adding what, in many cases, every beginner in rhetoric could have added.[41] Christopher Pelling calls it "expansion of inadequate material, normally by the fabrication of circumstantial detail".[42] I will give some examples here.

When the envoys of the Tarquins come to Rome with the message that the tyrant had changed his character etc., the consuls thought it best to ask the people. *Valerius resisted the plan successfully* (2.4). So only in Plutarch does Valerius play a part in the debate about the *reditus* of the kings.

The slave Vindicius, after considering whom he should inform about the proceedings in the house of the Aquilii, went not to the consuls,

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[37] *Publicola* 10.8–11.1.

[38] Affortunati / Scardigli (1992) 109ff. Cp. n. 35.

[39] Flacelière (1961) 87.

[40] Affortunati/Scardigli (1992) 110.

[41] The latter assumption is more probable; cp. Russell (1995) 361–365, Pelling (2002) 94 sqq., Stadter (1998) XXIII.

[42] Pelling (2002) 94. Cp. Stadter (1962) 126, 138 and *passim*.

but to Valerius (so far Plutarch's account corresponds with Dionysius's), *because Valerius was such a friendly and affable man.* When he tells Valerius what was going on, *Valerius' wife and his brother Marcus were present. Valerius then locks the slave up in his house, his wife serving as guardian; Marcus is sent to the castle of the kings in order to try to seize the treacherous letters* (in Dionysius Valerius himself seizes the letters in the house of the Aquilii) *and to guard the slaves of the castle* (5.1)

After the conspirators are captured, *Valerius gives order to bring in Vindicius.* The plotters are not able to defend themselves; some, to please Brutus, propose exile (to avoid execution), the other consul weeps *and Valerius, in support of the defendants, is silent* (6.1f.).

After the execution of the sons of Brutus, Collatinus, fearing that the other conspirators, who were his relatives, would also be killed, shows signs of weakness. Thereupon the Aquilii take heart and ask that Vindicius should be seized. Collatinus is willing to comply with the request, *but Valerius opposes it. He reproaches Collatinus strongly*, but Collatinus gives order to bring Vindicius before the assembly. *The entourage of Valerius prevents this* (7.2–4).

After the death of Brutus in the battle against the Etruscans and the interruption of the battle by a storm, *Valerius was puzzled. He did not see how the fight had developed up to now* etc. (9.5).

Valerius lived in a great house on the hill Velia. This fact and the aspect of Valerius' descent to the city from above in a royal manner incurred the envy and hatred of the people. *What now happened was a lesson that Valerius teaches us about how commendable it is for a statesman not to listen to flatterers but to outspoken friends:* for Valerius reacted at once when he heard about the matter and ⟨…⟩ (10.3). After Valerius had demolished the house, people were rueful, because the house was so beautiful *and because the consul now had to live in the house of others* (10.5).

During the consecration of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus by Publicola's colleague Horatius *it is Publicola's brother Marcus who tries to interrupt the ceremony by falsely reporting the death of Horatius' son* (14.6).

After Porsenna's declaration of war *Publicola wants to surpass the self-respect of the Etruscan king and founds very calmly a new colony μεγάλοις ἀναλώμασιν* (16.3).

When expelling those occupying the Janiculum, *Valerius is wounded* (16.5).

After her bold exploit, *Cloelia goes to Publicola who does not admire her and is discontented. He sends her back to the Etruscan camp* (19.3f.).

On her way back, Cloelia's female escort was attacked by Tarquin, *but Valeria, Publicola's daughter, was able to flee with three slaves* (19.5).[43]

Under Publicola's fourth consulate all Roman women give birth to deformed children. *Publicola looks through the Sibylline books and acts according to their prescriptions* (21.2f.).

It is *Publicola who brings about the immigration of Clausus and his clan*; it is he who *makes him and his fellow citizens and gives them land* (21.7; 10).

In the battle against the Sabinians, *Publicola's son-in-law Postumius is presented as a bold and skilful soldier* (22.4f.).

The Romans, who at other occasions were used to ascribe their exploits to the help of the gods, were of the opinion that only one man was the cause of their victory over the Sabines: Publicola (23.1, cp. 22.5ff.).

Plutarch gives his hero a family: we meet his brother, his wife and a daughter. By this device, he creates for his hero, who otherwise would remain still more bloodless, a personal environment. He lets him be puzzled, makes him stand silent in sympathy, adduces a strong witness (Vindicius) for his kindness, gives him relatives who go even beyond the bounds of honesty to further his interests: more than in our other sources, in Plutarch's *Life* the outlines of a real human being begin to appear. Additionally, Plutarch adds to Publicola's abilities as politician and general, thus supporting the abstract ἔπαινος that had been transmitted together with his name, by some badly needed material.

Let us remember the maxim by which, after a moment of doubt, Brutus' superhuman stoicism had been recognized as a valuable act: Δίκαιον δὲ τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἕπεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσθενείᾳ τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀπιστεῖσθαι. Of course, it is expressed only in connection with this one deed. Nevertheless, I would risk the assumption that it describes a method generally adopted by our biographer, once the ἀρετή of a person, after a thorough examination of the person himself or of the tradition related to him/her by the sense-organ "virtue", has been taken for granted. In the case of Publicola, Plutarch hit upon somewhat strange praise as the last word about him, contained in Dionysius and Livy. Even if there were not enough achievements capable of direct attribution to justify the degree of this praise, it is quite apparent that the constitution at this early period would have been in fatal danger if there had not been great strength of will, pru-

[43] Cp. Stadter (1962) 25, 81f., 138f., where the Cloelia-Valeria-story and its "small bits of gratuitous information" (138) are studied in comparison with Polyaenus and Livy.

dence, diplomatic skill etc. Now there was no other candidate after the death of Brutus on whom to bestow all these qualities—*ergo*. *Mutatis mutandis* the same thing could have occurred to Plutarch when there was a famous person whose character had some stains or was in some degree unmanly, etc., as in the case of Alcibiades, Coriolanus, and Cicero. In all these cases Plutarch may have said to himself that his judgment may be too weak to decide alone: so he looked at what the tradition said. If then his sense-organ, called ἀρετή, would provide no resistance, the person in question could be adopted into the gallery.

The attitude corresponds to Plutarch's approach of "higher" matters in general. In theology, he also refrains from clear statements of his own: the only thing that is important in these matters is that the dignity of the gods should be spared. This dignity of the gods is a concept that matches the concept of ἔπαινος, as I try to interpret it here. It is one person, one character, Plutarch, who thinks in such a way about theological matters and about great figures of the past. So it may be a Plutarchan axiom that, unlike most of the other axioms that parade in a first or a second chapter of a biography, is hidden in a chance phrase in this case.

If this is true, Plutarch takes his heroes out of a *musée imaginaire* to whom the common ἔπαινος has given rise (not without using his already too often quoted sense-organ), then adapting the new object to standards that he displays in those famous chapters one or two.[44] That it is *statesmen* whom he chooses is clear from the statesmen being the representatives of the most distinguished virtues, ἀνδρεία and δικαιοσύνη, as Aristotle says (I cited that before), thus deserving, of course, most ἔπαινος. The connection between statesman and ἔπαινος has been stressed even more by Cicero in his *De re publica*. The statesman—Cicero himself speaks about the *princeps civitatis*, but this is of no consequence for our study—, is, according to him, *operis maximi inter homines atque optimi* ⟨……⟩ *perfector*[em].[45] And: ⟨…⟩ *principem civitatis gloria esse alendum, et tam diu stare rem publicam, quam diu ab omnibus honor principi exhiberetur*.[46]

After Plutarch has decided that the person in question was *worthy* of being accepted as a guest at the *Aemil. Paull.* 1 symposium, he seems

[44] The character of museum pieces that Plutarch's heroes display is perhaps also due to the fact that he "rarely takes a larger view of his protagonist's actions, and generally refrains from commenting on their effect in the history of their city or of world affairs ⟨…⟩" (Stadter [1998] XXIV).

[45] 5.6.

[46] 5.7.

to proceed as has been described here. For at other places (Plutarch mentions Publicola only twice in other *Lives*)[47] the same hero may be praised in an unspecified way as in Livy's final words about Publicola. So we read about him in *Coriol.* 33.1: μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἔν τε πολέμοις καὶ πολιτείαις ὠφελήσας.

II. *The statesman as an object of affection*

Plutarch's standards concerning how to present a statesman involve methods regarding composition (e.g., by not enumerating the battles and other feats that attract attention but by concentrating on more personal details etc.) and material (e.g., by telling the truth even if it may lead the reader to reproach the hero). There is another chance phrase in the *Lives* that could define Plutarch's arrangement of his material from a new point of view: I do not maintain that what the passage teaches us is new—on the contrary: every reader of Plutarch feels its truth at once; rather I think that the *passage* is less known than it should be. If I am mistaken, so much the better.

It is *Cato Minor* 9.10. Plutarch there says: Ἀρετῆς ⟨...⟩ ἀληθινὸς οὐκ ἐγγίνεται ζῆλος ἢ δι' ἄκρας τοῦ παραδιδόντος εὐνοίας καὶ τιμῆς· οἱ δ' ἄνευ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐπαινοῦντες τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αἰδοῦνται ⟨μὲν⟩ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, οὐ θαυμάζουσιν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐδὲ μιμοῦνται. Immediately prior to this Plutarch mentioned that Cato by his dress, his life-style and his gait, by his being superior to the people who bear the title of *imperatores* in manner, magnanimity and eloquence, attracted the fondness of his soldiers.

If we combine this passage with *Aemil. Paull.* 1, we will see that it explains incidentally the way Plutarch presents his heroes. In *Aemil. Paull.* he lays stress on the *examination* of the heroes. But even there the idea of *hosting* them is equivalent to decreasing the distance between reader and hero. However, in most cases he positively tries to generate inclination to the person as a whole, as Cato succeeds in doing without taking care. This is sometimes particularly clear, as, e.g., in the case of Lucullus,[48] towards whom he feels gratitude because he was a benefac-

[47] The passage to be quoted and *Romulus* 16.8.

[48] Plutarch's intention to defend Lucullus and to amplify his (certainly great) exploits has been shown by Bulin (1983) 89–98. Bulin's result is based on a comparison between Plutarch and other sources.

tor of his native town Chaironeia. There is the intention to make the Gracchi and their endeavours speak to our hearts, Cicero and all the other problematic statesmen and generals are presented as if by a good friend who tries to make the best of the sometimes not so flattering data, to say nothing about the others whom he deeply admires, such as Lycurgus, Aemilius Paullus, and Dio. So I think the passage may be read as a self-testimony. Plutarch speaks not about writing biographies, it is true, but his remark is so general that it can be related to it (as to many other things) without difficulty.

There is a further implication. The rhetoricians used to teach, and Aristotle does so too, that the speaker himself should try to exhibit his character as untainted and himself as a trustworthy adviser. Now the Cato passage can be related not only to the hero of the respective *Life*, but also to the author of the gallery himself. For *Plutarch* wants to make us better, and he seems to know that he can achieve his aim only if he himself is trustworthy.[49] In his case there could be one more postulate. It would demand that the writer himself should evoke the inclination of his readers. The text of *Cato Minor* 9.10 is general enough to correspond also to this interpretation. There is no doubt that Plutarch has achieved his aim.

However, I would like to concentrate here on Plutarch's *hero* as the object of affection. One possibility to show Plutarch's method is to compare his report or his judgment with what other writers say who deal with the same person. I chose the final evaluation of Galba in Tacitus' *Historiae* and Plutarch's summary of Galba's achievements. The two texts are so close to each other that we can conjecture that they rely on a common source. Considering that the *material* is the same in both cases, the differences are the more striking.

Tacitus is, to say the least, not very close to Plutarch. He is a political writer, it is true, but even more he is an enormous artist who creates figures of Shakespearian intensity. He adds to his always impressive portraiture of persons and situations the somber ambivalence of his verdicts; every reader feels that this way of speaking is appropriate for matters that have to do with human decisions and arrangements. There is no inclination towards his heroes[50] and absolutely no interest to make us love them. And it is not a museum of great men, but a

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[49] Cp. Stadter (1988) 292.

[50] For the story of Germanicus, especially of his death, and the praise bestowed on him *Annals* 2.71–73, see Pelling (1993) *passim*.

limited time of history seen through coloured glasses that provides him with his material. So it is by contrast that we learn from him what is peculiar to Plutarch. Here are the texts (the passages that are peculiar to each author are in italics):[51]

Hunc exitum habuit Servius Galba, tribus et septuaginta annis quinque principes prospera fortuna emensus et alieno imperio felicior quam suo. vetus in familia nobilitas, magnae opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus. *Famae nec incuriosus nec venditator; pecuniae alienae non adpetens, suae parcus, publicae avarus; amicorum libertorumque, ubi in bonos incidisset, sine reprehensione patiens, si mali forent, usque ad culpam ignarus. sed claritas natalium et metus temporum obtentui*, ut, quod segnitia erat, sapientia vocaretur. *dum vigebat aetas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit. pro consule Africam moderate, iam senior citeriorem Hispaniam pari iustitia continuit*, maior privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset.

Τοιαῦτα τὰ κατὰ τὸν Γάλβαν, ἄνδρα μήτε γένει μήτε πλούτῳ πολλῶν ἀπολειφθέντα Ῥωμαίων, ὁμοῦ δὲ πλούτῳ καὶ γένει πρωτεύσαντα πάντων τῶν καθ’ αὑτόν, πέντε αὐτοκρατόρων ἡγεμονίαις ἐμβιώσαντα μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης, ὥστε τῇ δόξῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ δυνάμει καθελεῖν Νέρωνα· τῶν ⟨γὰρ⟩ συνεπιτιθεμένων τότε τοὺς μὲν οὐδεὶς ἠξίωσε τῆς ἡγεμονίας, οἳ δ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἀπηξίωσαν, *Γάλβας δὲ καὶ κληθεὶς καὶ ὑπακούσας αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ τῇ Οὐίνδικος ἐμπαρασχὼν ὄνομα τόλμῃ, κίνημα καὶ νεωτερισμὸν αὐτοῦ λεγομένην τὴν ἀπόστασιν ἐποίησε πόλεμον ἐμφύλιον ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμονικοῦ τυχοῦσαν*. ὅθεν οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνειν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτόν οἰόμενος διδόναι τοῖς πράγμασιν, *ἄρχειν ἠξίου τῶν ὑπὸ Τιγελλίνου καὶ Νυμφιδίου τετιθασευμένων* ὡς Σκιπίων ἦρχε καὶ Φαβρίκιος καὶ Κάμιλλος τῶν τότε Ῥωμαίων. *ὑπερειπόμενος δὲ τῷ γήρᾳ* ἄχρι τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν στρατευμάτων ἄκρατος ἦν καὶ ἀρχαῖος αὐτοκράτωρ, *Οὐινίῳ δὲ καὶ Λάκωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπελευθέροις πάντα τὰ πράγματα πωλοῦσι παρέχων ἑαυτὸν οἷον Νέρων παρεῖχε τοῖς ἀπληστοτάτοις*, οὐδένα ποθοῦντα τὴν ἀρχήν, οἰκτείραντας δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς τὸν θάνατον ἀπέλιπεν.

A short interpretation of the two passages will explain the differences. Let us begin with Plutarch.

Τοιαῦτα ⟨…⟩ ἀπηξίωσαν. All this is praise. In classical antiquity, high birth and riches were assessed as meritorious. Plutarch attributes integrity under five emperors to him and traces the overthrow of Nero to this integrity.

Γάλβας ⟨…⟩ τυχοῦσαν. Galba supports Nero’s fall by supporting Vindex. In so doing, he makes a civil war proper out of what had been a petty revolt. The term “civil war” here evokes such events as the great wars between Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, Octavian and Antony, thus amplifying the enterprise and the man who brought the skirmishes to the higher level of a historical event. This praise is somewhat bold, considering the connotation of “civil war” in these post-Augustan times. Plutarch goes very far to achieve his aim.

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[51] Tacitus *Historiae* 1.49.2–4; Plutarch, *Galba* 29.

ὅθεν ⟨…⟩ Ῥωμαίων. *Because* (ὅθεν) Galba was such a man he selflessly tried to reshape the corrupted principate into a state worthy of a Scipio, Fabricius and Camillus.—Until now, there is not the faintest notion of blame in this epilogue.

ὑπερειπόμενος ⟨…⟩ ἀπέλιπεν. Even before Plutarch shortly touches on the frailty of the old man he assures us that he nevertheless was a general and *imperator* of the good old type. However old, a good soldier he remained to the end. Then, finally and, as it were, reluctantly, the deficiencies, in a hurry: in leaving "everything" to his ἀπελεύθεροι he was not better than Nero: so no one would have him back, but all deplored his death.

The message is unequivocal: Galba was an excellent man with one weak side in his old age. *Even if this does not cope with the previous text of the biography*, Plutarch wants the reader to leave the unhappy emperor with sympathy and kind feelings.

The (probably) Flavian source of Plutarch's biography seems to have been hostile to Galba, so it is improbable that it changed the tone at the very end. Only when an author felt the necessity to say by all means something good about his hero and to make us benevolent towards him would he commit such a humane *sacrificium intellectus* as Plutarch does by his epilogue.

I will add some short remarks about Tacitus; his intention and the difference between him and Plutarch is clear enough.

hunc ⟨…⟩ *suo*. Galba survives five emperors not in honour and glory, but by chance. The merit has disappeared, and the judge has taken a different position. Tacitus looks at Galba from above, Plutarch rather from beneath, or, to say it more cautiously, not from above. What follows is excellent sarcasm: under the five emperors whom he survived he was better off than under his own government.

vetus ⟨…⟩ *virtutibus*. Nobility and riches, in Plutarch titles of honour, are here a platform for disparagement. All the conditions were satisfied to make him a great man, and then this: his *ingenium* was moderate, his character was rather not bad than good. The verdict is cruel.

famae ⟨…⟩ *avarus*. In Plutarch, there was first the praise, then, hastily and *sotto voce*, the criticism. Here we have the contrary composition. In matters of glory and money Galba behaves well. If Tacitus had begun with these items, the whole epilogue would have had a very different character. But after what had been said about him before, especially about his *medium ingenium*, even such praiseworthy qualities as are mentioned here will be received by some readers with a contemptuous

smile. If we combine this remark of Tacitus with what follows some lines below about Galba's military exploits in Germany and his conduct in Africa and Spain, the parallel information in Plutarch would consist in Galba's resemblance to Scipio, Fabricius and Camillus and in the approving words that Galba was an ἄκρατος ⟨…⟩ καὶ ἀρχαῖος αὐτοκράτωρ.

amicorum ⟨…⟩ *ignarus*. The first part only seems to express approval; *patiens* ends this impression and *ignarus* makes clear that the man was—stupid.

sed ⟨…⟩ *vocaretur*. It seems that there also were friendly voices that said that Galba was a prudent man. Against these voices Tacitus directs his ironic remark, invalidating it effectively. What he says here, suits his verdict *medium ingenium* and *magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus* and *usque ad culpam ignarus*.

dum ⟨…⟩ *continuit*. Again an illusive praise. Taken by itself, it makes Galba a worthy Roman; if put at the beginning of the epilogue, it would alter the tone of the whole passage considerably. Particularly the pungent *magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus* would not be as credible. Now these words bias the interpretation of whatever is said afterwards about the good aspects of Galba's performance.

maior ⟨…⟩ *imperasset*. Perfectly Tacitean. The positive implications of the judgment make it even more devastating. Shortcomings of this sort are worse than complete negligibility.

The difference between the two judgments makes it clear how Plutarch tried to present a historical figure even if he was, as in our case, perhaps not included in the group of those great persons of the past to whom the introduction to *Aemil. Paull.* refers. If he dealt with *these*, we should expect him to have taken even more pains to generate benevolence towards them.

With regard to our limited subject (ἔπαινος / εὔνοια), Plutarch's closest relative among the historians and biographers of the early empire is Livy. It is true that this great writer does not try to generate *benevolence* towards the *maiores*, but rather it is reverence, respect, and admiration that he wants to create, so forming a common memory that would uphold the Augustan enterprise of the revival of ancient Rome. The preface to *Aemil. Paull.* is not far from Livy, neither is the concept of ἔπαινος and of the imaginary museum. The differences between the two authors are, of course, not to be neglected; the *common* trait depends, I repeat, on the *limits* of our question. Livy is a political author, Plutarch is not, or to a much lesser degree. Plutarch's particu-

lar religiosity and his particular ethical outlook are unmatched in Livy. Livy's striving for dramatization is not Plutarchan—the list of differences can easily be continued. But, and in this point the two authors approach each other, both rely on ἔπαινος and both try to generate affection towards the figures of the past (in the case of Livy, to the past in general). The affection is in one case Roman, in the other not especially Greek but Plutarchan. Perhaps here, concerning this *Plutarchan* mood, Plutarch's next parallels are Cicero's *De re publica* and Virgil's *Georgics* and *Aeneid*. But possibly I am in the grip of fantasy here.

DO PLUTARCH'S POLITICIANS NEVER LEARN?

Christopher Pelling

> It is a common belief, attested by the existence of political science as a subject of academic study, that the arts of government may be learned from books. The revolutionary career of Caesar's heir reveals never a trace of theoretical preoccupations: if it did, it would have been very different and very short.
>
> Lessons might indeed be learned, but from men and affairs, from predecessors and rivals, from the immediate and still tangible past…

That, unsurprisingly, is not Plutarch; it is Sir Ronald Syme, writing on the young Octavian.[1] We might expect Plutarch to disagree with at least the first part, the impossibility of learning statecraft from books: for does he not write book after book on political wisdom, not merely the explicit works in the *Moralia*—*Advice on Public Life, Should an Old Man Engage in Politics?*—but also surely, in some sense, the *Parallel Lives* themselves? He clearly expects his readers, and indeed himself, to learn *something* from these narratives. In the proem to the *Pericles* he is explicit that historical narrative can do what no statue can achieve, leading the thoughtful reader to a more informed as well as a more inspiring view of how the good politician, or perhaps the good man in politics, ought to behave (*Per*. 2). True, he also stresses that these lessons require discrimination: in a famous passage in *Advice on Public Life* (814A–C) he warns against the misuse of over-grand talk about the past—it does no good, and it might do a lot of harm, to inflate people with aspirations borne of Marathon, Eurymedon, and Plataea. But in the same passage he is clear that *some* lessons are to be learnt, about the way the Athenians behaved under the Thirty, for instance. This, we might expect, is not an author who would be too cynical about any notion that "the arts of government"—or at least of politics—"may be learned from books".

Yet this extraction of lessons for Plutarch's own generation is anything but straightforward: I have argued this elsewhere.[2] When he

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[1] Syme (1939) 121.

[2] Thus in Pelling (1995) = (2002a) chapter 10 I argue that the *Lives* have "resonance" for Plutarch's own day, but it is difficult to extract clear political guidance, and we

grazes themes with resonance for his own day–the dangers of domestic Greek "contentiousness", φιλονικία, in *Philopoemen–Flamininus*—the contemporary relevance may certainly draw readers in to be more *interested*, more engaged in the stories they read about. But do they really learn anything that they could apply to real everyday political problems? That is more difficult: it is often very hard to define exactly what course of action Plutarch would be recommending.[3] Much of the argument of Tim Duff's important book tells in the same direction:[4] in *Life* after *Life* Duff brings out that the ethical interest is multivalent, and pairs like (say) *Lysander–Sulla* or *Phocion–Cato minor* can be deeply problematic when readers try to trace their implications for their own conduct.

Both Duff's work and my own have here been reader-centred, exploring what Plutarch's audience, narratees, even "we" (the ubiquitous "we" of modern criticism) can learn from the *Lives*;[5] and more particularly *how* we can learn from his work, whether it is the sort of "moral" lesson which we can follow as a sort of maxim, or whether it is rather more a sort of mental exercise, stirring up our ethical sensibilities by making us wonder what it would be like to be in a very different, and very challenging, moral situation—what would *I* do if I were in Antony's shoes.[6] Jane Chaplin's recent book on *Livy's Exemplary History* reminds us that there is another way into this question, and that is to look at how lessons are learnt by an author's own characters, those historical figures who are acting *in the text*. Chaplin is herself particularly concerned with lessons from the past, as she looks at how Livy's figures learnt from earlier history and applied the distinctive Roman cast of *exempla*-thinking to their own situations. It emerges that there too it is very difficult to learn lessons: the past can be interpreted in several different ways, the same *exemplum* can itself be exploited in different directions, and the past is a site for contestation, argument, and perplexity

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can see some nimble footwork in avoiding making the contemporary implications too precise. I then pursue this theme with particular relevance to Trajan in Pelling (2002b) = (2002a) ch. 11.

[3] See Pelling (1995) 213–217 = (2002a) 243–247.

[4] Duff (1999), e.g. ch. 5 on *Phoc.–Cato min.* and 6 on *Lys.-Sulla*—though Duff may want more practical implications for contemporary life than I would (e.g. 309, "…a Greek response to Roman power, a statement of resistance").

[5] I have said more about Plutarch's "narratees", including "us", in Pelling (2002a) ch. 12.

[6] That approach to moralism is put particularly clearly by Stadter (2000), esp. 505.

rather than a clear repertoire of neat moral directions. In other words, characters *in* Livy's history view the past in a way not too far away from the way that both Duff and I think readers *of* Plutarch's *Lives* reflect on the stories they read there.

What about the characters in Plutarch's text? Do his politicians ever learn? And let us take learning to embrace both of Syme's categories, both book-learning and lessons from "from men and affairs … from the immediate and still tangible past"—lessons, that is, from experience.

Do they ever learn? Yes, of course they do. They can learn from the past: Agis can be inspired by Lycurgus and Spartan tradition,[7] Cleomenes by hearing about what happened to Agis and by listening to a philosopher,[8] Phocion by the thought of taking up the heritage of Pericles, Aristides, and Solon,[9] Brutus by the memory of what his ancestor had done,[10] Caesar by reading a book about Alexander and reflecting that at his age Alexander had conquered the world.[11] Notice that it is *not* from gazing at a statue of Alexander, as in the usual version:[12] Plutarch himself finds narrative a more inspiring medium than the visual arts (*Per.* 2, above), and his Caesar found it that way too. This is book-learning, indeed. And politicians can learn from experience, too—Syme's second category. Agesilaus can pick up from Lysander the ways of playing politics in Asia Minor, dancing court on the satraps and receiving court himself, and can even outplay Lysander at his own game;[13] Nicias has observed the Athenian people, and knows about the dangers of returning unsuccessful.[14] At Rome, Caesar's career initially fools people: they cannot believe that any danger can come from someone who dresses so sloppily, or parts his hair with one finger. Only Cato sees the danger; others, and most particularly Pompey, do not, and it is only "late" that they come round to sensing it. It is precisely experience, noticing what Caesar is up to in Gaul and (even in his absence) in Rome too, that finally alerts people to the mistakes they

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7 *Ag.–Cl.* 4.2, 6.2.

8 *Ag.–Cl.* 22(1)–23(2). For similar passages cf. Wardman (1974) 215.

9 *Phoc.* 7.5–6. For similar passages, esp. *Thes.* 6.8–9, cf. Frazier (1995) 148–149 and Pelling (1990) 229–230 = (2002a) 311.

10 *Brut.* 1, 9.6, 10.6.

11 *Caes.* 11.

12 Contrast Suet. *Div. Iul.* 7.1 and Cassius Dio 37.52.2, who have Caesar gazing at a statue of Alexander in the temple of Hercules in Cádiz: Pelling (2002b) = (2002a) 257.

13 *Lys.* 19.

14 *Nic.* 22.2–3 (~ Thuc. 7.48).

have made.[15] In a less famous sequence, Sertorius infers exactly what he has to expect, and to fear, from his knowledge of Marius' and Sulla's character and past (*Sert.* 5.1–3, 6.3), and directs his conduct accordingly.

But that example, and some of the others too, also suggests a second train of thought. Sertorius tries to persuade others of the danger, but he cannot. Scipio proves unpersuadable of the dangers of Sulla (6.3); Cinna listens to Sertorius' arguments about Marius, but still it does no good, because—as Sertorius himself acknowledges—Cinna's own ties to Marius are so close that he has no option but to follow him. One can learn lessons from experience; but it is not at all clear that those lessons will do much good, or that one only needs to recognise clear and present dangers in order to avert them. All Sertorius can do is—leave (6.4). Or take that growing awareness of the danger posed by the rising Caesar. Cato may have been the only one to sense the danger early, but it is not clear that his opposition to Caesar or his denunciations made things better; indeed, the narrative of 59 in Cato's own life is tweaked to make Cato even more responsible than elsewhere for the disasters that ensued.[16] If only he had not been so resistant to the idea of a marriage-alliance with Pompey, it all might not have turned out so badly… (*Cato min.* 30.9–10): we are reminded of the passage from Cicero's letters which Plutarch decided to use in his proem to *Phocion–Cato minor*, the gibe that Cato speaks and acts as if he were living in Plato's Republic, not the sewers of the Roman people (*Phoc.* 3.2). In that case book-learning—Cato's philosophical uprightness—and experience alike do not help much: they just make the danger worse. The same goes for Pompey's learning from experience of Caesar's danger. We do not get quite the same analysis in each *Life*—Pompey is quicker to wake up to the danger in his own *Life* than in the others[17]—but even there it does him no good, as he decides that his best policy is to pretend to be contemptuous of Caesar, and try to disarm the danger by being grand and confident about it (*Pomp.* 54.2). Whether Pompey is just blind, as in most of the *Lives*, or alert, as here, the upshot is the same: by now, Caesar cannot be stopped.

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15 Caesar's enemies initially fooled: *Caes.* 4.5–8 (no danger from that sort of man; it is late—ὀψέ—that they realise the truth), 5.8, 6.6–7 etc. Cato's insight: *Caes.* 13.6; *Pomp.* 47.4; *Cato min.* 31.7, 42.6, 43.3, 43.9.

16 Pelling (1980) 129 = (2002a) 93. On this passage cf. also Frazier (1995) 159–160.

17 Pelling (1980) 131–132 = (2002a) 96–98.

Nor is the upshot of our other examples clearly a positive one, even in those cases where learning clearly does make a difference. Brutus may be inspired to get rid of Caesar; but was *that* a good thing? In the epilogue to *Dion–Brutus*, Plutarch thinks it was not: Rome's malaise was by then so acute that Caesar was the best possible doctor (*Brut.* 55[2].2). Agis and Cleomenes may have been well-intentioned, but did they get it right? No, not really, thinks Plutarch: their ambition (φιλοτιμία) led them astray, they were *over*-inspired by a grand idea (*Ag.–Cl.* 2). And was it good for Caesar to play Alexander, or for Agesilaus to learn from Lysander to be so unspartan? We are already seeing that these lessons are difficult ones to define, and that characters in the text are finding practical wisdom as elusive as we saw reason to believe that Plutarch's readers—"we", "us"—might find it too.

Dion—Brutus

Dion–Brutus is a pair where we might expect philosophical learning to be particularly tested: it is not quite "book-learning" in *Dion*, perhaps, but the same issues arise, with Plato as a sort of walking book. In one, sweeping mood Plutarch can say that "Plato left fine words about laws and the constitution in his writings, but he implanted far better ones in his comrades: as a result of these Sicily was freed through Dion and Thrace through Python and Heracleides when they murdered Cotys, while in Athens generals like Chabrias and Phocion came out of the Academy…" (*Aduersus Colotem* 1126B–C).[18] In *Dion* too, as Lukas de Blois has argued, Plutarch has surely exaggerated the impact of Plato on Syracusan politics, and may be recasting Plato to align him more closely with the "wise man who was opposing tyrannical rulers and giving advice to good monarchs"—as De Blois says, a role with considerable resonance in the second century cultural imagination.[19] If so, we might expect the lessons of this *Life* to be particularly applicable

[18] Admittedly, he strikes different notes elsewhere: cf. Muccioli (1995) 278–281, who points in particular to *de Alex. Magn. fort. aut uirt.* 328D–E and *Lyc.* 31.2–3, both contrasting Plato's political impact with those of the great founders of cities or constitutions. It is not clear that the passages are wholly incompatible, but in each case the perspective and tone are anyway conditioned by context and genre: note "Sicily" (rather than Syracuse) in the *Adv. Colotem* passage, a looseness which Plutarch would not allow in the *Lives*.

[19] De Blois (1997) 214–216; (1999) 303–304.

to Plutarch's own day: as Dion learnt from Plato, so others may learn from Plutarch himself. But what exactly are these lessons to be? And how practicable will it be to apply them?

Dion evidently learns a good deal from his philosophy, especially from Plato, but we are also given an early hint that not everyone will learn very much. When Dion brings Plato to influence the elder Dionysius, the monarch's response has a certain style about it. He not merely sends Plato back home, but also gives instructions that he should be killed or sold as a slave along the way "because it would not do him any harm, after all: he would be happy wherever he was", for justice alone was the key to happiness (5.6–7).[20] There is a sense, perhaps, in which Plato is allowed the last laugh here, at least intertextually, for the rather melodramatic description of Dionysius' "terrified" existence—περίφοβος—recalls some of Plato's more extreme stereotypings of a tyrant's life (ch. 9, esp. 9.8 with its Plato-reference, and 4.6; compare *Gorgias* 510b–c, *Republic* 8.567a–c, 9.579b–c).[21]

There is more intertextuality in the air when we move on to the younger Dionysius, and his more complex, and sometimes more comic, relations with Plato. There are those struggles, for instance, for the affections of the young prince with others who offered more mundane and obvious pleasures (ch. 7): that has something of the *Symposium* about it, and the struggles for the young Alcibiades' heart between Socrates and his other, more erotically straightforward admirers (*Symp.* 217a–19d, exploited for Plutarch's own description of those struggles at *Alc.* 4).[22] When Dionysius falls so totally for this, the air of the court hangs full of dust because of the "horde of geometers" drawing their figures in the sand (πλῆθος τῶν γεωμετρούντων, 13.4): the *Meno* is in the background of that.

Things soon start going even more off-key. To brush off erotically straightforward rivals is one thing; when the struggle for Dionysius' mind starts being with other intellectuals (especially Philistus) the tricks start being a little dirty and a little more uncomfortable. Dion is not too high-minded to refrain from plotting with the Carthaginians against

[20] On the various forms this anecdote takes see Riginos (1976) 86–92. Unsurprisingly, the historicity of this story has been doubted, or at least Dionysius' role in it: cf. esp. Kahrstedt (1947), Porter (1952) 52–54, Stroheker (1958) 22, 105, 191 n.81 (and works there cited); its basic truth is defended by Sanders (1992) 212.

[21] Cf. Stroheker (1958) 19, 21–22, 106.

[22] For Plutarch's exploitation of *Symposium* in *Alc.* cf. Russell (1966) 40 = (1995) 196; Duff (1999) 216–217.

Dionysius, for instance (chs. 12, 14.4–7): he may be a philosophical traitor, but he is a traitor all the same. Then Dionysius' heart rather overdoes it, falling not just for Plato's philosophy but for Plato himself, and the erotically straightforward comes back after all. Dionysius starts trying to woo Plato's affections away from Dion (chs. 16, 19) in a neat but curious inversion of the way which Plato's Socrates tried to woo Alcibiades away from his rivals. Dionysius does then start playing the tyrant too, applying all sorts of crude material pressure to Dion. But his purpose is again an odd one, and a paradoxical travesty of a tyrant's normal aims: for it is all to get Plato to come back to Sicily (ch. 18), and ironically to knock all this tyrant stuff out of himself (cf. 16.4, 19.8). If this is the route to Plato's Republic, it has certainly taken some odd diversions along the way. And—predictably (19.7)—it does not last, and Plato and Dionysius fall out. Plato is lucky to be able to leave (20).[23]

When progress is made, it is not by educating the tyrant: Dion eventually does return to launch his programme of ousting Dionysius—in itself, something that may by now be very philosophically correct.[24] The problems that face him, though, are not at all those which a Platonic upbringing really fits him for. Dion has to take on other leaders who are more unscrupulous, and faces the problem of handling a captious *dêmos* and their demagogues (33–34, 37–39). This is a people that cannot appreciate high moral behaviour (32.1–2, cf. 33.5), and that cannot resist a bout of over-drunken celebrations (41.2–3). Even

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[23] De Blois (1997) 214 fairly comments that Plutarch makes a great deal of the impact of Plato on Syracusan politics: "The authors of the Platonic Epistles, especially the man who wrote the *Seventh Epistle*, probably Plato himself, are much more sceptical about Plato's chances of exerting real influence on the attitude of the tyrant and changing the polity and mentality of the Syracusans". But, ultimately, Plutarch is sceptical too: the difference is that Plutarch makes more of the initial *impression* that the impact may be real. Candau Morón (1999) prefers to make both Brutus and Dion examples of an ethically immaculate "metapolítica" which is at odds with "la política real" (246). That is well said, though I am uncertain whether Brutus and Dion are quite such embodiments of "ethical perfection" as Candau Morón claims.

[24] Or so Plutarch clearly thought: hence there is nothing here *incompatible* with the enthusiasm of the *Adv. Colotem* passage (above), though the register is very different. For Plutarch's view cf. esp. *Brut.* 55(2), where liberating Syracuse from Dionysius is contrasted with Brutus' more problematic assassination of Caesar; and also *Tim.* 5.1–2, 41[2].11, where Plutarch clearly has fewer doubts than Timoleon himself about the killing of his tyrant-brother. At *Tim.*32.1–2, 33.1–2, 40(1).2 execution of tyrants again seems morally unproblematic, though that of their womenfolk is clearly felt as wrong; cf. also *Phil.* 1.4. It is not clear that Plato himself (or the "Plato" that Plutarch would construct from the *Seventh Letter*) would have agreed about the ethical desirability of ousting Dionysius: cf. esp. *Seventh Letter* 331c7–d5, 350c3–d4.

when he is successful, what eventually gives him his chance is his opponents' decision to burn down the city rather than abandon it (44–45)—hardly the Platonic prescription of how to set about creating a city with a philosopher-king. Dion wants to act as a doctor to the sick state, restraining it and keeping it in a precise and prudent regimen (37.7); that picks up on the passage which Plutarch himself earlier (11.3) quoted from the *Seventh Letter*, where Plato "expected that through a single person, as if by the purification of the leading part, he would heal the whole of Sicily in its sick state". There was a wryness about the *Seventh Letter* passage itself (328c), as it dwells on how naïve Plato had been. Plutarch too brings out that the healing process is anything but straightforward, and gives it an extra nuance: for his word for "purification" here is ἐκκαθαρθέντος—or does this rather mean "removal by purgation"? That is a neat twist on the familiar puzzle about that word, and it is interesting that it was not used in the *Seventh Letter* passage itself.[25]

The medical imagery continues, with Dion's enemies characterised as the "disease" (37.7, 47.3, 54.5); but it all leads up to that passage in the synkritic epilogue, where at least in Brutus' case it emerges that it was the tyrant, Caesar, rather than the tyrannicide who was the real "best doctor" for the state, 55(2).2 (above). Admittedly, part of the point in the epilogue is precisely to contrast this "best doctor" with Dionysius, the more acknowledged "tyrant": but it does bring out how difficult it is to draw general conclusions from a case like Dion's, how misleading it might be to be inspired by a case like that. Idealistic tyrant-purgation can, in the real world of politics, be a lot more morally problematic than it might seem.

There is a second intertextual presence in those chapters too, that of Thucydides: that is heralded early by the fears that this single sophist, Plato, might be the instrument for achieving what the Athenians had failed to do "before, when they came here with vast sea and land power and were killed and destroyed before taking Syracuse" (14.2). Later we are several times reminded of Hermocrates in Thucydides 6–7, who faced counterparts of many of these events: unscrupulous

[25] Though the *Seventh Letter* does develop a similar series of medical images elsewhere in the context of healing Syracuse (330c–d, 331a, 331c, cf. *Fourth Letter* 320e, *Eighth Letter* 354d), and Plato does use a similar conceit with κάθαρσις at *Rep.* 8.567c: the tyrant has to plot against all his enemies "until he purifies/purges the city". At *Laws* 5.735d–6a he explores more explicitly the different "purifications" which a city may be given, ranging from the drastic and painful to the mildly restorative: it is again the tyrant who uses the harshest forms, though there the idea is given a more positive turn.

demagogue opponents (Thuc. 6.35.2–39), replacement of generals in a crisis (6.103.4, cf. *Dion* 37.6–38.4), over-drunken celebrations (7.73, cf. *Dion* 41.2–3), a battle at a river-crossing (7.84–85, cf. *Dion* 39.4), the arrival of a Spartan guest-commander (6.93.2, 7.2 etc.; cf. "in the same way as Gylippus before" *Dion* 49.5), and so on. The point of these parallels is unlikely to be simple, nor always the same; but most of these were problems or opportunities which Hermocrates handled well, usually better than Dion handles things now. The street-wise real life model may be a better guide than any philosophical book-learning.

The most interesting clash between philosophical idealism and the needs of the real world comes at ch. 47, where Dion's scurrilous opponent Heracleides falls into his power. His friends and allies press him to remove this "disease" (νόσημα, 47.3): sickness imagery again. The opposing demagogues shrewdly urge Dion to show his superiority over anger and spare his adversary: that is exactly the thing to say to the philosophically correct Dion, and he duly *is* merciful, explicitly relating his decision to his training in the Academy (47.4–9). But is he right? It is a difficult question, as difficult as the parallel question in the *Brutus* whether it was right to spare Antony on the Ides of March (18.3, 20.2). It certainly *seems* not to be right; within a chapter Heracleides is up to his old tricks, and Dion's friends can reasonably criticise him for being too high-minded to take their advice (48.9). A few chapters later, and things have worsened further; and this time Dion gives in to his friends, and orders the killing of Heracleides—and, interestingly, gets quite a good press from Plutarch for it (53.6), just as Brutus will get a bad press for sparing Antony (*Brut.* 20.2). The Syracusans "came to realise" that this town was not big enough for both Heracleides and Dion to practise politics. This is, indeed, a very hard-nosed and not specially idealistic picture, one where indeed "the end may justify the means",[26] and one where both Dion and the Syracusans show that they have learned—but by experience, not from books or theory.

[26] On this cf. Nikolaidis (1993), bringing out that "[m]oralist and idealist as he may be, Plutarch is also an alert pragmatist, a man of real life, … and his moral outlook feeds constantly on his experience and common sense". He therefore several times justifies or condones questionable means in the service of laudable ends: Nikolaidis' examples include Plutarch's approval for the rape of the Sabine women (*Rom.* 35[6].2), Timoleon's fratricide-tyrannicide (*Tim.*5.1, 41[2].11: above), Sertorius' tricking of Spanish tribes (*Sert.* 11.6–12.1) and Numa's deception of the Roman people (*Numa* 4.12). In such cases Plutarch tends to regard the service of the state as the higher good: cf. Frazier (1995) 166–171.

There are a few more twists and turns to go in this *Life*, and they will be enough to see the end of Dion himself,[27] outmanoeuvred ironically by one of his Platonic cronies (54–56) even as he tries to apply Platonic insights about the flaws of democracy (53.4);[28] but the drift should already be clear. Much is indeed captured by the reminder, at the end of the *Life* (52.5) as we had already heard at the beginning (8.4), that it was Plato himself who had warned Dion against his self-willed stubbornness, his αὐθάδεια (cf. *Fourth Letter* 321c1).[29] You have to be better at getting on with people, Plato had said; you have to be able to persuade and conciliate, to develop "plausibility" (τὸ πιθανόν). Philosophy is not enough; rhetoric is needed too. And there is a sense in which these reflections are teasing out a deeper theme of Plato himself, who was not at all unworldly about practical politics. Remember how he acknowledged that the utopia of the *Republic* might not be a practical possibility for mortals, even if it were right for gods or the children of gods (*Laws* 5.739d–e), and might simply be a paradigm "laid up in Heaven" (*Rep.* 9.592b); remember the disillusionment he expresses in the *Seventh Letter* (which Plutarch at least took to be genuine) about involvement in Athenian politics, or indeed in any contemporary state (325e–26a); remember too how he describes, almost revels in, the unsuitedness of Socrates to take on his much more street-wise attackers (*Gorgias* 486a–c, 511a–b, 521b–c). Dion may be more politically active than Socrates, but may ultimately be no better equipped for survival.

So philosophical learning turns out to be extremely difficult to apply to real-life politics. Dion in power may well be philosophically restrained, it may indeed be "as if he is dining with Plato at the Academy

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[27] Paradoxically, it is thus the tyrant-killer rather than the tyrant whose death is paralleled by Caesar's assassination in *Brutus*. Dion is killed "like a sacrificial victim" (57.4): this image is then followed through in *Brutus*, though less in the assassination itself than in tracing the sequel at 20.6, 45.8. Did the *Dion* passage play a part in suggesting the sacrificial imagery in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (esp. II.1.162–183)?

[28] Dion there tries to introduce a mixed constitution, "mixing together a Spartan and Cretan type of constitution from kingship and democracy, with aristocracy dominating…" (53.4): that is not too far from, though it is not identical with, the sort of mixed constitution sketched in the *Eighth Epistle* and Book 6 of the *Laws* as a next-best choice if a full-blown Platonic revolution were impossible (Porter [1952] 74, De Blois [1992] 4603, 4605).

[29] Cf. also 17.3, the shrewd steps Plato takes to arrange the right company for Dion in exile: the purpose was to provide the mix of elegance and intellectual companionship which would "make his character sweeter" (ἐφηδύνεσθαι τοῦ Δίωνος τὸ ἦθος), and 32.5, where Dion's σεμνόν demeanour is less attractive to the populace than the charms of Heracleides.

every night" (52.3), but the mismatch between that and the hard realities of politics is strongly felt (52.5–6)—and Plato himself knew as much, with that shrewd advice he had given Dion not to be too stubborn. Perhaps Plato himself would have shared Plutarch's criticism of Cato, that it is a mistake to behave as if you are living in Plato's Republic. In *Dion* the lessons which seem the sharper ones are indeed those learned "from men and affairs", and those leave no room to be too idealistic: a Heracleides has got to go.

And yet, and yet …—should we assume that Dion was *wrong* to spare Heracleides, to yield to mercy rather than pragmatism? The issue is the more difficult because even the practical issue is blurred: whether Dion spares Heracleides, as he does at first, or eliminates him, as he eventually decides is wise, it anyway seems to end badly. As so often, it is extremely difficult to extract any clear implication on how one *should* act, in eliminating a Dionysius or a Heracleides or indeed a Julius Caesar; just as it is difficult to extract clear moral lessons from all those other Plutarchan cases when a wise man faces up to intractable problems and ruthless opponents, and has no clear path to success.[30]

Admittedly, some worlds and some societies may be simpler: the world of *Numa*, for instance, where we can see a king applying simpler lessons "and illustrating the truth of Plato's saying many generations later, that human ills would only vanish when the power of a king were combined with the wisdom of a philosopher…" (*Numa* 20.8); but how many readers were likely to live in a world like that?[31] Plutarch himself stressed that the world soon changed after Numa's death, and that Rome's expansion had since changed it immeasurably more (*Numa* 26[4].10–13). In the politics of the real world, readers and characters alike will find any sort of clear learning elusive—except for the simple lesson that it is all very difficult.

[30] For analysis of these cases cf. De Blois (1992) 4606–11.

[31] "Quite a few", might be one answer, at least within a generation or so, for if anyone combined the wisdom of a philosopher with the power of a king it was Marcus Aurelius. But Plutarch could hardly foresee that; nor would Marcus himself find it straightforward to apply philosophical wisdom to a complex and wicked world. On *Numa* cf. De Blois (1992) 4601–4, stressing both the importance of the *Life* for reconstructing one Plutarchan ideal and the difficulty of extrapolating morals for other, more complicated worlds.

Solon—Poplicola

> Is there not something distinctive about this comparison which we have not really found in any other of my writings—that one became the imitator of the other, and the other bore witness to the first?
>
> (*Popl.* 24[1].1)

So Solon's insights about human felicity not merely "bore witness" to Poplicola's good fortune,[32] Poplicola also was an "imitator" (μιμητής) of his Greek predecessor. This then is another a case where learning from past experience may be particularly in point—or so we might expect.

Solon is a wise man, and one who famously never ceased to learn as he grew old (γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ διδασκόμενος, another quotation that Plutarch uses both at the beginning and at the end of a *Life*, *Solon* 2.2 and 31.7); whereas Poplicola at least knew enough to take Solon as his model and be his "imitator". In fact, there is rather less on either of those themes than we might expect. True, there is an emphasis on wisdom in *Solon*—it is interesting how many other wise figures crop up in this *Life*, Thales, Periander, Lycurgus, Pittacus, and more, rather as they do in the early pages of Herodotus—but there is very little on where he gets his wisdom *from*. Surprisingly, for instance, there is less on what Solon learnt from his journeys (despite the early emphasis at 2.1–2) than there is in the equivalent treatment of Lycurgus' travelling (*Lyc.* 4): we hear only that his trading experience gave him a certain loucheness of lifestyle and vulgarity in the way he describes his pleasures (3.1)—not at all the emphasis one might expect.[33] Then Epimenides is at one point viewed as preparing the way for Solon—

[32] In the slightly forced sense, as Plutarch goes on to explain, that Poplicola was an even better example to demonstrate Solon's insight than Tellus (*Sol.* 27.6). If that was to be said at all, it would more naturally be phrased as Poplicola "bearing witness to" Solon's wisdom rather than the other way round. The phraseology of *Popl.* 23.2, describing Poplicola's death, is already preparing for the Solonian point: "he brought his life to conclusion (ἐκ τελ ειωθείς) amid those things which are thought beautiful and good, insofar as that is attainable for humans". The key-words τέλος and ἄνθρωπος would be as familiar from Herodotus 1.29–33 as from *Sol.* 27.

[33] One reason for this, doubtless not the only one, is structural: Plutarch chose to leave most of the detail of Solon's famous visits till the end of the *Life*, once the law-giving is over (26–28). That is not purely an artistic choice, for chronological reasons played a part: it allows Solon to garner his Egyptian wisdom at an age when it is plausible that he might not finish his "Atlantis-draft" (26.1, 31.6: below); it also minimises the chronological awkwardness which he acknowledges in the Croesus–Solon meeting (27.1). But that positioning also allows the suggestive juxtaposition with the Thespis and Peisistratus items (29–32) which I explore later in this paper.

but in the sense that he had softened up the Athenians and made them more receptive, not that he put ideas in Solon's head (12.7–12). Time and again, the emphasis of the *Life* falls on Solon as applying a shrewd sense of practical possibilities rather than any philosophical "principles".[34] As for Poplicola as Solon's "imitator", that strand is strong in the epilogue, and not merely in the opening words quoted above: it was also Solon's model there that inspired Poplicola to make "democracy" his watchword (25[2].2). But that was not the emphasis of the narrative in either *Solon* or *Poplicola* itself. In *Solon* (esp. 13–14) the emphasis fell more on the balance between rich and poor than on democracy, and indeed Solon is very restrained in his move in that direction (esp. 19.1–2). In *Poplicola* there is slightly more of a democratic stress—not unnaturally with one whose very name proclaimed how he cultivated the people—but there was not a hint that he had learned from Solon, nor are the measures described in a particularly Solonian way. Thus the phrasing of Poplicola's dicastic reforms (11.3) could have been brought closer to *Sol.* 18.3; the *boulê* material of 11.2 might have been elaborated with echoes of *Sol.* 19.

Still, this pair can still be useful for our inquiry, especially if we look at the passage where the difficulties of learning and teaching might particularly be expected: that is, of course, the meeting of Solon and Croesus, where Croesus is so slow to pick up Solon's teaching. "And so Solon left: he had given Croesus pain, but not managed to give him advice" (λυπήσας μέν, οὐ νουθετήσας δὲ τὸν Κροῖσον, 27.9). Even at the end, it is not at all clear that Croesus really understands Solon's point. On the pyre, when he finally cries out "Solon, Solon" and admires his wisdom, the lesson which Croesus himself learns is a rather disappointing one. "It was a greater evil to lose this wealth than a good to gain it" (28.4): *that*, for him, is what Solon must have "foreseen" when he urged him to "look to the end" (28.5). Yet is that really the lesson? It was not what Solon said, and earlier in the *Life* Plutarch himself had elaborately pointed a very different moral. Thales had there set up a ruse for the travelling Solon, and a visitor was primed to bring a false report from Athens that Solon's son had died.[35] Thales' point had been

[34] Cf. esp. 15.1–2, 16.2, 21.2, 22.3, 25.6, 28.1: this is then the note on which the pair ends, *Popl.* 27(4). 4–6. Note also the early contrast with Thales at 3.6–8: Solon's natural philosophy was rough and ready in an old-fashioned way, while Thales' was unnecessarily elaborate.

[35] That story is then mirrored by *Popl.* 14.6–8, the false story of the death of Horatius' son: Horatius' restrained response ("cast out the corpse wherever you wish, for

the sufferings that marriage and parenthood can bring (6). Plutarch had strongly disapproved, emphasising the folly of thinking that it is a mistake to have anything good at all, "wealth, or glory, or wisdom" (7.1), simply because one might one day lose it. That is virtually the opposite of the lesson that Croesus now draws.[36]

So, however much Solon has learnt, it does not seem that he is very successful at teaching it. The next few chapters of the *Life* pursue the theme further, as Solon himself confronts a violent change—if not a Croesus-like change of personal fortune, then at least a terrible threat to his life-work. Can he now do anything about Peisistratus, his youthful friend and admirer—and aspiring tyrant? No, he cannot. He fails to "soothe and advise" Peisistratus himself (πραΰνειν καὶ νουθετεῖν, 29.5: "advise", νουθετεῖν, again as with Croesus at 27.9). Nor can he teach the Athenians of the danger, as that *stasis* looms again which it was his great achievement to foresee and forestall; so the final chapters reprise the moral of Solon's exchange with Anacharsis in ch. 4, where Solon was hopeful and Anacharsis sceptical about the chances of restraining "the rich and powerful" by any law-giving.

How, though, does Solon set about trying to do something about this threat of *stasis*? Why, by using literature, in this case his poetry, to try to deliver a lesson. Thus "he wrote his poems and rebuked the Athenians" (30.8). He "went forward into the *agora*" (30.6) to warn of the dangers, just as he had before with his poetic warning about Salamis (8.1–3); the poetic ploy had worked then (ironically with Peisistratus' support), but it does not work now.[37] All he can do is denounce Peisistratus for his play-acting, his ploy of wounding himself to obtain a bodyguard: "play-acting" indeed, for Solon attacks him for "acting" as the Homeric Odysseus (ὑποκρίνῃ, 30.1), arch-deceiver as he was. That is the sort of literary trick which is working now.[38]

I do not accept the mourning") contrasts with Solon's intense emotion (*Sol.* 6.6). A little later in *Popl.* Mucius' initial failure to identify Porsenna (17.3) mirrors Solon's difficulty in telling which sumptuously dressed person is Croesus (*Sol.* 27.3), an interesting Plutarchan addition to Herodotus' account. Mucius is set on action, Solon on wisdom, neither of them uncreditably. There are various ways here in which Plutarch explores Greek–Roman differences.

[36] For further misreading in the narrative here, cf. Pelling (2002a) 267–268.

[37] Though once again (cf. above) there may be ways *in a simpler world* for literature to have positive effects on a political constituency: cf. *Lyc.* 4, on the good effects on Sparta both of the lyric poet Thales and of the Homeric epics; see also next note, on the way in which Solon himself, at least on one version, exploited Homer in earlier days.

[38] Once again there may be a contrast with Solon's own earlier activity: note 10.2,

In the middle of this sequence there is a strange extra item, one which at first sight looks most intrusive. This is the story of Thespis and his innovation of what would become tragic poetry, and Solon's fears of where this would all end: why, one day people might actually take such trivialities seriously (29.7). Perhaps that story is not so intrusive after all, given this play on the good and bad effects of poetry, especially "play-acting" poetry. There are the good effects that Solon's own poetry can no longer exercise; there are the bad effects that different, deceptive sorts of poetry—Peisistratus' brand, Thespis' brand—do have, or might one day have. In a train of thought like that, and with a mindset like Plutarch's, we would be amazed if Plato (yet again) was too far away, and indeed there are several pointers to Plato in the closing chapters of *Solon*.[39] The most important one concerns Atlantis. Solon himself in his old age "tried" to write a poem to make Egyptian ideas of Atlantis familiar to the Greeks (26.1); he indeed began to sketch a Utopian set of Atlantis-ideas but could not finish the draft (31.6, cf. Plato, *Tim.* 21C). Then there is a notice that Plato—though he "learnt" from Solon, the way wise people can—still did not carry it through either: "among so many beautiful works, Plato's picture of Atlantis is the only one he left unfinished", 32.2. The note that Plutarch chooses to leave the *Life* on is one of a beautiful plan but one left unfinished, perhaps unfinishable; and with the notice that Solon lived on to see the tyranny of Peisistratus (32.3–4, cf. 31), the clear testimony to the failure of his plans and of his "teaching".

Or is it, quite, a failure? Plutarch also stresses that Peisistratus' tyranny really was not as bad as all that: "for he kept and respected most of Solon's laws, in the first place abiding by them himself and making his friends do so"; he even bore to face a prosecution in the Areopagus court, even though his prosecutor wisely failed to arrive; he introduced other good laws himself, and laws which continued and took further Solon's own work (31.3–4). Perhaps Solon's fears were exaggerated; we have seen that his teaching capacity was narrower than it might have

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the version that Solon used his own form of trickery with the Homeric poems to make the Athenian claim to Salamis. True, Plutarch does not explicitly accept this version, and makes it clear that it is rejected by the Athenians (10.3); its inclusion still has some effect.

[39] And indeed of "Aristotle the philosopher", the last three words of the *Life*: Aristotle is there quoted for a misleading, "implausible and myth-like" version: another instance, though a rather different one, where the most respected literary figures cannot give sure guidance.

been; perhaps his wisdom too, based on so much learning, did not capture the whole truth either. That is an interesting theme to pursue into *Poplicola* too, where again "tyranny" is a prominent theme.[40] There the Romans are so desperate to avoid tyranny after their experience of the Tarquins: but perhaps they too have *over*-learnt from that experience, forcing Poplicola to demolish his own house because of their suspicions (10), driving the liberator Tarquinius into exile because he happened to share the tyrants' name (7.6). And *Poplicola* is also a *Life* particularly rich in forward glances: glances to Rome's great Republican future, predicated as so much of it was on a repugnance for kings;[41] but also to Rome's even further future, with a few mentions of the emperors, those new monarchs who would one day return (and would *that* be for good or ill?).[42] So in the whole pair we have an interesting play on tyranny, whether one can do anything to avoid it, whether one over-reacts and over-learns from one's bad experiences under it, and whether even after that over-learning one can do anything, or should do anything even if one can, to prevent its return.

So this tour of a few *Lives* has left us with a rather surprising Plutarch, a Plutarch who might be closer than we expected to the passage of Syme with which we began—perhaps even one who is more sceptical than Syme, in that the scepticism can extend to learning from experience as well as from books. Or, more pertinently, he may be closer to the picture which many have of Thucydides: an author who believes passionately in the value of history to instruct, and to illuminate the way human nature operates; one with an immense interest in human behaviour and human ethics too; yet one who is anything but sanguine on the way that teaching, learning, even literature itself can really help people to understand and to avoid the mistakes of the past, to prevent the outcomes they fear, to find a solution which might work.

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[40] As indeed it is in the comparative epilogue, 25(2).4–6, 26(3).5, 27(4).2. Cf. Affortunati–Scardigli (1992), 115–116, 118, and Affortunati (1994) 261–262. It will be clear that I think the *synkrisis* is more thoroughgoing than Affortunati does (1994, 262 n.15), at least in this respect.

[41] Hints of future in *Poplicola*, 6.6, 7.7–8, 8.6–8, 12.3, 12.5, 19.8, 19.10, 21.10, 23.6. 26(3).4. More subtle echoes in *Popl.* of the late Roman Republic, especially Caesar, are collected by Affortunati–Scardigli (1992). Their interest is in tracing the development of the tradition about Poplicola and hence in attributing such echoing to earlier historians; it is possible that some may be Plutarch's own work, or at least taken over from his predecessors in full awareness of their resonance.

[42] *Popl.* 15, 17.8, 21.10.

Let us end by returning to the closing chapters of *Solon*, and that interest in the good and the bad effects that literature might have. Critics of the Herodotean Solon have become used to pointing the parallels between that Solon and the author himself, for Herodotus like Solon has learnt so much from his travels, and grasped lessons of human mutability and human fragility which he can try to communicate.[43] *Try* to communicate, but in Herodotus' case too only partly succeed, for his Croesus too is slow to learn, and there too we might doubt whether he ever completely succeeds. That may surely prompt us to ask questions about Herodotus' own text too: if Solon's learning from experience is so hard to communicate, does Herodotus' own learning have much greater chance of persuading his own audience, however hard both author and audience may try? In other words, in Herodotus' case we may well be prepared to read back from the potential learners *in* the text, those who try to read from experience, to draw conclusions about the potential readers *of* the text.[44]

If we are prepared to ask such metatextual questions about Herodotus, then we should not resist being metatextual about Plutarch too, and wonder about his text and what it can hope to teach, what inspiration it can offer and what qualifications it suggests. And here too we should not expect too simple, or too optimistic, an answer.

[43] "Solon … appears in Herodotus" narrative as a kind of alter ego of the narrator himself', Redfield (1985) 102. For other versions of this idea cf. Bischoff (1932), 39; Hellmann (1934) 38, 43–45; Benardete (1969) 16; Drexler (1972) 25–28, Stahl (1975) 5, 7, and esp. Moles (1996) 259–284.

[44] I pursue this approach in a forthcoming paper on "Croesus in Herodotus".

PLUTARCH ON THE STATESMAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION

Mark Beck

Following a serious spinal operation in October of 1954, the junior Senator from Massachusetts decided to apply himself to the research and writing of a book on a specific aspect of political practice. Tracing the actions of senators who made difficult decisions based on their personal convictions in the face of concerted opposition from their colleagues and constituencies, the book, entitled *Profiles in Courage*,[1] won instant acclaim and a Pulitzer Prize for biography in 1957 for Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the man who a few years later would be elected his country's 35th President. Kennedy clearly articulates in the book's first chapter the pressures affecting elected officials in democratic societies. The pressure placed on statesmen to placate and appease significant elements of their constituencies is very real. Powerful pressure groups in electorates can have a decisive impact on decision-making. Colleagues in government also exert considerable pressure. Recognizing that politics is an eminently social endeavor, Kennedy notes that statesmen enjoy the "comradeship and approval" of their "friends and colleagues", and that this discourages them from "pursuing a unique and independent course which would embarrass or irritate the other members.[2]" Faced often with these conflicting pressures, statesmen are forced to compromise, since in Kennedy's opinion, "politics and legislation are not matters for inflexible principles or unattainable ideals.[3]"

A reading of this book prompted me to search for similar concerns in Plutarch's political thought. While in many respects the activity of modern day statesmen bears faint resemblance to that of their ancient Greek and Roman counterparts, today's elected officials nevertheless do continue to sustain some of the same basic pressures also active in ancient Graeco-Roman democratic societies. The adjective "democratic" when applied to Athens and especially Republican Rome may

[1] Harper and Row: New York, Evanston and London (1956), I will cite the pagination of the memorial edition published in 1964.
[2] Kennedy (1964) 24.
[3] Kennedy (1964) 25.

be met with some degree of skepticism. Roman historians and most Greek historians have tended to subscribe to Robert Michels'[4] "Iron Law of Oligarchy" and to see concealed behind democratic façades a "crypto-oligarchy".[5] Sir Ronald Syme expressed this perspective in his influential book on the Roman Revolution, confidently asserting: "In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, oligarchy lurks behind the façade; and Roman history, Republican or Imperial, is the history of the governing class.[6]" Recently, however, investigators have been reevaluating the power wielded by the people in these societies. Most notably Josiah Ober in his book *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*[7] has studied "how the ordinary citizens of Athens gained and held power through a form of ideological hegemony that constrained the public and private behavior of the elite (the wealthy, highly educated, and wellborn)".[8] On the Roman side Fergus Millar's recent book, *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic* attempts the same type of analysis of public speaking to elucidate power structures, in raising the question of "what in reality distinguished Rome from a Greek democracy".[9] What is interesting about these efforts, for our present purposes at any rate, is that the focus bears a distinct resemblance to Plutarch's, who, as Christopher Pelling pointed out long ago, frames his analysis in terms of the *dêmos* versus the *Boulê* or Senate.[10] I do not propose to exhaustively analyze Plutarch's portrayal of the *dêmos* or the constraints it may or may not impose on the political activity of statesmen. That would be a demanding task indeed, since the degree to which statesmen are able to act independently is subject to various complex and involved circumstances, then and now.[11] Rather I would like to trace the development

[4] (1915) 1962.

[5] See, e.g., Ober (1996) 3–12, for a succinct discussion of the controversy.

[6] (1939) 7.

[7] (1989).

[8] Ober (1996) 145. This is Ober's own description of his project from a later work.

[9] (1998). He raises this question on page 226. See also the review by Hölkeskamp (2000) 203–223. I am indebted to Christopher Craig for this reference.

[10] (1986) 159–187. Pelling did not, at that time, think that Plutarch's focus on the *dēmos* vs. the Senate was appropriate or adequate for describing Roman politics.

[11] Statesmen today must in most cases successfully exploit the avenues mass media provides to influence and facilitate the acquisition of supporters, and to manipulate public opinion. Today's voting public sustains a continuous barrage of information. Television, newspapers, and news magazines, well aware of the prolific amount of information glutting the consumers' cognitive abilities, have responded by abbreviating their presentations accordingly. The thirty-minute political speech on the Pnyx has

of this *topos* in the relationship between Plutarch's *Political Precepts* and the *Parallel Lives* in an effort to assess its significance for his political thought.

His major political treatise, the *Political Precepts* or *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*,[12] is addressed primarily to a Greek audience entrusted with the management of local affairs under Roman Imperial hegemony. Naturally some of the precepts have wider applicability. In the proem, Plutarch, acting in response to a request made by the work's titular addressee, a certain Menemachus, extols the positive benefits to be derived from the study of varied examples of statesmanship (*Praec.* 798C, παραδείγματα ποικιλώτερα). The work is indeed replete with examples, modeling both positive and negative characteristics, derived from both Greek and Roman spheres. The names that repeat-

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given way to the thirty-second sound bite on CNN. Today's statesmen are also better informed about the public's attitudes to important issues. The general opinions of large segments of the modern community are monitored almost daily by hired pollsters in the employ of politicians and political parties. Most politicians capitalize on this ability to know the sentiments of their constituency in advance, by cautiously tailoring their decision-making to coincide with the majority opinion, or in response to the pressure exerted by a powerful lobby group. In other words, a sensitive dynamic occurs between the people and those in power.

Typically the knowledgeable statesman employs stratagems to influence or shape popular opinion in a manner conducive to the realization of his own and his parties' goals. Most modern discussions outline principally four such stratagems (See, e.g., Pratkanis and Aronson (2000²) 51: 1) The statesman must establish how an issue is defined and discussed. This technique, sometimes called pre-persuasion, establishes a favorable climate for the message, by determining how the issue is structured and framed. 2) The statesman must project an authoritative and trustworthy ethos. In short he/she must appear credible. 3) The statesman must focus the people's thoughts on exactly what he/she wants them to think about, by employing powerful arguments or imagery. 4) Finally the statesman must be adept at controlling and manipulating the emotions of the people so that the emotional response thus elicited compels his target audience to adopt the desired course of action. The similarity of these stratagems to ancient rhetorical precepts is obvious. This reflects the basic similarity of human interaction independent of temporal and cultural differences. Mastery of these four stratagems, which can be conveniently summed up as pre-persuasion, ethos, focalization, and pathos, is fundamental to securing a modern statesman's independence of action as I call it. By the same token the efficacy of these stratagems is surely contingent on the statesman's view of his audience and his ability to adapt himself accordingly. In certain situations this adaptation of the statesman's designs and motives to coincide with the expectations of his audience or the public will inevitably necessitate curtailment of his independence of action in some way or another, especially in those situations where the statesman has not yet established an authoritative hold on his audience or the public.

[12] Cited here according to the text of the (1936) Loeb edition of Fowler.

edly occur as models of good statesmanship are: Pericles, Themistocles, the Elder and Younger Cato, Phocion, Scipio, Epameinondas, and Solon. The apotreptic examples are mainly provided by the conduct of Cleon, Agesilaus, Lucullus, Marius, Nicias, and, on occasion, Alcibiades and Demosthenes. In essence Plutarch advocates statesmanship devoid of self-interest and personal gain, executed reasonably, with good judgment, and based on firm conviction (*Praec.* 798C–D). The first important challenge facing the novice statesman entails understanding the character of the citizens, with different national characters requiring individually a different approach (*Praec.* 799B–800A). Plutarch's point of departure in his analysis is the classical Athenian *dêmos* of the 5th century, with the comparative historical examples being drawn from Carthage, Thebes, and Sparta. Rejecting deceptive demagoguery, Plutarch advocates that the statesman use his knowledge and understanding of the people's character to employ the appropriate means of bringing it under his control (*Praec.* 800A). This is the first step in a process that ultimately should culminate in the now powerful statesman being able to lead his people gently towards worthy goals (*Praec.* 800A–B).[13] Plutarch concedes that this task of changing the multitude is quite ambitious (*Praec.* 800B). Success in this endeavor is directly contingent on the statesman's self-presentation in public. Of central importance here is the statesman's ability to modify his own character and behavior (*Praec.* 800B). At the very least the avoidance or repression of conspicuous faults should be maintained. To this, he thinks, should be added the power and charm of eloquence, as a means of facilitating the statesman's leadership ability (*Praec.* 801C–804C). True mastery of the people requires a high level of eloquence. In this context, Plutarch rejects pronounced displays of *euergetism* as an alternative leadership strategy (*Praec.* 802D–E). Plutarch selects Pericles again as the exemplar, citing Thucydides's (2.65.8) remarks about the Athenian's hold on the demos through his powerful oratory (*Praec.* 802C).[14] The primary negative example is one of Pericles' successors, Nicias, whose lack of persuasive skill ultimately resulted in the catastrophic Sicilian expedition (*Praec.* 802D).[15] Obviously then Plutarch considers oratorical abil-

[13] The adverbs ἀτρέμα and πράως indicate the subtle nature of this control. On the use of metaphorical expressions such as harmonize (ῥυθμίζειν) employed to describe this process, see Aalders (1982) *passim.*

[14] The most recent comprehensive analysis of Periclean rhetoric as presented by Thucydides is: Yunis (1996) 59–86.

[15] Cf. Yunis (1996)101–109.

ity a decisive factor enabling a statesman to act with the maximum degree of independence in policymaking. Those statesmen who possess this skill, like Pericles, are able to enact even relatively unpopular measures by overwhelming initial opposition with their verbal pyrotechnics. Statesmen who are unable to "rein in the people with speech" (*Praec.* 802D) because they lack the ability to persuade are forever hampered in their ability to initiate and implement effective policies in the face of popular opposition.

Based on the use made of Pericles in the *Political Precepts*, it seems quite clear that Plutarch considers him to be the paradigmatic statesman. The *Life of Pericles*[16] presents us, however, with a slightly different picture. Plutarch records here that Pericles did in fact stoop to bribery of the populace with gifts, etc., when he was still in competition with Cimon's euergetism. In fact he shows himself quite sensitive to popular pressure, even when his own interests are at stake. It is only after the collapse of political opposition occurs subsequent to the death of Cimon and the politician Thucydides' fall from popular grace that we see a change. Only at this point in his career does his fear of ostracism subside and his autocratic dominance emerge. The paired *Life* of Fabius Maximus continues and develops this theme of independence of judgment and action in the face of withering public pressure.[17] Fabius refuses to alter his strategy in combating Hannibal under any circumstances. An important distinction in the two *Lives* is the mode via which the two men establish their political dominance: Pericles' oratorical ability is contrasted with Fabius' promotion in a crisis situation through the failures of others.[18]

In the case of Nicias the depiction in the *Life* coincides with the stance taken in the *Political Precepts* (*Praec.* 802D–E).[19] In the *Life* (*Nic.* 2.4) Nicias does in fact acquire popularity, not through eloquence, but through his very fearfulness and timidity. As Plutarch explains, the multitude "fear men who scorn them but exalt men who fear them". This coupled with his uniform success as a general and generosity to

[16] All references to Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* refer to the six volumes of the Teubner editon edited by Ziegler (1968–1973).

[17] On this see Stadter (1975) 77–85. Reprinted in Scardigli (1995)155–164.

[18] Plutarch even depicts a somewhat inept Fabius (8.3–9.1) being outmaneuvered in a rhetorical contest by the tribune Metilius. Fabius's inability to restrain others is taken up in the *Synkrisis* (3.3).

[19] On Plutarch's rather negative characterization of Nicias see especially Nikolaidis (1988) 319–333.

the people render him a congenial public figure. But fortune (τύχη) is notoriously fickle (*Nic.* 7.1) and Plutarch leaves no doubt in the *Synkrisis* (1.2; 2.3) as to his negative opinion about Nicias' cowardice.

His irritation with Nicias' political activity, however, extends beyond the criticism of the source of his influence with the people. Plutarch is also not satisfied with this statesman's timing. Nicias elects, at a most inopportune time, to cede command of the Pylos expedition to the voluble demagogue, Cleon. Cleon's subsequent success increases his pernicious influence in Athenian politics. Nicias' actions are therefore deemed irresponsible by Plutarch. Here again Pericles provides the positive example. Knowing as he does the jealous nature of Athenian society, this statesman intentionally avoids giving the impression of omnipresence by limiting his overt political activity to important situations, while in other less important affairs he prefers to work behind the scenes through other political allies (*Per.* 7.5–6).

If the *Life* of Nicias demonstrates the faults of political activity that is too concerned with placating the people, the paired *Lives* of Phocion and Cato exhibit the other extreme of political insensitivity. While the *Political Precepts* employs these two figures consistently as positive examples,[20] the tenor of the *Life* of Cato at least is less avowedly enthusiastic. This disparity of outlook is first manifested in the Proem (*Phoc.* 1–3). In the case of Phocion, as we learn, the political situation of Athens under Macedonian hegemony considerably obscured the brilliance of his political activity. The unfavorable political climate ushered in by Macedonian rule affects the people of Athens and the way they respond to their political figures. They are unable to tolerate the truth; a situation disadvantageous to the frank-speaking style of a Phocion (*Phoc.* 2. 3). This is particularly unfortunate as it comes at a time in the fortunes of a city when the populace often needs forceful corrective leadership. Plutarch also allows in the same section that the opposite effect is also possible, i.e., that a prosperous populace inclines towards insolence (*Phoc.* 2. 1). In essence the statesman is faced with two pitfalls in his dealings with a difficult populace: the first being political intransigence,

[20] E.g.,positive, *Mor.* 809D–E: Phocion and Cato as stern and inexorable in sacrificing what was for the common good. *Praec.* 810C Cato for his statesmanlike gesture in handing leadership over to Pompey. *Praec.* 811A–B Cato's claim that good citizen ought to omit no trouble or diligence on behalf of the state. *Praec.* 818D Cato approves dole of grain to the poor to quell uprising (related to the conspiracy of Catiline and Caesar's speech). *Praec.* 820B Cato does not want statue of himself in Rome. *Praec.* 825D Cato and exemplary conduct. Negative *Praec.* 808E: Cato as quaestor.

wherein he opposes too forcefully the general mood, and the second involves a cessation of true leadership, wherein the statesman yields to the mistaken inclinations of the people (*Phoc.* 2. 4). A middle course is required. The wise and effective leader must be willing to grant concessions in his dealings with the populace to extract in return cooperative behavior in critical matters of advantage to the city (*Phoc.* 2. 5).

This happy mixture of austerity and reasonableness remains for Cato unattainable. He did not have a persuasive demeanor or appealing personality.[21] We would say perhaps that he lacked charisma. Plutarch regards Cato's character as somewhat old fashioned (ἀρχαιοτροπία) and out of place in the Roman society of his day, even though it was admirable in some ways (*Phoc.* 3.2). This maladaptive aspect of Cato's character rendered him ineffective in responding to the needs of his immediate times. In the *Life* his uncompromising, highly principled, approach to politics leaves him vulnerable to the popular measures of Caesar and others (*Cato min.* 31.1–5; 33.1–3; 49.3).[22] The very quality that makes Cato great, his sense of justice, is also the prime source of odium for the masses as well as the powerful (*Cato min.* 44.7–8). His refusal to court popular favor ultimately leads to a failed bid for the consulship, an office he would never occupy (*Cato min.* 49.4; 50.2–3). Because of Caesar's popular appeal, Cato's lack of popularity with the masses rendered him an ineffective leader outside of the senate, and, as Plutarch notes, even there the senators at this point were afraid of the people (*Cato min.* 51.5). Plutarch sternly censures Cato for rejecting Pompey's offer of alliance through marriage, an alliance that could have prevented the first triumvirate and the ultimate dissolution of the Roman Republic (*Cato min.* 30.2–6). Cato's sense of principle and his trepidation in the face of first Pompey's and then Caesar's burgeoning influence and power leads him to adopt courses of action that preserve his political independence, but undermine his ability to effectively control events. Without powerful allies and the support of the people he remained by and large politically impotent. Cato's courage may be admirable but its consequences were disastrous. He is too independent in his approach to politics.

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[21] (*Phoc.* 3.1) καὶ γὰρ οὗτος οὐ πίθανον ἔσχεν οὐδε προσφιλὲς ὄχλῳ τὸ ἦθος.

[22] Although Cato does, on occasion, adopt popular measures to thwart his opponents' power-hungry schemes. See, e.g., *Cato Min.* 26.1 (grain distribution to the poor); 47.3 (in support of the appointment of Pompey as sole consul). In general, however, this was not the case (Cf. *Cato Min.* 18.2; 44.2–4).

The motif of political unpopularity occupies Plutarch elsewhere in his gallery of portraits. The *Lives of Alcibiades* and *Coriolanus* present examples of very ambiguous popularity to say the least, combined with irresponsibility. While known for his physical beauty, Alcibiades recognized the dangers of being the subject of too much attention. This is expressed in the anecdote about the bad publicity he received after docking the tail of a particularly handsome dog, which to Alcibiades was welcome because he didn't want the Athenians saying anything worse about him (*Alc.* 9). This anecdote immediately precedes the account of his entrance into public life, which was meteoric. In the *Political Precepts* Plutarch claims that there are two modes of entry to public office: one slow, relatively inconspicuous, unlikely to arouse envy, the other, swift by contrast, is initiated by some great deed or daring action (*Praec.* 804C–F). In this latter category, alongside men such as Aratus, Pompey, and Cornelius Scipio, Plutarch notes, belongs Alcibiades through his formation of the Mantinean alliance (*Praec.* 804F–805A).[23] In the *Life* more is made of his public displays of generosity, his great gifts as a public speaker, his chariot racing, in addition to his military prowess, in explaining his rise to power (*Alc.* 10–13; 15; 26–35). The downside of Alcibiades's activities involved his luxurious lifestyle and attire, his drunkenness, and other behavior regarded as eccentric (*Alc.*16). As we learn from Plutarch, Alcibiades' positive achievements tended to garner him enough tolerance among the people of Athens to avoid incurring serious difficulties: they tended to label his transgressions with mild euphemistic terms (*Alc.* 16.3–6). Perhaps his most impressive skill, however, employed in the service of manipulating others, was his chameleon-like ability to assimilate and adapt his behavior to that of other peoples with great facility (*Alc.* 23.3–6).

With Coriolanus we are confronted with a completely different personality. Far from indulging in Alcibiades' hedonistic lifestyle, he is insensitive to "pleasures, toils, and mercenary gains" (*Cor.* 1.3). Yet it appears that Alcibiades' vice-ridden lifestyle is more endearing to his fellow citizens than Coriolanus' unswerving personality, which his fellow Romans regarded as "ungracious, burdensome, and arrogant" (*Cor.* 1.3). He, like Alcibiades, is of great natural ability, but he lacked the education that would have softened his nature (*Cor.* 1.4). While the people are impressed by his martial valor, they are put off by his

[23] Cf. *Alc.* 15. This occurred in 420 B.C.E.

grandiose manner (*Cor.* 15.1). Unable or unwilling to defuse the envy and resentment he aroused among the Roman people, even by popular methods such as the distribution of grain, Coriolanus through his hard-line stance procures his perpetual banishment from Rome (*Cor.* 15.2; 16.1–20.4).

Alcibiades and Coriolanus were individuals who possessed the requisite gifts to become popular and powerful statesmen in their respective cities. In both cases, however, they did not fulfill their early promise because of personality flaws that rendered them suspect in the eyes of their fellow citizens. In choosing to turn against their own cities, by enlisting the support of powerful enemies, they justified the suspicions their previous behavior had aroused.[24]

I have chosen these seven *Lives* because they offer perhaps the clearest glimpse of political behaviors that clearly intrigue Plutarch. I do not think Plutarch finds moderation or πραότης sufficient, wisdom and a philosophic *paideia* are also not enough. A statesman must be willing to sacrifice his own principles for the benefit of the community. He dare not sacrifice his position of power or command if that move could potentially cause great risk to the community, as Nicias did. He dare not abuse his position of power for self-aggrandizement, as Alcibiades did. The great crime of Alcibiades and Coriolanus was that they endangered their communities and this is Plutarch's Iron Law of Politics: the actions of a statesman should never needlessly imperil the community, even when the statesman's principles may be on the line. This is Cato's main flaw: his rigid adherence to his principles caused him to reject time and again pragmatic approaches that would have involved distasteful compromise or reconciliation.

A second Iron Law pertains to the statesman's dealings with the *dêmos*. Aside from the idealized philosopher kings Numa and Lycurgus perhaps, the leadership of democratic societies is constrained to play to the masses; the masses who, as Plato observed, do not appreciate philosophy and despise those who do (*Rep.* 493e–494a). Statesmen like Cato and Coriolanus who do not play the game do not get elected to high office. In these situations a virtue like justice for example, if expressed without regard to popular sentiment, takes on a caustic quality. This demonstrates that the valorization of traditional Greek moral concepts is situational in Plutarch's political philosophy: a situ-

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24 Plutarch condemns their traitorous actions in the *Synkrisis* 1–5.

ation reminiscent of Machiavelli but not quite as extreme as the line taken in *The Prince*,[25] wherein the Florentine theorist posits a political realm virtually devoid of absolute values. As a result, under certain circumstances, ambiguous or even negative behaviors, if they contribute to a statesman's popularity, may escape censure. Alcibiades' chameleon-like behavior is a case in point. It is far more appealing than the stern rigidity of a Cato and no less endearing than Nicias' bumbling fearfulness. It is no accident that Alcibiades relationship with the *dêmos* functions as a key theme in the *Life* (17–22; 26. 1–27. 1; 32.1–35. 4). Tim Duff has very admirably shown how Plutarch uses the technique of *synkrisis* to uncover the different manifestations of virtue, and it needs to be stressed that this method also is used to indicate under what circumstances a virtue becomes a vice and vice versa.[26] This is a critical difference between his *Political Precepts* and the *Lives*. The technique of *synkrisis* more clearly reveals the pragmatic approach Plutarch appears to advocate in politics. The *Political Precepts* remains by contrast more idealized and less useful as a result. At times the end result in the *Lives* is a far cry from what I would term moralizing, but it does reveal the mind of a man who understood the difficulties confronting statesmen, forcing them more often than not to abandon their preferred courses of action in favor of more popular agendas.

[25] I am thinking in particular of chapters 15–19.

[26] (1999) 243–286. Tim Duff makes this observation on p. 264.

POETRY AND MUSIC IN THE LIFE OF PLUTARCH'S STATESMAN

E.L. Bowie

When I first thought of talking about this subject I floated the idea before two or three eminent members of the Plutarch Society who were also good friends, perhaps putting a question of the form "Is this a topic that had already been fully explored?". Since they gave no red lights, or even amber, I took courage and decided to offer it. Much more recently Sven-Tage Teodorsson expressed his surprise at the title, and by then I had done enough investigation to realise why he was surprised. I must confess that a mixture of inaccurate memory and creative reconstruction had led me to imagine that there were several places where Plutarch gave us clear indications of his views on the place of poetry and music in a statesman's life. I had accordingly envisaged a paper analysing these and drawing sober conclusions (sobriety having always been a central virtue in Plutarch Society deliberations). As it is, I have a different problem, and it is one to whose solution I am not sure that I have a good answer. The problem is this:

1. It is clear that Plutarch himself had a very good knowledge of classical poetry, poetry that he cites frequently either to support a moral position or quite often simply for décor,[1] and that he thinks it appropriate for a cultured Greek (πεπαιδευμένος) like himself, even one who is a Platonic philosopher, to draw on poetry for moral lessons and for stylistic amplification (αὔξησις).
2. Plutarch's circle of friends also included at least one man, Sarapion, who was a poet, and there is some chance that Plutarch wrote one work in verse himself.[2]
3. The civic and religious culture in which Plutarch was himself a prominent local office-holder was still one which had important musical components, and Plutarch refers to the satisfaction to be

[1] See Bowie (1997) and work on Plutarch's quotation of other poetry cited there at p.99 n.2.

[2] See Bowie (2002), 45–46

drawn from participation in musical competitive festivals (μουσικοὶ ἀγῶνες) and processions involving music.[3]

4. We know, however, that Plutarch had strong views on the capacity of poetry and music to corrupt, especially to corrupt the young.
5. In view of the tension between this negative theoretical position (point 4) and the positive perception of music and poetry that is suggested by points 1–3, it would be reasonable to expect that Plutarch might give clear indications, especially in his *Lives*, of the rôle that poetry and music might be expected to play either in the education of statesmen or in offering them a legitimate form of relaxation from their taxing political life.
6. This expectation might be all the greater given that Plutarch's near-contemporary, Dio of Prusa, offers in his second *Kingship Oration* a firm and relatively detailed prescription for the poetry and music that should and should not receive approval from the ideal king.

I shall begin with a closer look at this last point. In a conversation with Philip, Dio's Alexander is represented as insisting that Homer is the only suitable poet for study by kings—Hesiod is all very well for shepherds and carpenters. However he denies that he would himself want to have Homer's poetic skills—he and the heroes celebrated by Homer have as their goal fine achievements (καλὰ ἔργα) not fine poetry.[4] When Alexander turns to music, he declares himself willing to learn to play the *cithara* or lyre to sing hymns to the gods or praise of men—as for melic poetry, that of Stesichorus or Pindar might be allowed, the former as an imitator of Homer, the latter because he had praised an ancestor of Alexander; but erotic poetry like that of Sappho and Anacreon is not suitable to be sung by kings, and it would be better for a phalanx to encourage itself to battle by singing Homer than Tyrtaeus.[5] Dio returns later to the question of music: a king should not listen to people playing the *aulos* or the *cithara*, or singing wanton and voluptuous songs, nor should he indulge the evil crazes for immoral stories (λόγων διεφθορότων κακοὺς ζήλους) composed to entertain the extremely uneducated (πρὸς ἡδονὴν τῶν ἀμαθεστάτων γεγονότας), but should purge his realm of such things, along with unrestrained comedy in prose or verse,

[3] Plutarch, *An seni sit gerenda respublica* 787b, 792f., see below at nn. 26–28.
[4] Dio of Prusa, *Oration* 2.8.
[5] *Ibidem* 28–33.

and provocative dancing and degenerate music.[6] Dio here seems to be censuring the most popular forms of contemporary theatre-culture—*citharodia*, *aulodia*, mime, and pantomime, which had also been among his targets in the *Alexandrian oration* (32). He touches on non-Homeric poetry once again when he denies that a king's prayers should take the form of Anacreon's prayer to Dionysus to put in a good word for him with the boy Cleobulus, or of Attic skolia in which singers pray to be objects carried by beautiful boys or a beautiful woman.[7]

A less negative stance is evident in Dio's *Oration* 18, a reading list for a man already well-launched into a public career.[8] Most of the recommended reading is prose—history, oratory and philosophy. But three poets are mentioned by name—Euripides and Menander, whom Dio recommends getting to know not by reading them oneself but by having the plays performed for one; and Homer—perhaps to be approached by reading a text, but Dio is not explicit. As for melic poetry, elegy, iambus and dithyrambs, these are rewarding for a man of leisure, but a busy man of affairs intent on improving his oratory will have no time for them.

Now we do find the same philosophically grounded suspicion of music and poetry in Plutarch, but at no point, I think, does he spell it out in relation to a statesman.

The most extreme and fully argued position is found in *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*. It might be argued, of course, that the very negative position evident here is relevant chiefly or solely to the possible effect of poetry on the young and impressionable. But Plutarch's concerns expressed here about the effect of poetry are more general. It is deceptive (ἀπατηλόν, 15C), and it is precisely its element of falsehood, its ψεῦδος, that makes the most striking impression and evokes admiration (16B–C): compare the complaint at the *Life of Pericles* 39.2 that the poets disturb us by their stupid accounts of the gods and their dwelling-place. Poetry can only be safely approached by somebody aware of its capacity for deception, somebody who will be able to say

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[6] *Ibidem* 55–56.
[7] *Ibidem* 62–63.
[8] Dio of Prusa, *Oration* 18.6–8.

> ‘ὦ μηχάνημα λυγκὸς αἰολώτερον’,
> τί παίζουσα τοὺς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις, τί δ’ ἐξαπατῶσα προσποιῇ διδάσκειν;
>
> “O contrivance more slippery than a lynx”
> Why do you beetle your brows? Why do you pretend to be instructing when you are deceiving outright?[9]

A reader needs to appreciate that an episode is mere “story-telling and fiction aimed at pleasing and gob-smacking the reader” (μυθοποίημα καὶ πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἔκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ, 17A). The good reader will not take the bad actions of gods or heroes in poetry as models. Likewise the properly trained reader will see that immoral utterances by characters in poetry are sometimes to be taken simply as a representation of a bad character (18E–F), and sometimes too a careful reading of a poet’s lines will show how something apparently presented neutrally is in fact being condemned. Plutarch adduces as an example Demodocus’ song of the affair of Ares and Aphrodite in *Odyssey* 8: by having Demodocus sing this song to the easy-living Phaeacians Homer is demonstrating that “bad music and wicked songs and narratives with immoral plots bring about abandoned characters and effeminate lifestyles and men who settle for luxury and self-indulgence and a feminine temperament” (19F–20A). Sometimes the reader must reason more subtly, as with the episode where Helen goes to bed with Paris when he has been whisked off the battlefield by Aphrodite:[10] since Homer does not represent anybody else going to bed with his wife during the day, but only a man known to be an immoral adulterer, *ergo* Homer clearly represents this sort of lack of self-control as blameworthy and shameful (18F).

The reader implied here seems to be a married man rather than an ephebic youth (νέος). Accordingly one might expect that Plutarch would see here an issue relevant to statesmen (some of whom, after all, have been known to go to bed during the day with women who were not even their own wives). Might we not expect remarks in the *Lives* about the wisdom of one statesman who never listened to “wicked songs” (ᾄσματα πονηρά), or about another statesman who did and whose bad conduct could be blamed partly on their influence? Might one not expect some general guidelines in the *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae*?

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9 Plutarch, *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*, 16D.
10 Homer, *Iliad* 3.369–448.

Perhaps part of the answer is that we do occasionally find the place of good or bad poetry or music mentioned in *Lives* but that Plutarch leaves his reader to draw broader conclusions rather than offering them himself.

One example of this is is to be found in the *Life of Antonius*. When Antonius moved to the province Asia in the spring of the year 41 B.C. his emotions drew him back to what had earlier been his bad habits: "his characteristic way of life".[11] These habits had been described earlier as filling Antonius' house with "mime-actors and jugglers and drunken flatterers" (μίμων καὶ θαυματοποιῶν καὶ κολάκων κραιπαλώντων, 21.3): at that point Plutarch makes no specific reference to music. Now in Asia, however, his house was invaded and indeed managed by "*citharodoi* like Anaxenor, *choraulai* like Xuthus and some dancer called Metrodorus, and all the rest of that sort of gang of Asianic performance artists".[12]

Plutarch expects his cultivated reader to find three features of this objectionable. First, that these diversions play such a large part in Antonius' life. Second, that it can correctly be claimed of some of these individuals that their roles were not limited to that of entertainment but that they even achieved administrative positions—Plutarch's statement is at least corroborated for Anaxenor both by Strabo (14.648), saying he was in charge of tax-collection from four cities, and by an honorific inscription from Magnesia.[13] Third, that the types of performer mentioned belong to the less intellectual end of the spectrum of Greek culture, though clearly these types of performer acquired international reputations and correspondingly generous honours and rewards in Plutarch's time. Even the unartistic Vespasian honoured the *citharodoi* Terpnus and Diodorus each with 50,000 *denarii*;[14] and Nero was so jealous of the *citharodos* Pammenes that he forced him to compete when already senile and wanted to mutilate his statues.[15] It is significant that a few lines earlier Plutarch has noted without obvious censure that Antonius had applied his leisure time to listening to lectures by academics and to watching competitive games (τὸ παῖζον αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἀκροάσεις φιλολόγων καὶ θέας ἀγώνων … ἔτρεπε)—something that Greeks

[11] ἀνεκυκλεῖτο τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰς τὸν συνήθη βίον, Plutarch, *Life of Antonius* 23.2.

[12] Ἀναξήνορες δὲ κιθαρῳδοὶ καὶ Ξοῦθοι χοραῦλαι καὶ Μητρόδωρός τις ὀρχηστὴς καὶ τοιοῦτος ἄλλος Ἀσιανῶν ἀκροαμάτων θίασος, *ibidem* 24.2.

[13] Strabo 14.648, *Syll.*[3] 766.

[14] Suetonius, *Divus Vespasianus* 19, cf. *Nero* 21.

[15] Cassius Dio 62.8.4–5.

approved of, and that earned him (to his delight) the epithets "lover of Greece" (φιλέλλην) and indeed "lover of Athens" (φιλαθηναῖος).[16]

A reader of the *Lives* can contrast Antonius' behaviour with that of Pericles, who pursued politics so single-mindedly that during his long political career he consistently turned down invitations to dine with his friends; Nicias too was such a workaholic that he did not dine with his fellow-citizens during his generalship (στρατηγία) but devoted himself wholly to public business.[17] We are perhaps to see this as veering too far to the other side of an Aristotelian mean, but it is surely being represented as more admirable than Antonius' wholesale devotion to amusement. That listening to music (and presumably to poetry?) was something that Plutarch not simply did himself but allowed to his statesmen seems indeed to follow from his anecdote early in the *Life of Pericles* about a comment made by Philip to Alexander and from the judgement that Plutarch then pronounces: when Alexander had played a stringed instrument pleasingly and skilfully during a *symposium* Philip said "Are you not ashamed to play so beautifully?" (οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;). It is sufficient, Plutarch goes on to explain, if a king has time to listen to others playing stringed instruments, and he is making the Muses a substantial allocation in being a spectator of others competing in this sort of sphere.[18] It is thus to be seen as a touch of wry humour when at the end of *De sera numinis vindicta* Plutarch creates an image of Nero reincarnated not as a viper, his initially intended fate, but as a frog, so that he might be a musical creature ᾠδικόν τι ζῷον (in recognition of his good action of granting freedom to the Greeks).[19]

Performing music is of course for Plutarch quite different from composing poetry and perhaps reciting it. In the same chapter of the *Life of Nicias* he mentions how Dionysius Chalcus acted as a spin-doctor for Nicias, and also notes that poems of Dionysius are still extant.[20] Plutarch must know enough to be aware that Dionysius was himself independently active in Athenian politics, and that his poetry was clever, metasympotic elegiac poetry for sympotic performance. Perhaps to have indicated disapproval of composing and performing such poetry was too far from Plutarch's agenda in this part of the *Life of*

[16] Plutarch, *Antonius* 23.2.
[17] Plutarch, *Pericles* 7.5; *Nicias* 5.1–2.
[18] Plutarch, *Pericles* 1.6.
[19] Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 32.567F–568A.
[20] Plutarch, *Nicias* 5.3.

Nicias, but it would have made a nice contrast with the preoccupations of Nicias himself, and I conclude rather that Plutarch had no problems with Dionysius' poetic activity.

That seems also to be the case with Cicero's poetry. In describing Cicero's brilliance as a schoolboy Plutarch comments that while embracing every branch of literature and culture "he was drawn especially towards poetry, and indeed a short poem is preserved composed by him in tetrameters when he was still a boy, *Glaucos Pontios*. And when he grew older and applied himself to a wider range of this sort of literature, he was held to be not only the Romans' best orator but also their best poet".[21] Plutarch goes on to remark that Cicero's oratorical reputation had survived to his own time despite intervening advances in rhetoric, but that his poetic output had disappeared into complete oblivion since he had had many gifted successors.[22] Neither here nor in the *syncrisis* does Plutarch suggest there was anything odd, far less reprehensible, about the mature Cicero writing poetry.

So too with Plutarch's own friend Sarapion, to whom he dedicated the dialogue *On the E at Delphi* (cf. 384E), and who is a speaker in the dialogue *De Pythiae oraculis (The oracles at Delphi)*.[23] There it emerges that Sarapion himself composed philosophical poetry, or at least poems of moral exhortation, in hexameters, put by the speaker Theon in the tradition of Orpheus, Hesiod, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedocles and Thales.[24] He also seems to have composed a paean that was later inscribed on the monument erected to commemorate his victory in a dithyrambic competition, and I see no reason to abandon my earlier guess that he also composed one or more of the dithyrambs with

21 Plutarch, *Cicero* 2.3–4: ἐρρύη πως προθυμότερον ἐπὶ ποιητικήν, καί τι καὶ διασῴζεται ποιημάτιον ἔτι παιδὸς αὐτοῦ Πόντιος Γλαῦκος, ἐν τετραμέτρῳ πεποιήμενον. προϊὼν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ ποικιλώτερον ἁπτόμενος τῆς περὶ ταῦτα μούσης, ἔδοξεν οὐ μόνον ῥήτωρ ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιητὴς ἄριστος εἶναι ῾Ρωμαίων.

22 *Ibidem* 2.5.

23 On Sarapion see Oliver (1936) (1940), Jones (1978), Geagan (1991), Kapetanopoulos (1994), Follet (2001) 88–89, and Bowie (2002) 45–46.

24 *De Pythiae oraculis* 402E–F: "Formerly philosophers used to utter their doctrines and arguments in the form of poems, like Orpheus and Hesiod and Parmenides and Xenophanes and Empedocles [and Thales]; later they abstained from—and still abstain from—using metre except for you; but because of you poetry once more returns from exile to philosophy, offering a clear and noble exhortation to young men" (πρότερον μὲν ἐν ποιήμασιν ἐξέφερον οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰ δόγματα καὶ λόγους, ὥσπερ Ὀρφεὺς καὶ ῾Ησίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς [καὶ Θαλῆς], ὕστερον δ᾽ ἐπαύσαντο καὶ πέπαυνται χρώμενοι μέτροις πλὴν σοῦ. διὰ σοῦ δ᾽ αὖθις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ποιητικὴ κάτεισιν, ὄρθιον καὶ γενναῖον ἐγκελευομένη τοῖς νέοις).

which he was victorious.[25] Perhaps Sarapion cannot quite be seen as a statesman on the world stage like the subjects of many of Plutarch's *Lives*, but he was certainly a member of the highly euergetically active Athenian élite.

This is an appropriate moment to return to the point made briefly at the beginning, that the civic and religious culture in which Plutarch was himself a prominent local office-holder was still one which had important musical components, and that on occasion Plutarch does refer to the satisfaction to be drawn from participation in μουσικοὶ ἀγῶνες and processions involving music. Those to which I have noticed him referring all involve choral performances, χοροί, and there may be others that I have missed. But these passages show how integral to Greek political and religious life Plutarch saw performance of χοροί and participation in them to be. The place of χοροί in political life is explicit in *An seni*: a political career involves "theatres and processions and choral performances and the Muse … and always honour to some god".[26] Their importance within the city's religious life is brought out well by a later remark in the same work: "You would not say 'You have performed enough, Plutarch, in the way of sacrifices and processions and choruses'".[27] In *Non posse suaviter* Plutarch dwells on the pleasure of participation in such rituals: the spectator's role in the festival involves less pleasure than "what we ourselves perform in relation to the gods, celebrating ὄργια or taking part in χοροί or attending sacrifices and rituals".[28]

Conclusions

Plutarch's views on poetry and music in the life of the πεπαιδευμένος, at any rate, are clear if not wholly consistent. Music is fine at the right time and place—for relaxation in a *symposion*, or in a public religious ritual. Poetry is also an inevitable component of literary culture, but it must be approached circumspectly. On the other hand the composition of poetry seems to cause Plutarch little discomfort. Music does seem to

[25] Bowie (2002) 45.
[26] Plutarch, *An seni sit gerenda respublica* 787B.
[27] Plutarch, *An seni sit gerenda respublica* 792F.
[28] Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter* 1105E.

be different: the Alexander story may suggest that Plutarch saw it as a bad use of time with possible bad effects on personality.

That seems to be how Plutarch saw the place of poetry and music in the life of πεπαιδευμένος in general. In the absence of explicit statements by Plutarch I would infer that for him all this applies to the statesman's life, but in spades.

PART THREE

THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S WORKS: POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND LITERARY ASPECTS

LOS HÉROES DE PLUTARCO Y SU ELECCIÓN ENTRE LA JUSTICIA Y LA UTILIDAD

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez

I

De todas las virtudes que conforman el canon ético con el que Plutarco analiza la conducta de sus héroes, es la justicia la más importante.[1] Única cualidad que define lo divino, ella nos acerca a los dioses ὥς τὸν ἐν δυνάμει καὶ τύχῃ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἀρχῇ βίον ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ποιεῖ θεῖον, ἡ δ'ἀδικία θηριώδη (*Arist.* 6.5). Lo es hasta tal punto que sólo por ella—y no por su inmortalidad o por su poder—colocan los hombres a los dioses en el lugar de respeto y veneración que merecen como tales. Así lo expresa el propio Plutarco en su digresión sobre el tema a propósito del sobrenombre Δίκαιος merecido por Aristides:

> Pues la inmortalidad también concurre en el vacío y en los elementos; potencia la tienen igualmente, y grande, los terremotos, los rayos, los vendavales y las trombas; pero de la justicia y del derecho nada participa, salvo que sea algo divino en virtud de la inteligencia y de la razón. Por eso, de los tres sentimientos que experimentan la mayoría respecto a los dioses—envidia, temor y respeto–, los envidian sin duda y los consideran bienaventurados por ser incorruptibles y sempiternos, se sienten sobrecogidos ante ellos y los temen por su poder soberano, y los aman, respetan y veneran por la justicia (*Arist.* 6.3).

Sin embargo, esta importancia, que es asumida en el grado máximo cuando se trata de la reflexión teórica, queda rebajada, o por lo menos se matiza, cuando Plutarco estudia las conductas individuales de sus héroes en circunstancias concretas de su historia pública y privada. Precisamente esto, su adecuación a la realidad natural de la condición humana, es lo que hace de las *Vidas Paralelas* ejemplos de comportamiento moral al alcance de cualquiera, y no ideales de perfección, sólo reservada para los dioses y para los prototipos humanos de los enco-

[1] En *Flam.* 11.4 Plutarco pone en boca de los romanos, con unas reflexiones de indudable cuño personal, que la justicia es la cualidad más rara entre las más difíciles de encontrar entre los hombres: ἦν δ' ἄρα σπάνιον μὲν ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις ἐν ἀνθρώποις, σπανιώτατον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ὁ δίκαιος.

miastas. Por ello, cuando leemos los relatos vivos de Plutarco e intentamos acomodarlos a las reflexiones teóricas vertidas en los *Moralia* o incluso en las digresiones de las *Vidas* como ésta de *Arístides*, advertimos inconsistencias y hasta contradicciones, que tienen su explicación razonable en la orientación ética y no teorética dada por el Queronense a sus relatos biográficos.

Un ejemplo, que puede servirnos ahora como justificación y punto de partida, es la conducta de Bruto, justa más allá de los límites, con sus hijos en la *Vida de Publícola*. Ante el silencio culpable de aquéllos, el cónsul ordena a los lictores que les corten la cabeza, mientras él contempla impasible la ejecución. Ante semejante actitud que, en principio, merece una valoración positiva porque el héroe antepone la justicia y el interés público a cualquier otra consideración, Plutarco no se queda indiferente y da su opinión en términos que, al menos, siembran la duda en sus lectores[2]:

> Puso entonces a los demás en manos de su colega y levantándose se marchó, tras haber cometido una acción imposible de elogiar o de censurar con razón, si se pretende; pues, o la cumbre de una virtud llevó su alma a la impasibilidad, o la fuerza de una pasión a la insensibilidad; y ni lo uno ni lo otro es cosa sin importancia ni humana, sino divina o propia de fieras. Pero es más justo acomodar nuestro juicio a la gloria de aquel varón que poner en duda su virtud por debilidad de quien la juzga (*Publ.* 6.5–6).

En este ejemplo, la posible crítica hacia Bruto es que, por la justicia, renuncia absolutamente a los sentimientos y a las elecciones propias de su condición humana como padre. Pero en el extremo opuesto están los casos de Colatino, en la misma *Vida*, y de Coriolano. En efecto, si la conducta de Bruto no merece un aplauso inmediato e incondicional, tampoco la valoración negativa del comportamiento de Colatino es decisiva. Al biógrafo se le brindaba la oportunidad del contraste—recurso retórico utilizado con frecuencia por los escritores antiguos, y por el mismo Plutarco en otros casos—entre ambas conductas. De haber sido esa su intención, era fácil decir que Bruto renunciaba incluso a sus hijos por la patria, mientras que Colatino anteponía a ésta los hijos de su hermana. De hecho, Dionisio de Halicar-

[2] οὕτω δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπὶ τῷ συνάρχοντι ποιησάμενος, ᾤχετ᾽ ἐξαναστάς, ἔργον εἰργασμένος οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινεῖν βουλομένοις ἀξίως οὔτε ψέγειν ἐφικτόν. ἢ γὰρ ἀρετῆς ὕψος εἰς ἀπάθειαν ἐξέστησεν ⟨αὐτοῦ⟩ τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ πάθους μέγεθος εἰς ἀναλγησίαν. οὐδέτερον δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ θεῖον ἢ θηριῶδες. δίκαιον δὲ τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἕπεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσθενείᾳ τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀπιστεῖσθαι. (*Publ.* 6.5–6).

naso aprovecha el rigor de Bruto para encomiar su rectitud[3] y Floro considera el hecho como prueba de que Bruto se convirtió en padre del Estado, al colocar al pueblo en el lugar de sus hijos.[4] Pero no, mientras que sobre Bruto se cierne, como decíamos, la sombra de su impasibilidad casi divina o salvaje, a Colatino no se le critica su debilidad humana (μαλακία) y su condescendencia con las hermanas, aunque se sugiere que de ambas se aprovecharon sus sobrinos para evitar el mismo destino que tuvieron los hijos de Bruto. Lo que se condena del colega de Bruto es la repercusión social de su actitud, que lo hace sospechoso por su parentesco con los tarquinios. De hecho, ya antes se había sugerido una cierta complacencia de aquél con la estrategia de Tarquinio, cuando se mostraba a favor de aceptar las riquezas ofrecidas por éste. No hay duda: Como en otros aspectos del pensamiento político de Plutarco, también aquí, al valorarse las actitudes justas o injustas de los héroes, el grado de alarma social es una vara de medir muy a tener en cuenta, tanto por aquellos como por el moralista que juzga su comportamiento.

El otro ejemplo que hemos elegido en contraste con Bruto, es Coriolano. De nuevo, al final de su biografía, nos encontramos ante el choque entre los condicionamientos personales del héroe en su elección y los políticos. Anticipemos que Plutarco es muy claro cuando valora la decisión del personaje de retirar su ejército ante las súplicas de su madre, prefiriendo sus sentimientos a las responsabilidades contraídas con los volscos y a su deber con la patria. En la *Comparación* el biógrafo le echa en cara precisamente que no quisiera reconciliarse antes con ella y que sólo la perdonara ante las súplicas de la madre.[5]

Ante ejemplos como ésos queda, pues, la sensación de que las elecciones afrontadas por los héroes de las *Vidas* no tienen una dirección única, sino que el moralista las juzga según el grado de incidencia que su decisión final tiene en el difícil equilibrio entre justicia, interés personal e interés de la comunidad; y, en ese equilibrio, pesa siempre más la repercusión social de las decisiones.

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[3] Dionisio de Halicarnaso 5.8.2–6.

[4] Floro 1.9.5.

[5] *Alc.-Cor.* 4.5: τὸ δὲ δημοσίαις ἱκεσίαις καὶ δεήσεσι πρεσβευτῶν καὶ λιταῖς ἱερέων ἀπηνῶς χρησάμενον, εἶτα χαρίσασθαι τῇ μητρὶ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν, οὐ τιμὴ τῆς μητρὸς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἀτιμία τῆς πατρίδος, οἴκτῳ καὶ παραιτήσει διὰ μίαν γυναῖκα σῳζομένης, ὡς οὐκ ἀξίας σῴζεσθαι δι' αὐτήν.

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En efecto, como moralista y estudioso de los comportamientos políticos de los personajes históricos, Plutarco cifra el principal valor de la conducta humana en la salvaguarda de la estabilidad social, fundamentada en el comportamiento justo de los diferentes estamentos de la comunidad. Pero tal comportamiento supone unas preferencias entre distintas posibilidades de elección, y eso es lo que trataremos de concretar en este trabajo.

El desprecio absoluto por la δικαιοσύνη, en beneficio de la violencia y la arrogancia, está representado por bandidos como aquellos a los que se enfrentó Teseo en el Istmo, que no utilizan su naturaleza para nada ἐπιεικὲς οὐδ' ὠφέλιμον, sino que están convencidos de que αἰδῶ δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον son signos de cobardía y debilidad (*Thes.* 6.4). Pero también incurren a veces los héroes en ese mismo comportamiento negativo, tal como le ocurrió a Coriolano, cuando actuó guiado sólo por su ambición, olvidándose de la justicia.

Sin embargo, frente a estos ejemplos negativos, en general el héroe plutarqueo se caracteriza por una actitud de sacrificio que lo estimula a defender la justicia, ideal de su filantropía. Así lo hace, frente a los citados bandidos, Teseo, símbolo de antiguos ideales heroicos. Aquí es su vocación pública, voluntariamente meditada y asumida, la que lo lleva a afrontar el riesgo, como una misión histórica. Por lo menos, en estos términos introduce el biógrafo su viaje por el Istmo desde Trecén a Atenas. Pero en otros casos, como en el de Rómulo y Remo, esa actitud es fruto de una naturaleza especial, que los induce a defender a los oprimidos: Entre sus objetivos están poner en fuga a los ladrones, capturarlos καὶ βίας ἐξελέσθαι τοὺς ἀδικομένους (*Rom.* 6.5). El premio por estos comportamientos es siempre la fama, el reconocimiento público. Se dice así en este pasaje del *Rómulo* y le sucede a Publícola, cuando utiliza su oratoria para defender la justicia (*Publ.* 1.2), y a Teseo, cuando, al final del viaje, obtiene la aceptación de los atenienses no por la espada reconocida por Egeo, sino por su propio heroísmo. La relación directa entre justicia y prestigio es tan grande que, a veces, resulta difícil precisar si el motor del héroe es la justicia o la ambición de gloria. Así lo afirma de forma expresa Plutarco cuando su héroe decide ofrecerse voluntariamente como parte del tributo a Minos: οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ἡλίκης ἐστὶ τόλμης ἢ μεγαλοφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης περὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πόθου δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς (*Thes.-Rom.* 1.5).

Como actitud general, la filantrópica defensa de los oprimidos y la hostilidad hacia los violentos es una condición básica del buen político, comprometido en el sacrificio personal por los ciudadanos. Pero, en las encrucijadas particulares de la historia,[6] estos personajes se mueven entre lo público y lo privado, entre la paz y la guerra, o toman decisiones que trascienden incluso las limitadas fronteras de la patria. Así, a menudo se ven obligados a elegir entre la utilidad (personal o pública) y la justicia, entendida como el conjunto de normas (codificadas o morales) que regulan las relaciones humanas y sus pasiones, emociones y compromisos como individuos responsables de la comunidad a la que gobiernan. Son conflictos que exigen una elección, aunque ésta suponga transgredir incluso la justicia misma. Plutarco es cuidadoso al valorar también esas decisiones injustas, pero necesarias, asumiendo, al menos con matizaciones, el principio de que "el fin justifica los medios".[7] Pero la clave de esa valoración estará o bien en la magnitud histórica de la empresa "injusta" abordada, o bien en la naturaleza de las ventajas que se quieren alcanzar con esa injusticia. Su punto de vista queda claro (entre otros pasajes) en la *Comparación entre Nicias y Craso* (4.3–4) donde el moralista hace suyo el verso euripídeo εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, no a cualquier precio, como las escaramuzas de Nicias, sino por grandes empresas, como las de Craso, aunque no se coronaran con la victoria. Pero veamos ya algunas de estas situaciones de conflicto.

3

1) Conflicto entre justicia y utilidad propia: Incluimos aquí los casos en que el personaje ha de optar entre sus propios sentimientos, familiares o amigos y la justicia. Se valoran conceptos tan importantes como la amistad, el amor entre padres e hijos y entre hermanos, el éxito, o el bienestar personal y el instinto de supervivencia. En estos casos la decisión injusta de un personaje sólo suscita la crítica cuando afecta a intereses más elevados, y en especial a la seguridad de la patria. Personajes como Craso (7.7), Pirro y Demetrio (*Pyrrh.*12.2–5), que sólo buscan el interés propio (τὸ συμφέρον), son criticados o porque con ello se apartan de la βεβαιότης, una de las condiciones que debe tener el buen polí-

[6] Véase el excelente análisis de Nikolaidis (1995) 301–312.
[7] *Vid.* Nikolaidis (1995) especialmente 311f. Cf. Duff (1999) 132f.

tico, ya que inspira confianza en el pueblo,[8] o porque ponen en peligro el bien común. Pero cuando los favores injustos a los amigos no tienen mayor trascendencia, el moralista es demasiado condescendiente. Admira de Aristides—es cierto—que procuraba no cometer injusticia por favorecer a un amigo ni molestarlo por no hacerlo; pero, pese al tono crítico hacia Temístocles con que se abre la comparación con aquél, Plutarco no censura expresamente la afirmación de éste en el sentido de que no desearía ocupar un puesto con el que sus amigos no obtuvieran ventaja respecto a los enemigos (*Arist.* 2.5–6).

2) Conflicto entre justicia, interés personal e interés público: Sólo cuando está en juego el interés de la comunidad, se censura la preferencia por los intereses particulares. A propósito de esto, es muy ilustrativo el caso de *Agesilao*, un rey entre cuyas virtudes menciona Jenofonte sus favores a los amigos y familiares.[9] Plutarco recoge varios episodios en este sentido, sin reprocharle nada, salvo cuando confía el mando de la flota a su cuñado Pisandro, a pesar de que había otros más aptos que él para el cargo (10.11). En el otro extremo están Timoleón y Licurgo. El primero merece la admiración de los ciudadanos por haber combatido a muerte la tiranía impuesta por su hermano, optando así por la justicia en vez de por el propio provecho, aunque éste encontrara apoyo en un sentimiento tan noble como el amor fraterno: ὅμως τὴν πατρίδα τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον προετίμησε τοῦ συμφέροντος (*Tim.* 5.1). En cuanto a Licurgo, simulando estar de acuerdo con las codiciosas propuestas de la reina, la engañó, evitó el aborto y finalmente pudo presentar ante los espartanos a su nuevo rey Carilao. Su conducta tuvo como premio el reconocimiento de aquellos, ἀγαμένους αὐτοῦ τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην (*Lyc.* 3.6). Pero el ejemplo más significativo es el de Teseo, cuando—como ya hemos dicho- voluntariamente y contra el parecer de su padre, se ofreció como parte del tributo que los atenienses debían enviar a Minos, sacrificando su propio bienestar (y el de su padre) por el bien de la comunidad (*Thes.* 17.2): ταῦτ᾽ ἠνία τὸν Θησέα, καὶ δικαιῶν μὴ ἀμελεῖν ἀλλὰ κοινωνεῖν τῆς τύχης τοῖς πολίταις ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ἄνευ κλήρου προελθών.

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[8] Cf. *Cato Mi.* 44.11–14.

[9] *Ages.* 1.17–19; 4.3–4; 11.11–12. Una buena síntesis de todos los casos en que el rey favorece a sus amigos puede verse en el comentario de Shipley (1997) 32–35.

3) Conflicto entre justicia y utilidad pública: Si dejamos ya a un lado las implicaciones personales del héroe, la oposición entre justicia y utilidad pública se circunscribe en las *Vidas Paralelas* a dos tipos de situaciones diferentes: aquellas en que peligra la seguridad inmediata del Estado y aquellas otras que suponen una ventaja adicional para éste. En el primer caso, el pensamiento de Plutarco es muy claro: El deber primero del hombre público es mirar por el bien común, frente a cualquier otro tipo de consideraciones. A esta idea responde su digresión sobre el tema a propósito del rigorismo de Catón de Utica, en el prólogo del *Foción*:

> En política, el modo demasiado recto y opuesto en todo a los deseos del pueblo es duro y seco, como, por otra parte, dejarse arrastrar por los errores que comete la mayoría es una pendiente resbaladiza y conlleva la misma falta; en cambio, el gobierno que hace concesiones a los súbditos y les otorga lo que les agrada, pero reclama luego, a cambio, lo que es útil (los hombres rinden muchos servicios de buen grado y provechosos, si no se les guía en todo con despotismo y violencia), es un gobierno salutífero, aunque trabajoso y arduo, y encuentra dificultades para unir la seriedad a la condescendencia. (*Phoc.* 2.7–8).

Estos son los límites públicos de la justicia. Con ellos justifica abusivamente Agesilao su traición al rey de Egipto[10] y se asume, aunque sea de forma tácita, que Rómulo no castigara a los asesinos de Tacio (23.1), arguyendo que el crimen ya se había lavado con otro crimen. Plutarco no considera el hecho digno de mayor reflexión, tal vez porque no tuvo mayores consecuencias políticas o sociales ni fue motivo para que los sabinos se rebelaran o dejaran de admirar al fundador de Roma. En definitiva, como la conducta de éste no hizo peligrar la estabilidad del Estado ni mermó su prestigio, al moralista político sencillamente no le parece censurable tal abandono de la justicia (23.5). Hay otros ejemplos en las *Vidas Paralelas*. Algunos, como los de la *Vida de Aristides* han sido objeto de atención por estudiosos bien conocidos de todos, en especial, por A. Nikolaidis y F. Frazier,[11] y por mí mismo en un trabajo ya antiguo,[12] así que no voy a detenerme en ellos. Pero sí aludiré a otros

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[10] Así, en el cap. 37.4–6, como respuesta a Cabrias, que intentaba retenerle en su fidelidad a Taco: αἰσθομένου δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Ταχῶ καὶ τραπομένου πρὸς δέησιν αὐτῶν, ὁ μὲν Χαβρίας ἐπειρᾶτο καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ Ταχῶ πείθων καὶ παραμυθούμενος κατέχειν, 5 ὁ δ᾽ Ἀγησίλαος εἶπεν ὅτι Σοὶ μέν, ὦ Χαβρία, κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἀφιγμένῳ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λογισμοῖς ἔξεστιν, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδόθην Αἰγυπτίοις στρατηγός. 6 οὔκουν ἂν ἔχοι μοι καλῶς οἷς ἐπέμφθην σύμμαχος πολεμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ πάλιν ἡ πατρὶς κελεύσῃ.

[11] Nikolaidis (1995) l.c.; Frazier (1996) 161–164.

[12] Pérez Jiménez (1980) 147–153.

dos ejemplos bastante ilustrativos. Uno es *Mar.* 42.4, donde el excesivo rigor jurídico de Octavio, que no quería liberar a los sirvientes para que defendieran la patria, atenta contra el interés público.[13] Y el otro es *Phoc.* 32.6–7. Aquí, la actitud del personaje, dejando escapar a Nicanor, merece la crítica de Plutarco en una importante reflexión que diferencia claramente entre la justicia personal y la justicia pública, preferible ésta a aquélla:

> Foción, cuando fue acusado de dejarlo escapar en lugar de retenerlo, dijo que confiaba en Nicanor y que no esperaba nada malo de su parte; y que, aunque así no fuera, prefería que se le viera padecer una injusticia a cometerla. 7 Esta respuesta, si se considera con relación a él solo, podría parecer una manifestación de honradez y nobleza; pero quien arriesga la salvación de su patria, siendo estratego y gobernante, no estoy seguro de que no transgreda una justicia mayor y más venerable, la que corresponde a los ciudadanos.

Sin embargo, el interés público también tiene sus límites, como demuestra el rechazo moral—explícito, en boca de los propios personajes, o implícito, por un silencio cómplice—de medidas que no buscan ya la salvación de la patria, sino su victoria o una ventaja conseguida por medios ilícitos. Lo dice claro, por ejemplo, Camilo, a propósito de la traición del maestro de los falerios, cuando le entrega a los niños de aquéllos. Entonces el héroe explica a sus amigos que, pese a las injusticias y acciones violentas que se dan en la guerra, καὶ τὸ νικᾶν οὐχ οὕτω διωκτέον ὥστε μὴ φεύγειν τὰς ἐκ κακῶν καὶ ἀσεβῶν ἔργων χάριτας -ἀρετῇ γὰρ οἰκείᾳ τὸν μέγαν στρατηγόν, οὐκ ἀλλοτρίᾳ θαρροῦντα κακίᾳ χρῆναι στρατεύειν- (*Cam.* 10.5). Implícitamente Plutarco asume este principio en la *Vida de Temístocles* al elogiar la justicia del pueblo ateniense[14] por no haber aprobado el proyecto de Temístocles que proponía incendiar las naves de los griegos reunidas en Págasas, porque Aristides consideraba que no había ninguna medida más provechosa (λυσιτελεστέραν) ni más injusta (ἀδικωτέραν) (*Them.* 21.2).

El panhelenismo subyacente con toda probabilidad en la valoración de esta medida como injusta nos lleva a recordar otra actuación, ahora de Agesilao, que Plutarco elogia de manera tácita, por cuanto

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[13] …οὐ τοσοῦτον ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ Ὀκταβίου τὰ πράγματα βλάπτοντος, ὅσον ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν δικαίων προϊεμένου τὰ χρειώδη παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ὅς γε…

[14] Véase Arist. 22.4: οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὁ δῆμος ἦν φιλοδίκαιος, οὕτω δὲ τῷ δήμῳ πιστὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ βέβαιος.

responde a la proyección panhelénica de su pensamiento. Se trata de la entrega de los griegos de Asia a los persas, que hicieron los espartanos por medio de Antálcidas, decisión con la que Agesilao no estuvo de acuerdo. Pues bien, tal acción es calificada por el biógrafo como αἴσχιστα καὶ παρανομώτατα (*Ages*. 23.2–3).

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En suma, la justicia, entendida como equilibrio entre los intereses individuales y comunitarios y el respeto a las normas—escritas o no- que mantienen la armonía de las relaciones entre individuos y pueblos, aparece como un tópico fundamental en el análisis biográfico que hace Plutarco de sus héroes griegos y romanos. Entre ellos vemos personajes calificados explícitamente como "justos" (Aristides, Agesilao,[15] Foción), que, sin embargo, incurren en injusticias necesarias; y otros (como Catón el Menor o Bruto) cuyo excesivo rigor en la aplicación de la justicia es motivo de censura o no encuentra una entusiasta aprobación por parte de Plutarco. Así, la justicia en cuanto virtud política difícilmente encuentra su punto medio en la práctica de las *Vidas*. Sólo parece tener perfiles netos en un personaje, Numa, que el propio Plutarco sugiere como ejemplo máximo de esta virtud en la *Vida de Foción*.[16] Pero este Numa, medio histórico, medio mítico y bastante inventado, es presentado como un sabio platónico,[17] de sospechosa formación helénica, que realiza la δικαιοσύνη a través de la εὐσέβεια y que renuncia al interés personal para asumir el poder político como servicio divino. Numa lleva a cabo con su política interior una misión de concordia general, limando las diferencias entre sabinos y romanos con sus reformas sociales y apartando a los romanos de la guerra (mediante una sabia instrumentación del temor religioso) para hacerlos vivir en paz. De esta forma el segundo rey de Roma se convierte en un ideal para este grecorromano de finales del siglo I y principios del II d. C. que pretende hacer de Trajano otro Numa[18]: un monarca capaz de aunar,

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[15] Cf. *Phoc*. 3.8.

[16] *Ibidem*: καὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς δικαιοσύνην, ὡς τῆς Νομᾶ πρὸς τὴν Ἀγησιλάου…

[17] Cf. Durán López (1990) 21–26.

[18] Sobre este tema nos hemos ocupado en un trabajo reciente, "¿Las biografías de Plutarco como medio de propaganda imperial?", en las *Actas* del Coloquio *O Retrato Literário e a Biografia como Estratégia de Teorização Política*, celebrado en la Universidad de Coímbra el 4 y 5 de marzo de 2002 (en prensa).

mediante su sabiduría, justicia, interés personal y bien común, es decir, los tres términos en conflicto que sirven de pauta a menudo para la valoración moral de los héroes en las *Vidas Paralelas*.

"WITH FOLLOWETH JUSTICE ALWAYS" (PLATO, *LAWS* 716A). PLUTARCH ON THE "DIVINITY" OF RULERS AND LAWS

Luc van der Stockt

Introduction

In the first century A.D., it must have been nearly impossible for any thoughtful man of the world not to have any opinion on the question of the divinity of rulers, and especially so for Plutarch. For he was familiar with the very phenomenon of the "divinity" of rulers, viz. with that of the Hellenistic kings in the past, as well as with that of Roman Emperors in his own times. Notably Domitian, the emperor who had expelled the philosophers twice, and who allowed himself to be addressed as "Lord and God" (*dominus et deus*)[1] must have made a deep, albeit not favourable impression on him.

Now when Plutarch was writing about politics and leadership in general, he had at his disposal—and indeed made use of—recorded facts, thoughts and even a phraseology that enabled that very undertaking.[2] And if both history and experience provoked him to take a stand in the particular question of the "divinity" of rulers and laws, so the already constituted body of reflection on that issue will inevitably have inspired his own critical efforts.

In sketching Plutarch's actual stand, scholars frequently turned to his essay *To the uneducated ruler* (Goodenough [1928] 94–98; Scott [1929] 126–129; Chesnut [1978] 1321–1324; Aalders/De Blois [1992] 3401–3402); they highlighted the allusion to the Hellenistic theory of the King as divine Living Law contained in §5, 780C:

> "Who, then, shall rule the ruler?
>
> *Law, the king of all,*
> *Both mortals and immortals,*

[1] On this title of Domitian, see Jones (1992) 108–109.
[2] For the literary sources of Plutarch's political thought, see Aalders (1982) 62–65.

> as Pindar says—not law written outside him in books or on wooden tablets or the like, but reason endowed with life within him".[3]

It is not my intention to study the bearing of this particular statement, nor to discuss the question of its supposedly Pythagorean (Goodenough [1928] 94–98) or Stoic (Babut [1969] 85–87 argues against this thesis) sources. My ultimate aim, however, has indeed to do with the essay *To the uneducated ruler*: I will study a specific part of the *materia* in §3, 5 and 7 of that essay, and see what it reveals about Plutarch's opinion on the matter of the "divinity" of rulers and laws.

My interpretation will draw in other Plutarchan essays and it will focus on the actual format of the Plutarchan thoughts and texts involved. Those texts are not just collected haphazardly for my present purpose: it will be shown that Plutarch himself organized them through some analogical trains of thought ànd through some identical and specific references and metaphors. As an implication, the *materia* in those texts expounds, in different thematic contexts, what is one complex idea[4] in Plutarch's mind.

The Zeus of Justice

In Plutarch's train of thoughts, the following passage from Plato, *Laws* 4, 715e–716a (**A**) will turn out to express the pivotal concept:

> ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος. τῷ δ' ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὃ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος …, ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτ' ἄρχοντος οὔτε ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος κτλ.
>
> God who, as old tradition tells, holdeth the beginning, the end, and the centre of all things that exist, completeth his circuit by nature's ordinance in straight, unswerving course. With followeth Justice always, as avenger of them that fall short of the divine law; and she, again, is followed by every man who would fain be happy, cleaving to her with lowly and orderly behaviour; but who so is uplifted by vainglory, or prideth himself

[3] All texts and translations are from *The Loeb Classical Library*.

[4] For an analysis of yet another cluster of Plutarchan parallels concerning the "divinity" of rulers, see Van der Stockt (2002).

> on his riches …, and through his pride joined to youth and folly, is inflamed in soul with insolence, dreaming that he has no need of ruler or guide, etc.

This passage remains largely enigmatic and paradoxical, not in the least because of the pun εὐθείᾳ—περιπορευόμενος. If εὐθείᾳ—as is probable—suggests moral correctness, it is nonetheless perhaps "not merely an alternative for κατὰ δίκην, for in that case Plato would not have added τῷ δ' ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται Δίκη κτλ." (England [1976] = [1921] 447–448). On the other hand, περιπορευόμενος clearly suggests the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Perhaps we ought to give credit to Proclus, who interprets this statement as containing a symbol of time (*Commentary on Parmenides* 1122, 31–37), and εὐθείᾳ as a symbol of a divine Providence that never changes course (*Commentary on Euclides* 108, 10–17).

Anyhow, Plutarch was fascinated by this passage: he refers to it no less than six times in the *Moralia*. He never quotes the lines completely nor verbally, but picks out now this part of the sentence, now that, as it suits best the different contexts of his own train of thought. What appealed to him constantly, however, was the concept of a highly transcendent god (bound to conflict with the Stoic concept of a more immanent god), the god's intimate relation to Justice, and the ethical implications of that concept. These connotations turn up in different essays, and each time different aspects are stressed. On the other hand, they are constantly—and, to that extent, non-coincidentally—accompanied by a number of parallels, that constitute the format of Plutarch's thought and texts. These parallels are to be listed as follows (each parallel is marked by a capital in bold):

Against Colotes	*On exile*	*To the uneducated ruler*	*On Isis and Osiris*	*Progress in virtue*
			§1: **G** god's gift §1: **H** thunderbolt §1: **I** god's happiness	
		§3: **F** Euripides [§3: **G**] §3: **H** thunderbolt §3: **I** god's happiness	*§3:* ***J*** *beard/gown* *§3:* ***K*** *Mysteries*	
	[§4: **E**]	§4: **C** Hesiod §4: **D** Epaminondas		
§30: **B** gods—rulers §30: **C** Hesiod §30: **A**	§5: **F** Euripides §5: **B** Zeus is ruler §5: **A**	§5: **A** § 5: **G** god's gift §5: **J** beard/wallet §5: **M** justice's light		§10: **E** vessels *§10:* ***J*** *beard/gown* *§10:* ***L****:* *title "philosopher"* *§10:* ***K*** *Mysteries* §10: **M** great light *§10:* ***A***
	§7: **E** vessels	§7: **E** vessels		
§33: **D** Epaminondas				
			§24: ***A*** *§24:* ***L*** *title of god* §24: **H** thunderbolt	

A brief comment on the parallels in each of these writings and on their contribution to our understanding of the *materia* in *To the uneducated ruler*, is now in order.

'Against Colotes'

The last section of *Against Colotes* (§30–34) is concerned with divine Providence. And the invective is against the Epicureans.[5] Plutarch attacks Colotes' thesis that

> those men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this away, we shall live a life of brutes, *etc.* (1124D)

Colotes' implicit denial of the operation of an inner conscience must have vexed our author. Plutarch's polemic bias first tends to oppose Colotes' revered law (νόμος) to reason (λόγος). Indeed: take away the laws, so Plutarch argues, and we will still have the teachings of philosophers, and we still will not regress into the primitive state. That Plutarch is not substituting philosophic doctrine (δόγματα) for the laws as *external* means of coercion, is made clear by the examples of philosophic teaching:

> for we shall fear all that is shameful and shall honour justice *for its intrinsic worth*, holding that in the gods we have good governors (**B**; Plato, *Phaedo* 63a) and in the daemons watchers (**C**; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 253)[6] of our lives, accounting all "the gold on earth and under it a poor exchange for virtue" (Plato, *Laws* 728a).[7]

And Plutarch adds climactically: "and doing freely at the bidding of our reason, as Xenocrates says, what we now do at the command of the law". The teachings of the philosophers then, as is usual in

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[5] *Divine vengeance* presents the same situation. There, Plutarch quotes from *Phaedrus* 248a, but in such a way as to suggest that he had **A** in mind as well: he connects—quite conveniently for his train of thought—ἕπεσθαι θεῷ with the punishing justice of **A**. This explains, in *To the uneducated ruler* §6 (right after the mention of **A**), the protest against quick punishment by governments.

[6] Notice that Hesiod is quoted as if he were a philosopher. Einarson–De Lacy (1967), 295, n. c refer to *Works and Days* 253, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

[7] Plutarch probably did not think of Hesiod, *Works and Days* 121–126; there the daemons are called πλουτοδόται: an allusion to this particular passage would be very inconvenient in the context of *Against Colotes*, where Plutarch prefers virtue to riches!

Plutarch, invite us to apply our own reason. One may conclude that, to Plutarch's mind, if we do away with laws, we still have reason and religion as the basis of civilized society (see also 1125A). But … the Epicureans do not "believe" in reason, but in pleasure. They spit on virtue, and they do not respect divine Justice. Indeed, they scoff at such words as those of Plato, *Laws* 715e–716a: "God, even as … divine Law" (**A**; 1124F). And the primitive state Colotes is referring to is precisely the life propagated by the Epicurean doctrine! It is the Epicureans who are thus most in need of laws! Again, "the very legislation that Colotes praises provides first and foremost for our belief in the gods" (1125D), and it is impossible to establish a government if you remove all religion from under it.

Against Colotes thus expresses the belief in divine Providence, divine justice, divine government and law as "the underpinning and base that holds all society and legislation together" (1125E). The positive laws Colotes refers to are clearly outdone by divine Law to which reason, or philosophy, points the way.

Now *To the uneducated ruler* 781C mentions, together with **A**, an identical item, viz. a reference to Hesiod, *Works and Days* 256–262 (**C**); in Hesiod this passage follows upon the allusion to daemons, and it describes Dikè as sitting beside Zeus (πὰρ Διί πατρὶ καθεζομένη). In *To the uneducated ruler* Plutarch interprets **A** and holds that Dikè is not merely the πάρεδρος of Zeus, but that Zeus himself *is* Justice and Right and the oldest and most perfect of Laws.

Moreover, it is most probably no coincidence that Plutarch takes on the defence of Epaminondas (**D**) against the slander of the Epicureans in *Against Colotes* §33, whilst he produces him as an example of somebody who takes care of his fellow citizens in *To the uneducated ruler* §4.

'On exile'

Plutarch's ultimate stance in *On exile* is Platonic (Babut [1969] 106–108), despite the Stoic flavour of many of the applied topoi, and despite the probability that Ariston of Chios is among his sources (Giesecke [1891] 56–100). This holds especially also for his discourse on cosmopolitanism, a theme treated from §5b onwards (600E: Οἷόν ἐστιν κτλ.). The structure of the essay itself testifies to that interpretation (Barigazzi 1966, 262): the σῶμα-σῆμα doctrine, referred to in §17 (the heavenly origin of the soul imprisoned in the body "as an oyster in its

shell": *Phaedrus* 250c) controls the perspective from which cosmopolitanism is to be understood. Moreover, whenever Stoic ideas or images turn up, Plutarch always puts them in the correct Platonic perspective, as will be shown.

In §4–5a Plutarch argues that we are in control of our reaction to things that happen to us, "using our own resources to smooth out the roughness of what comes from outside ourselves" (opposition τῷ οἰκείῳ—τὸ ἀλλότριον). He makes an allusion to the Homeric jars of Zeus, quoting from Plato, *Republic* 379d. Plutarch's interpretation, however, rather seems to make use of *Gorgias* 493a–c (see also Hani [1980] 236, n. 5). In that Platonic passage, just after the the σῶμα-σῆμα doctrine has been mentioned (493a), the desiring part of the soul of the "thoughtless, who are uninitiated" is compared to a leaky vessel (τετρημένος πίθος), and their souls to leaky sieves. Socrates goes on comparing the life of the intemperate man with filling vessels that are corrupt and leaky (ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά). Plutarch, in *On exile*, argues paradoxically that the multitude is like filters (ἠθμοί; **E**), leaking the best and keeping the worst.

Plutarch then applies the image to things that are not evil by nature. In the case of exile, we should remember that there is no such thing as a "native" land. Ariston is quoted, but immediately thereafter Plato (*Timaeus* 90a): "man is no earthly plant, but a celestial one—the head, like a root,[8] keeping the body erect—inverted to point to heaven". The context in Plato's *Timaeus* is of importance for a correct understanding of the rest of Plutarch's exposé. For Plato (90cd) argues that the man who has devoted himself to learning and true thoughts, will inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine (φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα) and will in no degree fall short of partaking in immortality (μετασχεῖν ἀθανασίας). The image of the celestial root thus suggests a divine vocation. In order to implement that vocation, one should supply each part with its own congenial food and motion; "and for the divine part within us the congenial motions are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe". The latter remark indeed explains why Plutarch soon comes up with the quote from *Laws*. For if no particular city is by nature our native city—Heracles and a Stoic-Cynic Socrates (Κόσμιος) illustrate this point—, then the whole earth, embraced by

[8] Cf. the image of the root in *Progress in Virtue* 81B.

the aether (**F**; Nauck: Eur. 941, 1–2), is our native country. Plutarch then evokes this Universe in terms of the Stoic concept of the cosmos-πόλις. But the quote from Plato *Laws* (**A**; 601B) again puts the Platonic perspective on the exposé: it is the Platonic god who is the only king and ruler (**B**) of the cosmos. In Plato, Zeus is (always) "followed by Dikè", who, in turn, is followed by "every man who would fain be happy"; in Plutarch, Dikè is said to be observed by all men towards all men as our fellow-citizens: the Justice of Zeus inspires the justice among men.

Apart from **A**, two elements from *On exile* turn up in *To the uneducated ruler*:

a) The Platonic image of the vessels (**E**; 782EF). Plutarch compares corrupt souls (αἱ σαθραὶ ψυχαί) to empty vessels: one cannot tell which is whole and which is defective, but when you pour liquid in them, the leak appears; just so corrupt souls cannot contain power, but leak out in acts of desire, anger, imposture, and bad taste.

b) The quote from Euripides (**F**; 780D). It has been argued (Giesecke [1891] 95–96) that Plutarch took this quote from a cynic-Stoic source, because of the Stoic flavour of the surrounding context, where the cosmos is seen as a πόλις. This may be true, but one should notice that Plutarch puts a Platonic perspective on the cosmology, viz. with the reference **A**. Moreover, Plutarch uses "magistrates, procurators and councillors", and "laws" only as metaphors; this means that he distinguishes between the god ("one king and ruler") and the visible cosmos (Babut). Consequently, what we should expect is that Plutarch somehow makes it clear that he disagrees with the Stoa, despite the possibly Stoic flavour of **F**. This is exactly what he does at the beginning of § 5 of *To the uneducated ruler*, before quoting **A**: "For it is neither probable nor fitting that god is, as some philosophers say, mingled with matter, *etc.*"

'On Isis and Osiris' § 1

The opening chapter of *On Isis and Osiris* shows some striking parallels with *To the uneducated ruler* 780F–781A (see also Babbitt [1993] = [1957] 7, n. b, and 9, n. a).

a) (**G**) In *On Isis and Osiris* § 1 Plutarch argues that sensible men should especially pray that the gods may grant them the knowledge about themselves (τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμης), and thus reveal the Truth. On the part of human beings, this quest for the divine involves study and

investigation, an occupation well pleasing to Isis, who is a philosopher (φιλόσοφον οὖσαν). It is thus the gods themselves who bridge the gap between themselves and humans. The same idea is expounded in *To the uneducated ruler* 782A: god establishes the sun in the heavens as his mirrored likeness; in the same way he establishes the light of justice in states as an image of his Reason (λόγου τοῦ περὶ αὐτόν), which wise men can copy with the help of philosophy.

b) (**H**) Just as, in *On Isis and Osiris* §1, god is not strong because of thunder and lightning (βρονταῖς καὶ κεραυνοῖς), so the ruler in *To the uneducated ruler* 780F establishes as his likeness and luminary, intelligence in place of sceptre, thunderbolt (κεραυνόν) or trident. These are the attributes, so Plutarch (780F) states, some rulers represent themselves with *in sculpture and painting*, thus provoking god's anger. There can be no doubt about what Plutarch was thinking while writing this. *On Isis and Osiris* §24, 360D recalls, with Plutarch's explicit approval, the criticism of Lysippus on Apelles, who had represented Alexander with a thunderbolt in his hand. "Those who imitate" are, to Plutarch's mind in *To the uneducated ruler*, not so much Alexander himself, but the rulers who would allow themselves to be represented "with thunderbolts", like Alexander was painted by Apelles.

c) (**I**) Just as the god, in *On Isis and Osiris* §1, is blessed through knowledge and intelligence, and for the same reason possesses immortal living, not just lapse of time, so in *To the uneducated ruler* 781A, god enjoys felicity, not through the length of his life, but through the ruling quality of his virtue.

'Isis and Osiris' and 'Progress in Virtue'

A close connection between *On Isis and Osiris* and *Progress in virtue* is *a priori* likely: if the former essay is a philosophical quest for mystic truth, the latter explains philosophical-ethical progress as an initiation into Mysteries. Besides, there is, to Plutarch's mind, a close and detailed analogy between Mysteries and philosophy (Roskam 2001).

On Isis and Osiris §3 informs us that having a beard and wearing a coarse cloak (πωγωνοτροφίαι … τριβωνοφορίαι) does not make philosophers: this is identical to 81CD (**J**).

And thus, as *On Isis and Osiris* §3 goes on, the true votary of Isis, the one who has legitimately received what is displayed and done (τὰ δεικνύμενα καὶ δρώμενα) in the Mysteries (**K**; there is an allusion to

Mysteries in *On exile* as well: see above), uses reason in investigating and in studying the truth. Just so, in *Progress in Virtue* 81EF, the one who is initiated into philosophy follows reason as a god, like the one who pays attention when in the Mysteries the holy rites are displayed and done (δρωμένων καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν).

Now right after **K** in *Progress in Virtue*, Plutarch brings up **A** (more specifically the *humility* of the follower of the god): the devotee will "humbly" follow reason as a god. One might expect to find a reference to the same Platonic passage in *On Isis and Osiris*. And indeed we do, but only after Plutarch has investigated some Egyptian customs and rites, and has told the myth of Isis (§4–21). After this "interludium", the discussion on Euhemerism follows in §22–24. Plutarch reports that such great men like Cyrus and Alexander were considered merely noble kings (βασιλέων ἀγαθῶν). Plutarch takes the following stand: "But 'if some, elated by a great self-conceit', as Plato (**A**) says, "with souls enkindled with the fire of youth and folly accompanied by arrogance" have assumed to be called gods (ἐδέξαντο θεῶν ἐπωνυμίας; cf. *Progress in Virtue*: τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφίας ὄνομα … οὐδὲ προσγράφουσιν (**L**); the variation is clearly due to the different subject of the treatises), their repute flourished but a brief time, etc.".[9] Those kings are humbled, like the young man who is initiated into philosophy becomes humble.

The distance between the elements **J** and **K** on the one hand, and **A** and **L** on the other, can easily be explained by the structure of *Isis and Osiris*, and so I do not hesitate to consider these four elements together a cluster of parallels (i.e. a non-coincidental repetition of at least three tangible elements, illustrating a particular idea) with *Progress in Virtue* §10, where they occur together. The cluster opposes merely outward display of divinity or philosophic expertise to the humility of the one who is truly initiated and humbly studying the truth.

'Progress in Virtue' and 'To the uneducated ruler'

Finally, we confront *Progress in Virtue* with *To the uneducated ruler*. Here as well, a close parallelism will not come as a surprise. For both essays operate with the same argumentative strategy: they oppose a reproachable care for outward façade to an ethically authentic inner self.

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[9] Plutarch keeps Plato's *Laws* in his mind: in §26 he quotes from *Laws* 717a.

In §10 of *Progress in Virtue* Plutarch opposes the man who is still "looking outside" (*ἔξω* βλέπων ἔτι: 80F) and is still attracted toward repute to the man who has no need of eulogies and audiences, but is satisfied with being the sole witness of his good action: "reason is already growing within him and taking root in his own self" (τὸν λόγον *ἐντὸς* … ἐν ἑαυτῷ: 81B). Plutarch then sharpens the antithesis by means of more images. The "emptiness" in the comparison of young devotees of philosophy with grain is the *tertium comparationis* which elicits the Platonic image of (empty) vessels (**E**; ἀγγεῖα κενά: 81C). Pouring some liquid in them results in the expulsion of the air inside. Even so, when men are being filled with really good things, their conceit evaporates. They cease to feel pride in their philosopher's beard and gown (**M**; πώγωνα καὶ τρίβωνα: 81C). They do no longer give themselves the title of philosopher (**L**). The man who makes progress in virtue is finally compared to the one who is initiated into the Mysteries (**K**) and has seen a great light (**M**; μέγα φῶς ἰδών: 81E), and again Plutarch's phrasing reminds one of Plato, *Laws* 716a: "that man 'humble and orderly attends upon' reason as a god" (**A**: 81E); in Plato as well, that man is contrasted with the one who is uplifted by vainglory (ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας).

Philosophy thus enables to see virtue. Does this apply to a ruler as well? The second half of *To the uneducated ruler* deals with this question. Now if we expect the relation virtue—reason—god to be applicable to the situation of the ruler, we can also expect Plutarch to repeat some specific elements. And so he does. We find

a) the quote from Plato in 781F–782A (**A**), together with the idea that philosophy helps to copy the god (**G**; see already 780EF);

b) the reference to beard and gown as merely outward marks of the philosopher (**J**). Only: the beard has been replaced by the wallet, which was the trademark of Diogenes, whose encounter with Alexander is told in 782AB;

c) just like the young philosopher is compared to the one who is initiated into the Mysteries and then sees a great light, so the ruler copies the light of justice (**M**; τὸ … φέγγος εὐδικίας: 781F) god has established in the cities as an image of his Reason;

d) the young philosopher who he is making progress is compared to a vessel: when the latter is filled with a liquid, the air gives way; in the same way, in the former, when he is filled with really good things, conceit (ὁ τῦφος) gives way. The image of the vessel is also used in connection with the ruler. You can see what empty vessels (**E**; τῶν κενῶν

ἀγγείων: 782EF) are leaky when you poor a liquid into them: the liquid will leak out; likewise, when a ruler has a leaky soul (σαθραὶ ψυχαί), his power will leak out in acts of desire, anger, imposture and bad taste. In the case of *To the uneducated ruler*, the image of the leaky vessel is clearly borrowed from Plato, *Gorgias* 493, where the intemperate man is said to be constantly filling leaky vessels with ἐπιθυμίαι.

Having thus established the cluster **A**, **J**, **M** and **G**, a final word should be added about the occurrence of **G** in §3 as well as in §5. This repetition has been regarded as a token of a clumsy composition. However, such a repetition, introducing an element of a cluster before the cluster itself is produced, is not uncommon in Plutarch (see Van der Stockt [1999] 585).

Conclusions

1. It is clear that the discussed *materia* is not just an arbitrary amalgam of parallels: these are too numerous, and at the same time too close and too repetitious to be fortuitous. On the contrary, we deal with a quite fixed body of items, at the centre of which is the quote from Plato's *Laws*. Perhaps one can distinguish two groups in this body of items: the one links the Plato quote to Hesiod and refers to Epaminondas, the other links it to Euripides and refers to Alexander; the former stems from a polemic against Epicurism and favours participation in public life (the βίος πρακτικός), the latter polemizes against the Stoa and stresses the importance of a mystical philosophy. But anyhow, inasmuch as *To the uneducated ruler* integrates almost all of the items, this essay is a *thoroughly Plutarchan* work.

2. The *materia* is at the same time highly Platonic: it contains quotes from or allusions to the *Phaedo* (vessels; gods as rulers), *Phaedrus* (σῶμα-σῆμα doctrine), *Gorgias* (σῶμα-σῆμα doctrine, Mysticism), *Timaeus* (man as a plant), and *Laws* (**A**). Inasmuch as this *materia* is (part of) the philosophical background for *To the uneducated ruler*, this essay is (also) *very Platonic*. It remains, however, to assess the bearing of this Platonic stamp with regard to possible Pythagorean influences in §3 of the essay (cf. supra).

3. Concerning the question of the "divinity" of rulers and laws, the discussed *materia* allows for the following conclusions.

Plutarch interprets the Platonic text from *Laws* always in an ethical sense: "Justice always following god" is at the basis of social life and the

administration of positive law (*Against Colotes, On exile*). Human law can never justify unjust deeds of *rulers (To the uneducated ruler*), but should be in accordance with "god as the oldest and most perfect law" (*Against Colotes*).

On the other hand, if justice and virtue are properly god's privilege, they are nonetheless within our reach: god grants us a share in his reason and *virtue (On Isis and Osiris, To the uneducated ruler*) so as to enable us to copy his virtues (not: his power and immortality) and to become like him (ὁμοίωσις; *To the uneducated ruler, On Isis and Osiris*). This is our ultimate mission: to reach out to god's knowledge and virtue, to be open for the revelation through philosophy and Mysteries (*To the uneducated ruler, On Isis and Osiris, Progress in Virtue*). A ruler, then, should not get too much into his head. Basically, it is the gods who are rulers, and particularly the god of Plato's *Laws* (*On exile, To the uneducated ruler*). Far from being his equal, the ruler should try to become an ethical copy of god, taking care of his people (*Against Colotes, To the uneducated ruler*) and striving for wisdom and justice with the help of philosophy (*To the uneducated ruler*). The quest for this authentic divinity will do away with mere external show such as divine titles and divine appellations: philosophy would learn the ruler that such fuss and bother calls for god's wrath (*On Isis and Osiris, To the uneducated ruler, Progress in virtue*). In his eagerness for a divine status through philosophy, the ruler always *humbly* follows Dikè. In fact, the ruler's "great ship of fortune, tossed by high winds and surging sea" is in dire need of "heavy ballast and a great pilot" (782B); this pilot is the reason he possesses as his share in divinity.

PLUTARCH'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: PERIPATETIC AND PLATONIC

Jackson P. Hershbell

Introduction: Plutarch's Eclecticism

Plutarch's admiration for the "divine" Plato, a "philosopher pre-eminent in reputation and influence,"[1] has been a starting point for many studies of his own thought, but K. Ziegler noting that Plutarch considered himself a Platonist, deemed him *kein originaler Denker*, whose primary allegiance to Plato was in ethics.[2] For H. Dörrie Plutarch's philosophy was a form of "school Platonism," a view rejected by J. Dillon who regarded Plutarch as an "unorthodox" Platonist.[3] According to Dillon, Plutarch might even be considered an eclectic thinker, provided that "eclectic" is understood descriptively and not disparagingly.[4] For example, in Plutarch's *De virtute morali* and in some of his other works, Aristotelian or Peripatetic opinions appear, a phenomenon Dillon explained not as "mindless eclecticism," but as a consequence of Plutarch's belief that Aristotle essentially remained a Platonist.[5]

This study's main purpose is, however, not to pursue *in extenso* Plutarch's eclecticism or Platonism, but to re-examine his knowledge of Aristotelian and Peripatetic works, especially those concerned with political thought, and to assess their possible influence on Plutarch's own political philosophy. Scholars such as J. Dillon, F.H. Sandbach, G. Verbeke, K. Ziegler, and especially G.J.D. Aalders, H. Wzn. and L. de

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[1] See *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* 90C where Plato is called "divine", an epithet of greatest praise, and *Quaestiones convivales* 700B for the second reference.

[2] Ziegler (1964) col. 301. This second edition of Ziegler's comprehensive treatment of Plutarch and his work, is a photomechanical reproduction of his 1949 offprint appearing in *R.E.* two years later in expanded and revised form. See vol. 21.1, cols. 636–962. Col. 938 in *R.E.* = col. 301.

[3] See Dillon (1988) 107ff. Dillon refers to Dörrie (1971) 36–56.

[4] See Dillon (1988) 104 and *passim*.

[5] *Ibidem* 112.

Blois,[6] have all contributed much to understanding Aristotelian/Peripatetic influence on Plutarch. To these and other scholars much indebtedness is owed.

Plutarch's Knowledge of Aristotle's Political Works

Plutarch belongs to the best educated and well-read of ancient Greek authors, and given his many works, both extant and lost, it is clear that Plutarch drew from numerous sources for his *Lives* and *Moralia*. Most of these sources were literary, but Plutarch also had a large circle of friends, composed of intellectuals and well-educated statesmen.[7] It is thus likely that he used oral as well as literary sources. Plutarch had a prodigious memory, and he also kept "notebooks" (ὑπομνήματα), most likely excerpts from or comments on his reading and his conversation with others.[8]

Given these considerations, a brief survey of relevant studies since Ziegler's excellent "*Plutarchos von Chaironeia*" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* (1949),[9] is in order concerning Aristotelian and Peripatetic influence on Plutarch. In "Plutarch and the Development of Aristotle" (1960), G. Verbeke never doubted Plutarch's knowledge of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, accepting Ziegler's belief that Plutarch knew Aristotle's *Politics* and other works.[10] In 1982, stimulated by I. Düring's "Notes on the History of Transmission of Aristotle's Writings" (1950), F.H. Sandbach thoroughly studied Plutarch's knowledge of Aristotle while criticizing H.C. Helmbold and E. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (1959).[11] They provided, for example, no clear criteria for determining a quotation, and Sandbach properly questioned their "parallels" vis-a-vis Aristotle, asking whether any of these or their "quotations" really demonstrate Plutarch's direct knowledge of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.[12]

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[6] See Aalders/De Blois (1992) 3397–3399; Sandbach (1982) 207–232; Verbeke (1960) 236–247. References to Dillon and Ziegler were given in previous notes.

[7] See Ziegler (1964) cols. 30–60 = *R.E.* 21.1 cols. 665–696.

[8] See *Mor.* 464F. For more on ὑπομνήματα, see *"Hypomnema"* in *Der kleine Pauly*, eds. K. Ziegler & W. Sontheimer II (Munich, 1979), cols. 1282–1283.

[9] See note 2 preceding.

[10] Ziegler (1964) col. 284 = *R.E.*, 21.1, col. 922.

[11] Düring's study appeared in *Göteborgs Högskolans Årsskrift* 56 (1950) = *Symbolae Philologicae Gotoborgenses* 37. Cited by Sandbach (1982) 208–209.

[12] Sandbach (1982) 209. See also Samuel Sandmel's "Parallelomania," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 81 (1962), 1–13 which cautions against the dangers of finding "parallels."

Sandbach also saw other problems concerning Plutarch's alleged knowledge of Aristotle's treatises.[13] First, there is uncertainty in ascertaining whether Plutarch refers to a lost esoteric work of Aristotle, or to a passage in an extant treatise. Second, when Plutarch refers to a passage of Aristotle's writings, it is seldom clear whether he actually read the text, or relied on a secondary source. This is especially the case when Plutarch and Aristotle refer to something commonly believed or known.[14] In brief, Sandbach agreed with R. Volkmann's early study (1869) that Plutarch did not directly know many of Aristotle's works, including the *Politics*.[15]

In their collaborative study of Plutarch's political philosophy (1992), Aalders and De Blois claimed that Aristotle's treatises, including the *Politics*, were *teilweise bekannt* to Plutarch.[16] They also concurred with Düring's opinion (1957) that Plutarch read the *Politics*, although the parts he knew first-hand can no longer be determined. Düring himself claimed that Plutarch read some of the *Politics*, mainly on the basis that Plutarch knew the "lists" (πίνακες) of Aristotle's works made by Andronicus of Rhodes, ca. the first half of the first century B.C.E. (See *Sulla* 26).[17] And with caution Aalders and de Blois suggested that Plutarch's knowledge of Aristotle's thought came from *peripatetische Schulschriften*,[18] e.g. those of Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum, and Dicaearchus. In brief, proof for Plutarch's direct knowledge of Aristotle's *Politics* and other writings, seems meagre, especially given Sandbach's study mentioned earlier.

Plutarch's interest in Aristotle's political works seems, however, demonstrated by his knowledge of the *Athenian Constitution* which, according to Sandbach, was "clearly known to him although he never mentions it by name."[19] This work was unanimously attributed to Aristotle in antiquity even though its terminology is not Aristotelian, and unlike the *Politics*, its content is mainly descriptive with little philosophical reflec-

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[13] Sandbach (1982) 209–210.

[14] *Ibidem*, 210: e.g. at *Quaest. conv.* 660F Plutarch had no reason to refer to Aristotle's *Historia animalium* 532b3 or 556b16 to know that cicadas drank dew.

[15] After critical remarks on Aalders (1977) Sandbach agrees with Volkmann (1869) 2.23, whose opinion seems to be an *obiter dictum*. See Sandbach (1982) 220. Unlike Volkmann, Sandbach has given evidence for his judgement vis-a-vis the *Politics*.

[16] Aalders/De Blois (1992) 3397. They seem, however, to ignore Sandbach's belief that the *Politics* was not known.

[17] See Sandbach (1982) 231, n.2.

[18] Aalders/De Blois (1992) 3398.

[19] Sandbach (1982) 211.

tion.[20] Though not in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* of the Middle Ages, the *Athenian Constitution* proves Plutarch's direct knowledge of one political work attributed to Aristotle.

To be sure, the *Athenian Constitution* is not by Aristotle, but at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a treatise probably read by Plutarch, Aristotle presents a seemingly partial outline of the *Politics* (see *E.N.* 1181b16–24) with reference to a "collection of constitutions," or "different forms of constitutions," which will be the basis for treating the stability of states, the various kinds of constitutions, and the causes of good and bad government, topics which comprise Books 3–4 of the *Politics*. Given then, the *Nicomachean Ethics*' conclusion, it is understandable why Plutarch and other ancient authors believed that the *Athenian Constitution* was by Aristotle. Yet Plutarch's knowledge of this work does not prove that he read the *Politics*. Together with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Athenian Constitution* shows only Plutarch's interest in political works he believed to be by Aristotle, and his possible knowledge of the *Politics* cannot be dismissed.

Further consideration of the *Nicomachean Ethics* seems in order. In view of Plutarch's demonstrable familiarity with Aristotelian ethics, it is hard to deny that he knew the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As D.A. Russell observed, much of the ethical terminology of Plutarch's *De virtute morali*, and "even the norms for its presentation were inherited not from the Academy, but from the Lyceum."[21] For example, chap. 5 of *De virtute morali* shows Aristotelian influence on the soul's division into the theoretical and practical, the opposition of σοφία-φρόνησις, practical reason's role in regulating the passions, and the concept of virtue as a means between defect and excess. In brief, despite its basic Platonic convictions, Plutarch's *De virtute morali* shows considerable familiarity with, and use of Aristotelian concepts and terminology.

Sandbach seems to have discounted this Aristotelian terminology of *De virtute morali*, and perhaps gave too much attention to 442B, a passage concerning Aristotle's bi-partition of the soul, an apparent conversion from his earlier Platonic view of the tripartite soul.[22] Though

[20] See Düring (1966) 476f.

[21] Russell (1973) 84. See also Hershbell (1978) 135ff., esp. 135, n.1 for bibliography.

[22] See Sandbach (1982) 221. Verbeke (1960) 238ff. paid great attention to the passage, claiming that "Plutarch gave an example of doctrinal evolution" in Aristotle's psychological views. According to Verbeke, not only did Aristotle's psychological views change, but his metaphysical as well, and for his thesis he relies not only on Plutarch's *De virtute morali*, but other treatises as well, e.g. *Adversus Colotem*.

Plutarch's remarks at *De virtute morali* 442B do not definitely prove that he read the *Nicomachean Ethics*, together with *Adversus Colotem* 1114F, they strongly suggest that Plutarch knew about a change or development in Aristotle's thought. Though 442B is not conclusive evidence that Plutarch had direct knowledge of Aristotle's ethics, it shows Plutarch's familiarity with an "evolution" in Aristotle's thought.[23]

Further argument for Plutarch's knowledge of Aristotle's political philosophy is given by Aristotle's union of ethics with politics in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where, according to W. Jaeger, Aristotle envisions a comprehensive philosophy about human beings (ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία).[24] For Plutarch, ethics and politics were also closely linked, and though they formed a unity in Plato's thought, Plutarch, like Aristotle, deviated from Plato by basing his political reflection more on personal experience than on theory. According to Jaeger, Aristotle abandoned Plato's logical or theoretical construction of the state, and formed his political thought on "the facts of experience."[25] And so in his *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, cautiously dated by J.-C. Carrière ca. 96–108,[26] Plutarch used Aristotle's practical approach to politics when advising Menemachus, a young citizen of Sardis, who intended to enter politics.[27] Plutarch writes to Menemachus from his own experience, and contrasts the true statesman from the favor seeking, self-serving politician who wants only fame or glory.[28] For Plutarch the genuine statesman must exemplify the virtuous life, and so continue the Hellenic tradition of maintaining humane and virtuous qualities (814A). In emphasizing the need for virtuous statesmen, Plutarch draws, of course, from Platonic and Aristotelian convictions, and from those of still earlier thinkers, e.g. Solon.[29]

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[23] Verbeke (1960) 236.

[24] See Jaeger (1948) 264f.

[25] *Ibidem*, 265. Jaeger later remarks that "the empirical part in Books IV–VI … shows no trace of the old Platonic spirit of constructions and ideal outlines." See (1948) 269ff.

[26] Carrière (1984) 9–25 has a thorough treatment of the *Praecepta*'s probable dates. Jones (1966) 72 was noted for having *prudemment* dated the *Praecepta* between 96 and 114.

[27] Carrière (1984) has an exhaustive discussion of Menemachus. See 29–33.

[28] See 798C–799B.

[29] Plutarch's interest in and admiration for Solon as a "statesman" and wise man is evident from his life of Solon, and *Septem sapientium convivium*.

Plutarch's Knowledge of Peripatetic Sources on Politics

Plutarch's *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* illustrates well the problems of *Quellenforschung*. As J.-C. Carrière noted, it is difficult to unravel sources that have been tightly woven in Plutarch's personal thought.[30] And given his vast learning, it is also difficult to ascertain Plutarch's sources, many of which are no longer extant. And so, for example, A. Mayer (1910) and K. Mittelhaus (1911) published studies in which they agreed that the *Praecepta* has much Peripatetic material, though they disagreed on whether Ariston of Keos or Theophrastus of Eresos, was Plutarch's main source.[31] Mayer argued that Plutarch relied mainly on Ariston's πρὸς τούς ῥητορούς, while Mittelhaus claimed that Theophrastus' πολιτικὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, was Plutarch's primary source for the *Praecepta*.[32] Mittelhaus' thesis has greater plausibility given the so-called Lamprias Catalogue's list of Plutarch's works: Περὶ Θεοφράστου ⟨πολιτικῶν⟩ πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς (nr. 53).[33] The entry is probably correct, but then, like Ariston quoted at 804E, Theophrastus is cited only once at *Praecepta* 804A. Since both Ariston's and Theophrastus' treatises are lost, along with Plutarch's response to the latter, Peripatetic influence on Plutarch seems quite conjectural.

Mittelhaus, however, noted that there were parallels between the *Praecepta* and Plutarch's *Lives*, and to these Carrière added seventeen more.[34] Also in a recent edition of Theophrastus' sources, many fragments from his lost political writings are found in Plutarch's *Lives*.[35] Ziegler and other scholars believed that these citations or references were from Theophrastus' Ἠθικά and Περὶ βασιλείας,[36] the latter of which Plutarch cites at *Themistocles* 28.1. In general, Plutarch gives no specific sources for Theophrastus in his *Lives*.

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[30] See Carrière (1984) 25.

[31] See Mittelhaus (1911) and Mayer (1910) 483ff.

[32] Ariston is, however, only mentioned once at 804E. As Carrière (1984) 27, remarks: "*cet indice est beaucoup trop mince, et, qui plus est, on a confondu, dès l'antiquité, Ariston de Ceos, le péripatéticien, et Ariston de Chios, le stoïcien.*" The disagreements between Mayer and Mittelhaus are well summarized by Carrière, *ibidem*, 25–29.

[33] On the contents and assessment of the Catalogue, see Ziegler (1964) cols. 60–66 = *R.E.*, 21.1, cols. 696–705.

[34] Carrière (1984) 15; for some parallels, see 16–17.

[35] See Fortenbaugh (1992) esp. 456–458. Theophrastus' influence on the *Lives* has recently again been noted by Scardigli (1995) 7–9 and Duff (1999) 103–104.

[36] Ziegler (1964) col. 284 = *R.E.* 21.1, col. 922, and Fortenbaugh (1992) 439–441.

But even if Plutarch used Theophrastus' ethical/political works as sources for his *Lives*, it does not follow that Theophrastus was a primary source for the *Praecepta*. As Ziegler and others have noted, the references to Theophrastus in the *Lives* seem unconnected with the *Praecepta*, and thus Ziegler left open Plutarch's use of Peripatetic sources in the *Praecepta*.[37]

Much like the *Praecepta*, Plutarch's *An seni res publica gerenda sit*, draws from his own political experience and study. Not surprisingly, Peripatetic sources have been claimed for both treatises, and so, for example, as with the *Praecepta*, Ariston of Keos has been considered a source for *An Seni*.[38] Plutarch's report at 787C that "several (ἔνιοι) liken envy to smoke," may include Ariston who at 804E of the *Praecepta* is quoted as saying that "fire does not cause smoke, nor reputation envy." Efforts to connect, however, Ariston with *An Seni* falter because Plutarch never mentions him in this work, and C. Fornara has argued that *An Seni*'s first section (783–792) is an argument against an opponent questioning whether the elderly should participate in politics. And, according to Fornara, Plutarch engages in a polemic not against Ariston of Keos, but against Ariston of Chios, a Stoic student of Zeno of Citium (see Cicero, *Cato Maior* 1.3).[39] But Fornara's attempt to ascribe *Tithonus* or other works to Ariston of Chios has no support from Diogenes Laertius who at *Lives* 7.162 claims that Ariston wrote nothing except letters, and that the works assigned to him are really by Ariston of Keos.[40] On the whole, there are no decisive reasons for believing that Plutarch argued against Ariston the Stoic in *An Seni*.[41] He and the Peripatetic, Ariston of Keos, were often confused in antiquity. Perhaps Plutarch used Ariston of Keos as a minor source in *An Seni*, but a polemic would, in any case, be more likely directed against a Stoic then against a Peripatetic.[42]

Far more significant for Peripatetic influence on Plutarch's *An Seni* is Fornara's thesis that it was Demetrius of Phalerum, not Ariston of Chios, whose work much impressed Plutarch.[43] First, both Demetrius

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[37] Ziegler (1964) col. 182 = *R.E.* 21.1, col. 819.
[38] Ziegler (1964) cols. 185–186 = *R.E.* 21.1, cols. 821–822.
[39] Fornara (1960) 119–127.
[40] Diogenes Laertius may not, of course, be a reliable source.
[41] See Aalders/De Blois (1992) 1198, n.64.
[42] Plutarch's extant polemics were directed against Epicureans and Stoics. No similar polemical works against Peripatetics are found in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue or extant works.
[43] Fornara (1966) 125–127.

of Phalerum and Theophrastus wrote treatises Περὶ γήρως.[44] Second, at 786F Plutarch states that it is a duty not to allow reputation to become withered by old age, but to add something new and fresh for arousing gratitude for previous actions, making them better and lasting "just as the artisans who were responsible for keeping the Delian ship in good condition, by inserting and fastening in new timbers to take the place of those becoming weak, seemed to keep the vessel from those ancient times everlasting and indestructible." A similar notion appears at *Theseus* 23.1, and there Demetrius is the source. That the simile comes from his Περὶ γήρως is thus likely. The Delphic ship was both ancient and new at the same time, and so a striking symbol for vital old age. Yet another fragment of Demetrius is in a context concerned with old age (795C–D): after Demosthenes' reversal in the Athenian assembly he was disheartened until an old man touched Demosthenes, telling him that he resembled Pericles in natural ability (τὴν φύσιν), and so had no reason to blame himself. This anecdote also appears in "Demosthenes," *Vitae decem oratorum* 845A–B, which, though spurious, reflects Plutarch's interest in Demosthenes, and that Demetrius of Phalerum was Plutarch's source for the *An Seni* anecdote is supported by Photius' *Bibliotheca* 493a41-b19.[45]

Demetrius of Phalerum was also an authority for Plutarch's *Life of Demetrius Poliorcetes* for which Plutarch perhaps relied on Demetrius of Phalerum's own autobiographical Περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας, written about his role as an Athenian προστάτης (ca. 317–307 B.C.E.) until driven from office by Demetrius "Poliorcetes." Given, however, the loss of Demetrius of Phalerum's treatises, and Plutarch's failure to cite sources, the extent of his indebtedness to Demetrius' political views remains uncertain.

Dicaearchus is also a possible source for Plutarch's knowledge of Peripatetic political thought. Indeed, there is little doubt that Dicaearchus' works influenced Plutarch's *Lives*: in his own biographies Dicaearchus emphasized the "practical life" (βίος πρακτικός) instead of the "theoretical life" (βίος θεωρητικός).[46] He also wrote a βίος Ἑλλάδος, which examined not only how human beings lived, but under what cultural or social conditions. D.A. Russell considered Dicaearchus' a

[44] *Ibidem*, 125.
[45] *Ibidem*, 126.
[46] See Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 2.16.3.

"kind of general social history," and according to Russell, it had likely influence on Plutarch's *Lives*.[47]

Since the evidence is paltry, further consideration of Plutarch's literary sources for his knowledge of Peripatetic political thought, seems unproductive. Plutarch certainly knew of or read works by Ariston of Keos, Demetrius of Phalerum, Dicaearchus, and Theophrastus, and used their writings in his *Lives* and *Moralia*, especially in the essays which Ziegler classified as *politische Schriften*.[48]

Plutarch's Non-Literary Sources for Aristotelian/Peripatetic Political Philosophy

In general, Plutarch's knowledge of Peripatetic political philosophy rests not only on literary sources. He had many Greek and Roman friends, all well-educated, and some of these were Peripatetics.[49] For example, Menephylos against whom Ammonius defended Plato (*Quaest. Conviv.* 741A–B); Aristotle who belonged to his namesake's school with a minor role in *De facie in orbe lunae* 920F and 922E; Favorinus, an enthusiastic admirer of Aristotle, and to whom Plutarch dedicated *De primo frigido*. There is also a lost treatise listed in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue (No. 132), Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Φαβωρῖνον περὶ φιλίας κτλ,[50] a title which suggests Plutarch's familiarity with Aristotelian views on friendship discussed at some length in Book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Favorinus also participated in *Quaestiones convivales* 8.10, and there is likelihood that he is Favorinus of Arles, a student of Dio of Prusa.[51] But besides Favorinus and other Aristotelian friends mentioned previously, it is likely that Plutarch had other friends familiar with Aristotelian/Peripatetic teachings, and so non-literary sources may have been another source for Plutarch's knowledge of Aristotle and his school.

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47 Russell (1973) 102.
48 See Ziegler (1964) cols. 180–188 = *R.E.* 21.1, cols. 817–825.
49 See Ziegler (1964) cols. 30–60 = *R.E.* 21.1, cols. 665–696.
50 Ziegler (1964) col. 63 = *R.E.* 21.1, col. 699.
51 Ziegler (1964) col. 39 = *R.E.* 21.1, col. 675.

Conclusions

As a thinker familiar with the "divine" Plato's works and with those of Plato's successors, it is not surprising that Plutarch also read some of Aristotle's treatises, and was partly influenced by them. At first glance, Plutarch's interest in Aristotle seems confined to natural questions, e.g. *De facie in orbe lunae*, *De primo frigido*, and the possibly spurious *Quaestiones physicae*.[52] But as seems clear from *De virtute morali*, he was familiar with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Athenian Constitution*, then believed to be by Aristotle. Although he may not have read the *Politics*, Plutarch could have learned about Aristotle's political thought both from Peripatetic literary sources, e.g. works of Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum, and Dicaearchus, and from his own Peripatetic friends.

Although Plutarch polemicized against Epicureans and Stoics, he seemed kindly disposed toward Aristotle's thought and that of his school. As Dillon noted, Plutarch considered Aristotle essentially a Platonist.[53] But to what extent did Aristotle influence Plutarch's own political thought? In a brief summary of Plutarch's political views, Dillon states that he was no admirer of democracy, and held a theory of kingship, according to which the ruler is the image (εἰκών) of god who rules the universe (*Ad principem indoctum* 780E). The ruler is also god's agent for governing the human race (708D). Given, however, the work's incompleteness, its declamatory nature, and the impossibility of dating it, it is uncertain whether it represents Plutarch's mature thought.[54]

In a similarly brief or fragmentary work whose title, Περὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, is probably not original,[55] Plutarch appeals to Plato's belief that monarchy is the most excellent form of government. If the work is genuine, such a view does not wholly conform to that of Aristotle who at *Politics* 1279a22ff. suggests a six-fold classification of constitutions. Three good ones are: 1) the rule of one, or monarchy; 2) the rule of a few, or aristocracy; 3) the rule of the many, a πολιτεία, a term he often uses for "constitution." The three bad or deformed kinds of constitution are: 1) tyranny, aiming only at the tyrant's good; 2) oligarchy, aiming at the wealthy minority's good; 3) democracy aiming

[52] Ziegler (1964) col. 220 = *R.E.* 21.1, cols. 857–858. Plutarch seems to have been influenced in the *Aetia* if the work is his, by the pseudo-Aristotelian Προβλήματα.

[53] See note 5 above.

[54] Dillon (1977) 198.

[55] See Ziegler (1964) col. 137 = *R.E.* 21.1, cols. 823f.

specifically at the poor majority's good. To be sure, this is not the only way Aristotle classifies constitutions. For example, at *Politics* 1290a12ff. he refers to a division of constitutions into oligarchy and democracy. And while criticizing this division, Aristotle observes that constitutional government may be described as a mixture of these two (1293b33ff.).

In general, Aristotle seems to shift his views on government, probably because of an awareness of the complexities of political forms. He realizes, for example, that there are different kinds of democracy and oligarchy (*Pol.* 4, chapters 4–6). Moreover, Aristotle appears to have studied actual constitutions, and already in Book 2 of the *Politics*, he rejected Plato's ideal state. He later gives his own views in Books 7 and 8. There the state's goal is to secure the good of the whole community, and the best constitution provides that everyone can act and live in a condition of well-being. Such a community depends, however, on its citizens' virtuous activity, and only the citizen can practice the virtues of both philosopher and statesman.

Like Plato and Aristotle, Plutarch was mistrustful of democracy. And though monarchy was not necessarily the best constitution, he shared Aristotle's favorable judgement of the Athenian politician Theramenes.[56] Plutarch regarded him as a model Greek politician, and as Aalders and de Blois noted, Theramenes led Athens while it was temporarily under Spartan supremacy (ca. 404 B.C.E.). At *Praecepta* 804B Theramenes is cited as someone who could remain neutral while caught between Sparta's power and Athens' unpredictable *dêmos*, *wie vergleichweise die griechische Lokalaristokratie zwischen ihrem Demos und der römischen Oberhoheit* in Plutarch's own time.[57]

It is thus significant to note how in Plutarch the ancient distinction between Greeks and barbarians gave way to a three-fold one: Greeks, barbarians, and Romans, "barbarian" now referring to those who threatened to destroy the Roman empire from without its boundaries.[58] According to C.P. Jones, Plutarch's attitude to Rome was "both Greek and Roman: Greek in that he saw himself as Greek by birth and language, Roman, in that his interests and sympathies were bound up with the empire."[59] In brief, given his political pragmatism Plutarch tended to move away from Plato's often theoretical views while follow-

56 See Aalders/De Blois (1992) 3399.
57 *Ibidem*, 3399.
58 Jones(1971) 124f.
59 *Ibidem*, 125; See also Jones' n.18 on this page.

ing Aristotle's more flexible and empirical approach to political matters. He shared Aristotle's conviction that politics and ethics are inseparable,[60] and although Plato also held this belief, Plutarch pursued the Peripatetic emphasis on "character," illustrating its close connection with politics in his *Lives*. For Plutarch there was no clear distinction between ethics and politics. Statesmen, like other citizens, had obligations to the entire community whether it be a small Greek town like Chaeronea, or to the Roman empire.

As a Platonist, however "unorthodox," Plutarch realized that his world was no longer that of the "divine" Plato. He was, of course, still concerned about the management of cities, and cities always needed a statesman's oversight, but that was only part of his role. He also had to act as a subject, and he was like those governed, always subject to Roman officials such as proconsuls and procurators.[61] In any case, unlike Plato, Plutarch never sketched an ideal republic or legislated for an imaginary city. He wrote for his contemporaries, and he resorted to Aristotelian and Peripatetic terminology and thought when necessary. For him Aristotle always remained a Platonist.

[60] Aalders (1982) 16.
[61] Jones (1971) 112.

PRESENCIA DE LAS IDEAS POLÍTICAS DE ARISTÓTELES EN PLUTARCO

Inés Calero Secall

Que Plutarco tenía gran conocimiento de Aristóteles es algo que no ofrece ninguna duda, cuando su nombre aparece citado con frecuencia por las *Vidas* o por los *Moralias* como fuente a la que había acudido Plutarco. Otra cosa es que el queronense hubiera leído directamente toda la obra aristotélica. Desde hace tiempo, como es sabido, han surgido al respecto opiniones divergentes, cuyo estado de la cuestión es recogido esquemáticamente por el profesor Sandbach (1982, 208).

Por mi parte, me parece interesante observar cómo en la *Política* de Aristóteles encontramos opiniones concordantes con Plutarco, pero esta evidencia no nos puede dar pie a pensar que el moralista tenía la *Política* en sus manos y mucho menos calificar las ideas coincidentes con el estagirita de citas directas de la obra, al modo como Helmbold y O'Neil ([1959] 8)[1] pretenden.

Es razonable entender que muchas de estas concordancias no habrían surgido en Plutarco por la lectura directa de Aristóteles, sino a través de Platón, pues, dado que el estagirita absorbe y comparte muchos de sus ideales, en este sentido está presente en Plutarco, aunque no se puede descartar el hecho de que el queronense hubiera reafirmado su ideario político al beber también de la fuente de Aristóteles (Aalders, *Mnemosyne* [1982] 78, n.45).[2] Pese a que el cotejo de la *Política* con la obra de Plutarco no nos proporciona ninguna evidencia concluyente de una lectura directa ni en las expresiones ni en los comentarios, no obstante Plutarco pudo acudir a algún resumen de esta obra, puesto que en algunos casos sus ideas son llamativamente coincidentes y, por eso, con cierta razón, Masaracchia (1995, 234) aconseja que se revise la *communis opinio*.

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[1] Disiento de ellos en la cantidad de citas que han anotado de la *Política* de Aristóteles, pues en muchos casos hay tan sólo una alusión muy sucinta del tema. De todos modos es de agradecer su labor de recopilación, a la que, sin duda, he acudido.

[2] Para quien su influencia en Plutarco ha sido grande.

En primer lugar, tendríamos que comenzar por el concepto del hombre como un *Zoon politikon*[3] y que es asumido plenamente por Plutarco,[4] quien considera la dedicación a la política como una necesidad que le viene dada al hombre por su condición de ser *politikon* y *koinonikon*. Pero si esa condición natural del hombre que le otorga la capacidad de hablar y que le hace distinto de los otros animales gregarios es contemplada por Aristóteles tanto en su integración como miembro de la ciudad como en el medio familiar, Plutarco la circunscribe al ámbito político y le sirve para apoyar su idea de que el hombre al estar dotado de instinto social y político ha nacido para consagrar su vida al servicio de la ciudad.

Y porque se preocupó de los problemas políticos de su ciudad, Plutarco coincidió con Aristóteles en analizar el régimen más conveniente que habría de establecerse en las ciudades. Así cuando Plutarco examina las formas de gobierno, entra en puntos de contacto con Aristóteles en unas, aunque en otras disienta. Por ejemplo, la democracia gozaba en estos tratadistas de muy pocas simpatías. Aristóteles no tiene ningún reparo en calificar de peligrosa la participación del pueblo en los cargos más importantes, porque su insensatez, *aphrosynê*, y su falta de justicia le conducirán a incurrir en actos injustos o erróneos[5]; de igual manera Plutarco no confiaba mucho en las masas, porque eran insensatas (*An seni* 796E), audaces, violentas (*Praec.* 801E), muy predispuestas a la corrupción (*Thes.* 35.4) y a mostrar sus simpatías a todo "aquel que le diera algo o que le concediera un favor" (*Praec.* 821F). Para él la masa era muy difícil de manejar (*Num.* 4.12; *Praec.* 800C). Estas consideraciones le sugerirían su aprobación de la medida adoptada por Solón de conceder al pueblo la facultad de elegir magistrados y pedirles cuentas de su mandato, pero no dejarle ocupar las magistraturas. Esta opinión la compartía Aritósteles,[6] pero su aplauso reside, sin embargo, en el acierto de evitar el descontento del pueblo, si no se le concedía alguna participación.

Sin embargo, cuando Aristóteles estudia las distintas clases de regímenes políticos y sus derivaciones, considera la posibilidad de una democracia más moderada constituida por los campesinos y también

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[3] Como fuente de esta idea Helmbold y O'Neil señalan *Política* 1253a7, pero también se podría haber registrado, *Ética Nicomáquea* 1097b11 y *Ética Eudemia* 1242a24.

[4] *An seni respublica gerenda sit* 791C.

[5] *Política* 1281b26.

[6] *Política* 1274a17; Plutarco, *Solón* 18.

los pastores, frente a otra más radical, la de los obreros y jornaleros. Sus argumentos se apoyan en la pérdida de poder que acontece a la Asamblea, al tener que ocuparse sus miembros de las labores agrícolas sin tiempo para reunirse en el ágora, sino en su propio territorio,[7] condiciones que, a los ojos del filósofo, restaban peligrosidad a las asambleas. Este rechazo a las reuniones armoniza con las ideas de Plutarco que califica de ignorantes a los que buscaban el voto popular y celebraban asambleas (*An seni* 796E) y recela de lo *demotikon*, porque se preguntaba: "¿Cómo un hombre puede conducir la ciudad con un atuendo y un aspecto populachero y querer tener poder y dominar a muchos sin tener el *logos* persuasivo y cautivador?" (*Praec.* 801E).[8]

Y aunque respecto a la realeza no comparten la misma opinión, porque, si Plutarco la calificaba como la mejor de todas las formas de gobierno *An seni* 790A (Cf. Pérez Jiménez [1988] 98), Aristóteles se muestra remiso a aceptar el gobierno de uno sólo, ya que dos hombres buenos son mejor que uno y más difíciles de corromper,[9] ambos no veían con malos ojos la aristocracia, pues Aristóteles la verá no tanto como el régimen que se ajusta al ideal, como el que está al alcance de casi todas las ciudades, mientras que el moralista es un gran admirador del régimen aristocrático de la Esparta de Licurgo, sobre el que pocas veces emite juicios negativos. Aun coincidiendo con Aristóteles[10] en atribuir intenciones democráticas a las *syssítia* que organizó: acabar con el afán de lujo y con el deseo de riquezas,[11] las consecuencias pocos democráticas que el filósofo había observado, porque no era fácil que los muy pobres participaran, son silenciadas por Plutarco en un gesto que le dicta su admiración. En este pasaje, sin embargo, no parece que tuviera como fuente a Aristóteles, sino a Teofrasto al que cita en *Licurgo* 10.2.

La sintonía con Aristóteles se hace más nítida cuando termina por reconocer que la base de un buen gobierno no reside tanto en un determinado régimen, sea aristocracia o monarquía, como en la calidad humana de los gobernantes (Sobre Plutarco, Aalders [1982] 33 y 44), que han de mirar al bien de la comunidad y no a su propio interés.[12]

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[7] *Política* 1317a22 ss; 1319a37.

[8] En su concepto de democracia Plutarco es contradictorio como fruto de la propia época en que vivió, *cf.* Plácido (1995) 389.

[9] *Política* 1287b13; 1286a31.

[10] *Política* 1271a32.

[11] *Licurgo* 10.1; *Apophthegmata Laconica* 226D.

[12] *Política* 1279a17.

Por eso aborrecen ambos la tiranía y en sus análisis coinciden en resaltar la perversidad de un rey y los demagogos como dos vías que conducen al establecimiento de la tiranía que es la forma más perversa de monarquía[13] a la que condenan por igual con severas críticas y con alusiones a su camarilla de espías o *prosagogidês*,[14] información que Plutarco podría haber tomado de la *Política*.

Pero una de las más importantes herencias que Plutarco recibe de la vieja tradición es el maridaje que se establece entre ética y política. En su búsqueda del gobierno ideal, Aristóteles está convencido de que es competencia de la ciudad la máxima atención a la virtud del ciudadano, por lo que es función del legislador averiguar el modo de hacer al hombre lo más virtuoso posible.[15]

Este ropaje ético con el que está envuelta la política lo encontramos ya en Platón, cuya preocupación por el tema queda plasmada en buena parte de su *República*. Plutarco, fiel a ambos, propone establecer como meta de los políticos el "conducir a los ciudadanos hacia lo mejor con fuerza y sin miedo" (*Praec.* 800A). Deberán estudiar "los caracteres de sus conciudadanos", aunque él mismo se da cuenta de que "cambiar el temperamento colectivo de un pueblo no es nada fácil" (*Praec.* 799B).

Pero no basta con preocuparse por educar y encaminar a los ciudadanos a las acciones virtuosas, la virtud ha de ser predio del gobernante. Este principio cristaliza de forma semejante en los códigos que ambos autores destinan a los hombres con la misión de mandar. Aristóteles erige la *phronêsis* como la virtud por excelencia que ha de poseer un gobernante[16] y, aunque no cree en una superioridad manifiesta del gobernante frente a los gobernados, considera que deben ser en parte diferentes[17] y, por tanto, aquél debe poseer virtudes distintas al gobernado, si se ha de pensar en un buen gobierno. El gobernante, además de sensatez, deberá contar con la habilidad necesaria de un hombre práctico, mientras que para los gobernados no es tan fundamental la sensatez como la *doxa* verdadera.[18] Y aunque ello no obsta para que puedan tener virtudes comunes, considera la conveniencia de una educación especial para el gobernante, mediante la cual ha de aprender

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[13] *Política* 1305a9; 1310b15; 1311a ss; *Ética Nicomáquea* 1160b12; *Pirro* 23.3.
[14] *Dión* 28; *Política* 1313b13.
[15] *Política* 1280b6; 1333a14; *Ética Nicomáquea* 1180a30.
[16] *Política* 1277b25.
[17] *Política* 1332b16.
[18] *Política* 1277b28; 1325b13.

cosas distintas al gobernado, puesto que, por ejemplo, es diferente la templanza y la justicia del que manda.

Otra cosa es el aprendizaje del ciudadano, pues deberá participar de las virtudes del gobernante y de las del gobernado. Pues no hay que perder de vista que en Aristóteles no existe una total identificación entre gobernado y ciudadano, al que define como "aquel que participa en la justicia y en el gobierno".[19] En realidad, el ciudadano es un gobernante en potencia, aunque en otros momentos pueda estar en función de gobernado. Sólo el hecho de habitar una ciudad no da derecho a ser llamado ciudadano.

También el queronense considera que aquellas personas que van a gobernar habrán de destacar por la excelencia de sus cualidades.[20] De esta manera, imbuido por la racionalidad de los filósofos antiguos,—los guardianes de Platón entre otras cualidades han de poseer *anchinoia*[21]— Plutarco no podía dejar de subrayar la razón como guía imprescindible en los buenos gobernantes (*Ad princ.* 779E), puesto que considerará la *krisis* y el *logos*, el juicio y la razón, como un sólido fundamento y un vigoroso principio en la actividad política (*Praec.* 798C) sin olvidar que el estadista deberá comenzar por preparar su "propia alma y afianzar su carácter" (*Ad princ.* 780B). Ante ello manifiesta la necesidad de elegir como líder de la *politeia*, no a un hombre que sea célebre y poderoso únicamente, sino al que goza también de valor moral (*Praec.* 806C).

Así, a tenor de la definición aristotélica del ciudadano en tanto que está capacitado para participar en el gobierno, su virtud consistirá no sólo en dejarse mandar, sino también en poder mandar, porque aquel que va a ejercer el mando no será capaz de mandar bien, si no ha sido mandado antes. Esta máxima no era una idea original de Aristóteles, porque la expresión utilizada por el filósofo "se dice, y con razón"[22] revela que había sido concebida con anterioridad. Y es verdad que la encontramos en las *Leyes* de Platón (643e), referida, en el mismo sentido, al doble aprendizaje del ciudadano. Plutarco hace alusión a este principio en *An seni* 783D, pero es evidente que el vehículo transmisor no fue la *Política* de Aristóteles, como anota Helmbold-O'Neil, sino Platón, como el mismo Plutarco atestigua (*Praec.* 806F).

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19 *Política* 1275a23.

20 Su figura del ἀνήρ ἀγαθός se asemeja al σπουδαῖος aristotélico, *cf.* Becchi (1995) 59.

21 Platón, *República* 503c.

22 *Política* 1277b12.

El contenido de este pasaje parece inspirado en *Leyes* 643e, aunque utiliza más bien la terminología de 762e, pasaje que no contiene, como muchos consideran, la misma idea, porque aquí Platón exalta sobre todo el sometimiento (*douleuein*) a las leyes, etc. El pasaje de *Praec.* 816F, señalado por Helmbold-O'Neil, no recoge el espíritu de Aristóteles, sino alude a la repercusión de la obediencia del súbdito en la buena labor del gobernante.

Son más las virtudes que ambos destinan al acervo del buen gobernante. La serenidad y apacibilidad son consagradas como actitudes necesarias al impecable ejercicio de gobernar. El hombre de Estado no puede dirigirse a su pueblo si no es con serenidad, *praos*, nos dirá también Plutarco en *Praec.* 800B.[23] Este ideal de apacibilidad introduce elementos discordantes con Platón, cuya teoría sobre el comportamiento exigido a los guardianes era inadmisible también por Aristóteles.[24] Aunque no cita abiertamente a Platón, el peripatético se está refiriendo a *República* 375c, con la que discrepa al no compartir la necesidad de mostrarse duro con los desconocidos[25] y amable con los conocidos como era el deber de los guardianes, por cuanto concibe la idea de que son precisamente los amigos y familiares los que más odios engendran si no son debidamente atendidos.

Pero esa apacibilidad no es suficiente, con ella debe ir aparejada otra cualidad opuesta como la fogosidad. Ya Platón[26] nos decía que los guardianes han de tener a la vez un temperamento fogoso, *thymoeidês*, y apacible; también fogosa y reflexiva *thymoeidês* y *dianoêtikos*, ha de ser la índole natural de los ciudadanos de Aristóteles.[27] Esa fogosidad, a mi juicio, entendida como vivacidad, energía para llevar las riendas del estado, quizás alimentara la expresión plutarquea "sin miedo y con fuerza" como actitud necesaria para el gobernante que ha de conducir a la virtud (*Praec.* 800B).

Pues bien, la tranquilidad que debe reinar, como decía, en todo régimen bien gobernado obliga al hombre de Estado a procurar evitar las discusiones y acabar con las rencillas que surjan entre poderosos. Este principio es compartido por ambos pensadores, cuyo gobernante

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[23] Pero no habla de *eirene*, porque un gobernante ha de guerrear, *cf.* Bravo García (1973) 163.
[24] *Política* 1327b39.
[25] *Política* 1328a8.
[26] *República* 375c.
[27] *Política* 1327b37.

ideal ha de ser, ante todo, reconciliador.[28] Plutarco, siempre mucho más explícito, defiende, en primer lugar, la idea de que todo hombre que pretenda gobernar bien ha de poner remedio para que no surjan desacuerdos en su país, pero, si ocurriesen, los ha de atajar rápidamente, pues de lo contrario, con una celeridad mayor de lo que cabe pensar, se extiende al dominio público y precisamente la trascendencia de cualquier conflicto más allá de los interesados es el primer error que un gobernante ha de evitar. Por ello el moralista no comprende cómo Solón pudo prescribir una ley en virtud de la cual castigaba con la pérdida de los derechos de ciudadanía a los que no tomaran partido por un bando u otro en caso de discordia civil (*Praec.* 823F). No estaba de acuerdo con esta medida que con más rotundidad critica en *De sera numinis vindicta* 550C. Es muy probable que Plutarco recogiese este dato de la *Constitución de los Atenienses* 8.5, pero Aristóteles no hace ningún juicio negativo respecto a esta decisión, al contrario, parece que la justifica por cuanto el deseo de Solón estaba dirigido a motivar a los ciudadanos que adolecían de indiferentismo y a involucrarlos en las actividades políticas.

No obstante, a este precepto político los dos escritores confluyen, por el hecho de que asumen el principio de que las revueltas se originan de pequeños conflictos.[29] Es muy claro Aristóteles cuando en *Política* 1303b17 sostiene que las revueltas no nacen a propósito de insignificancias, sino por causa de insignificancias y provocan grandes conflictos. Esta idea es reproducida por Plutarco en *Praec.* 825A, pero no utiliza la misma expresión, pues prefiere el término *diaphorai* frente al aristotélico *staseis* y añade la sugerencia de un posible trasvase de un conflicto particular a uno público, *idia koinon aitia kathistatai*, por lo que no parece que tuviera el texto delante ni, por tanto, ofrece indicios de ser una cita de Aristóteles.

Campo abonado para las revueltas no es, a los ojos de Aristóteles, la igualdad, sino la desigualdad, aunque no hay que perder de vista la distinción que claramente hacían los antiguos respecto a la igualdad (Harvey [1965] 101ss; Aalders [1984] 55–71): la aritmética basada en el número y la proporcional. A ambas hacen referencia nuestros autores, aunque a la proporcional, que está basada en el mérito, *kata axian*,

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[28] *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 825AC; *Política* 1303b37.

[29] El análisis plutarqueo de los peligros y las *staseis*, para Pavis D' Escurac (1981) 287, es un testimonio importante para conocer la situación de las ciudades griegas en época de Trajano.

de los individuos, Aristóteles[30] no la designa con el término "geométrico", adoptado, en cambio, por Plutarco.[31] El queronense, siguiendo al Sócrates platónico que la califica de "todopoderosa entre los dioses y los hombres[32]" acepta sin reservas la igualdad o proporción geométrica, de corte aristocrático, como principio organizador de la actividad política, razón por la que hace una de las más duras críticas a Solón, por haber introducido la proporción aritmética que era la defendida por la democracia (*Frat. am.* 484B). Aristóteles, en cambio, con la moderación que le caracteriza, estaba convencido de que era necesaria la proporcional, pero en algunas ocasiones convenía la aritmética.

En el repertorio de preceptos destinados al comportamiento del buen gobernante encontramos también la necesidad de delegar en otros magistrados las tareas de Estado, puesto que grandes dificultades se ciernen sobre el gobernante, si desea ocuparse sólo de todos los asuntos. En *Política* 1287b8 se puede leer esta idea, que se marida perfectamente con los consejos plutarqueos al ciudadano con pretensiones de gobernar. El ceder cargo a otras personas y el emplear a otros a su servicio son obligaciones que compete al hombre político (*Praec.* 812C). Para expresar sus ideas con más claridad, Plutarco hace uso de una comparación marítima en términos aristotélicos. Esta es una de las pocas citas, de entre las recopiladas por Helmbold-O'Neil, que parece evocar con más fuerza las palabras de Aristóteles, puesto que el filósofo alude al timón y al guía como instrumentos, *organa*, auxiliares del *kybernetes* en la función de navegar.[33] Pero, sin duda, la habríamos confirmado con certeza como fuente, si Plutarco hubiera aludido a los dos tipos de *organa*, animados e inanimados, como hace Aristóteles, puesto que Platón utiliza también en el *Político* 298d una expresión semejante.

Entre los consejos que prodiga Plutarco a los políticos incluye la recomendación de hacer concesiones al pueblo en pequeños gustos y en las pequeñas cosas para así resistir en las mayores.[34] Su nexo con Aristóteles no reside en este consejo, sino en la cita que utiliza del tirano Jasón, que cometía pequeñas injusticias, según Plutarco, para poder practicar la justicia en las grandes. Esta cita de la *Retórica* aristotélica (1373a25) que Helmbold-O'Neil registra, a mi juicio, no parece que

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30 *Política* 1301b30; 1302a7.

31 *De fraterno amore* 484B; *Quaestiones convivales* 719AB.

32 Platón, *Gorgias* 508a.

33 *Política* 1253b28 ss.

34 *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 818A.

fuese recogida directamente, al existir una diferencia sustancial, no ya de vocabulario, sino de contenido, dado que alude a términos de cantidad y no de importancia, tal como Plutarco traduce el comentario de Aristóteles que reza en cambio así: "Jasón decía que era necesario cometer algunas injusticias para poder realizar muchos actos justos".

Ocurre lo mismo con otra cita de Aristóteles aportada por Helmbold-O'Neil, la que se refiere a la ley tan severa sobre los borrachos promulgada por Pítaco, en virtud de la cual los delitos cometidos por los ebrios exigían una pena doble.[35] Es la conveniencia la razón que esgrime Pítaco, a los ojos de Aristóteles, para haber actuado así y no la indulgencia que atenuaría la pena por encontrarse aquellos en estado de embriaguez. La conexión con Aristóteles está sólo en el dato, pero parece que de forma subliminal se evoca también su espíritu, cuando Plutarco saca a colación a Pítaco, planteándose si el fin justifica los medios. De hecho más adelante pone en boca de Mnesífilo el principio que atribuye a Solón de que "es el producto lo que importa y no los medios que lo producen". Este aforismo enlaza con la concepción aristotélica cuando habla de la necesidad de la guerra para obtener la paz, no como fin, sino en función de esta (una reflexión sobre ello, Nikolaidis [1995] 301–312).[36]

Convendría ahora examinar si ambos pensadores coincidían en el colectivo que creían más idóneo para dedicarse al gobierno de la ciudad. Es significativo el hecho de que encuentren gran resistencia a aceptar la competencia de los jóvenes en materia política. Este rechazo es consecuencia de la asunción del axioma que define la experiencia como factor importante a la hora de administrar el Estado.

Muy contundente se muestra el estagirita cuando en la *Ética Nicomáquea* 1095a2; 1142a15 nos dice que el joven no es un discípulo apropiado cuando la materia que se enseña es la política, porque no tiene experiencia de las cosas. Por esa misma razón Plutarco no estaba de acuerdo con aquellos regímenes que licenciaban a los ancianos de los cargos públicos, puesto que, entonces, el pueblo es dirigido por un grupo de jóvenes desprovistos de espíritu político (*An seni* 790D). Defendía, por tanto, a los viejos como administradores del Estado, para que educasen a la gente joven (*An seni* 790E), porque, en la misma línea que Aristóteles, entendía que con la edad llegaba la sabiduría que proporciona

[35] *Septem sapientium convivium* 155F; *Política* 1274b23.
[36] *Politica* 1325a7.

la experiencia.[37] Esta coincidencia armoniza también con la tesis platónica que encontramos en *República* 412c y *Leyes* 690a de que los más viejos han de gobernar y los más jóvenes ser gobernados.

Y si la inexperiencia de los jóvenes era considerada un impedimento para ocupar cargos políticos en la vieja tradición, con la que concuerda Plutarco, la clase obrera era excluida por Aristóteles de la ciudadanía[38] y, por tanto, de toda intervención en política. La idea de que la dedicación a la política ha de ser exclusiva era comúnmente compartida, porque tanto Aristóteles[39] como Platón[40] proclaman al unísono la disponibilidad de tiempo libre como exigencia ineludible que conlleva la consagración a la política[41] y, por ello, el gobernante no debe ocuparse en ningún oficio.[42] No hay razones para dudar de que los límites de la ciudadanía que marca Plutarco son más amplios y no excluyen a los artesanos, pero parece concordar en su preferencia de alejar al político del comercio o cualquier actividad técnica (Desideri [1985] 396).

¿Quiénes, entonces, podían optar a ocupar cargos políticos? ¿Quedaba la dedicación abierta a los ricos? La conveniencia o no de la riqueza como aliada de la vida política era una cuestión que se planteaban los tratadistas políticos. En concreto, el exceso de riqueza era considerado como mal consejero en el ámbito de la política por Aristóteles.[43] Vale la pena recordar cómo veía en la clase media el mejor elemento para que prosperase el buen gobierno de una ciudad,[44] en consonancia con el principio de la *mesotes*.[45] Ni el exceso de ricos ni de pobres podría proporcionar la estabilidad a un régimen[46] que la igualdad económica entre los ciudadanos otorgaba. Ni los pobres ni los ricos deberían tener autoridad en la ciudad por la multitud de problemas que unos y otros creaban.[47]

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37 *An seni respublica gerenda sit* 790C; *Politica* 1329a15.

38 *Política* 1278a8.

39 *Política* 1329a1.

40 *República* 395c.

41 Para Platón han de ser filósofos sus guardianes. Respecto a la polémica sobre si Plutarco recoge esta tesis platónica, *cf.* Aalders (1982) 41, quien defiende esta idea. Massaro (1995) 241, opina que se debe puntualizar y considera que Plutarco contempla la mediación educativa del filósofo "que ha de preparar al no filósofo, gobernante o súbdito, para la actividad política".

42 *República* 396b

43 *Política* 1323b7 ss.

44 *Política* 1295b ss.

45 *Política* 1295a37.

46 *República* 422a

47 *Política* 1281a ss.

Y si Plutarco en las *Vidas* parece apartarse de los antiguos al defender vínculos estrechos entre la pobreza y el político, en sus *Praecepta* parece expresar otra opinión y considera una limitación la estricta pobreza y establece la diferencia entre dos clases de políticos (Desideri [1985] 398), los que sufragan las liturgias y los que realmente obtienen el mando, como Aristides que no se caracterizaba precisamente por su riqueza (*Praec.* 823E).

No me gustaría terminar sin subrayar la desconfianza que a ambos despertaba la proximidad al mar. La sintonía que el conservadurismo de sus ideas les unía se manifiesta en atribuir efectos negativos a la introducción a través del mar de elementos innovadores y extranjeros que Plutarco deja claro en *Bruta anim.* 989C y *Licurgo* 27.8 y a los que Aristóteles consideraba perjudiciales para la buena marcha de la política ciudadana.[48] Como en otras muchas ocasiones el eslabón que les unió fue Platón.[49]

Podríamos concluir, entonces, que Plutarco en unos casos a través de Platón y en otros desde el propio Aristóteles asimiló el espíritu aristotélico, pues el concepto que tenía de la política se asemejaba en muchos aspectos al de Aristóteles, aunque haya, sin duda, divergencias en los detalles. Sin embargo, pienso que su *Política*, cuyo contenido, sin duda, conocía, tal vez no la tuviera delante, porque en algún momento hubiera podido citar expresamente a Aristóteles como fuente en algunas de las ideas coincidentes con la *Política*, como hizo en otras ocasiones, pues me resisto a aceptar las citas que Helmbold y O'Neil proponen.

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48 *Política* 1327a11 ss.

49 *Leyes* 705a.

THE DREAMING KRONOS AS WORLD ARCHON IN PLUTARCH'S *DE FACIE IN ORBE LUNAE*

Abraham P. Bos

Plutarch's philosophical myth in De facie in orbe lunae

At the end of *De facie in orbe lunae* (940F) Plutarch relates a fascinating philosophical myth which has always drawn a great deal of attention. It shows how all reality is ultimately governed by Zeus (942A). But for the execution of Zeus' divine counsel Plutarch introduces a mediating agent: Kronos is chief executive officer in the cosmos. The government of the world is in the hands of demons, who receive their instructions from Kronos. However, Kronos is not presented as a spry and vigilant administrator, but dwells in a deep cave on an island near Ogygia, where he sleeps. For sleep is the chain with which Zeus has shackled him (942F). An important passage in the text (though one which has not remained free of corruption) talks about two states of Kronos. On the one hand it mentions "Titanic affections and motions of his soul", on the other "his royal and divine element", which comes to the fore when he has been purified of those "Titanic affections".[1]

The demons carry out their world-governing task on the basis of guidelines which they receive from Kronos as "dream oracles".

In this contribution I want to investigate the view of world-government which Plutarch has set before us here and what its background is. In doing so I will gratefully make use of contributions by many previous authors[2] to the discussion and build on earlier contributions by myself.[3] My arguments will be aimed at showing that in the Hellenistic period

[1] Plutarch, *De facie* 26, 942A: εἶναι δ' ἀνάστασιν τὰ Τιτανικὰ πάθη καὶ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ⟨ἕως⟩ ἂν αὐτῷ πάλιν ἀνάπαυσιν ὁ ὕπνος ⟨καταστήσῃ⟩ καὶ γένηται τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον.

[2] Von Arnim (1921); Hamilton (1934); Soury (1940); Görgemanns (1968); (1970); Beardslee (1975); Dillon (1977); (1986) 214–229; Donini (1988).

[3] Bos (1989); (2001).

theological discussions on the government of the cosmos as a whole corresponded closely to views on the best possible order in human society, but also to views on man as a microcosm.

A double theology with a monarchianist purport

In *De facie* Plutarch uses the scheme of a divine hierarchy headed by one supreme divine entity, namely Zeus. But Plutarch says almost nothing about him. We can only conclude *e silentio* that Zeus does not sleep but is always awake, and that he is not bound but free. But he has no direct involvement with the course of affairs in the cosmos. All that Zeus "premeditates" is realized only through the mediation of Kronos.

In contrast to Zeus, Kronos is not free but bound (with the bond of sleep) and confined in a deep cave. Also, his royal and divine element seems to be regularly troubled by the effects of his "Titanic affections and motions of soul".

This information, however limited in itself, offers sufficient grounds, in my view, for claiming that Plutarch here sketches a "double theology", in which ultimate sovereignty, all-governing rulership rests with a totally transcendent principle, while executive power is assigned to a cosmic god and his subordinates. It is the system of a *cosmic theology* framed in the superstructure of a *meta-cosmic theology*, a system which we also find in the Jewish author Philo of Alexandria, in Alcinous and Numenius, Maximus of Tyre, in the early Christian authors Justin Martyr[4] and Tatian, in the *Poimandres* of the Hermetic Corpus, and in the theology of Basilides and other Gnostics.[5]

"The Cave" in which Kronos is enclosed, and which has an opening at the top, can be interpreted as a symbol of cosmic, physical, sense-perceptible reality. And the "sleep" in which he is lost and with which Zeus has "bound" him can be connected with the "bondage" of his

[4] Cf. Justinus Martyr, *Apologia* 1.12.7: ὁ Λόγος ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὗ βασιλικώτατον καὶ δικαιότατον ἄρχοντα μετὰ τὸν γεννήσαντα θεὸν οὐδένα οἴδαμεν ὄντα. Note that Justin connects "royal dignity" with the *Logos* and not with God. We already saw above that Plutarch, *De facie* 26, 942A attributed "royal dignity" to Kronos. When Justin, *Dialogus* 4, 2 talks about the βασιλικὸς νοῦς, this is not the highest Intellect of Plato, *Philebus* 30d2, but a subordinate entity, as is shown by what follows the passage in *Dialogus* 4.2: ὡς δὲ ὁρᾷ τὸν θεόν. Cf. Van Winden (1971) 76–78.

[5] Cf. Bos (1994); (1998); (2000).

intellectual powers to a fine-material soul-body, but also suggests the notion of the intellect of the soul which has to be "awakened" by the Intellect-in-act.

This fascinating myth is not a literary embellishment without further philosophical relevance. It expressively formulates Plutarch's own theology, which he elsewhere presents in a more abstract form. In his *De procreatione animae* (that is, in his exegesis of Plato's *Timaeus*!) he talks about the need for the intellect of the World Soul to be awakened by the transcendent, pure Intellect (1026E–F; 1016C). This is entirely in line with what Alcinous sets out in his *Didaskalikos* (10.164, 42—165.4; 14.169.36–41).

Plutarch's myth seems remarkably fresh and original. Yet we can better understand some of its elements if we appreciate the role which Aristotle's philosophy has played here. It is my intention to clarify this by showing that Plutarch was convinced by Aristotle's fundamental criticism of Plato. This criticism manifested itself in:

a. discussion of the relation between philosophers and rulers in human society;
b. discussion of the role of the gods in the macrocosm;
c. incorporation of these theological conceptions in mythical cosmogonies.
d. However, these aspects of Aristotle's criticism were all due to the one, central point of difference between Plato and his pupil, namely their view of the soul (in conjunction with that of the intellect) of man as a microcosm.[6]

(a) *Philosophers and kings*

Plato clearly and systematically distinguished between the political activity of a ruler or governor (*archôn*) and the contemplative activity of a philosopher. In *Republic* 5 he advances the provocative proposition that there will never be an end to human misery unless kings become philosophers, or philosophers are entrusted with the task of governing society (*Resp.* 5, 473c11. Cf. 493a1; 499b–c; *Epist.* 7, 326a–b).

[6] Szlezák (1996) 41: "Es war die feste Überzeugung Platons, dass Seele, Staat und Kosmos in einem ontologisch begründeten Zusammenhang stehen und dass daher die Erkenntnis dieser Bereiche einheitlich aus denselben Prinzipien zu gewinnen ist". On this point Aristotle agreed with his teacher.

So Plato strongly emphasizes that philosophy is essentially different from government. Philosophy is oriented to the reality which is always identical with itself. Ruling and governing take place in changeable everyday reality. But despite the sharp distinction between the activity of the philosopher and that of the ruler, Plato holds that a personal union between these two functionaries is necessary. The same person should, in a dialectical process, sometimes turn away from sense-perceptible reality, and sometimes return to it, in order to implement the eternal models for human action in the human world (*Resp.* 7, 520c1).

Aristotle seems to have criticised this fundamental Platonic conviction. According to Themistius, Aristotle rejected the thesis of the "philosopher-king" as superseded and replaced it by the rule that kings should lend a ready ear to those who are truly philosophers. But kings should act, not theorize[7]!

In the controversial work *De mundo*, which was attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity, the author, in the introductory chapter in which he outlines to Alexander of Macedonia the high value of philosophy, seems to follow the same line which Themistius ascribes to Aristotle.[8] Alexander is not exhorted to become a philosopher, but to maintain excellent relations with philosophy.

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[7] Themistius, *Oratio* 8, 107c–d = Aristotle, *De regno* fr. 2 Ross; 982 Gigon: Πλάτων μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα θεῖος καὶ αἰδοῖος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε ἀτεχνῶς ἀποκεκινδυνευμένως προήκατο λόγον, ὅτι μὴ πρότερον τὰ κακὰ λήξει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πρίν ἂν ἢ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἢ βασιλεῖς φιλοσοφήσωσιν. ἐλήλεγκται δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ δέδωκεν εὐθύνας τῷ χρόνῳ. ἄγασθαι δὲ ἄξιον Ἀριστοτέλην, ὅτι μικρὸν τὰ Πλάτωνος ῥήματα μεταθεὶς τὸν λόγον πεποίηκεν ἀληθέστερον, φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φάσκων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδών, τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀληθινῶς ἐντυγχάνειν εὐπειθῆ καὶ εὐήκοον· ἔργων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὴν βασιλείαν ἐνέπλησεν, οὐχὶ ῥημάτων. Leppin and Portmann (1998) 157 see Themistius' remark about Plato's theory being "outdated" as an allusion to the failure of the Emperor Julian!

[8] Aristotle, *De mundo* 1, 391b5–8: Πρέπειν δέ γε οἶμαι καὶ σοί, ὄντι ἡγεμόνων ἀρίστῳ, τὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἱστορίαν μετιέναι, φιλοσοφίᾳ τε μηδὲν μικρὸν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις δώροις δεξιοῦσθαι τοὺς ἀρίστους. This is a difficult passage, which has been explained in various ways. I now opt for the translation: "And in my view it is fitting for you, as the most excellent of world-leaders, to acquire knowledge of the greatest matters, and (it is fitting) for philosophy not to pay attention to anything insignificant, but to generously regale the noblest among men with such gifts". What goes before has talked about the generous reception which philosophy grants to its admirers (1, 391a16–18) and of the "small-mindedness" of those who devote their attention to one limited part of the cosmos (1, 391a18–26). Cf. Reale; Bos (1995) 176 and 251 n. 29. In *Oratio* 8, 106d quoted above Themistius also referred to Aristotle's tutorship of Alexander of Macedonia (in Mieza, close to the northern Greek city of Naoussa) and in 120a pre-

(b) *Theology*

Plato's view of the task of the gods in the macrocosm is very similar to his view of the philosopher-kings. For him the reality of the Ideas is the only truly transcendent, meta-cosmic reality. Only this reality can be postulated to have a perfect identity with itself (*Phaedo* 79a9; 79d1–2; 80b1–3; *Politicus* 269d5). The situation of the gods is different.[9] The gods are perfect living creatures (with perfect knowledge of transcendent reality[10]), but they are also intermediate between the world of Ideas and the visible cosmos. Plato presents the gods as those who bring about order and dynamics in the cosmos. Their proper management of affairs in the cosmos is a typical feature of the gods in Plato's conception (*Phaedrus* 246a–248a).

But Plato's theology always involves a "dialectics", in the sense that the gods, too, are alternately oriented to the world of Ideas and to the visible cosmos.

This also applies to the Demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus*. He, too, is alternately oriented to the perfect Living Being and to its visible image, which he establishes as perfectly as possible. After doing his work, this deity also withdraws to his normal state of rest (*Timaeus* 42e5) and delegates further tasks to subordinate agents (41c). The task of these "younger gods" is not just to "create" mortal living creatures but also to "govern" and "control" them.[11] So the exposition on the "younger gods" in the *Timaeus* has two sides: their products are less perfect than those of the Demiurge himself, in that mortal beings receive from them their mortal soul-part plus their mortal, gross-material bodies; and their task is to supervise affairs in the world of mortal beings.

The divine demiurge himself is also the agent who sets in motion the entire system of revolving celestial spheres (34a1). He is the principle of movement, it seems, just as Plato had said this of the perfect souls in the *Phaedrus*.

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sented himself as the philosopher-tutor of Valentinianus Galates, just as Aristotle had been for Alexander of Macedonia.

[9] The identification of the "always self-identical reality" and God took place in Middle Platonism. There is no good reason for attributing this identification to Plato, as De Vogel does (1970) 210–242. This innovation is due to the debate on theology after Plato and Aristotle.

[10] The gods are not "*philo-sophoi*", like people, but possess wisdom: *Symposium* 204a1: θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ.

[11] Cf. Pl., *Timaeus* 42e: τοῦτο καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἀκόλουθα ἐκείνοις ἀπεργασαμένους

But there is a problem in the *Timaeus*. For the World Soul, too, is the principle of movement in the cosmos. And Plato describes the World Soul as the product of the Demiurge's world-creating activity. And both the principle of Identity and the principle of Otherness form part of the structure of the soul. This might suggest that Plato presented his supreme divine principle as pure Intellect, and as of a higher order than Soul. But it can be argued equally well that Plato had no place in his ontology for a pure Intellect but only for a perfect Intellect *of* the World Soul.

This idea gains force when we observe that Aristotle criticised the ambivalence of Plato's Demiurge. Aristotle did not interpret the Demiurge as an "efficient cause".[12] A fundamental point of his criticism of Plato was always that Plato postulated only formal principles (the Ideas) and a "receiving principle". This may imply that Aristotle primarily regarded the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* as a facet of Plato's doctrine of principles.

Aristotle's alternative here is, again, a theology which makes a systematic and sharp distinction. The supreme divine principle is a purely transcendent Intellect which occupies the position in his system which the world of Ideas has in Plato's conception. The activity of the Prime Unmoved Mover is pure intellectuality (*noêsis*). But from the very beginning of his career Aristotle had complemented this theology of a transcendent divine principle with a "cosmic theology" of cosmic, executive, and governing divine beings, the stars and planets. In this way Aristotle instigated the "double theology" which since then was generally accepted in the Platonistic tradition as well, and which developed a hierarchical model in which the cosmic Archons are considered to be subordinate executors of the divine counsel of the highest, controlling, and governing Intellect.

(c) *The remythologization of philosophical theology*

A remarkable feature of Plato's oeuvre is the way in which he, in his *Statesman*, links with Hesiod's ancient mythical conception of a perfectly

ἄρχειν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῷον. See also Boyancé (1967) 346.

[12] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 9, 991a11; a22; 991b3–5; *De generatione et corruptione* II 9, 335a30; 335b8, and see Pépin (1964) 24 n. 2.

happy and carefree rule of Kronos. He, too, is helped by "governing gods" and demons.[13] This is contrasted with the toilsome rule of Zeus, in which the cosmos, without the help of God, under its own power (like a sphere hanging from a cord that has first been wound up and then unwinds), lapses into disorder and chaos with increasing speed.

This image of Kronos who looks after the cosmos as a whole, and divine Archons who take care of the parts, is taken up in Plato's last work, the *Laws* (4, 713c–714a; 10, 903b–905d).

The myth in Plato's *Statesman*, with it splendid image of the cosmos hanging from a wound-up cord, has at its heart the *a priori* proposition that the cosmos, as a corporeal entity, cannot possibly be without change in an absolute sense (268dff. esp. 269d9). Therefore, it must be subject to a change in its direction of rotation. The two conditions of the cosmos described in the myth should therefore be understood as resulting from two different conditions of the Soul of the cosmos, namely the ideal condition in which the Soul of the cosmos is oriented to the Ideas, and the fatal condition in which the power of the Soul is not oriented to ideal reality.[14]

In Plato's *Laws* 10 these two conditions of the one Soul are even presented as two Souls, a good and an evil one (896d–897b). These are set against each other as "a soul which acquires the aid of reason" and "a soul conjoined with unreason".[15]

In any case this remythologization of Plato's philosophical theology also sees the highest deity as an entity that causes movement because he himself possesses movement. In this regard the god Kronos seems to belong to the same category as the gods of the *Phaedrus*, that is, the category of perfect *souls*.

A striking contrast to this in Aristotle is that he also talked about the Titan Kronos in one of his lost works, but there he is a "dreaming Kronos". This is reported by Tertullian in his *De anima* (c. 46.10 = Aristotle,

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[13] *Politicus* 271d: Τότε γὰρ αὐτῆς πρῶτον τῆς κυκλήσεως ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος ὅλης ὁ θεὸς ὡς νῦν ⟨καὶ⟩ κατὰ τόπους ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὑπὸ θεῶν *ἀρχόντων* πάντ' ἦν τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη διειλημμένα· καὶ δη καὶ τὰ ζῷα κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας οἷον νομῆς θεῖοι διειλήφεσαν δαίμονες (O.C.T. vol. 1, 1995).

[14] The proposition of Brisson (1995) that the myth of the *Statesman* involves three phases (and not two) is highly ingenious, but fails to convince me. For a critical commentary, see Erler (1995) 375–380; Ferrari (1995) 394 n. 17.

[15] *Leges* 10, 897b1: νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται.

Protrepticus fr. 20 Ross; 979 Gigon). J.H. Waszink[16] and H. Cherniss have usefully explained what Aristotle may have meant by this. They hypothesize that Plutarch's myth of the "dreaming Kronos" must go back to Aristotle, and specifically to his *Protrepticus* or his famous dialogue the *Eudemus or On the soul*. Their explanation also makes it clear that Aristotle used the mythical figure of Kronos polemically *against* Plato. The "dreaming Kronos" must have been subordinate to an ever-alert god, Zeus. And this indicates that Aristotle gave the "dreaming Kronos" a place in a "double theology" of a supreme, wholly unchanging principle and a lower, cosmic deity who is subject to change and burdened with "potentiality".[17]

(d) *The doctrine of soul*

But to understand what is really at issue in the various aspects of Aristotle's criticism of Plato, we need to look at the essential difference between the two lions of Greek philosophy. It is in fact as Hippolytus of Rome said: in most other matters Aristotle agrees with his teacher, but not in the matter of his doctrine of soul.[18] And we cannot rule out that Cicero, too, talked about *one* (fundamental) difference of opinion between Plato and his great pupil.[19]

How should we formulate this one point of difference? The best way is to say that it is essential for Aristotle that the soul is "not without body (*sôma*)".[20] For Plato the emphasis is on the fact that the soul is incorporeal.

Plato had reached this view after inquiring how human knowledge of the truth is possible. Aristotle had developed his critical alternative because he was fascinated with the phenomena of perception, emo-

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[16] Waszink (1933); (1947); (1980).

[17] Cf. also *Corpus Hermeticum* 10.5; Tatian, *Oratio* 9 (p. 10, 23 Schwartz): πῶς τε ὁ πεδηθεὶς Κρόνος καὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἔκβληθεις γενόμενος τῆς εἱμαρμένης οἰκονόμος καθίσταται; πῶς τε βασιλείας ὁ μηκέτι βασιλεύων δίδωσιν;

[18] Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 1.20.3: καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνός ἐστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγματος ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἀθάνατον, ὁ δὲ ᾿Αριστοτέλης ἐπιδιαμένειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναφανίζεσθαι τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι and 1. 20, 6 (Marcovich 1986).

[19] Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.13.33 = Aristotle, *De philosophia* fr. 26 Ross; 25.1 Gigon: *Aristoteles in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens*, where I follow Pépin (1964) 140 in reading: '*a magistro uno [Platone] dissentiens*'.

[20] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.2, 414a19–21: καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή. Also 1.1, 403a5–10; a16–18 and *De generatione animalium* 2.4, 738b26: ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ οὐσία σώματός τινός ἐστιν.

tions, walking, and reproduction. For Aristotle, as for Plato, it was quite clear that these matters required the operation of a soul. But Aristotle was equally convinced that an incorporeal soul on its own could never realize such activities.

We can conclude that the debate in the Academy in the fourth century BC led to essential progress from a philosophical point of view: Aristotle showed that a modal distinction should be recognized between the sphere of specifically psychic phenomena and the sphere of pure thought. Like Plato, Aristotle continued to talk about a human way of functioning which is non-physical, *i.e.* the activity of the human intellect (*nous*) in its orientation to totally immaterial objects of thought as foundations of all discursive intellectual activity.[21] All other human activities are typified by their "natural" character and consequently by their material and physical aspect.

Plato had prepared the way for Aristotle's distinction by presenting the soul as a complex entity with the intellect or the rational soul-part as the highest part in contrast to other, specifically "psychic" parts as lower parts. But for Plato the intellect had always remained the highest *part of the soul* (*Phaedrus* 247c7). Aristotle radically reconfigured this view. For him the "potency for intellectuality" is a potentiality *of the soul*, and as such connected with physicality, i.e. "not without corporeality". But the intellect-in-act transcends physical reality; it is separate from all materiality and thereby essentially different in kind from the soul[22] (which by its definition does not exist without an "instrumental body"[23]).

It is as E. Barbotin has lucidly formulated: the ontological separation which Plato had introduced between body and soul was raised one level by Aristotle, namely to a separation between soul and intellect.[24] Plutarch expressed this succinctly in the myth at the end of his *De facie in orbe lunae*: the intellect is not a part of soul, just as the soul is not a

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[21] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.2, 413b24: Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά. *De generatione animalium* 2.3, 736b27: λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ ⟨ἡ⟩ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια (Drossaart Lulofs 1965). Perhaps the correction ⟨ἡ⟩ is unnecessary here. This text is discussed at length in Moraux (1955).

[22] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.2, 413b25 (cited above): ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι.

[23] On my interpretation of '*sôma organikon*' as "instrumental body" in Aristotle's definition of the soul cf. Bos (2001) 187–201.

[24] Barbotin (1954) 220.

part of the body. In the same degree as soul is superior to body, so is mind better and more divine than soul.[25]

How did Aristotle gain this new insight?

How did Aristotle gain this new insight? (a) Through his study of physical reality. His analysis of all phenomena of movement had led him to the insight that movement is always movement of bodies.[26] He therefore rejected Plato's doctrine of soul as an incorporeal self-moving principle of movement (*De anima* 1.3, 405b31–406b25).

(b) Through his study of reproduction. His analysis of all vital phenomena had led him to see that life is passed on in the act of reproduction by means of semen and seeds. In this process life is always wrapped in a material covering.

However, Aristotle had also observed: "The presence of soul can manifest itself in two ways: as sleeping and as awake".[27] (This motif brings us close to Plutarch's "dreaming Kronos".) A grain of corn and a chestnut actually contain a principle of life, but only in germ. The soul is present in them as if "asleep". And on a higher level, in a human embryo, the soul-*parts* of perception and locomotion are only "dormant", whereas the vegetative function of the human soul has already been activated. But from the first moment when an animal or human being has been impregnated and from the moment when a grain of corn or chestnut is planted in soil with the right level of moisture and temperature, it is certain that a process of development will start towards a new specimen of the same kind, a process led by the

[25] Plutarch, *De facie* 28, 943A: νοῦς γὰρ ψυχῆς ὅσῳ ψυχὴ σώματος ἄμεινον ἐστι καὶ θειότερον.

[26] Cf. *De caelo* 1.9, 279a15: κίνησις δ' ἄνευ φυσικοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν. In *Physics* 6.4, 234b10–20 Aristotle argues that movement belongs only to something that possesses parts. Interestingly, Simplicius, *In Phys.* 964.14ff. (ed. H. Diels) states that, according to Alexander of Aphrodisias, "some" for this reason enclosed the soul in a kind of body as an "*ochêma*", a view which Alexander goes on to dispute vigorously.

[27] Aristotle, *De anima* 2.1, 412a23: ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσίς τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. I prefer Barbotin's translation (Paris 1966) 30: "Car le fait d'être animé comporte les deux états de veille et de sommeil: la veille correspond à l'exercice de la science, le sommeil à la possession de celle-ci sans l'exercice". This distinction was used already in Aristotle's *Eudemus*. In quite a few texts connected with that dialogue the theme of "sleeping" and "being awake" is prominent.

soul-principle, which is activated from that very first moment and leads and controls the entire process.

The entire, natural process of development from fertilization to the maturity of the new specimen is a goal-oriented production process, even though this process is not sustained and controlled by the original producer (the begetter).[28] The way in which nature works is structurally different from the way in which a craftsman or demiurge works. But the culmination of nature's work, in the case of a new human being, is that the activity of this human being's intellect is "awakened" on the path of science and philosophy! That is to say, the natural process culminates in a "liberation" of the human intellect from this nature.

The generation of new life: a process of development under its own power

It is crucial to consider how very differently Aristotle talked about the generation of a new living creature compared with Plato. Aristotle pointed out that the begetter does not produce a ready-made specimen; in the act of mating he merely provides an initial impulse, which sets off a process that is best compared with the action of automata or winding mechanisms.[29] These mechanisms, when wound up, have their own *dynamis*,[30] even when they have not been set off. The act of begetting can be compared with the releasing of the winding mechanism, which next, *under its own power*, unwinds to realize a new specimen of the same kind as the begetter. But the various vital functions of the new specimen are not active from the moment of fertilization; they are realized in succession, in a fixed sequence.

To put it succinctly: the form of the begetter is transferred by way of movement to the menstrual blood of the female, blood which is a

[28] *De generatione animalium* 2.1, 734a33-b17.

[29] Aristotle talks explicitly about "winding mechanisms" in *De generatione animalium* 2.1, 734b17–19; *De motu animalium* 7, 701b2–20; *Metaphysics* A2, 983a12–17 and *Mechanica* 849a19. In *De mundo* 6, 398b6–24 he uses the same model without mentioning the name. In *De philosophia* fr. 26 Ross; 25.1 Gigon "*replicatione quadam*" should in my view also be interpreted as the "unwinding" of a spring or winding string of a winding mechanism. It is fascinating to surmise that with his comparison of the winding mechanism Aristotle is subtly correcting Plato's image of the cosmos hanging from a cord that is wound up, and his image of the charioteer and his pair of horses in the *Phaedrus*.

[30] *De generatione animalium* 2.1, 734b10: ἔχοντα γάρ πως ὑπάρχει δύναμιν τὰ μόρια ἠρεμοῦντα.

pure residue (*perittôma*) and the female equivalent of male semen. This *pneuma*-containing residue is the instrument (*organon*) for the movement which moves this instrument to produce the new specimen.

In this way there is a First Cause at the very beginning. But the process of generation is a matter of phased development under the new creature's own, natural power. This proceeds until the point is reached when the rational soul-part is roused to intellectual activity and the intellect as the eye of the soul, which has been "blind" so far, opens.

The consequences of Aristotle's fundamental criticism of Plato's soul-doctrine

For Aristotle this led to a radical critique of Plato's psychology in the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Statesman*, and the *Timaeus*. He interpreted all vital phenomena as manifestations of soul-principles which do not exist and are not active "without body". Besides, the *dynamis* of every soul has something of the divine, astral element.[31] He considered the continuity of these vital phenomena to depend on the astral gods, ensouled divine creatures with bodies consisting of ether.

But he sharply distinguished from these the immaterial, transcendent Intellect. This transcendent Prime Unmoved Mover is not a later addition to an earlier version of Aristotle's philosophy,[32] but an essential part of his fundamental correction of Plato's theology.

That is why he already attributed all divinity to the Intellect in his dialogue *De philosophia*, but sharply distinguished from it "another entity", which "governs and maintains the movement of the cosmos by a kind of unwinding".[33] *De philosophia* already presented a cosmic deity as "Archon" of the world. But as cosmic World Ruler burdened with *sôma* this deity is "bound" and unfree. And as World Soul he also has an aspect of "sleep", like Plutarch's "dreaming Kronos".

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[31] *De generatione animalium* 2.3, 736b36–737a9. Aristotle's introduction of a new, fifth element can in fact only be understood in relation to his fundamental rejection of Plato's doctrine of the (immaterial) World Soul.

[32] This theory was argued by H. von Arnim and supported by W.K.C. Guthrie, A.J. Festugière, and J. Pépin.

[33] Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.13.33 = Aristotle, *De philosophia* fr. 26 Ross; 25.1 Gigon: *Alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur.*

Hence Aristotle presented God in *De mundo* as entirely transcendent in relation to the cosmos, but separated by a series of barriers from the world of earthly mortals, whose daily existence is regulated by powers and forces subordinate to God, those of the astral spheres.[34]

Someone who has a limited vision and does not look beyond the boundaries of the cosmos may think that the human world is abandoned to the whims of a host of cosmic rulers, who are sovereign in their own sphere. But anyone who beholds the entire cosmic order with the eye of his intellect will realize that no Afghan conditions prevail in the cosmos: there is no rivalry in the cosmos between warlords and tribal elders. "The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be".[35] And this is in fact the case. It is the metacosmic Intellect that rules and governs the entire cosmos through the power (of attraction) of its thought!

Just as the human soul's potentiality-for-intellect must be "roused" by the attraction of the Truth, so the World Soul's potentiality-for-intellect must be awakened. We see this motif in highly diverse theological conceptions from the period after Aristotle, also in thinkers who can safely be called "Platonists". This is very clear in Alcinous, and equally in Plutarch. But the *Hermetic Corpus* 10.5, too, talks about a dreaming Uranus and a dreaming Kronos, who must awaken from the slumber caused by their astral bodies to share in the most blissful contemplation. It is again a motif in the Gnostic theology of Basilides of Alexandria, who talks about the "repentance" of the great World Archon through the effect of the Gospel, through the mediation of his Son. It also forms the background to the distinction which Philo of Alexandria introduces between God as the transcendent Intellect and the *Logos* active in the cosmos, as the demiurgic and governing principle.

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[34] Therefore the doctrine of a "limited Providence" always attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity is wholly authentic. Cf. Ps. Plutarch, *Placita* 2.3 and Tatian, *Oratio* 2; Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 1.20.6; 7.19.2; Clement, *Stromateis* 5.14; *Protrepticus* 5.66.4; Origen, *Cels.* 1.21; 3.75; Eusebius, *P.E.* 15.5.1 and 5.12; Gregory Naz., *Or.* 27.10; Epiphanius, *Haer.* 3.2.9; Theodor. *Graec. aff.* 5.77.47; 6.86.7; Ambrose, *Off.* 1.13.48 and Chalcidius, *In Tim.* 250 (ed. Waszink, p. 260). For the modern discussion see Festugière (1932) 221–263; Ross (1923) 183; Moraux (1970). A step in the right direction compared with Festugière is Runia (1989) 1–34.

[35] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Λ 10, 1076a4, where *Iliad* 2, 204–205 is quoted. Philo of Alexandria, *De confusione* 170 also opts for this view of world-government.

STATESMANSHIP IN A MINOR KEY?

Michael Trapp

Plutarch's *An seni respublica gerenda sit* and *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* are rightly prized as giving a rare insider's view of day-to-day politics in the Greek cities of the Roman Empire.[1] Two aspects in particular have attracted special comment: Plutarch's insistence on the need always to remember the presence of Roman authority, with its over-riding concern for civic order, on the one hand; and on the other, his "Machiavellian" readiness to countenance collusion within the political class, and the stage-management of public debate.[2]

My concern in this paper, however, in keeping with the overall theme of this volume, is with the idea and ideal of statesmanship embodied in the two treatises, and with how one might seek to relate it to political ideology in Plutarch's day more generally. A great deal of interesting work has been done over the last few decades on the politics and political theorizing of the Imperial period. The themes of euergetism, the competitive pursuit of honour, the assertion of class identity and the defence of privilege have emerged as central to our understanding of the dynamics of civic life and civic administration.[3] It seems a good idea to manoeuvre Plutarch's two texts into some part at least of this theoretical territory, in order see what might emerge.

The reference in my title to "a minor key" picks out what I take to be a fairly uncontroversial point about the frame of reference within which Plutarch chooses to operate in the *An seni* and the *Praecepta*. In both texts, the role he envisages and recommends for the *politeuomenos*, the man engaged with the business of the city, is in one way or another

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[1] The main discussions are those of Jones (1971) 110–121, Carrière (1977) and (1984) 3–69 (esp. 33–65), Desideri (1986) and Swain (1996) 161–186; see also Centrone in Rowe and Schofield (2000) 575–583, Dillon (1977) 198, Aalders (1982) and Aalders/De Blois (1992) 3386–97.

[2] Relations with and attitudes to Rome are the main theme for Jones and Swain; the "Machiavellian" label is referred by Desideri (1986) 375 to the disenchanted analysis of Carrière (1977) 240.

[3] I have in mind principally Veyne (1976/1990), Mitchell (1993) 198–226, Brown (1992), Schmitz (1997), Lendon (1997). Interesting connections with Plutarch are made already by Carrière (1984) 36–40 and 51–53.

avowedly circumscribed. This is wholly explicit in the *Praecepta*, with its reminder of the constant looming presence of the Roman governor and his troops, and of the inescapable truth that the old heroic days of glory, and of deadly risk, are gone for ever.[4] The same message is subtly conveyed also in the treatise's noticeably *diminuendo* conclusion. In the very last image, Plutarch compares the proper conduct of personal disputes, in and out of the lawcourts, with the use of padded boxing-gloves for training in the *palaestra* (in contrast, implicitly, to the leather thongs used for real bouts in Greek boxing and the metal-studded *caestus* of the Roman arena).[5] Although this image has overtly a specific, limited reference, its positioning, and its coherence with a larger system of imagery (of athletic competition for political activity),[6] make it easy to take as a more general verdict on the scope of contemporary politics: these days the button never comes off the foil, it's all shadow-boxing.

The *Praecepta* are addressed to a young (or young-ish) man, on the verge of entering public life; we may easily imagine that his juvenile enthusiasm and declamation-fed view of political action need to be damped down in this way by the sober realism of an older hand. The *An seni*, from one older hand to another, is understandably more upbeat, centred on the insistence that both the state and the individual *politikos* stand to benefit if he resists the temptation to retire too early. This overall tone too seems to be reproduced in the text's concluding image. Old herms, says Plutarch (meaning herms with older features rather than those made long ago), are shown "without hands or feet, but with their private parts stiff"; this, he claims, "hints at" (i.e. represents allegorically) the truth that older men are valuable not for their physical but for their mental prowess.[7] The *overt* message here (as allegorically deciphered) is irreproachably respectable; but I wonder if the sexual reference can be entirely reduced to virtuous metaphor, especially as Plutarch himself blurs the dividing line by using the sexually significant words ἔνεϱγος ("active") and γόνιμος ("fertile", "potent") to characterize the continuing mental vigour of the elderly. There is something here, I think, of two old timers casting youthful claims to superior potency back in their makers' faces, in what is, on any account, a happy, confident ending. And yet, when the treatise is taken as a whole,

4 *Praec.* 813D–814C.
5 *Praec.* 825EF.
6 Cf. 804B–C, 804D, *An seni* 783B, 785D, 786F, 793F.
7 *An seni* 797F.

it is undeniable that here too there is a sense of limits. Valuable as they are to the continued smooth running of the state, disastrous as it would be if they all withdrew into idle retirement, Plutarch insists that the old neither can nor should take on too much; their proper sphere of action is circumscribed as a subset only of the whole field of political activity.[8]

In both texts, then, even allowing for the divergence in tone, there is a careful avoidance of manifestly unrealistic claims for the activity—*politeuesthai*, *prattein ta politika*—on which Menemachus is just about to start, and in which Mestrius Plutarchus and Flavius Euphanes have been happily engaged for decades. It is, however, already evident that Plutarch does not thereby go out of his way to belittle political action. On the contrary, he has a whole series of ways of presenting it as none the less an admirable and indeed uniquely satisfying business. It is on these more positive ideas and the problems that they throw up that I shall concentrate for the remainder of this paper. In the process it will emerge (I hope) that Plutarch is not quite so representative of the mainstream of his age and class as recent discussions seem (if only tacitly) to assume.[9]

One obvious means by which Plutarch underlines the creditable nature of political engagement—explicitly drawn attention to in the *Praecepta*, but scarcely less evident in the *An seni*—is the inclusion of a huge weight of *exempla* from history. Menemachus and Euphanes are encouraged to see themselves as heirs of a great tradition, in which they have been preceded by some of the most admired figures of history, from Solon, Lycurgus, Pericles and Epaminondas to Cato and Appius Caecus. The boost thus administered to the modern politician's self-esteem and sense of the worthiness of his activity is, I think, unaffected by Plutarch's careful warnings about changed circumstances and narrowed scope. It is still good to be told that one is following in the footsteps of such figures, and if their experience can still be learned from there can have been no complete break with the glorious precedents they set. The effect

[8] See especially *An seni* 793A–794F.

[9] Jones (1971) 117 fleetingly raises the possibility that Plutarch's contemporaries might have "found his standards uncomfortable or antique", but develops the point no further; Swain's focus on relations with Rome (1996) 161–183 means that the question of philosophical elements is not raised at all. Carrière (1984) characterizes the *Praecepta* as an attempt to "*infléchir les idéaux des nobles dans un sens philosophique*", but is as impressed by the "realism" of Plutarch's political thinking (e.g. 51) as by any divergence from contemporary norms.

is made all the more weighty by the sheer breadth and chronological completeness of Plutarch's references. Ranging apparently effortlessly over Greek and Roman history, they draw on archaic Greek history, the fifth and fourth centuries, Alexander and the Hellenistic monarchs, the Roman republic and the Empire (up to episodes in the reigns of Nero and Domitian)—history without a break from the earliest figures seriously discussed by Herodotus down almost to the present.

Mythological comparisons, by contrast, are very scarce—presumably deliberately, to underline the seriousness and realism of the advice being given. Where one slips through the effect isn't always entirely happy. Or am I alone in finding it amusing that in *Praec.* 819D a group of *politikoi*, banding together for some piece of relatively parochial civic business, are favourably compared with the mighty Argonauts? (The message is: don't be stupid enough to leave your biggest hitter (your Heracles) behind, as they did, and so be forced to rely on unmanly subterfuge.)

But this is perhaps over-familiar ground, and not particularly distinctive of these two treatises. The explicit and implicit use of history, past glories, to dignify the present is a well-known feature of Greek élite consciousness in the Imperial Period quite generally. There is also something more subtle and individual afoot. In these two treatises, Plutarch offers a view of what it is to practise politics in general. And at the centre of this view stands a conception of political activity as a self-sufficient way of life, and of the political practitioner, the *politikos*, as an ideal type of humanity.

That *to politeuesthai* should be seen as a way of life, a vocation, not an intermittent sequence of discrete episodes and an imposition, is stated in so many words in both texts: "λειτουργία γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία τὴν χρείαν ἔχουσα πέρας, ἀλλὰ βίος" ("political engagement is not a specific formal obligation aiming at practical utility, but a way of life") at *An seni* 791C; "τὴν πολιτείαν βίον καὶ πρᾶξιν οὐκ ἀσχολίαν ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ λειτουργίαν ἡγούμενος" ("considering that politics is a way of life and an activity, not, as most people do, a matter of work and formal obligation") at *Praec.* 823C. And it is easy enough to see how, in the *Praecepta* in particular, Plutarch bit by bit fills out a specific life-pattern for the *politikos*, covering his aims, values, personal conduct, social relations, and even his speech and gesture.[10] Similarly in the

[10] Aims and values (e.g.) 798C–799A, 823F–825D; personal conduct (e.g.) 800A–801A, 806F–809B; speech and gesture 801A–804B; social relations (e.g.) 805E–809B,

An seni, though with less specific detail, Plutarch presents retirement from the public arena as a radical change of direction, comparable to a divorce after a lifetime's marriage or the uprooting of a venerable tree, rather than the cessation of a particular limited set of functions.[11]

This feature of Plutarch's thinking has been noted by Paulo Desideri, who in an illuminating overview has compared Plutarch's presentation and development of the *politikos* to Quintilian's of the related but not identical figure of the *orator*.[12] As even the brief summary just given should make clear, it is a development that shows an ambition on Plutarch's part to raise the credit of political activity not only in the eyes of his immediate addressees, but among actual and potential participants more generally. But I believe that Plutarch's ambitions in this direction are greater and more curious than may at first be apparent. The life-pattern Plutarch identifies for the *politikos* in both texts is not presented as just one respectable choice among several, but as the *only* creditable choice for the thinking, responsible individual who is in a position realistically to make it;[13] and it is the only creditable choice because the life and values of the *politikos*, as Plutarch wants them to be, are identical to those of the *philosophos*. As in the *Maxime cum principibus* and the *Ad principem ineruditum* Plutarch insists that the monarchical or oligarchic leader needs philosophical advice, so here he asserts that the participant in what he calls "democracy"[14] must be a philosopher himself.

The point—for all that it is such a striking one—is made by cumulative implication rather than as bald assertion. A close parallel between the life of politics and the life of philosophy is asserted in *An seni* 26 (796C–797A), where the direction of explanation (or perhaps better, of persuasive redefinition) runs from well-established facts about philosophy to a less widely-recognized proposition about politics. We have known since the innovations of Socrates, says Plutarch, that philosophy is not a matter of intermittent bursts of didactic activity, but of constant beneficent interaction between the philosopher and those around him.

810A–811A, 824D–825F.

[11] 789BC, 787F.

[12] Desideri (1986) 372.

[13] Cf. Plutarch's explicit assertion in *Cato Maior* 30.1 that political *arete* is "generally agreed" to be the highest form of virtue.

[14] Defined in *Praec.* 816F as depending on the regular rotation of office, rather than on any dangerous notions of popular sovereignty. This is not an uncommon sense for the term in the Imperial period, cf. e.g. Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 4.231.

Socrates was never off-duty, and brought philosophy to "every time and part and experience and activity" in human life.[15] So we ought to believe that it is too with politics: the true politician is never off-duty, even if not formally in office, and he is never not concerned for the well-being of his city and his fellow-citizens. On the surface, this passage only directly asserts a parallel between politics and philosophy; but indirectly, it also suggests a convergence, an identity of aim (with perhaps also, for a sympathetically alert reader, a reminiscence of the idea from Plato's *Gorgias* of Socrates as, paradoxically, the only true *politikos*). The suggestion of a convergence is in any case reinforced by a series of further remarks spread through the treatises (though admittedly more prominent in the *An seni* than in the *Praecepta*), which characterize the life of politics in terms that are as familiar, or more familiar, as distinctively philosophical formulations of the aims of the well-lived, virtuous, philosophical human life in general.

In philosophical discourse, human life is defined above all by reference to its distinctive end, its *telos*. Three formulations of the distinctive end of philosophically enlightened living had particular currency and prominence; and all of them are reflected in what Plutarch says about the life of politics. The aim can be stated as "good living", τὸ εὖ ζῆν;[16] at *An seni* 783C we find Plutarch encouraging Euphanes to stick with his original *prohairesis* (of the political life), ταὐτὸ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ποιησάμενοι πέρας, "treating life and the fine life as co-terminous". The aim can be stated (by Platonists at least) as ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, "assimilation to God":[17] at *An seni* 786B, the politician is said to have the opportunity of participating in "the finest and greatest of pleasures, from which it is reasonable to suppose the gods themselves derive their sole or their chief enjoyment (αἷς καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εἰκός ἐστιν ἢ μόναις ἢ μάλιστα χαίρειν)". This is followed up in 786d with an assimilation of the pleasure of political benefaction to the experiences of the soul nearing communion with the divine in the myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*.[18] Or, thirdly,

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[15] For this perception of the philosopher's engagement with the society around him, cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Dialexeis* 1.1–4.

[16] Perhaps the most widely-accepted formulation of all, from Plato (*Republic* 354a, 387d) and Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1095a18–20, *Politics* 1276a28) onwards; cf. Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem* 1108C, Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 1.339 and 2.229.

[17] E.g. Philo, *De fuga* 63, Alcinous, *Didascalicus* 28, Plutarch, *De sera* 550D ff.; the formulation is taken up also by the Stoic Epictetus: 2.14.12–13, with Long (2002) 170–172. The base text is Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b.

[18] *Phaedrus* 246b–248d; cf. Trapp (1990).

the aim of a philosophically responsible life can be given as "living in accordance with nature", τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν;[19] at *An seni* 791C, in the continuation of a passage quoted earlier, we read that political engagement is the life ἡμέρου καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ κοινωνικοῦ ζῴου καὶ πεφυκότος ὅσον χρὴ χρόνον πολιτικῶς καὶ φιλοκάλως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ζῆν, "a creature *naturally* fitted to live its allotted span as a citizen, devoted to fine action and philanthropy"; at *Praec.* 813C the *politikos* is characterized as "*naturally* the ruler" of the community (φύσει ἄρχων), like the queen bee in a hive. Moreover, these explicit references to *phusis* are bedded in more diffuse patterns of imagery that underline the naturalness of political engagement (such as that in *An seni* 787f, where the senior politician is compared to an old tree, so deeply rooted in the life of his community that he could only be removed at the cost of serious damage to the whole).[20]

In passages such as these Plutarch seeks to make the choice of political engagement seem like just that choice of the right way to live which philosophy claims to promote. The point is not exactly that he is thus trying to change politics into something else—we shall return to this later—but rather that he wishes to claim that there is a *version* of politics that turns out also to satisfy the criteria that philosophy lays down for the good life; and that his version of politics thus turns out to be the only truly fulfilling form of the activity. But this is a strategy, an approach to politics, that carries with it a very evident risk. While some *politikoi*—Euphanes perhaps, Menemachus perhaps—may welcome the reassurance that philosophical commitment and political activity converge, and that their chosen course of life is thus an aid to virtuous living rather than a distraction from it, others may be pardoned for feeling that Plutarch has after all changed the subject—that the politics he now recommends isn't the politics they, and many of their fellow-citizens, think they are engaged in. Bluntly, by making politics look attractive to the high-minded, Plutarch may be making it look unattractive, or even unrecognizable, to everyone else.

The sense that the political values Plutarch recommends are at odds with what we might call mainstream civic consensus is perhaps strongest over the central, and related, issues of honour and benefaction. As

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[19] E.g. Cicero, *De finibus* 5.26, *De officiis* 3.13; Philo, *De decalogo* 81, *Quod omnis* 22. 160.

[20] Cf. *An seni* 783F, 787A, 789F, 791C, *Praec.* 805EF (though it is true that images of *human* authority and control—doctors and ships' captains—are more frequent in the *Praecepta*).

has been repeatedly emphasised in studies published over the last thirty years or so, the civic life of the Imperial Period throve on a curious, unstable, but indispensible "contract" between the ruling élite, the *politeuomenoi* who held the magistracies and other positions of authority, and the remainder of the citizen body.[21] In return for lavish and sustained financial and material contributions to the life and fabric of the city, conceived as benefactions *(euergesiai)* springing from the giver's innate philanthropy, generosity and patriotism, the community granted honour, embodied not only in transient gestures of gratitude and thanks, but more permanently in durable physical tokens such as statues and honorific inscriptions; these honours in their turn, perpetuated also in the élite's own dedications and funerary monuments, served to legitimate their leading status. Now, as Christopher Jones and others have pointed out, the language of this institution, known to us from the inscriptional record, the language of *euergesia*, of *philotimia*, *epimeleia* and *philanthropia*, is all there in Plutarch.[22] But at the same time—and this is less frequently appreciated—Plutarch can be seen to be making a determined effort to adjust its referents. He may talk the talk, but he doesn't walk the walk.[23]

Above all, Plutarch attempts to shift the sense of what counts as proper benefaction, and proper response, away from the purely or crudely material. True euergetism, he insists, does not depend on the material resources of the euergete (*Praec.* 822D–823B); it is shown instead in the depth and consistency of his concern for his fellow citizens, manifested as much in private gestures of sympathy and assistance (even down to marriage-guidance counselling, 823B) as in more showy public donations. Paying for theatrical shows, or gladiatorial contests, or distributions of food, is to enter a corrupt relationship, like that between a prostitute and her client (821F),[24] and will only inflame the people's lower nature (822C). If money is to be spent on treats, rather than to relieve genuine want, it should be spent on religious events, which at least bolster popular respect for the divine (822B). On the other side of the equation, Plutarch suggests, just as gladiatorial shows and the like win only a harlot's compliments (821F), so true honour

[21] Veyne (1976) 228–327 = (1990) 101–156; Brown (1992) 78–89; Mitchell (1993) 206–211; Schmitz (1977) 97–110.

[22] Jones (1971) 114–115 with nn. 29–42.

[23] Cf. Carrière (1984) 49.

[24] There is something of a pattern of comparisons of bad political with improper sexual behaviour: see also *An seni* 785D–F, 788E, 790C.

comes in the form of the people's grateful awareness of the politician's goodwill and benevolence (820F, 823D). And as such, it does not need to be embodied in elaborate physical manifestations: at most, says Plutarch, the *politikos* should accept an inscription, a decree, or a green branch (820D), never a statue (820B); for the honour that is given in return for benefaction "is a symbol, not a payment" (820E).[25]

This is all very high minded and admirable. But is it not also piously unrealistic in its hopes both of the ruling élite and of the general populace? Knowing what we know from the archaeological record, and from our reading of Favorinus's *Corinthian Oration* (= [Dio Chrysostom] *Or*. 37) or Dio's *Oration* 31 to the people of Rhodes, how many contemporary *politikoi* do we think would voluntarily have given up their statues, or more generally the physical tokens that gave them the edge over their competitors for civic status? And how many *demoi* do we think would have voted to forgo their *panem et circenses* (of which Plutarch's "θέατρα ἢ νεμήσεις ἢ μονόμαχοι"—"shows or distributions or gladiators"—in 821f is an almost exact Greek rendition)? Even Plutarch seems to have had some uncertainty. For although at the end of the *Praecepta* he is ready to attribute generous high-mindedness to the *demos* too, alleging that it welcomes and acknowledges good character as warmly as it does material handouts, elsewhere he portrays it (in heavily Platonic vein) as a headstrong and capricious beast that must be kept on a tight rein for its own good.[26]

High-minded and philosophical too is the picture Plutarch gives of the aims of political activity, as they bear on the whole citizen body rather than on the *politikos* himself. Sometimes, it is true, he speaks conventionally and with what might seem to be the voice of humble realism: above all, in the celebrated passage towards the end of the *Praec*. 824C–825D, where he admits that of the goods at which political activity used to be held to aim, only the good of concord, *homonoia*, falls within the range of the modern *politikos*. But earlier on in the same text, it has become apparent that his idea of *how homonoia* is to be inculcated carries him away once again from the mainstream. It is hard, he says, for the tyro politician to mould the character of his citizens—"ἠθοποιεῖν καὶ μεθαρμόττειν τοῦ δήμου τὴν φύσιν"—straight away; like wine, he must allow time for his influence to seep into and start working on the body politic (799BC); but when he has established himself, then

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[25] Cf. Carrière (1984) 51–53.

[26] 800C, 802D, 814C, 821A, 823E–F; cf. Jones (1971) 111, n. 10.

indeed he should positively strive to have such an influence—"τὸ .. τῶν πολιτῶν ἦθος … πειρᾶσθαι ῥυθμίζειν ἀτρέμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ὑπάγοντα καὶ πράως μεταχειριζόμενον" (800AB: "to attempt to shape the character of his citizens, gradually and unobtrusively leading it towards improvement and taking it gently in hand"). This too—the claim that it is the proper business of the *politikos* to change the moral character of his citizens—is a notable philosophization of politics, a collapsing of administration into ethics, parallel to the insistence that the personal aim of the *politikos* who wields this influence is the attainment of the good life. The fact that it has, once more, such good Platonic precedent should not blind us to how oddly ambitious it is.

We may detect, therefore, a clear sense in which Plutarch is claiming the moral high ground in his political advice, but an equally clear sense that in so doing, he is parting company with the instinctive attitudes of many of his fellows in the politically active class of his day. He could, however, have gone much further, and it is revealing that he doesn't. As he himself was well aware, philosophical commitment was often held to dictate not modification of political engagement, but its wholesale rejection. Some particular versions of this stance were admittedly closed to him on principle. No-one would expect to find a Cynic Plutarch, rejecting political activity as part of the corrupt machinery of unnatural living; and his entirely unsurprising distaste for Epicurean quietism, explicitly articulated elsewhere,[27] is fleetingly visible at *An seni* 789B and *Praec.* 824B. But his own Platonist philosophical tradition too contained precedents for the rejection of conventional politics, and his refusal of this option is more noteworthy.

The key texts in this connection are *Republic* and *Gorgias*, in both of which conventional political arrangements are condemned wholesale as based on fundamentally mistaken principles. Of the two, it is *Gorgias* that is the more radical, with its deliberately paradoxical claim that the only true *politikos* is in fact the philosopher, who rejects both the hedonistic, materialist values of ordinary politics, and the ordinary politician's key tool, rhetoric. And it is, intriguingly, with the contents of *Gorgias*, rather than those of *Republic*, that Plutarch's discussion in the *Praecepta* and *An seni* more closely co-incides. In common between Plutarch's two texts and *Gorgias* are: the question of the statesman's moral character, in relation to that of the *demos* he either leads or

[27] E.g. in the *An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum* and *Adversus Colotem* 1125C–1127E.

panders to; the threat of corrupt relationships of "flattery" (*kolakeia*) between statesman and people; the value and effect of material benefactions as opposed to moral benefit; the evaluation of the great Athenian statesmen, Pericles, Themistocles, Miltiades and Cimon; and the question of the value and proper application of rhetoric—all embraced within the enfolding question of who best deserves to be called a true *politikos*.[28] And yet, though Plutarch's discussion in *Praecepta* and *An seni* thus repeatedly traverses territory famously mapped in a classic precedent, he never acknowledges any relationship. *Republic* is several times quoted, and for pieces of Platonic political radicalism,[29] but never *Gorgias*. Tacitly rejecting the rejectionism of *Gorgias*, Plutarch evinces instead a stable conviction that ordinary politics can be redeemed "from inside", by a suitable infusion of the values that ought to steer an enlightened private existence too.

This avoidance, of a position famously articulated in a classic of Plutarch's own philosophical tradition, reveals the limitations to his philosophization of politics. He is happy to use *Republic* as a point of reference, because it can be read as a proposal for a reformed politics; but the world of the *Gorgias*, in which politics in any recognizable sense are thrown out entirely, is not one he wishes to enter.[30] The cynical reading of this state of affairs would be that, for all his philosophical allegiance, Plutarch is also a committed member of the ruling élite, and not about to sacrifice his social and material privilege for extremist theory.

Plutarch, to conclude, was no philosophical or political radical. The most he desired was some ethically responsible modification of contemporary political values and behaviour, for which he believed there was good historical precedent in the examples set by the best *politikoi* of the past. But even this relatively little that he asked for is apt to seem unrealistic, quaintly ambitious, when set against the norms for his period, as

[28] Moral character: *An seni* 788A–F, *Praec.* 799B–801C. Corrupt(ing) relationships: *Praec.* 821F–822C. Material versus moral benefaction: *An seni* 786F–787C, *Praec.* 821F–823E. Statesmen: Pericles, *An seni* 784E, 789C, 759D, *Praec.* 800C, 802C, etc.; Themistocles, *An seni* 759D, *Praec.* 805C, 807AB, 808F, 812B; Cimon, *An seni* 791A, 795D, *Praec.* 800E, 802C, 812F, 818D; Miltiades, *Praec.* 800B. Rhetoric: *Praec.* 801C–804C. With all this compare above all *Gorgias* 512e–522c.

[29] *Praec.* 818C, 820A, 822BC.

[30] Plato in the *Laws* famously rowed back from his earlier purist stance; it is no coincidence that *Laws* is a text Plutarch is specially fond of quoting throughout his work.

we see them in the historical and inscriptional record. It is perhaps fitting, therefore, that he himself was destined in a way to be borne back into the mainstream. For all his strictures on the superfluity of statues, he is to be found towards the end of his life supervising the dedication of one to Hadrian;[31] and soon after his death he himself was honoured by the dedication of a statue at Delphi and (if the identification is right) a herm at Chaeronea, on the latter of which he is described as "the benefactor", τὸν εὐεργέτην.[32] It is perhaps fortunate that this herm has lost its head: we are thus spared the proof of what we must nevertheless suspect, that it showed an older Plutarch, but one without the symbolic erection he himself surely felt he deserved.

[31] *Syll.*³ 829a; Jones (1971) 33–34.
[32] Richter (1965) 3.284, with fig. 2025 (dubious).

PLUTARCH'S "MANY OTHER" IMITABLE EVENTS: *MOR.* 814B AND THE STATESMAN'S DUTY[1]

Brad L. Cook

Plutarch purposefully fills his *Parallel Lives* and moral treatises with deeds of past Hellenic and Roman men and women. The great deeds of past heroes could, however, prove to be dangerous if misused. The military and political glory of the past should not be imitated, since Hellenes now live under Roman rule.[2] In his *Advice on Public Life* Plutarch condemns contemporaries who stir up the people with inappropriate reminders of the past glory of military victories, such as Marathon, Eurymedon, and Plataia (*Advice on Public Life* 814C).[3] In the place of such glorious and well-known martial victories, Plutarch offers for imitation five historical events that are not so great or famous–one might even call them obscure. These five exemplary events appear so suddenly and briefly in *Advice on Public Life* 814B that we may read past them without realizing how rare and unusual they are in Plutarch, and in surviving ancient texts in general. The rarity and seeming oddity of these scenes suggest that Plutarch did not casually pull these from his standard stock of historical exempla. He chose them with unusual care and in explicit opposition to the standard, famous, well-known episodes from the glory days of Hellas, because these five exempla illustrate on a communal level Plutarch's constant advice to the individual statesman that he root out civic strife and maintain harmony through individual and public mildness and self-control (πρᾳότης).[4]

In *Advice on Public Life* Plutarch presents political principles to Menemakhos, a young man of Sardis, which Plutarch illustrates by means of historical and personal examples. In a remarkable passage, 813C–814C, Plutarch turns from giving advice on local, domestic politics to remind Menemakhos of the larger, international situation. The local Hellenic

[1] I would like to thank Kerri J. Hame and Donald Lateiner for advice on this paper at various stages and Christopher Pelling for his very helpful suggestions on the text as delivered at the conference.

[2] On the political atmosphere see, e.g., Swain (1996) 135–186, Caiazza (1993) 19–20, Gabba (1991) 52–57, Aalders (1982), Jones (1971).

[3] Cf. Plutarch's list of Salamis, Mykale, Plataia in *The Glory of Athens* 350B.

[4] See Prandi (2000) and Swain (1996) 167.

community functions under the auspices of Rome and a Roman governor. Plutarch condemns, with great earnestness, statesmen who unwisely remind the people of deeds, views, and actions of their ancestors that are utterly inappropriate for the contemporary situation (814A), such things as Marathon, Eurymedon, and Plataia (814C). Plutarch insists that:

> There are many other deeds of earlier Hellenes which one can recount to modern Hellenes to shape and temper their character, calling to mind, for example at Athens, not deeds of war, but such things as (1) the vote for the amnesty at the time of the Thirty, and (2) the fining of Phrynikhos for producing on stage the capture of Miletos, and (3) that, when Kassandros [re]founded Thebes, the Athenians wore celebratory crowns, and (4), after learning of the clubbing in Argos, in which the Argives "removed" 1,500 of their own people, they ordered a purificatory sacrifice be carried around the *ekklêsia*, and (5) during the Harpalos affair, while searching houses, they passed over only one, the house of a man recently married. And so even today we can be like our ancestors by imitating these examples (814B).

Plutarch assumes that Menemakhos will readily grasp the underlying principle of these five examples. The underlying principle, however, is no longer obvious. To understand that principle and the function of these five examples, we need to investigate the presence and meaning of these five events in Plutarch's other writings.

The first *exemplum*, the decree of amnesty after the rule of the Thirty in Athens (814B), is well known to us but difficult to find in the writings of Plutarch. In the *Parallel Lives* Plutarch covers the relevant period in the *Lives* of Lysander and Agesilaos, but the amnesty plays no role in those *Lives*. If we had a *Life* of Thrasyboulos, the hero of the democratic restoration, we would surely find some praise for the amnesty, as we find in Nepos' brief biography of him, but we have no such *Life* by Plutarch. Where Thrasyboulos does appear in Plutarch, we see him as a bold hero overthrowing the pro-Spartan oligarchs and the Spartan hegemony, as in *The Glory of Athens* (345F, 349D-F), or as a source of inspiration to Pelopidas in his *Life* (*Pelopidas* 7.2).[5] This military component of the restoration of democracy in 403 B.C. is the complete opposite of the amnesty and is the very sort of great and glorious deed of the past that Plutarch wants Menemakhos to shun.

[5] Cf. *Pelopidas* 13.4 and *Artaxerxes* 16.4

The Athenian amnesty of 403 appears in one other passage in Plutarch, in his *Life of Cicero* (42.3).[6] On the 17th of March, 44 B.C., after the assassination of Caesar, a meeting of the Senate was called. In three other *Lives–Brutus*, *Antony*, and *Caesar*–various figures talk about concord and amnesty (ἀμνηστία).[7] Only in the *Life of Cicero*, probably written earlier than the other three,[8] do we find Cicero calling on the senate to vote for "an amnesty in imitation of the Athenians" ('Αθηναίους μιμησαμένην ἀμνηστίαν, *Cic.* 42.3). Plutarch may have read about this in Cicero's own words. Cicero describes this event in the opening of his *First Philippic* and calls to mind how he laid the foundation for peace and "revived the ancient example of the Athenians" (*Atheniensium renouaui uetus exemplum*), using, as he says, "the Greek word (*Graecum uerbum*) which that state employed in settling its strife, and I recommended that all memory of our strife be wiped out by everlasting forgetting (*obliuione sempiterna*)". This is our only firsthand knowledge of Cicero's speech, and it seems that Cicero did not publish the original speech from the 17th of March.[9] If, as I believe, Plutarch used Cicero's *First Philippic*,[10] he understood Cicero's "Greek word" to be "amnesty" (ἀμνηστία),[11] marked in Cicero by its Latin equivalent, *obliuio*.[12]

Plutarch's use of Cicero's speech may explain why he mentions the comparison to the Athenian amnesty only in *Cicero*, and not in the other three *Lives*. I think, however, that Plutarch included Cicero's comparison to the Athenian amnesty in *Cicero* intentionally and for the same reason that Cicero made the comparison in the first place, in

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[6] Ghilli (1995) 553–554, notes 577–578.

[7] *Antony* 14.3 (Antony speaks of *amnestia*), *Brutus* 19.1 (Antony, Plancus, and Cicero speak of *amnestia*), *Caesar* 67.8 (the Senate passed ἀμνηστίας τινάς). See Pelling (2002) 44 n. 173.

[8] Pelling (2002) 2–5.

[9] Millar (1964) 51–52.

[10] On Plutarch's use of Cicero's writings, see Pelling (2002) 16–18, 39 n. 105, 62 n. 38.

[11] *Contra* Denniston (1926) 65 who argues that ἀμνηστία is not classical (though common in later Greek, it is rare in classical Greek, e.g., Plato, *Menexenos* 392c), but he does not observe that Appian later uses ἀμνηστία in this very context (*Bella civilia* 2.142), as does Nikolaus of Damascus (*Life of Augustus* 28); cf. Canfora (1993) 307–309. Fourth century texts on the amnesty (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 2.4.43 and "Aristotle", *Athenaion Politeia* 39.6) do not employ the noun ἀμνηστία but use the verb μὴ μνησικακεῖν.

[12] Cf. the four passages listed in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1982), s.v., *obliuio* 3, three of which (Nepos, Velleius Paterculus, Valerius Maximus) are used for the Athenian amnesty of 403 B.C.; Justin 5.10.11 also uses *obliuio* of the Athenian amnesty.

March 44 B.C., and later reminded the Senate of it in September of the same year. Cicero stood at a dangerous crossroad in history that had already been paved with civil strife and bloodshed since his birth and most recently in the civil war of 49 and 48 B.C. He had great hopes that the removal of Caesar might allow the remaining players to forget their differences and restore and maintain their republican form of government. Athens' situation in 403 B.C., after the rule of the Thirty, presented a similar, horrific past and offered an extraordinary and unique historical *exemplum* to the Romans that revealed a solution that was sound and stable. Cicero's serious hope for reconciliation in March and later, after he returned to Rome in September, must have seemed tragic to Plutarch or any other reader who knew what would happen to Cicero over the ensuing months to the end of 43. The glorious success of Athens' amnesty acquired an ever more sad aura as Cicero's hopes were destroyed and his head was cut off. Plutarch felt this, I think, and underlined Cicero's insightful but futile comparison of Rome's doom and Athens' success by including the comparison in Cicero's mouth in his *Cicero*.

The poignancy of hearing Cicero make a comparison to the Athenian amnesty, in light of the civil strife that was to take Cicero's own life, would be clear to Plutarch. He records this significant comparison in the one relevant *Life*; though Antonius speaks for amnesty in both *Antony* 14.3 and *Brutus* 19.1 (Plancus and Cicero too), Cicero's hopeful suggestion of imitating Athens was only made by him, and Plutarch reserves that failed comparison for Cicero's *Life*. Though Cicero's use of the exemplum was not successful, here, in *Advice on Public Life*, Plutarch begins his list of imitable events with it in the hope that a Greek audience may listen carefully to its message. The Athenian amnesty of 403 is a powerful, positive and negative exemplum. It is positive in proving that a divided community can settle its differences and succeed. The division that led to and called forth the amnesty, however, was bloody and sowed dangerous seeds. If the amnesty failed, as it did in Rome, the consequent strife could be worse than what proceeded. Plutarch, it seems, intentionally reserves such a powerful *exemplum* for this rare appearance in his extant works. Here, in *Advice on Public Life*, he unceasingly insists that the Hellenic statesman must lead the local community to work together to maintain civic harmony for the good of the people; if the community fails, it will destroy itself, or Rome will intervene and strip the community of that small degree of independence that Rome still grants it.

Plutarch offers Menemakhos a second historical *exemplum* from Athenian history, the fining of Phrynikhos for the production of his *Capture of Miletos*, which was probably performed in 493/2 B.C. (814B).[13] We must ask what Plutarch means by this very famous anecdote of theatrical lore. Plutarch must have known the passage on the destruction of Miletos in Herodotos 6.21. Although he harshly criticizes Herodotos in his treatise *On the Malice of Herodotos* (*Moralia* 854E–874C), he learned much from Herodotos and borrowed the message that communities should have support and sympathy for one another. In his *Histories*, after Miletos is taken by the Persians in 494 B.C., Herodotos complains that the Sybarites failed to respond to the suffering of the Milesians, though the Milesians had previously expressed grief for the destruction of Sybaris in 510 B.C. In contrast to the Sybaritic neglect of their guest-friends, Herodotos suddenly[14] turns to praise the Athenians' active grief for the Milesians. As striking proof of their grief, he cites the fining of Phrynikhos when, through his play *The Capture of Miletos*, he called to mind suffering that the Athenians, as Hellenes, Ionians, and founders, viewed as "their own suffering" (οἰκήια κακά, Herodotos 6.21).[15] This public, communal mourning both draws the Athenians together as a socio-political entity and unites them with other Hellenes, fellow Ionians, in the case of the Milesians.

The Athenians' communal action in fining Phrynikhos is also one of self-control, πρᾳότης, Plutarch would say, self-control that both reveals the depth of their sympathy for the Milesians and one that also avoids any uncontrolled reaction to their grief. The statesman, in *Advice on Public Life*, is advised to control excessive emotions, usually negative emotions, such as anger, arrogance, and ambition, both for himself and his community. For Plutarch's purposes, and his own day, the fining of Phrynikhos allows the Athenians to express their sympathy for the suffering of their fellow Hellenes and to learn how to avoid being drawn into their ruin by an uncontrolled reaction (as the Athenians' initial aid to the Milesians brought about two invasions!). This *exemplum*, then, serves to draw the community together in a positive way–mourn another's suffering–and to draw the community away from that very

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13 See Snell (1971) 1: 69, note to T2 for ancient passages on the fining of Phrynikos; Frost (1980) 76–77.

14 On the asyndeton, see How and Wells (1912) 2: 72.

15 See Gorman (2001) 36 and Loraux (2002) 147–148; *pace* Roisman (1988) 18, who understands "their own suffering" to refer to the Athenians' suffering at the sack of Athens in 480/79, which leads him to date the play to 476 B.C.

ruin. This second *exemplum*, though out of historical sequence, follows a logical sequence. In the first *exemplum* Plutarch reminds the local Hellenic community to avoid internal strife and drawing Rome into their problems; in the second *exemplum* he is telling us to confirm that unity which we have established for our own community through group sympathy for a related or like community while, at the same time, controlling that sympathy so that we do not overreach our current power and put our unified community at risk.

With his third *exemplum*, Plutarch continues this theme of consolidating the local community through another rare but instructive *exemplum*. For his third *exemplum* he says: "When Kassandros [re]founded Thebes, they [the Athenians] wore celebratory wreaths" (814B). The refounding of Thebes, in 316 B.C., appears almost nowhere else in Plutarch and is rare in general.[16] Plutarch mentions the refounding in his dialogue *On the Slowness of Divine Vengeance* (*Moralia* 548A–568A). There, Timon, Plutarch's half-brother, suggests that some punishment is postponed until the guilty can bring forth some good that resides in his or her power, just as a condemned pregnant woman is allowed to give birth before her sentence is carried out (552D). To illustrate this idea Timon offers historical examples, one of which is the divine delay in punishing Kassandros, until he had refounded Thebes (552E). Plutarch considers the resurrection of Thebes a great blessing, just as he portrays the destruction of Thebes as a horrific crime. In his *Alexander* the destruction of Thebes is described as most savage (*Alexander* 13.2), and appears to have roused even the wrath and vengeance of Dionysos (*Alexander* 13.4).

The refounding of Thebes, whether divine or human, is a cause for celebration in Plutarch's eyes. The celebrants in this *exemplum* are Athenians, age-old neighbors and enemies of Thebes. Plutarch, however, stresses elsewhere how Athens and Thebes support each other when both are threatened, for example, when the Spartans, or Phoibidas more precisely, seized the Cadmea (*Pelopidas* 6.3–5) or when Alexander razed Thebes (*Alexander* 13.1). The resurrection of Thebes when Hellas was under Macedonian rule should lead Hellenes as a group to celebrate the stability and security that they possess. And this third *exemplum* builds, literally, on the second *exemplum* by showing the good that can come of observing the principle of the first two *exempla*. As

[16] Diodorus Siculus 19.53–54, cf. 20.110.3; Pausanias 4.27.10, 7.6.9, 9.3.6, 9.7.1–4.

with the earlier *exempla*, members of the community, which now means all Hellenes, in the same city or neighboring ones, need to cooperate and support one another, for their common good, just as the individual Hellenic statesman is advised by Plutarch to set aside personal hostilities and grudges for the good of the community (817C).

In his fourth *exemplum* Plutarch reports that the Athenians, "after learning of the clubbing in Argos, in which the Argives 'removed' 1500 of their own people, they ordered that a purificatory sacrifice be carried around the *ekklesia*" (814B).[17] Plutarch nowhere again mentions this obscure event. We find the event recorded in some detail only in Diodorus Siculus. After Leuktra, in 370/69 B.C., Diodorus speaks of civil strife and slaughter among the Argives of an incomparable magnitude "as is remembered among no other Hellenic state, ever" (15.57.3). The horrific scale of the Argive civil strife serves in other writers as a warning of the extreme violence to which civil strife can lead. Isokrates, in his *Philippos* of 346 B.C., invokes Philip to come save the Hellenes from killing each other, and cites the Argives who "kill the most worthy and most wealthy of their citizens and in doing this rejoice as no others rejoice in killing their enemies" (*Philippos* 52). We find this event used later by Dionysius, in his account of the trial of Coriolanus, where he praises the Romans for avoiding civil strife, calling this avoidance "above all the many and marvellous accomplishments the most glorious accomplishment" (*Roman Antiquities* 7.66.4). He then compares this "most glorious accomplishment" of avoiding civil strife to a pain-filled list of what had become by the first century B.C. the worst-case scenarios, namely Corcyra, Argos, Miletos, all of Sicily, and "many other cities" (*Roman Antiquities* 7.66.5). The Argive civil strife, presumably that of 370 B.C., finds itself second in Dionysius' list only to Corcyra, commemorated so vividly by Thucydides (Thucydides 3.70–85, 4.46ff.).[18]

Dionysius' list must have been known to Plutarch. He used Dionysius' history of Rome for his early Roman *Lives* and, most certainly for his *Coriolanus*, where this list of civic violence would appear.[19] Plutarch's

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[17] See Parker (1983) 21–22 and n.12 for sources; see also on Aiskhines 1.23, Fisher (2001) 146.

[18] See Gabba (1991) 81.

[19] Cited only six times: *Romulus* 16.7 (= *Roman Antiquities* 2.35), *Synkrisis of Coriolanus and Alkibiades* 2.4 (= *Roman Antiquities* 8.2), *Pyrrhos* 17.7 (cited twice) (= *Roman Antiquities* 19.12), *Pyrrhos* 21.13 (= *Roman Antiquities* 20.1–3), *Roman Questions* 282C (= *Roman Antiquities*). On Plutarch's use of Dionysios in *Coriolanus*, see Russell (1963); see also Swain 1990, (247–249), Gabba (1991) 213–214. and Pelling (2002) 387–411.

own portrait of Coriolanus is a virtual case study of how a statesman should not let his ego lead to civil strife. Plutarch condemns Coriolanus for nearly destroying Rome, not through internal, civil strife, it is true, but from the outside, via the Volscians (*Coriolanus* 1.4, *Synkrisis Coriolanus-Alkibiades* 4.7). But even when Coriolanus fails to be elected consul, Plutarch observes that he lacked "stability of character and self-control" (τὸ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ τὸ πρᾷον) which Plutarch considered essential characteristics of political virtue (*Coriolanus* 15.4; cf. *Brutus* 1.3). This personal instability and arrogance, whether in Coriolanus, or a contemporary Hellenic statesman, leads to civil strife. The Athenians, in Plutarch's *exemplum*, save themselves from such strife by a sober, apotropaic ritual that separates their very space of cooperative public discussion and government, the *ekklesia*, from such dissension and ruin. With this fourth *exemplum*, then, Plutarch stresses the governmental means whereby the benefits of the first three exempla can be maintained and protected.

Plutarch, in his fifth and last *exemplum*, selects a minor and passing moment from what has been called "the greatest of all fourth-century Athenian political scandals".[20] But Plutarch chooses what seems, at first glance, to be the most insignificant element of the affair: "during the Harpalos affair, while searching houses, they passed over only one, the house of a man recently married" (814B). This *exemplum* is surely the most striking as it seems to have no connection to the earlier *exempla* and to be irrelevant to political life. It is, however, an *exemplum* most relevant to Plutarch's day and the future career of Menemakhos, and a fitting conclusion to this list of five *exempla*.

The Harpalos affair, like the four earlier exempla, rarely appears in Plutarch, only once elsewhere, in fact, in the *Life* of Demosthenes. There Plutarch provides some background to the Harpalos affair so that he can focus on a cleverly constructed scene in which Demosthenes succumbs to his innate venality and suffers the consequences. In *Advice on Public Life*, however, Plutarch offers no context and assumes that the historical situation is known. We recall that Athens was diplomatically besieged by representatives from Antipater, Olympias, and Philoxenos, Alexander's satrap in Caria. Even after Harpalos escapes from the guard that the Athenians had placed around him, Athens could still be held responsible for the reported 700 talents that were deposited on

[20] Hansen (1991) 293. For modern discussions of the Harpalos affair, see Whitehead (2000) 357–361, Blackwell (1999), Bosworth (1988) 215–220, and also Badian (1961), especially 31–36, for Demosthenes' role in the affair.

the Akropolis. When half of that money is found missing, the Athenians could be in all the more trouble, if Alexander came looking for it. On the international level, their actions could affect their relationship with the then dominant power of Macedon.

All these pressures are, presumably, in the background of Plutarch's episode. But in *Advice on Public Life*, Plutarch selects the slightest of details in regards to the manner in which the Athenians conduct their investigation. This investigation included the searching of the homes of suspected statesmen, except for one, that of a man recently married (814B).[21] In the face of immense international pressure, the Athenians insist on conducting their investigation with the utmost propriety and self-control. This extraordinary respect for the near sanctity of the home of the newly-weds must have been of great importance to Plutarch. In his treatise *On Curiosity*, he lists as one of the obsessions of the curious "the bedrooms of the newly-weds" (517A). In *Demosthenes* Plutarch uses this detail to set the personally and publicly disgraceful and destructive venality of Demosthenes and a complete collapse of self-control in stark juxtaposition to this scrupulous propriety and self-control of the Athenians in their thorough but absolutely upright and civil investigation, all for the good of the community. In *Advice on Political Life*, Plutarch ignores the rest of the Harpalos affair and focuses on this detail because the Athenians' care in this matter illustrates by its very insignificance how all things in the community must be managed with constant regard and respect for the good of community, without exception. It is this most basic of civilities that underlies the success of the preceding four *exempla*.

Plutarch, with these five historical events, has illustrated Wilamowitz's observation that "Plutarch not only had a very thorough knowledge himself of the history of the ancient world before he embarked on his great work; he also presupposes it in his readers, as is made clear from the historical examples he uses in his other works".[22] These five exempla of civic cooperative and self-control illustrate how the greatest

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[21] In *Demosthenes* 25.8, Plutarch gives a more detailed version: "they conducted a fresh search, and entering in, they searched the houses, except that of Kallikles, the son of Arrheneides, for they would not allow his house alone to be searched, he being recently married and the bride being inside, as Theopompos reports;" though the reading "Theophrastos" is accepted by most modern editors of Plutarch, based on N and U (derived from N), N's readings of proper names should be questioned, and, in this case rejected; see Cook (2001).

[22] Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1926) 2: 271.

goal of the Hellenic statesman, in Plutarch's day, namely public harmony, ὁμόνοια, the absence of political strife and discord (824C–D), is attained through the principle of self-control, or self-restraint, πρᾳότης, and related characteristics, which the statesman applies both to his own life and to the citizens he governs.[23] Once we recognize that these five historic episodes arise out of and illustrate how public πρᾳότης maintains ὁμόνοια, it becomes clear that Plutarch selected them, however obscure they may be, with great care. These seemingly odd five *exempla* obtain, then, a greatness that is different from the competitive and militaristic ambition of Marathon, Eurymedon and Plataia, but a greatness of character that embodies cooperative self-control which is the essential goal of Plutarch's quietist advice to the Hellenic statesman under Roman rule.

[23] On πρᾳότης in *Political Advice*, Stadter (1989), xxx-xxxiv, Carrière (1984) esp. 49–50, Aalders (1982) 45–47, Panagopoulos (1977) 216–222; de Romilly (1979) 275–307 on the use of πρᾳότης in all Plutarch's works, and Martin (1960) on πρᾳότης in the *Parallel Lives*.

L'IMAGINAIRE POLITIQUE DE PLUTARQUE

Jacques Boulogne

Οὐ γὰρ μισθὸν εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πράξεως ἀλλὰ σύμβολον τὴν τιμήν, ἵνα καὶ διαμένῃ πόλυν χρόνον. Soit, en français: «Car ce n'est pas un salaire de l'action que doit être l'honneur, mais un symbole, afin précisément qu'il persiste longtemps.»[1] Voilà comment Plutarque définit l'honneur, au chapitre 27 de son essai *Préceptes politiques* (*Praec.* 820 E). Et c'est, à notre sens, une bonne entrée en matière pour qui veut cerner le noyau métaphysique de la pensée politique de Plutarque. Nous y trouvons, en effet, associées trois idées essentielles de son système philosophique: l'agir, le symbolique et la permanence. Trois idées dont la combinaison signifie que tout individu participant à l'histoire de l'humanité peut échapper à l'oubli et vaincre sa finitude temporelle grâce à un substitut persistant de tout ce qu'il a fait. Ce passage de l'espèce de lettre ouverte, pour reprendre la formule de Thérèse Renoirte,[2] que constitue ce recueil de recommandations adressées à un jeune aristocrate de Sardes, Ménémachos, poussé dans l'arène de la politique par sa position sociale, s'inscrit dans un développement satirique contre les chefs d'État qui se complaisent dans la multiplication de leur propre statue. Les statues rouillent ou sont renversées, quand elles ne finissent pas en pots de chambre (820E–F). Il s'agit là de «pseudo-honneurs» (821F: ψευδώνυμοι τιμαί), qui n'apportent qu'une «gloire éphémère et incertaine» (*ibidem:* ἐφήμερόν τινα καὶ ἀβέβαιον δόξαν), au gré des flatteries démagogiques. La célébrité ne nous appartient pas: elle dépend d'autrui (820B: τὸ εὐδοκιμοῦν ἀλλότριόν ἐστι). Et la meilleure façon d'échapper à ce genre d'aliénation reste d'obtenir, grâce à son mérite, la «bienveillance» (εὔνοια) du peuple (820F–821A, 821C et D, 821E). Car alors, non seulement on a la possibilité de cultiver l'estime de soi en se remémorant ses actes (820A–B), mais on entre également dans la mémoire collective (820F). Les honneurs les plus grands ne prennent donc pas la forme d'effigies peintes, sculptées ou coulées dans le bronze

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[1] Les traductions de Plutarque sont de nous. Mais nous utilisons l'édition de la Collection des Universités de France et, en l'occurrence, le texte édité par Jean-Claude Carrière (1984).

[2] Voir sa thèse (1951).

(820B). Ils relèvent de la vie intérieure des uns et des autres,[3] se traduisent par la «confiance» (821C: μίστις) et l' «affection» (*ibidem:* φιλοφροσύνη) de ceux qui les accordent et valent à ceux qui les méritent des marques de reconnaissance matériellement discrètes ou modestes, par exemple l'octroi aux enfants d'une journée de congé pour célébrer la date anniversaire de la mort d'une personnalité estimée (820C–E), mais symboliquement indépassables, dans la mesure où elles dénotent une gloire inaccessible à l'usure du temps.

Ces considérations sur les distinctions honorifiques de bon aloi dont se trouvent gratifiés certains, en raison de leur excellence, reposent sur une anthropologie, une métaphysique et une vision de l'histoire, toutes trois enracinées dans des mythes.

Aux yeux de Plutarque, l'être humain est voué par sa nature à l'action politique. Pour ouvrir l'investigation, nous partirons à nouveau d'une citation, tirée cette fois du traité *Si la politique est l'affaire des vieillards*. Au chapitre 6, nous y lisons que «rien au monde en fait de spectacle, de souvenir et de réflexion n'apporte un enchantement aussi profond que de revoir en pensée des actions personnelles accomplies dans le cadre de magistratures et de la vie politique comme dans des lieux baignés de lumière et publics» (*An seni*, 786 E: … θέαμα δὲ καὶ μνημόνευμα καὶ διανόημα τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὃ τοσαύτην φέρει χάριν ὅσην πράξεων ἰδίων ἐν ἀρχαῖς καὶ πολιτείαις ὥσπερ ἐν τόσοις λαμπροῖς καὶ δημοσίοις ἀναθεώρησις).[4] L'action politique y est clairement placée au faîte du système axiologique de Plutarque. Ni la contemplation, ni la remémoration, ni la méditation ne connaissent d'objet plus gratifiant, qui comble davantage l'être humain, qui lui apporte un plus grand épanouissement, toutes connotations présentes dans la notion de χάρις, qui signifie à la fois plaisir de donner et plaisir de recevoir, deux plaisirs solidaires dont la somme ne peut que ravir et enchanter (nous rencontrons, ici, le troisième sens du mot, celui de charme), et dont l'interdépendance constitue le socle même du vivre ensemble. En tout cas, la vie politique fascine Plutarque, qui n'hésite pas à soutenir, certes dans un opuscule de jeunesse, mais que rien dans le reste de son œuvre conservée ne vient démentir, *Les Athéniens se sont-ils davantage illustrés par*

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[3] Jugement assez largement répandu à l'époque. Cf. Caton (Plutarque, *Cato Ma.* 29.5); Dion de Pruse (*Orat.* 44.2); Tacite (*Ann.* 4.38); Pline le Jeune, (*Pan.* 55).

[4] Texte édité par Marcel Cuvigny (1984).

la guerre ou par l'art?,[5] que la gloire d'Athènes doit plus à ses chefs d'État qu'à ses artistes, peintres, poètes ou orateurs, qui, d'abord, sans les acteurs de l'histoire dont ils reproduisent les actes, ne créeraient aucun ouvrage d'art (*Bel. pac.* 345E–F), et qui, ensuite, ne produisent jamais que des simulacres de l'action elle-même (348A–B). La finalité de la vie politique est, en effet, selon Plutarque, le beau. C'est ce qu'il affirme dans son pamphlet anti-épicurien, *Si la maxime* «Vis caché» *est bonne*, en faisant de la politique une partie de l'éthique, laquelle est elle-même assise sur la physique par l'intermédiaire de la théologie et de la justice divine, fondement de la justice sociale, le tout constituant une sorte de pyramide dont le sommet est formé par le beau que vise l'homme politique (*Lat. viv.* 1129B).[6] Or la beauté, non seulement suscite l'admiration, mais elle incite en plus l'âme à l'imitation, comme Plutarque le rappelle au début de sa biographie *La vie de Périclès* (*Per.* 1.2–4 et 2.2–4). C'est pourquoi contempler, tels des modèles, les comportements des grands hommes devient indispensable à qui veut progresser sur le chemin de l'excellence (cf. *La vie de Timoléon*, préface). Et même le spectacle de carrières gâchées par le vice peut, indirectement, par le constraste, y aider également avec efficacité, ce que souligne l'introduction de *La vie de Démétrios* (*Demetr.* 1.6).

À cela deux raisons, qui tiennent l'une et l'autre à la façon dont Plutarque se représente la nature humaine. De même, écrit-il à la fin de son dialogue *Qu'il n'est pas non plus possible de vivre plaisamment en suivant Épicure* (*Non posse*, 1107C),[7] que notre amour du savoir (τὸ φιλομαθές) s'explique par notre «aptitude à la contemplation» (τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ), de même notre «amour de l'estime» (τὸ φιλότιμον) provient de notre «propension naturelle à l'action» (τοῦ πρακτικοῦ). Reprenant, au cours de ses *Préceptes politiques* (*Praec.* 820A) le mythe platonicien[8] de l'autochtonie qui évoque des hommes tous enfants de la terre et composés, à ce titre, d'un mélange d'or, d'argent, de fer et de bronze, il étend à tous ceux qui aspirent à l'excellence ce que Platon réserve aux gardiens de la cité, voyant dans la référence à des métaux précieux une image pour désigner une nature de bonne qualité, et il recommande à tout un chacun de cultiver ce que son ambition personnelle contient de pur, c'est-à-dire la recherche d'une «estime que la récapitulation et

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[5] Texte édité par Françoise Frazier (1991).
[6] Texte édité par B. Einarson et Ph.H. de Lacy (1967).
[7] Texte édité par B. Einarson et Ph.H. de Lacy (1967).
[8] *Resp.* 3, 415a–b et 416e.

la considération de nos actes politiques font grandir» (820B: … τιμὴν ἀναλογισμῷ καὶ περιθεωρήσει τῶν πεπραγμένων ἡμῖν καὶ πεπολιτευμένων αὐξανομένην). Donc, tous ceux que l'excellence attire possèdent en eux cet or pur, qui pousse à prendre part aux affaires de la cité et que seule l'action est capable d'accroître.

Mais, plus fondamentalement, ce qui conduit Plutarque à définir l'homme comme un être né pour agir reste sa conception *photique* de l'âme humaine. Le mythe qu'il prête à un certain Timarque de Chéronée, dans son dialogue *Le démon de Socrate*[9] (*Gen. Soc.*, chapitres 21–22) évoque le ballet des âmes avant et après leur immersion corporelle, de même que le mouvement des démons dans les régions supérieures. Les premières et les seconds sont représentés comme des étoiles (591E–592A). Un autre mythe eschatologique, celui de Thespésios de Soles, dans le traité *Les délais de la justice divine*[10] (*De sera*, chapitres 22–33), s'intéresse plutôt aux châtiments infligés aux âmes des défunts qui se caractérisent par un éclat lumineux (564B, cf. 565C), plus ou moins altéré (564D). Quant aux démons eux-mêmes, nom donné par la foule à l'intellect (νοῦς), à ce que dit le *Le démon de Socrate* (*Gen. Soc.* 591E), et, d'après le récit de Sylla dans le dialogue *Du visage qu'on voit apparaître dans l'orbe de la lune*[11] (chapitres 26–30), ils proviennent du soleil (943A), dont ils possèdent la force vitale (*De facie*, 945C) et où ils retournent, une fois séparés de l'âme, quand s'achève complètement le processus de la mort, avant que commence un nouveau cycle (945C). L'homme est, par conséquent, dans sa dimension la plus essentielle, d'une nature consubstantielle à celle de la lumière solaire. Voilà pourquoi, dans son écrit anti-épicurien *Si la maxime* «Vis caché» *est bonne* (*Lat. viv.* 1130A–B), Plutarque rapproche le mot archaïque employé par les poètes pour désigner l' «être humain» (ὁ/ἡ φώς) de τὸ φῶς, «la lumière». Voilà pourquoi, fort de cette étymologie et du soutien de certains philosophes, entre autres Héraclide[12] et probablement aussi les Pythagoriciens,[13] il y reproche aux Épicuriens de préconiser un mode de vie contre nature, où règnent l'obscurité, l'oubli et le néant (1129D, 1130B, 1130D–E).[14] C'est également la raison pour laquelle il y loue Démocrite de prê-

[9] Texte édité par Jean Hani (1980).
[10] Texte édité par Yvonne Vernière (1979).
[11] Texte édité par Harold Cherniss (1968).
[12] Cf. frag. 100 Wehrli.
[13] Cf. Plutarque, *Quaest. rom.* 281B.
[14] Cf. *Non posse*, sur la qualité insurpassable des plaisirs de l'action (chapitres 15–19), et sur la peur viscérale en tout un chacun du néant (chapitres 28–29).

cher en faveur d'un renouvellement quotidien de ses pensées (1129E: νέα ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ φρονέοντες[15]). Quelle que soit la véritable signification que l'atomiste d'Abdère ait donné à cette formule, notre auteur y voit la constatation que chaque jour qui se lève appelle au renouvellement, comme si l'apparition de la lumière, après la nuit, exerçait une attraction vers l'action et renouvelait l'inclination spontanée à entreprendre toute sorte de tâche, notamment dans le domaine de la politique.[16] En effet, comme le souligne la citation de l'essai *Si la politique est l'affaire des vieillards*, par laquelle nous avons ouvert cette partie de l'investigation, il n'est pas de lieu plus approprié pour réaliser pleinement la nature humaine ainsi conçue que le champ de la vie publique.

Le fondement anthropologique[17] de la vocation politique de l'être humain trouve lui-même son fondement dans la métaphysique. La fiction du mythe de Timarque,[18] essentielle pour comprendre le comportement d'Épaminondas lors des événements de la libération de Thèbes, -nous y reviendrons dans la conclusion-, nous invite à imaginer un «univers» (*Gen. Soc.* 591B: τῶν ὅλων) quadri-partite, où «tout» (πάντων) dépend de quatre «principes» (ἀρχαί), dont l'ordre de succession correspond à une hiérarchisation logique de type génératif. La source première, au delà de laquelle on ne saurait remonter parce qu'elle tire sa naissance d'elle-même et qu'elle explique le reste des réalités, se révèle être la «Vie» (ζωῆς). Comme celle-ci se définit par la capacité autonome de se mouvoir, elle devient la racine du principe suivant, qui n'est autre que le «Mouvement» (κινήσεως) lui-même. L'étroite dépendance de ce dernier à l'égard de la vie provient de ce qu'il lui est «lié» (συνδεῖ) directement par un «lien» (συνδέσμων) situé «dans l'invisible» (κατὰ τὸ ἀόρατον), c'est-à-dire la partie de l'univers extérieure à la sphère céleste, le lieu unificateur par excellence, dans la mesure où il apparaît comme le facteur en soi de toute unité, à savoir la «Monade» (μονάς). La présence d'une des filles d'Ananké, la Moire Atropos, l' «Inflexible», symbolise la nécessité de l'enchaînement Vie-Mouvement. Cet ensemble unifié par la Monade est, «dans la région du soleil» (καθ' ἥλιον), qui correspond peut-être, elle, à deux parties de l'univers, celle qui s'é-

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[15] = frag. B 158 DK. Parole citée également dans les *Quaest. conv.* 655D et 722D).

[16] Pour le désaccord, sur ce plan, entre Épicure et Démocrite, cf. *Non posse*, 1100C; et *Adv. Col.* 1126A.

[17] Et non pas sociologique, comme chez Platon (*Protag.* 322a–d), ou chez Aristote (*Pol.* 1.2, 1253a1–20).

[18] Pour une analyse d'ensemble, voir Hani (1975).

tend de la périphérie de la sphère céleste à l'orbite du soleil et celle qui sépare l'orbite de cet astre de celle de la lune, deux zones constituant le monde supra-lunaire et, pour les deux tiers, les «parties supérieures» (591A: τῶν ἄνω) de l'univers, dans cette région donc, le couple ζωή- κίνησις est, ensuite, enchaîné par l'Intellect (νοῦς) à la Génération (γενέσεως) sous la surveillance de Clotho, la «Fileuse». Pas de genèse sans mouvement autonome, en d'autres termes, sans le mouvement de la vie, et celle-ci impliquant une mise en ordre, seul le νοῦς, en tant qu'opérateur de synthèse possède le pouvoir d'effectuer cette nouvelle concaténation, non moins indispensable que la précédente, si l'on veut rendre compte de tous les phénomènes. Reste à comprendre les processus de dégénération et de décomposition auxquels nous assistons dans le monde où nous vivons. Son principe ne peut logiquement se confondre avec celui de la Γένεσις. Il doit donc exister séparément et la logique exige également qu'il ne soit posé qu'après son contraire: la vie précède la mort. C'est pourquoi, le fil de Clotho se termine, en quatrième et dernière position, par la Corruption (φθορά), reliée à la Génération par la Nature naturante (φύσις), dont l'activité se traduit en effet par la répétition incessante de la séquence du naître et du mourir. Ajoutons que ce troisième nœud s'effectue «dans la région de la lune» (κατὰ σελήνην), sous l'autorité de la troisième des Moires, Lachésis, la «Distribution du destin,»[19] laquelle symbolise ainsi la solidarité des deux derniers principes.

Telle est la matrice du monde sensible. Il serait trop long et peu en rapport avec notre sujet d'en examiner tous les détails, en particulier les connotations des liens choisis ou la signification des changements qu'apporte Plutarque à cette réécriture du mythe d'Er ou par rapport aux genres suprêmes que Platon[20] ajoute à l'Être, le Repos et le Mouvement, le Même et l'Autre. Il nous suffit de constater que les trois quarts de la chaîne des principes finalement fondateurs de notre existence, par les maillons de la vie, du mouvement et de la génération, place l'action créatrice et constructrice au cœur du cosmos et transforme celui-ci en être vivant fécond, dont les créatures reproduisent nécessairement la texture, à la fois active et lumineuse, conséquence du rôle prépondérant qu'y joue le soleil.

Lieu, en effet, de l'articulation de l'ensembe unifié Vie-Mouvement et de la Génération, celui-ci devient le pôle du cycle de la vie. Un autre

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[19] Voir Platon, *Resp.* 10, 620d.
[20] Voir *Soph.* 254d–e.

mythe, celui de Sylla, à la fin du dialogue *Le visage qu'on voit apparaître dans l'orbe de la lune*, en illustre encore davantage l'idée. Plutarque y évoque la circulation de la vie entre le soleil et la terre, de même que les deux morts qui lui sont associées en un processus incessant de dons et de restitutions. L'homme y est défini, en effet, comme un être composite, fait de la réunion de trois éléments: un «intellect» (νοῦς), une «âme» (ψυχή), et un «corps» (σῶμα). Ces trois[21] éléments se mélangent deux à deux, sans pour autant que l'un devienne une partie de l'autre (943 A). Ainsi, l'union de l'âme et du corps produit l'irrationnel, principe du plaisir et de la douleur, tandis que celle de l'âme et de l'intellect donne la raison (λόγον), principe de la vertu et du vice. Les trois éléments constitutifs premiers ont chacun une provenance différente: la terre fournit le corps, la lune l'âme, et le soleil l'intellect. Le cours de la génération commence par une fécondation de la lune sous l'effet de la force vitale (τῷ ζωτικῷ) du soleil; de même qu'elle emprunte à ce dernier sa lumière, la lune reçoit de ce dernier, telle une semence, le νοῦς, qui est consubstantiel à la lumière solaire, et elle crée de nouvelles âmes (945C). Donc, point d'âme sans intellect, mais celui-ci reste distinct de celle-là. Quant à la carnification, dont il est question dans un autre mythe eschatologique,[22] celui de Thespésios dans le dialogue *Des délais de la justice divine* (566 A: σαρκούμενον), elle demeure principalement l'œuvre de la terre; toutefois, elle démarre déjà dans la lune, dont la substance[23] est mixte (945D, cf. 943E et 944A); par conséquent, c'est l'âme qui fait apparaître le corps, bien loin que celui-ci l'attende comme un réceptacle préexistant. Une fois l'assemblage cristallisé (943A: συπαγέντων), il se décompose, au bout d'un certain temps, par dissociation: sur terre, l'âme (il faut alors entendre l'ensemble formé par l'attelage âme proprement dite—intellect) se sépare de son enveloppe charnelle, et c'est la première mort (943B). La terre rend ce qu'elle a accueilli. Puis, sur la face cachée de la lune, celle qui regarde vers le ciel (944C), a lieu une seconde mort, définie par la séparation du νοῦς et de la ψυχή l'intellect, irrésistiblement attiré par l'absolu et le divin dont le soleil est l'image, quitte la puissance naturante de l'âme (944E–F: ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

[21] Pour cette tripartition, voir les analyses de Dillon (2001), Bos (2001) et Alesse (2001).

[22] Sur ces mythes de Plutarque, voir Vernière (1977).

[23] Sur la densité de la lune et les emprunts de Plutarque à Xénocrate, voir Dillon (1999).

φύσις) pour rejoindre la substance à laquelle il aspire amoureusement. Et le cycle recommence sans fin.

Que nous montre cette représentation imagée de la structure du cosmos? Le rôle déterminant de l'intellect dans le mouvement général de la vie et, par suite, de la génération, de même que sa conaturalité avec la lumière, laquelle explique l'amour inné de tout homme pour la clarté du jour et son goût naturel pour tout ce qui rayonne de la beauté lumineuse du divin (944 E: δι' ἧς ἐπιλάμπει τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον οὗ πᾶσα φύσις, ἄλλη δ' ἄλλως, ὀρέγεται). Si, dans cette structure, la lune occupe une position centrale autour de laquelle s'infléchit la génération vers la corruption du fait de la carnification et du cycle des réincarnations précédant la seconde mort (*Gen. Socr.* 591B–C: ἡ καμπὴ τῆς γενέσεως), la source de la vie demeure le lieu plus capital de l'astre solaire, symbole à la fois de la générosité créatrice du mouvement fécondant et de la source vers laquelle tend instinctivement, quand rien ne vient le contrarier, le mouvement fécondé. Dans ce schème topologique, la terre devient le lieu de la réalisation de l'humain par la tension entre la carnification, qui, avant la première mort, ne cesse de s'accentuer, et l'attrait qu'exerce le Bien absolu sur la raison, une tension qui trouve sa solution dans l'action. Traversé par ce double mouvement cosmique de pesanteur et d'apesanteur, chaque individu est porté à reproduire ici-bas, par un mimétisme vitaliste, l'action constructrice de l'intellect lumineux. De ce point de vue, l'action politique relève de l'organisation de la vie à l'échelle du cosmos, et pas uniquement de la nature humaine.

À cela s'ajoute que nous vivons dans la quatrième partie de l'univers, celle qui se situe sous la lune et où l'humidité se concentre le plus, donc un milieu très déformant,[24] que traverse plus ou moins aisément la lumière.[25] C'est pourquoi les Muses sont si nombreuses. Car, s'il suffit d'une Muse, Uranie, pour patronner la musique des sphères, l'harmonisation du monde terrestre demande beaucoup plus de compétences, tant les fausses notes, les fautes de mesure et les déviances en tout genre s'y multiplient. Il se révèle donc indispensable que les huit autres Muses soient préposées à la correction de toutes les formes de disharmonie que nous connaissons. C'est ainsi qu'en particulier Tha-

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[24] Cf. Platon (*Phaedo* 109b–110b), pour sa représentation de la terre.

[25] Sur l'importance de la bipartition du cosmos entre le monde supra-lunaire, pur, et le monde sub-lunaire, impur, dans la pensée métaphysique de Plutarque, voir Chlup (2000) en particulier 151.

lie se charge de transformer la jouissance bestiale et asociale en plaisir convivial et sociable et qu'Érato humanise le désir sexuel en le faisant évoluer vers l'amitié fidèle. Toutes ont pour mission d'assurer le triomphe de la raison, tout spécialement Calliope, qui préside à la politique et aux fonctions royales. Cette redistribution dans l'affectation des filles de Mémoire, proposée par Plutarque à la fin d'une des questions traitées dans ses *Propos de Table*,[26] s'inscrit dans le prolongement d'une redéfinition générale de leur fonction par Ammonios et attribue à toutes, mis à part Uranie, ce qu'Ammonios conçoit pour une seule sans la nommer (*Quaest. conv.* 746A), celle qui prend en charge l'humanité, en imaginant qu' «elle donne aux mortels, par l'intermédiaire de la raison et du chant, tout ce que leur nature leur permet de percevoir et de recevoir des charmes de la beauté, du rythme et de l'harmonie, avec en plus la persuasion auxiliaire de la vie politique et sociale, l'apaisement et l'apprivoisement de ce qu'il y a en nous de turbulent, et le rappel en douceur, comme d'une région sans chemin, de ce qu'il y a en nous d'errant, pour le mettre sur la bonne voie.»[27] Nous trouvons, résumée là, toute la conception que Plutarque se fait de la politique, dont la finalité est, à son avis, d'étendre au monde des hommes l'ordre céleste, en parvenant à les convaincre que c'est pour eux la clé du bonheur.

Finalement, une telle mobilisation de la presque totalité des Muses autour de la politique, non seulement confère de l'importance à cette dernière, mais, en outre, souligne sa nécessité. Déjà doublement poussé à l'action rationnelle par sa nature et par l'architectonique du cosmos, l'être humain, en raison des conditions physiques de son existence, doit privilégier l'action politique.

Quelles sont les conséquences politiques de ces prémisses tant anthropologiques que cosmologiques? Il en découle principalement trois, qui ordonnent toute la pensée politique de Plutarque.

La première, liée à la position souveraine de la Monade[28] dans la structure cosmique, privilégie, comme plus pertinente, la vision héno-

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[26] *Quaest. conv.* 9.14: « Sur le nombre des Muses, les traditions minoritaires ».

[27] 746A: … τοῖς θνητοῖς, ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ δέχεσθαι πέφυκε χαρίτων καὶ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, ἐνδίδωσι διὰ λόγου καὶ ᾠδῆς, πειθὼ πολιτικῆς καὶ κοινωνητικῆς συνεργὸν ἐπάγουσα παραμυθουμένην καὶ κηλοῦσαν ἡμῶν τὸ ταραχῶδες καὶ τὸ πλανώμενον ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνοδίας ἀνακαλουμένην ἐπιεικῶς καὶ καθιστᾶσαν. Texte établi par Frazier (1996).

[28] Si, dans le *Def. orac.* (428F–429D), Plutarque considère la Monade et la Dyade comme les principes ultimes (τῶν ἀνωτάτω ἀρχῶν), par ailleurs (cf. *Quaest. rom.* 270A), il subordonne la Dyade à la Monade, qui est nécessairement première.

logique du multiple. Radek Chlup[29] a, nous semble-t-il, raison de relativiser le dualisme de Plutarque. La théologie de ce dernier se déclare clairement hénothéiste:[30] le divin demeure ontologiquement un, mais ses manifestations sont multiples, d'où les polythéismes; et, à Delphes, la présence de Dionysos ne doit donc pas faire illusion: Apollon et Dionysos sont deux noms pour désigner deux aspects d'une même puissance, qui, dans les parties plus élevées du monde, ne rencontre aucune résistance, mais qui, au niveau de la nature, se fragmente,[31] comme la lumière solaire peut le faire, à cause de l'humidité de l'air, dans le phénomène de l'arc-en-ciel.[32] Dans ces conditions, la monarchie apparaît comme le seul régime politique approprié à l'ordre du monde. En effet, impossible, sans justice, de profiter pleinement des biens dispensés par la divinité, écrit Plutarque dans son opuscule *À un chef d'État dépourvu de formation* (*Ad Princ.* 780E); or la justice est le fruit de l'observance de lois et celles-ci sont instituées par le détenteur du Pouvoir. À cet égard, ce dernier est «l'image du dieu ordonnateur de toute chose» (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος) et, reflet de la monarchie divine, il ne peut parfaitement remplir cette mission qu'en étant lui-même un monarque, car alors sa légitimité ne dépend pas de ses sujets, à la différence des autres chefs d'État, dont le pouvoir manque de stabilité, tributaire qu'il demeure du bon vouloir de ceux qui le lui confèrent (*De unius* 827B–C). Seul le roi[33] se trouve vraiment en mesure de pratiquer le plus opportunément et le plus adéquatement possible l'art difficile de tendre ou de détendre, selon les circonstances, les cordes qui assurent la cohésion de la société.[34] Encore convient-il qu'il échappe à la tentation de l' «irresponsabilité» (*De unius* 826F–827F: τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον), sous l'emprise de laquelle la monarchie engendre la «démesure» (ὕβριν) et dégénère en tyrannie. C'est ce que n'est pas parvenu à faire un Romulus.[35] «Qui concède ou augmente la tension», affirme Plutarque dans sa *sunkrisis* de Thésée et Romulus (2.3), «ne reste pas roi, ni chef; il devient ou un démagogue ou un despote, et inspire à ses sujets

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29 Chlup (2000).

30 Voir *E Del.* 393A–C, et *De Is.et Os.* 377E–F et 382C–D.

31 Voir Chlup (2000) 148–151.

32 Sur l'utilisation par Plutarque de ce phénomène pour renvoyer à l'unité originaire, voir *De Pyth. orac.* 409C–D; *Amat.* 765E–F; *De Is. et Os.* 358F–359A.

33 Plutarque emploie indifféremment l'un pour l'autre les deux termes de μοναρχία et de βασιλεία (*De unius* 826E–827A).

34 Sur cette technique de la politique assimilée à l'accord d'une lyre, voir *Per.* 15.1–2; *Num.* 23.6; *Phoc.* 2.7–8; *Praec.* 809E.

35 *Rom.* 31.1.

la haine ou le mépris» (Ὁ δ' ἐνδιδοὺς ἢ ἐπιτείνων οὐ μένει βασιλεὺς οὐδ' ἄρχων, ἀλλ' ἢ δημαγωγὸς ἢ δεσπότης γιγνόμενος ἐμποιεῖ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ καταφρονεῖν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις). Or, s'il veut montrer les «qualités humaines» (φιλανθρωπία)[36] qui le mettent à l'abri de ce danger, s'il tient à figurer au nombre des bons monarques, le roi doit renoncer à ce que son pouvoir possède d'excessif et d'absolu et dont, tout compte fait, il n'a aucun besoin, de même que l'embonpoint n'apporte rien à la santé (*Ad Princ.* 779E), pour se mettre lui-même au service de la raison. On ne saurait convenablement commander aux autres en restant incapable de se maîtriser soi-même, c'est-à-dire d'obéir aux ordres de la raison (780B–C). De même que les statues colossales doivent leur équilibre à la quantité de terre, de pierre et de plomb dont on les remplit, de même les détenteurs d'un pouvoir ne sont pas renversés s'ils sont lestés de la formation grâce à laquelle ils apprennent à se dessaisir d'une partie de leurs privilèges (779D–780C) pour écouter ce que leur dicte la «raison qui vit en eux» (780C: ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος). C'est pourquoi le bon souverain incarne, à la manière de Zeus (781B), la Justice (Δίκη) et le Droit (Θέμις), ce qui lui interdit toute licence.

Si le despotisme est à tenir pour une maladie du pouvoir, il en est une autre, plus grave encore eu égard au plus grand nombre des victimes, la guerre. À la fin du dialogue *Les oracles de la Pythie* (*Pyt. or.* 408B–C), Plutarque se réjouit de la paix et de la tranquillité qui règnent alors: «la guerre a cessé, et il n'y a plus, en Grèce, d'errances, de séditions et de tyrannies, ni d'autres états maladifs et d'autres maux nécessitant la puissance de médicaments multiples et exceptionnels.»[37] La paix fait partie des plus grands biens dont puisse jouir une cité.[38] Elle apporte, en effet, la douceur de vivre;[39] et il ne suffit pas qu'elle soit locale, comme on le constate à travers le témoignage de Nicarque, le grand-père de Plutarque, lors du conflit entre Antoine et Octave: pour approvisionner ses troupes, Antoine pillait la Grèce entière et tous les citoyens de Chéronée ont été contraints, sous les coups de fouet, de transporter jusqu'au port d'Anticyre, dans le golfe de Corinthe, le

[36] Pour l'importance de cette valeur dans le système de pensée de Plutarque, voir Martin (1961); Jacqueline de Romilly (1979), chapitre 14 *Plutarque et la douceur des héros*, 275–292; Frazier (1996) 230–236.

[37] 408C: … πέπαυται δὲ πόλεμος καὶ πλάναι καὶ στάσεις οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ τυραννίδες, οὐδ' ἄλλα νοσήματα καὶ κακὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὥσπερ πολυφαρμάκων δυνάμεων χρῄζοντα καὶ περιττῶν.

[38] *Praec.* 824C.

[39] *An seni* 784F.

blé disponible.[40] C'est pourquoi Plutarque apprécie tant que le monde méditerranéen ait trouvé, grâce à Rome, un équilibre stable. Dans son discours sur *La fortune des Romains*, il compare l'hégémonie de la première puissance de la terre habitée à un corps céleste dont la révolution crée un monde de paix et un cercle unique sans raté.[41] C'est pourquoi il recommande tant aux hommes politiques d'assurer la concorde chez eux et d'éviter qu'une généralisation de l'agitation oblige Rome à intervenir pour rétablir l'ordre par la force, en réduisant encore davantage les libertés concédées.[42] Et il est encore plus fou, répète-t-il, de se révolter contre l'autorité romaine elle-même.[43] C'est pourquoi, enfin, Plutarque pousse les vieillards à continuer de se mêler de politique, afin de tempérer les ardeurs bouillantes des jeunes, que leur soif naturelle de gloire et de pouvoir rend souvent dangereux.[44] Sa position d'homme politique à l'égard de l'occupant tient de celle du médecin concernant la santé: il s'agit, dans les deux cas, de préserver de la mort, et la préexcellence accordée à la vie dans l'échelle des valeurs s'explique par le primat du principe cosmique de la vie. Rome, assimilée comme on vient de le noter aux astres, dont par ailleurs il est dit qu'ils possèdent intrinsèquement le principe de la vie et du mouvement,[45] est ainsi pensée comme le garant divin de la vie pour l'ensemble du monde méditerranéen.

La troisième conséquence d'une structure métaphysique du cosmos dominé par la Monade se confond avec la conviction d'une unité de l'humanité qui, après l'éloge du pouvoir monarchique des empereurs et de l'hégémonie universelle exercée par un unique État, permet à Plutarque de sauver la dignité hellénique.[46] Les Romains ne font en définitive que parachever l'œuvre d'Alexandre, qui, en répandant la civilisation grecque en Asie,[47] en «rassemblant dans le même tout ce qui était éparpillé,»[48] en soumettant les peuples de la terre à une «raison unique» (ἑνὸς…λόγου) et à «un seul gouvernement» (μιᾶς πολιτείας),

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[40] *Ant.* 68.6–8. Cf. les troubles qui agitent l'Italie, accablée par les impôts de guerre prélevés, dans le même temps, par Octave (58.2).

[41] *Fort. Rom.* 317C: … εἰς κόσμον εἰρήνης καὶ ἕνα κύκλον τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἄπταιστον περιφερομένης …

[42] *Praec.* 824A–825A.

[43] *Praec.* 813E–814A, et 825C–D.

[44] *An seni* 790D et 791B–C.

[45] *Tranq. an.* 477C: … ἀρχὴν ζωῆς ἔχοντα καὶ κινήσεως …

[46] Voir Hartog (1996) 164–167.

[47] Voir *Alex. fort.* 328D et F.

[48] 329C: εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνενεγκὼν τὰ πανταχόθεν.

voulait unifier l'humanité entière.[49] Par son dessein, du moins tel que le perçoit Plutarque, établir entre tous les hommes concorde, paix et sentiment d'appartenir à la même communauté,[50] le grand conquérant grec a traduit dans les faits le rêve de Zénon, le fondateur du Portique, réaliser l'unité politique du monde des hommes réunis, sous une loi commune, dans un genre de vie et une ordonnance unique,[51] une aspiration pleinement partagée par notre auteur.[52] Alexandre dépasse les particularismes ethniques pour accéder à la raison universelle et, en cela, il doit être regardé, selon Plutarque, comme un philosophe.[53] Or les Romains ne font rien d'autre qu'ordonner, sous l'empire de la raison, la terre habitée, qui, avant leur suprématie, était en proie à une instabilité et une agitation chroniques.[54] Ici, se profile une certaine conception de l'histoire et, comme le suggère John Dillon,[55] Plutarque, dans ces pages-là, n'est pas loin de la vision d'un temps orienté. Œuvre du temps, Rome devient, en effet, pour lui, momentanément, l'instrument du dieu[56] pour augmenter, dans les espaces sublunaires, la part de l'ordre divin et réduire progressivement celle du désordre. Ainsi se combinent deux temporalités: celle d'un temps circulaire commun à l'ensemble des parties du monde, celle où s'inscrit le cycle de la vie; et celle d'un temps linéaire, qui correspond à la lente et difficile, mais constante,[57] élévation de l'humanité vers la rationalité universelle.[58] Donc, d'après Plutarque, le seul idéal politique défendable pour un État hégémonique, dès lors qu'il revêt les dimensions de l'*oikoumenê*, précisément parce qu'alors il résulte de la volonté de la providence, consiste à favoriser encore un peu plus la pénétration du divin dans la sphère du corruptible et, ce faisant, à aider l'humanité à se rapprocher encore

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[49] 330C: … ἕνα δῆμον ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας ἀποφῆναι βουλόμενος.

[50] 330E: … πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρασκευάσαι…

[51] 329B: … πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ᾖ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νομῷ καὶ νῷ συντρεφομένης.

[52] Même s'il faut se garder d'y voir, chez lui, une influence stoïcienne. Voir Babut (1969) 84–85.

[53] 330E: Οὐκοῦν πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῆς στρατείας ὑπόθεσις φιλόσοφον τὸν ἄνδρα συνίστησιν …

[54] Voir *Fort. Rom.* 317A–C.

[55] (1997) 236–238.

[56] Cf. Flavius Josèphe, pour qui le dieu des Juifs utilise Rome pour faire advenir plus tard le règne du peuple juif.

[57] Sans retour en arrière, à la différence de ce qu'enseigne la théorie polybienne de *l'anakuklosis*.

[58] Voir Boulogne (1994) 124–130.

davantage de la rationalité absolue, en un mouvement sans fin et de type hélicoïdal, à l'image de la marche oblique et inclinée que dieu imprime au soleil pour gouverner le monde.[59]

Nous sommes maintenant en mesure de conclure brièvement. Finalement il apparaît que les positions de Plutarque à l'égard de l'empire romain s'enracinent dans l'imaginaire métaphysique du mythe de Timarque,[60] tout comme la primauté qu'il accorde au βίος πολιτικός. Plutarque modifie, en effet, la hiérarchie aristotélicienne[61] des genres de vie, en plaçant l'action politique au-dessus de la contemplation. Mais attention! Si la spéculation pure demeure inutile, inversement l'homme d'action sans le secours de la philosophie, multiplie les erreurs, faute de culture, comme il le souligne dans son traité *L'éducation des enfants* (*Lib. educ.* 8A). Et, lorsqu'il reprend le lieu commun[62] de l'idéal d'une vie mixte (7F), où le temps se partage entre la politique et la philosophie, c'est afin de mettre celle-ci au service de celle-là, comme l'illustre le comportement d'Épaminondas, lors de la libération de Thèbes, tel qu'il est décrit par le dialogue *Le démon de Socrate*.[63] Les plaisirs de l'action politique éclairée par la philosophie lui apparaissent incontestablement supérieurs à tous les autres,[64] et, si le philosophe n'est pas lui-même un homme d'action, il doit utiliser les puissants, en s'efforçant de les influencer, comme Plutarque l'a fait personnellement au cours de sa carrière de notable, pour que, par leur intermédiaire, la collectivité profite largement des biens de la sagesse. C'est le sens de l'opuscule *Le philosophe doit le plus possible s'entretenir avec les chefs d'État*, inspiré par l'idée que le discours philosophique est générateur d'actes utiles et de nobles choix (*Princ. phil.* 775C). C'est également la raison pour laquelle Plutarque tient Alexandre pour le plus grand des philosophes,[65] dans la

[59] Voir *Phoc.* 2.6–9.

[60] La portée politique du sens de ce mythe forgé par Plutarque échappe à Vernière (1977), ainsi qu'à Corlu (1970) et Hani (1980), tout comme à Babut (1984 et 1988).

[61] Voir, en particulier, *EN* 1.3, 1095b14–19: διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν, τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Cf. Jamblique, *VP* 58; et Platon, *Resp.* 9, 581c.

[62] Voir Joly (1956) 147 et 172.

[63] Plus qu'une unification de la vie active et de la vie contemplative comme en juge Hani (1980) 62, Épaminondas incarne, aux yeux de Plutarque, la subordination de la seconde à la première.

[64] Voir le dialogue *Non posse*, où ils sont présentés après les plaisirs de l'intellect (chapitres 15–19).

[65] Dans *Alex. fort.* 329A.

mesure où il s'est montré le plus grand des civilisateurs. Il ne s'agit pas là d'un paradoxe de la rhétorique, mais d'une conviction profonde: par son action, Alexandre lui semble avoir fait passer des conceptions hautement philosophiques du champ de l'abstraction dans celui des réalités concrètes.

BARBARIANS IN PLUTARCH'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

Thomas S. Schmidt

Despite the title of this paper, the reader should be warned from the start that the barbarians are *not* central to Plutarch's thought.[1] This is even more striking when it comes to political issues: only rarely are the barbarians and their political organization mentioned in Plutarch's works. In the so-called political treatises,[2] for instance, they are virtually inexistant. One interesting thought is found in *Ad principem ineruditum* (780C–D), when Plutarch mentions the famous anecdote of the Persian king being reminded every morning by one of his chamberlains that his power is subordinate to the higher power of the god Oromasdes. This is not what one would normally expect to be said in relation with the Persian king, since he usually stands as a symbol for unlimited power.[3] But of course this is precisely Plutarch's point here: if even an absolute monarch as the Great King obeys to a higher power, so the more should the "educated ruler" (who, by the way, does not need to be reminded of it every day, as Plutarch adds in 780D). Another interesting statement about the political system of the Persians comes from *De unius dominatione* (826E): Plutarch, if he really is the author of this little treatise, remarks that, among the three existing political systems, the Persians have opted for the "autocratic and irresponsible royalty" (αὐτοκρατῆ βασιλείαν καὶ ἀνυπεύθυνον).[4]

Apart from these two examples, the barbarians are hardly ever mentioned in the political treatises and when they are, their rôle is reduced to mere anecdotes: in *An seni sit gerenda res publica*, for instance, the Libyan king Masinissa is mentioned, alongside Phocion and Cato, as an example of an elderly statesman still in full possession of his faculties (791E), while Darius and the Scythian Ateas figure as illustrations for

[1] For similar warnings, see Schmidt (1999) 329–330; Schmidt (2002), 57.

[2] *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum* (776A–779C); *Ad principem ineruditum* (779D–782F); *An seni sit gerenda res publica* (783A–797F); *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* (798A–825F); *De unius dominatione* (826A–827C, possibly spurious).

[3] As early as in fifth-century authors, cf. Hall (1989) 192–195; in Plutarch, see below.

[4] The English translations of Greek quotations are taken from the volumes of the *Loeb Classical Library*.

intelligence in action (792C);[5] in the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, Plutarch briefly mentions the harsh character of the Carthaginian people, which makes them intransigent in political matters (799D–E), and he refers to Hannibal, among others, as a man who was not able to share his political power (812E).

These examples, and a few more,[6] are all rather insignificant and do not show any attempt of political analysis. Further study reveals that this is actually the case for references to barbarians throughout Plutarch's oeuvre. One may of course deplore the loss of the *Quaestiones barbaricae*,[7] where interesting thoughts about the political customs of the barbarians may have been developed, but in the absence of such a work, one has to admit that the barbarians do not seem to be an issue for Plutarch in his political thinking. Is there any point, then, in treating this subject at all? Despite all negative premises, this paper aims at showing that some insight into Plutarch's political thought may nevertheless be gained from his general presentation of the barbarians.

From a general survey of the passages in which barbarians are mentioned by Plutarch, it appears that these are mainly represented as

(a) lawless peoples:

Plutarch uses words such as ἄνομος (*Quaest. rom.* 269A) and ἄθεσμος (*De fort. Alex.* 328B) to describe their lack of political organization, but it is interesting to note also the repeated use of the doublet βάρβαρος καὶ παρανόμος (*Pel.* 21.5; *De superstit.* 171B; *De Iside* 358E).[8] So the barbarians in general are seen as people either without law or without respect for the law. This holds for peoples located on the fringe of the world, like the Scythians and the Indians (cf. *Pomp.* 70.4), but it also applies to various other peoples. One thinks for instance of the description of the inhabitants of Spain in the *Life of Marius* (6.2), mere tribes which "still considered robbery as a most honourable way of living", or in the *Life of Sertorius* (14.1, 16.2–3), where Plutarch repeatedly stresses their lack of discipline and of organization. The same applies to nordic tribes such as the Cimbri and the Teutones (*Mar.* 11.3–14; 14.1; 19.2), and also to the "kingless" Thracians (*Alc.* 36.5).

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[5] See also *Reg. et imp.* 172F (Darius) and 174D (Ateas).

[6] Within the political treatises, barbarians are further mentioned only at *Praec. ger. rep.* 815E, 820D, 821D–E, 824C.

[7] Catalogue of Lamprias, no. 139.

[8] The two terms of such doublets tend to be synonymous, see Teodorsson (2000), Schmidt (1999) 17–22, Schmidt (2000) 457–460.

The absence of political organization is usually seen as a lack of civilization. In that respect the *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* is particularly interesting because it displays a strong rhetorical contrast between the savage and lawless populations of Asia and Alexander's mission of civilization (328A–329A): in this long passage Alexander is shown introducing among savage tribes (ἀγρίοις ἔθνεσιν, 328B; ἄθεσμα καὶ ἀνήκοα φῦλα, 328B; ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους διαίτης, 328E) an organized form of life based on Greek "political" concepts such as "city" (πόλεις, 328A; 328E), "law" (νόμους, 328B), "peace" (εἰρήνην, 328B) and "magistracies" (Ἑλληνικοῖς τέλεσι, 328E).

(b) paradigms of monarchy:

The most frequently described political organization of the barbarians, however, is monarchy. This, of course, is not peculiar to Plutarch: ever since the Persian Wars, the barbarians have been associated with the idea of absolute monarchy. As is clear from the above quotation from *De unius dominatione*, this is to be understood as the negative form of monarchy, which comes close to tyranny and despotism, two other forms of government which Plutarch categorically rejects.[9] It is interesting to note, en passant, that there is a cluster of ideas between tyranny, despotism and barbarians in Plutarch's works, as may be seen even in the vocabulary used to describe these forms of government.[10]

Just as for tyranny and despotism, Plutarch heavily and repeatedly stresses the negative components of barbarian monarchy, which can mainly be summarized as

1. absence of law (i.e. despotism, arbitrary rule): e.g. *Artax.* 23.5; *Ages.* 9.2–4.
2. absence of freedom (i.e. δουλεία): e.g. *Sull.* 22.6; *Luc.* 18.4; 21.5.
3. absence of free speech (i.e. lack of truth, flattery, etc.): e.g. *Luc.* 21.6; 26.4–5; *Eum.* 13.10.

To these can be added a vast number of moral shortcomings inherent to the barbarian monarchy, such as ὕβρις ("insolence"), extravagance, cruelty, intrigues, corruption, faithlessness, etc. In that respect, the *Life of Artaxerxes* may at first sight look like an exception because of the various positive characteristics granted to the Persian king, but in reality

[9] For a list of passages in which Plutarch condemns tyranny and despotism, see Aalders (1982) 34–35.

[10] See e.g. *Eum.* 13.10; *Cleom.* 13.1–9; *Mul. virt.* 250F–251A; *De aud. poet.* 36F; see also the *Life of Timoleon* (*passim*) and the second part of the *Life of Alexander*, cf. Schmidt (1999) 294–298; further examples in Aalders (1982) 22–23 and Frazier (1996) 128–129.

this biography is precisely an illustration of the life of intrigues and of the abuse of power at the Persian court.[11]

Thus, being described either as lawless people or as paradigms of an absolute monarchy, the barbarians constitute a powerful negative pole in Plutarch's works, with one notable exception however: Anacharsis, who is the only barbarian with positive political views. These are mainly expressed in the *Septem Sapientium Convivium*, with some interesting remarks about the good king (152A), the best form of democracy (154E) and the best form of "domestic" government (155A–D). As it appears, however, these must be understood as Plutarch's own views. Besides, the positive image of Anacharsis was inherited from the long tradition around this figure.[12]

That the barbarians should constitute a negative pole in Plutarch's works is, of course, by no means surprising. This is too obviously the characteristic of Greek thought in general as to need any further explanation here. Still, the use that Plutarch makes of this negative pole of the barbarians is, I believe, the interesting side of the question.

The example from *De fort. Alex.* (328A–329A) mentioned above has already shown that Plutarch uses the barbarians—the savage and lawless populations of Asia—as a foil to bring out the great achievements of Alexander and the superiority of the Greek political system, based on values such as πόλις, νόμος and εἰρήνη. The same can be observed about the action of Timoleon in Sicily, another example of the triumph of Greek civilization over tyrants and barbarians combined (*Tim.* 35.1–4): in contrast with the savage state to which the island had been reduced (νῆσον ἐξηγριωμένην), Plutarch highlights Timoleon's achievements in four short formulas which celebrate the major political values of the Greeks, i.e. "conclusion of war" (πολέμου τις λύσις), "institution of law" (νόμων θέσις), "settlement of territory" (χώρας κατοικισμός) and "arrangement of civil polity" (πολιτείας διάταξις). These are, almost to the word, identical with those of Alexander. They mark a clear contrast between the "lawless" and the "lawful" and demonstrate the superiority of "democracy" over tyranny and barbarity.

This opposition between tyranny and "democratic" values is a concept which occurs also in relation with monarchy, although in a slightly

[11] See Schmidt (1999) 315–324.

[12] On the figure of Anacharsis in Plutarch's works, see Kindstrand (1981) 44–48 and Ungefehr-Kortus (1996) 146–186; also Schmidt (1999) 260–261.

different way, in the *Life of Cleomenes* (13.1–3): in this fairly long passage, Plutarch effectfully contrasts the wealth and extravagance, haughtiness and pomp of the "other kings"[13] with the simple, plain and unpretentious manners of Cleomenes, and concludes by saying that people who came in contact with him "were completely won over" (κατεδημαγωγοῦντο). The use of this word at the end of the passage is very interesting, as its usual negative meaning is clearly to be replaced by a positive tone. In accordance with the context, the translation offered by Flacelière and Chambry seems particularly apt: "ils étaient conquis par ses manières démocratiques" ("they were completely won over by his democratic manners").[14]

Of course, in the latter passage, the distinction is not between "monarchy" and "democracy" (since Cleomenes himself is a king), but between the "good" and the "bad" monarchy. Interestingly enough, this theme also comes up with some insistence in the *Life of Alexander*. The famous saying of Alexander at the battle of Issos, after the Macedonian had taken hold of Darius' immensely rich tent, immediately comes to mind: "This, as it would seem, is to be king" (Τοῦτ' ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔφη, τὸ *βασιλεύειν*, *Alex.* 20.13). The meaning of this sentence has been diversely interpreted, but the right interpretation seems to be, once more, that of Flacelière and Chambry, who understand: "Voilà donc en quoi consistait pour Darios la royauté" ("This is what, in the eyes of Darius, it meant to be king").[15] If this interpretation is correct, it implicitly presents Alexander, by contrast to Darius, as the "good" king. Alexander shows indeed much indifference to all this incredible wealth, which is highlighted even more by the contrast with the attitude of Alexander's own soldiers, who "were like dogs in their eagerness to pursue and track down the wealth of the Persians" (24.3). Alexander's unconcern for money is also illustrated later in the *Life* (57.1–2), when he ordered the booty accumulated by his army to be burnt before setting off toward India. This indifference to money is the attitude of the "good" king, as is explicitly said in *De fort. Alex.* 342A:

> Ἀλεχάνδρῳ δ' ἐπέταττε ἡ Ἀρετὴ τὸν *βασιλικὸν* καὶ θεῖον ἆθλον, οὗ τέλος ἦν οὐ χρυσὸς ὑπὸ μυρίων καμήλων περικομιζόμενος οὐδὲ τρυφαὶ Μηδικαὶ

[13] It may well be that Plutarch had Hellenistic rather than barbarian kings in mind here, but his description matches all the negative stereotypes of barbarian monarchy as well. See Marasco (1981) 459–465; Schmidt (1999) 128–132.

[14] Flacelière-Chambry (1976) 53.

[15] Flacelière-Chambry (1975) 55 n. 2.

> καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ γυναῖκες οὐδὲ Χαλυβώνιος οἶνος οὐδ' Ὑρκανικοὶ ἰχθύες, ἀλλ' ἑνὶ κόσμῳ κοσμήσαντα πάντας ἀνθρώπους μιᾶς ὑπηκόους ἡγεμονίας καὶ μιᾶς ἐθάδας διαίτης καταστῆσαι.
>
> "But upon Alexander it was Virtue who laid the kingly and god-like Labour, the end and aim of which was not gold, carried about by countless camels, nor the Persian luxury, banquets, and women, nor the wine of Chalybon, nor the fish of Hyrcania, but to order all men by one law and to render them submissive to one rule and accustomed to one manner of life."

A similar idea is implied in the words of the Persian ambassadors, impressed by young Alexander's superior intelligence (*De fort. Alex.* 342B): "This boy is a 'great king', our king is only wealthy" (ὁ παῖς οὗτος βασιλεὺς μέγας, ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος πλούσιος).

The theme of Alexander as the "good" king also comes up in the description of his attitude towards the Persian women (Darius' mother, wife and two of his daughters), taken prisoners after that same battle of Issos. The respect which Alexander shows for these women is explicitly presented as "the most beautiful and most royal favour" (ἡ δὲ καλλίστη καὶ *βασιλικωτάτη* χάρις ἦν…, *Alex.* 21.5) and a few lines below Plutarch explains that Alexander did not touch any of these women because "as it would seem, he considered the mastery of himself a more kingly thing than the conquest of his enemies" (ἀλλ' Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ *βασιλικώτερον* ἡγούμενος, *Alex.* 21.7). And a few chapters later (*Alex.* 30.1–14), Alexander's noble attitude is praised by Darius himself!

Likewise, the barbarian τρυφή ("luxury") to which Alexander's companions have succumbed gives Plutarch the opportunity of presenting Alexander as the "good" king, since Alexander explains to his friends that "it is a very servile thing to be luxurious, but a very royal thing to toil" (δουλικώτατον μέν ἐστι τὸ τρυφᾶν, *βασιλικώτατον* δὲ τὸ πονεῖν, *Alex.* 40.2), and later on, being criticized by his friends, he says "that it was the lot of a king to confer favours and be illspoken of therefore" (φάσκων *βασιλικὸν* εἶναι τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν εὖ ποιοῦντα, *Alex.* 41.2).

Just as in the *Cleomenes*-passage quoted above, there is a clear shift here from a political concept ("monarchy") towards a moral issue (the "good" king), which is quite revealing of Plutarch's moralism. More importantly, however, the previous examples show an all too obvious contrast between the barbarians, either as lawless people or as paradigms of monarchy, and the values which, in the eyes of Plutarch,

make the superiority of the *Greek* political system and the *Greek* civilization in general. This is most explicit in the cases of Alexander and Timoleon, but also quite obvious with Cleomenes. It seems legitimate, then, to ask where the Romans stand within this dichotomy. As it appears, Plutarch uses this method of contrast for the Romans in the same way as for the Greeks, and yet in a slightly different manner. An illustration of this is offered in a passage of the *Quaestiones Romanae* (269A) which has been often discussed in recent publications.[16]

> Διὰ τί τὸν Ἰανὸν διπρόσωπον οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ γράφουσιν οὕτω καὶ πλάττουσιν; Πότερον ὅτι τῷ μὲν γένει Ἕλλην ἐκ Περραιβίας ἦν, ὡς ἱστοροῦσιν, διαβὰς δ' εἰς Ἰταλίαν καὶ συνοικήσας τοῖς αὐτόθι βαρβάροις μετέβαλε καὶ γλῶτταν καὶ δίαιταν· ἢ μᾶλλον ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν φυτοῖς ἀγρίοις καὶ ἀνόμοις χρωμένους ἔθεσιν εἰς ἕτερον βίου σχῆμα, πείσας γεωργεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόσμησεν;

> "Why do they suppose Janus to have been two-faced and so represent him in painting and sculpture? Is it because, as they relate, he was by birth a Greek from Perrhaebia, and, when he had crossed to Italy and had settled among the savages there, he changed both his speech and his habits? Or is it rather because he changed the people of Italy to another manner and form of life by persuading a people which had formerly made use of wild plants and lawless customs to till the soil and to live under organized government?"

The interesting point is that Janus, who is definitely a Roman god, is presented in this passge as being of Greek origin, which means that the elements of civilization he introduces among the barbarians are to be understood as Greek values. This short passage should certainly not be over-estimated, but it is quite revealing of Plutarch's general attitude.

Another illustration of this can be found, for instance, in the *Life of Lucullus*. The idea spreads over several chapters. In short, when Lucullus has overcome king Mithridates, he is said to have restored order in the province of Asia by introducing "justice" (δίκης, 20.1), "laws" (θεσμῶν, 20.1; πολλῆς εὐνομίας, 23.1) and "peace" (πολλῆς εἰρήνης, 23.1), i.e. exactly the same values as were highlighted for the Greek heroes Alexander and Timoleon. At first sight, then, this looks like a clear instance illustrating the fact that Greece and Rome shared the same values in Plutarch's eyes. However, as Simon Swain has shown,

16 See in particular Preston (2001) 97–98 and Goldhill (2002) 269–270, with further bibliography.

throughout the *Life* the accent is put on Lucullus' Hellenism, and therefore the values he defends are, in fact, also to be understood as typically Greek.[17]

Sligthly different is the case of Sertorius (*Sert.* 14.1–4):

> ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θαυμαζόμενος ἠγαπᾶτο παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις ὁ Σερτώριος, καὶ ὅτι Ῥωμαικοῖς ὁπλισμοῖς καὶ τάξεσι καὶ συνθήμασι ἀφαιρῶν τὸ μανικὸν καὶ θηριῶδες αὐτῶν τῆς ἀλκῆς ἀντὶ ληστηρίου μεγάλου στρατὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν δύναμιν. … Μάλιστα δ' εἷλεν αὐτοὺς τὰ τῶν παίδων. Τοὺς γὰρ εὐγενεστάτους ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν συναγαγὼν εἰς Ὄσκαν, πόλιν μεγάλην, διδασκάλους ἐπιστήσας Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Ῥωμαικῶν μαθημάτων, ἔργῳ μὲν ἐξωμηρεύσατο, λόγῳ δ' ἐπαίδευεν, ὡς ἀνδράσι γενομένοις πολιτείας τε μεταδώσων καὶ ἀρχῆς.
>
> "In consequence of these successes Sertorius was admired and loved by the Barbarians, and especially because by introducing Roman arms and formations and signals he did away with their frenzied and furious display of courage, and converted their forces into an army, instead of a huge band of robbers. (…) But most of all were they captivated by what he did with their boys. Those of the highest birth, namely, he collected together from the various peoples, at Osca, a large city, and set over them teachers of Greek and Roman learning; thus in reality he made hostages of them, while ostensibly he was educating them, with the assurance that when they became men he would give them a share in administration and authority".

Here, Sertorius is described as introducing two major values: military discipline and education (allegedly in view of forming the young for the duties government and administration). These values may be considered genuinely Roman, especially military discipline, but it should be pointed out that Plutarch cannot refrain from saying that the education given to these young barbarians was Greek as well as Roman.

In sum, there is always some Greekness lurking when it comes to the values introduced by Romans. The contrast with the barbarians has shown that the Romans are clearly on the "good" side, so to say, except that this "good" side is to be understood as Greek.

However, I have not noted contrasting examples involving Romans and barbarians where a reflection on the "good king" would be going on as in the cases of Alexander and Cleomenes. This, of course, may be due to the cautiousness of Plutarch regarding this rather delicate question, with the unavoidable reference to the political system of the Roman empire. But such a contrasting discussion may actually be

[17] Swain (1992).

going on in Plutarch, though implicitly rather than explicitly. With the barbarians, and especially the barbarian monarchy, Plutarch has set up a negative standard by which the Greek and Roman leaders are or may be judged. It works through *exempla* and may thus be deduced by the reader himself even without explicit statements by Plutarch.[18] The barbarian monarchy is a powerful example of what a king should *not* be. With this counter-example in mind, the reader will be able to judge the Greek and Roman "kings" or "king-like" figures on their positive values (as, for instance, in the cases of Alexander, Cleomenes, and Numa[19]), but also on their wrong-doings and shortcomings (as, again, for Alexander, but also Demetrius, Antonius, Caesar[20]). But here we are touching upon a much wider, moral issue, which lays beyond the scope of this modest contribution.

[18] A similar idea is expressed by Aalders (1982) 22–24 in relation with the Hellenistic kings.

[19] For a positive evaluation of Numa as opposed to a barbarian stereotype, see *Num.* 3.7–8; for Alexander and Cleomenes, see above.

[20] Cf. barbarian-like features in the behaviour of Demetrius: *Demetr.* 1.7–8, 14.2–4, 41.5–8, 42.1–11; of Antonius: *Ant.* 9.5–9, 19.4, 28.1–2, 37.3–6, 56.6–10; Alexander's "barbarization": from *Alex.* 42 onwards; Caesar's aspiration to monarchy: *Caes.* 57.1–2, 60.1–2.

PLUTARCH AS SOURCE FOR EARLY GREEK RHETORIC. THE CASE OF GORGIAS FRG. 23 DK

Jeroen A.E. Bons

1. *Methodology*

In his methodological considerations concerning the editing of the Posidonius-fragments, I. Kidd provides us with a number of criteria fundamental to any research on fragments and the ways and means of editing them. Below I mention the most important ones, each representing a separate stage of analysis and, at the same time, providing constituents of the edition itself.

1. to establish the general characteristics of the so-called "reporter", the author in whose work the fragment occurs in relation to the fragment and its subject-matter;
2. to establish the general characteristics of the incidental work in which the fragment occurs;
3. to demarcate the immediate context of the fragment if it is a quotation (I leave out for now different kinds of potential fragments, such as paraphrases);
4. to determine the place and function of the fragment in its immediate context, i.e. to account for the structure of the argument in which the fragment occurs and its function therein;
5. to relate the fragment to the general context of other fragments or works of the author to whom the fragment is ascribed.

The final edition of the fragment therefore has three constitutive elements: first, an introduction (1+2); followed by the fragment itself (3); and finally a commentary (4+5).

This paper will follow the consecutive steps of the presented outline, as applied to Gorgias' Fragment 23 DK as it is reported by Plutarch.

2. *Sophists and the tragic in Plutarch*

Since the subject-matter of Gorgias' Frg. 23 DK is dramatic illusion and tragic *apatê* or "deceit", the first step consists of looking at Plutarch in general with regard to the presence of references to and quotations of the sophists, to which group also Gorgias belongs, and to Plutarch's views on tragedy and the tragic.

From his own works we learn that Plutarch was a meticulous reader, who kept notes and files of his reading. In the process of writing, he would refer to these when incorporating or discussing quotations from other authors (see *Mor.* 464F–465A; 457D–E). The first stage in the production of a treatise could consist of the elaboration of parts on the basis of previously collected excerpts to be adduced for confirmation or rejection, or of the putting together of *hypomnêmatika*, the provisional final draft of the treatise as a whole. This draft would contain the elaborated and ordered raw material, which still needs the final redaction of stylistic fine-tuning prior to publication (*ekdosis*).[1] With regard to the sophists, a survey of quotations shows that Plutarch as a rule refers to one sophist at a time or quotes an opinion of one sophist at a time, but never mentions the sophists as a group.[2] This indicates that Plutarch will have prepared by making thematic selections relevant to the subject-matter of the treatise he was working on, or even that he could draw on pre-existing collections of opinions on specific topics, as they seem to have been used in rhetorical education.

Evidently the subject of tragedy, and of the dramatic and the tragic, was of interest to Plutarch. From his works it appears that he discusses tragedy, and poetry in general, by emphasizing the negative aspects: defects rather than merits are mentioned. The works of the poets are beneficial in a restricted way only, insofar as they contain philosophical teachings (see below). The main reason for condemnation of poetry and the tragic is that it essentially contains an element of deceit (*apatê*) and falseness (*pseudos*), with regard to its subject-matter, the audience and the actor.[3]

[1] For the details on Plutarch's method of writing and of the *modus operandi* of hellenistic writing of treatises see Dorandi (1991) 12–17.

[2] Classen (1985) 32 with n. 70.

[3] See De Lacy (1952) 159–168.

A good illustration of this is Plutarch's *Solon* 29,3–30,5.[4] Solon is attending a performance of tragedy staged by Thespis, the inventor of the genre. Solon, however, condemns this type of drama as an instance of falseness (*pseudos*). When Thespis defends himself by saying that playing an intellectual game (*paidia*) is not something to be indignant (*deinon*) about, Solon is furious and warns against the dangers of this kind of playfulness for day-to-day life. He is proved right by the immediately following description of the famous "dramatic performance" of Peisistratus. The aspiring tyrant wounds himself and rushes into the marketplace on a chariot, stirring up the people and deceitfully claiming that a plot is threatening his life. In doing so he succeeds in obtaining the people's support and gains the tyranny. This incident, too, is condemned by Solon as an act of drama and an instance of deceit on the part of Peisistratus (*exapatêsen*).

3. *General character of De audiendis poetis*

The treatise presents itself as an educational guide for a friend of Plutarch, Marcus Sedatus, whose son is at an age at which he will be confronted with the works of the poets as part of his education. The study of poetry had a fixed and traditional place in the school curriculum, especially at secondary stage, and therefore also a boy who is preparing himself for a way of life based on philosophical principles will come across poetry. In Plutarch's view, however, reading poetry is potentially harmful. A gifted boy will prove to be sensitive to its appeal and pleasures and might thus be easily damaged in his intellectual development.The question is, therefore, how to avoid this potential damage during the inevitable exposure of the young student to poetry, or: how to prepare and train the pupil to derive benefit from reading the poets.

In pointing out the possibly harmful effects of literature and poetry Plutarch is following Plato. He indicates that there might be harm done to one's character (*blaptei kai diaphteirei*, 15A), and that there might occur loss of self-control and of rationality (*taraktikon kai paraphoron*, 15C). Given the system and curriculum of education, Plutarch is not in a position to put a ban on harmful poetry as Plato had proposed. He has

[4] On the passage see also Hadavas (1996) 30–33.

to find a means of protection against what is harmful and a means of determination of what is valuable and useful. This can only be done when it is recognized that the value of poetry lies hidden underneath the layers of poetic artfulness that account for its charm and are a source of pleasure.

Prior to providing this set of rules of engaging with the poets, Plutarch provides a theoretical basis to his treatise, consisting of the treatment of two characteristics fundamental to all literature. First, there is the deceitfulness of poetry, and secondly he addresses the mimetic nature of poetry (chs. 2–3 of the treatise, 16A–18F).[5]

1. 16A–17F has the motto *polla pseudontai aoidoi* "poets tell many things that are not true", a saying attributed to Solon. Poets do this as a result of the requirement of providing entertainment for their audience. Since the truth is too stern and often unpleasant, poets create an opportunity to provide happy endings by inventing their own stories. They do so in an expert way, also paying attention to the formal qualities of a story in order to make it well told, and thus they provide something highly satisfactory to the audience. A survey of the notions used by Plutarch is relevant to this paper, because it seems that he has used a number of different theoretical traditions on the subject, combining their general purport into a pragmatic new whole:

- the poets tend to please their audience, an observation to be found in Gorgias and Plato;
- the need of a happy ending seems to be derived from Aristotle's *Poetics* 1453a30–34, where it is mentioned that poets "are led to give spectators what they want" and have good characters enjoy a happy ending and bad characters ending badly;
- the preeminence of story (*muthos*) over stylistic form is also Aristotelian (*Poetics* 1447b18), but the description of the effects of poetry in terms of allure (*haimulia*), charm (*charis*) and being stunned (*ekplêxis*) is again reminiscent of Gorgias (*Helen* 16);
- the comparison of a well-constructed story that lacks plausibility to a painting without colour might be inspired by the comparison between poetry and painting as found in Simonides.

The main idea seems to be that a young student should beware of the fact that literary stories are entertaining while making use of lies,

[5] For the following outline of chs. 2–3 see Sicking (1998); an analysis of the the treatise concentrating on the Platonic background is provided by Brêchet (1999).

whether intentionally or unintentionally (Plutarch does distinguish between *pseudea* as *falsa* or "untruths" and *mendacia* or "deliberate lies"). In being alert to this the student will be able to ward off undesirable emotional effects and keep his soul healthy.

2. 17F–18F on *mimesis* offers a similar conflation of ideas deriving from Plato and Aristotle. This enables Plutarch to maintain the essential mimetic nature of literature while allowing the pupil a certain pleasure in the observation of skillful representation and craftmanship. As in the section on deceitfulness, Plutarch advocates an approach which in fact denies the artistic and essentially literary qualities of poetry. He reduces poetical works to a kind of embellished containers from which the detached reader can extract the philosophically useful content while neutralizing the poetic effects. In short, the pupil must be taught to read literature as if it were not literature. In fact he illustrates this attitude at the very beginning of the treatise, when he quotes the poet Philoxenus:

> *tôn kreôn ta mê krea hêdista kai tôn ichthuôn hoi mê ichthues*
>
> "of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish have the best flavour"

Reading poetry, therefore, is an introduction to philosophy of a kind. The works of the poets should be treated as if they were "ethical treatises enlivened by poetic means" (Sicking).

4. *The fragment's immediate context*

What seems particularly relevant to the question at hand is the fact, as seen above, that Plutarch evidently made use of different existing traditions of literary theory in establishing a foundation for his practical instructions. Even if the Platonic contribution remains the dominant one, notions derived from Gorgias and Aristotle also play their part. This being pointed out, we can now take a more detailed look at the introductory chapter of the treatise, in which the Gorgias-fragment is found at 15D.

The mixed nature of poetry, which has much that is pleasant and nourishing to offer for the mind of a young student (*neos*), but at least as much that is disturbing and misleading, calls for a reading under the proper guidance (*paidagogia orthê*). This point Plutarch explaines (*gar*) as follows (15C–D):

> *(1) ou gar monon hôs eoike peri tês Aiguptiôn chôras alla kai peri tês poiêtikês estin*

eipein hoti "pharmaka polla men esthla memeigmena polla de lugra" tois chrômenois anadidôsin. (2) "enth' eni men philotês, en d' himeros, en d' oaristus / parphasis, hê t' explêxe noon puka per phroneontôn."

(3) ou gar haptetai to apatêlon autês abelterôn komidêi kai anoêtôn. diho kai Simônidês men apekrinato pros ton eiponta "ti dê monous ouk exapatâis Thessalous?": "amathesteroi gar eisin ê hôs hup' emou exapatâsthai."

(4) Gorgias de tên tragôidian eipen apatên, ên ho t' apatêsas dikaioteros tou mê apatêsantos kai ho apatêtheis sophôteros tou mê apatêthentos.

(1) It appears that not only on the land of the Egyptians but also on poetry one can maintain that for those who are involved in it ⟨poetry⟩ offers "many beneficial drugs mixed with many harmful" (*Odyssee* 4, 230).

(2) "Present is love, present desire, and present fond discourse, that steals away the mind even from sound thinking men" (*Iliad* 14, 216–217).

(3) In fact the deceitful element ⟨in poetry⟩ does not touch the ones altogether stupid and without intelligence. That is why Simonides, when asked "why are the Thessalians the only ones you have not deceived?" answered: "because they are too ignorant to be deceived by me."

(4) And Gorgias said that tragedy is deceit, wherein the one who deceives is more correct than the one who does not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more wise than the one who is not deceived.

The sequence of thought in the pasage seems to be the following: the *Iliad*-passage Plutarch takes to mean that friendly persuasion in poetry steals away the awareness of those who are intelligent in particular. This constitutes an interpretation "pour le besoin de la cause", because Homer expresses the idea that this can happen even if (*per)* people are sound thinkers. The Simonides-quotation puts the same idea negatively (*diho kai*). The Thessalians are so ignorant they can not be deceived, because the condition of the presence of intelligence remains unfulfilled. Finally, the Gorgias-quotation presents a step forward in the sequence (*de*): now the fact of the vulnerability to being deceived is described as a mark of sophistication on the part of the audience of poetry. This final quotation offers Plutarch an opportunity to bridge the gap between the essential deceitfulness of poetry and the pragmatic need to accomodate the reading of poetry in the education of the young student. He thus provides a link between the deceitful nature of poetry (*to apatêlon*) and practical wisdom (*sophia*).[6] In fact, Plutarch interprets Gorgias as offering a crucial notion of literary

[6] On the passage as a whole see Heirman (1972) *ad loc.*

theory: he takes the words to mean that the ancient idea of the poetic being simply "untrue" (*pseudos*, cf. Solon's words quoted earlier) can be superseded by the seemingly paradoxical concept of poetry deceiving the audience into truth. This interpretation is confirmed by the second instance where Plutarch uses the Gorgias-quotation, now in relation to tragedy and its performances in Athens, but there he offers an explanation immediately following the quotation (*Mor*. 348C):

> *ho men gar apatêsas dikaioteros hoti touth' huposchomenos pepoiêken, ho d' apatêtheis sophôteros, eualôton gar uph' hêdonês logôn to mê anaisthêton*
>
> "and indeed the one who deceives is more correct, because he does what he promises; and the one who is deceived is more wise, because that which is not insensible is easily carried away by the pleasure of words."

The point Gorgias is making, and is taken to make by Plutarch, is that the audience should hold the illusionary reality of the stage, for the time of the performance, as a kind of truth. This does not amount to falseness, because both parties involved, the poet and the audience itself, partake in the mechanics of poetry. The deceit of the poet is "correct" because he is clear about his intentions from the very beginning and conforms to conventions. It is his task to produce a dramatic or poetic illusion in which the audience can "believe". Complementary to this is the sensibility and capacity for identification on the part of the audience. It can be called "wise" because it has the competence to appreciate the dramatic/poetic illusion for what it actually is. This competence goes beyond mere aesthetic experience.[7]

From this sequence of thought Plutarch draws a conclusion, which has the form of a dichotomy, of which the second leg is to be preferred. He uses the image of the Ithacans having their ears stopped with wax when confronted with the seductive singing of the Sirens:

> *poteron oun tôn neôn…ta ôta kai ategktôi kêrôi kataplattontes anagkazômen autous… poiêtikên pheugein kai parexelaunein, ê mâllon orthôi tini logismôi paristantes kai katadeontes tên krisin, hopôs mê parapherêtai tôi terponti pros to blapton, apeuthunômen kai paraphulattômen*

[7] On the interpretation of *dikaioteros* as "more correct" see Verdenius (1981) 117 with n. 12; cf. also Rosenmeyer (1955) 235; also pertinent on both passages is Van der Stockt (1992) 167–168, but I disagree with his restricting Plutarch's interpretation of Gorgias to the aesthetic experience of mimesis: *apatê* in Gorgias is concerned with the nature of tragedy (or the use of persuasive language in general), not its effect (for which he uses the term *ekplêxis*), see below.

> "shall we then stop the ears of the young with hard and unyielding wax…and avoid poetry altogether, or rather shall we provide some proper standard of reasoning to guide and guard their judgment, so as to avoid that their judgment is carried away from its course by pleasure towards what is harmful."

Thus Plutarch has returned to the proposition he wanted to prove. The "proper standard of reasoning" to be imparted on the young is the competence to appreciate poetic illusion and not mistake it for reality. In this way their judgment will remain sound and the innate dangers of literary deceitfulness can be avoided.

5. *Commentary to the fragment of Gorgias*

Gorgias can be qualified as a philosopher of language: it is the spoken word as such that intrigues him, and he looks for explanations for the phenomenon experienced by many, that people can be influenced in their opinions by the spoken word. In studying this phenomenon he approaches persuasive speech from a broad perspective: he does not confine himself to the role of rational argumentation, but according to him the manipulation of emotions is an essential feature of the process of persuasion, too. By consequence the domain of rhetoric is not confined to its traditional fields of the lawcourts and the political assembly. Also on stage, in the theatre, there are people involved in trying to persuade others, both actors speaking persuasively and authors making them speak as such, and thus in an activity that can be defined in terms of rhetoric. In this case one regards as rhetorical "anything that is said with the intent to persuade any person who shares the stage with the speaker, or even the speaker himself."[8] Thus the process of persuasion in its traditional domain becomes comparable with and even parallel to persuasion on the theatrical stage. One should bear in mind that in both cases persuasion is aimed at a listening audience, either directly or indirectly, and taking this into consideration it becomes plausible that both were studied from the same perspective by Gorgias.

This point needs some further elaboration, because of its relevance to the correct understanding of the Gorgias-fragment, which is after all transmitted in isolation. More can be said than pointing out that Gorgias' contribution to literary theory consists of the acknowledgment

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[8] Bers (1994).

that drama as such can be seen as rhetoric, insofar as poetry "creates the impression of eyewitness immediacy or accuracy"[9], or that according to Gorgias "tragedy…was only thetoric in verse."[10] On the basis of the following considerations it can be shown that the fragment's content conforms to what is known about Gorgias' views on language and communication in general.

(1) Gorgias' notion of *apatê* is closely connected to his theory of knowledge. Since human beings are unable to grasp the true nature of things, they must as a consequence remain in a world of seeming and be content with opinion rather than knowledge as the highest epistemological level possible (see *Helen* 11, and *On nature, or on what is not*). By definition, however, opinion is unstable and changeable, and furthermore its means of communication is words. Thus opinion can be influenced by words and persuasive speech can alter opinion. The spoken word has the power to effect this alteration, a power labelled by the word *apatê*. This word has etymologically the meaning of "leading away" and in this usage it refers to the fact that "a person is deflected from his own way of thought without realizing it"[11], hence the translation "deceit".

The means by which the spoken word exercizes this power are exemplified by Gorgias in his *Encomium on Helen* and *Defense of Palamedes*, and in the *Helen* in particular he identifies these means in terms of the capacity to arouse emotions (fear, sorrow, joy, pity). In this respect he points out the analogy with the curative effect of incantations and drugs (*Helen* 8–14). The notion of persuasion being a form of deception affecting the opinions of men is summed up in the phrase *apatêmata doxês* "deceptions of belief", where the key-words *apatê* and *doxa* are combined.

This doctrine of deception is clearly relevant to the fragment 23. Normally, to deceive will be qualified as something unjust, but seen in the context of theatrical performance deceit can be understood as an essential element. The fictional world created on stage, the dramatic illusion, is a phenomenon integral to tragedy, and to appreciate it as such is a mark of competence and intelligence. In surrendering to the charms and deceit of tragedy the audience proves its competence and can be labelled "wise".

[9] Cole (1991) 38.
[10] Guthrie (1971) 180–181.
[11] Verdenius (1981) 116.

(2) The fact that Gorgias tried to establish a relation between rhetoric and tragedy also sheds some light on his methods as a student of persuasive speech. Speaking generally, sophists can be compared in this respect of method to the philosophers of nature. Both groups can be regarded as examples of intellectuals who observe phenomena, natural or artistic, and explain them with the help of rational thought. Observation and rational speculation are typical of their approach. Gorgias' thoughts on tragedy seem a case in point. His object of inquiry is the power of speech, to which he attributes the capacity of arousing emotions as an essential element. Apparently he chose tragedy as a model case, where persuasive speech is present and where its emotional effects are obvious. Apart from the reference to Aristotle's *Poetics* and its famous definition of tragedy in terms of evoking pity and fear, one can also point to similar observations in Plato, e.g. *Phaedrus* 268c: ⟨tragedy contains⟩ *rhêseis oiktras kai tounantion au phoberas* "pasages evoking lament or again causing fear". And furthermore there is evidence of Greek audiences being moved to tears by theatrical performances, e.g. Plato *Philebus* 48a: *tas ge tragikas theôrêseis, hotan hama chairontes klaôsi* "the spectators of tragedy feel pleasure and weep at the same time". Thus it seems that also Gorgias recognized in the dramatic performances, and probably especially in the interactions between characters, a rhetorical situation (to use a modern term) similar to the one ususally associated with persuasion: the arena of the lawcourts and the political assembly. In doing so he conformed to the way in which at least some Athenians experienced these scenes. It seems that a passage in Plato's *Gorgias* (502d2–3) reflects a similar view. In his discussion with Callicles Socrates compares poetry to public address and then suggests: *ê ou rhêtoreuein dokousi soi hoi poiêtai en tois theatrois* "do poets not seem to you to engage in rhetoric in the theaters?". As a further illustration of the way in which this type of persuasive speech was perceived as rhetoric one can also point to Thucydides and his rendering of the Mytilene-debate, where Cleon criticizes the members of the assembly for behaving like spectators when speeches are to be heard (*theatai…tôn logôn*, Thuc. 3.38.4).

(3) A third point is concerned with the way in which Gorgias describes the power of speech. Its influence is irresistible and audiences will inevitably submit, even if the process of persuasion does not develop by force. Rather an audience will succumb to that power willingly, having been brought under a kind of spell. In this Gorgias is a representative of the tradition already present in Homer, where the persuasive

force of words is closely linked to the beautiful form in which they are presented (see e.g. *Od.* 11, 367–368; 8, 170). Also the proemium of Hesiod's *Theogony* can serve as an example: the Muses inspire the poet and the judge, who thanks to the sweetness of their words (*glukerên*, 83) are successful in appeasing opposing parties, talking them over (*malakoisi paraiphamenoi epeessi*, 90) and changing their mind (*metatropa*, 89). This passage can be taken as materially expressing the very notion of later Gorgianic *apatê*.

Besides aesthetic charm another aspect of the power of speech has its early expression in epic. In bringing about the unvoluntary alteration in thinking rhetoric operates thanks to a kind of magic. Skillful speeches can bewitch human beings, and of this capacity there are many examples in Homer, the greatest verbal magicians being, of course, the Sirens who "enchant" (*thelgousin*, *Od.* 12, 41) not only with their music but also with their seductive, promising words (192–193).[12] Also Odysseus, a mortal man, can have that enthralling effect on his audience (*Od.* 11, 334).

It is relevant to note that already in Homer and, after him, in many instances the enchanting power of rhetoric, also as it is represented by the goddess Peitho, is connected with the power of love. One of the *thelktêria* or charms in the brassière of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, is *oaristus parphasis*, the capacity of gently talking the partner's head off. This capacity love has, to "take over", is expressed many times[13] and receives ambivalent qualifications. Love's power cannot be resisted and although the experience of love has its positive sides, the take-over will more often than not result in a deterioration of the person affected. At most, being in love is a mixed blessing, in the words of Sappho *glukupikron* "bittersweet".

The magical and enchanting aspect of persuasive speech, both in the aesthetic and the psychological sense, was highly relevant to Gorgias. It seems to me that the decision to formulate his doctrine of *apatê* in an *encomium* on Helen, the most beautiful of women and the embodiment of seduction and desire, was a very conscious one. Even though the keyword *apatê* itself seems to be borrowed from Parmenides in a conscious polemic with his epistemology, it also belongs to the verbal domain of *eros*. In Sophocles' *Antigone* we encounter the phrase *apata kouphonoôn erôtôn* "the deceit of blithe and careless desires", which refers to the

[12] Cf. De Romilly (1973) 156–157.
[13] Carson (1986) 48–49, 148ff.

cheating of men by desires. Thus *apatê* also carries a connotation of seduction[14] , and therefore the argument drawn from its power is all the more appropriately exemplified in an apology of Helen.

6. *Conclusion*

With regard to its content, fragment 23 of Gorgias on tragedy fits well in his overall thought on the persuasive use of language, especially as it is set forth in his *Helen*. It can be accepted as authentic and be interpreted as a serious attempt by Gorgias to apply his doctrine of epistemological *apatê* to the problem of dramatic illusion. In the way Plutarch introduces and evaluates Gorgias in his discussion of the problem of exposing young students on their way to education in philosophy to the dangerous charms of deceitful poetry, he reflects the relevance of the Gorgianic notion to his argument. On the basis of this it can be concluded that Plutarch proves to be a reliable and faithful "reporter" of the fragment under consideration.

[14] On rhetoric as "seduction" in Plato, see Kelley (1979).

PART FOUR

PLUTARCH'S STATESMAN: HIS INFLUENCE AND AFTERMATH

PLUTARCH AND APULEIUS

Vincent Hunink

What has the venerable Greek moralist Plutarch got to do with a Roman "Second Sophist" such as Apuleius, who seems to be so much unlike him?

First, let me give some elementary data concerning Apuleius.[1] This Roman author was born in Madauros (North Africa) and lived from about 125 until, as is commonly assumed, about 180.[2] In his own days, Apuleius was probably best known for his rhetorical achievements as a public speaker. His extant *Apology*, the only Roman judicial speech after Cicero to survive, and his *Florida*, a collection of epideictic fragments bear witness to his activities in this field.[3] There is a third rhetorical work, *De Deo Socratis* (*DDS*), to which I will return shortly. Apuleius himself would probably have liked to be remembered first of all as a *philosophus Platonicus*,[4] a philosopher of the school, the *secta*, of Plato. In this respect, he belongs to what is now generally called "middle-Platonism." His philosophical works include the aforesaid speech *De Deo Socratis*, and a Latin translation of the pseudo-aristotelian *Peri kosmou*, aptly called *De mundo*.[5] Nowadays, Apuleius is best known, and even loved, for his most voluminous work, the *Metamorphoses* or *"Asinus Aureus"*, the famous novel on Lucius of Corinth, the man who was changed into an ass, and after various adventures turned man again and became a priest of Isis in Rome.[6]

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[1] From the vast amount of modern scholarship on Apuleius, some recent introductory books may be mentioned here. Cf. Schlam (1992), Sandy (1997); Harrison (2000).

[2] Many details concerning Apuleius' biography remain vague. Only his date of birth is relatively certain, since it can be deduced from indications in his work. The date of his death depends on the date one assumes for Apuleius' novel *Metamorphoses*, which is a hotly debated issue; see Hunink (2002).

[3] The latest editions are Hunink (1997) and (2001). For a new English translation with introduction and notes, see Harrison a.o. (2001).

[4] For the term, applied to himself, see *Apol.* 10.6: *Platonico philosopho*; cf. also e.g. *Apol.* 41.7: *Platone meo*; *Flor.* 15.26: *noster Plato*.

[5] For a broader survey of Apuleius' extant works and fragments, see Harrison (2000) 10–38.

[6] The standard Latin text is by R. Helm in the Biblioheca Teubneriana. For most of the eleven books, annotated editions are available in the well-known series *Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius*. Several integral translations in English are available; the most

Influences from Plutarch on Apuleius?

In this survey there are one or two elements that may associate Apuleius with Plutarch, but these may not seem very many. Nonetheless, on closer scrutiny, scholars have found a number of points which seem common to both authors. The most relevant contribution here is that of P.G. Walsh in an important, short article published in 1981 (Walsh 1981). Walsh's thesis is that Apuleius and Plutarch share "a set of religious, philosophical and moral preconceptions which are articulated in the *Metamorphoses*" (Walsh [1981] 30). He distinguishes six points: (1) the reconciliation of Platonist philosophy and Isiac religion; (2) the *curiositas* motif "a proper understanding of the allegorical message of the tale of Cupid and Psyche's *De curiositate*" (Walsh [1981] 30); (3) the insights offered by Plutarch's views on demons; (4) attitudes towards fidelity and harmony in family-life; (5) the condemnation of religious indifference and superstition (*De superstitione*); (6) the importance of the *Erôtikos* for "a proper understanding of the allegorical message of the tale of Cupid and Psyche".

Walsh's points seem an attractive set of corresponding interests, but it may be seriously doubted whether we can assume specific Plutarchan influences on Apuleius. For instance, the *curiositas* (*periergia*) motif[7] is widespread in narrative since the earliest days. Even if it is true that it played a role in middle-Platonic discourse, this does not imply that Apuleius was "inspired" by a specific treatise of Plutarch. Likewise, Apuleius' pictures of unfaithful or, by contrast, loyal wives really do not need to have been derived from Plutarchan works. Rather, they may have been derived from common notions in satire, Greek novel, comedy, and extra-literary "real life".

Similar points may be raised against Walsh' arguments concerning Isis. Although there are some interesting links with Plutarch, who defends the notion that Isiac religion is compatible with a Platonist vision of the world, it is surely exaggerated to state, as Walsh does, that "it seems beyond doubt that Plutarch's *De Iside* inspired Apuleius' conversion of the comic-ass story into an apologia for the Isiac mystery-cult." Why do we need to refer to Plutarch, rather than to Roman

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recent one is Kenney (1998).

[7] Cf. the sensible survey of the motif in the *Met.* by Schlam (1992) 48–57; further Hijmans (1995). The motif of curiosity may even have played a role in Apuleius' Greek model, a lost novel called *Metamorphoseis*.

everyday life, in which the cult of Isis had become very popular? Surely, Apuleius can easily have come into contact with Isis during his stay in Rome and Ostia.[8]

As to the allegorical interpretation of Cupid and Psyche, it suffices to say that this is still a hotly debated issue among Apuleian scholars. Walsh readily takes sides with the proponents of such a reading (notably Merkelbach), but much more is to be said on this topic. The allegorical reading of Cupid and Psyche is by no means the only possible interpretation of the tale.[9]

Next, I will concentrate on a point that does not concern Apuleius' novel: the demonology of Plutarch and Apuleius. This element seems to allow for a much less general comparison between both authors, because they have both written explicitly on the same subject: "What was the *daimonion* of Socrates like?", in works that even bear the same title: *Peri tou Sokratous daimoniou* (De genio Socratis)[10] and *De deo Socratis*[11] respectively.

Demons

Plutarch's dialogue *Peri tou Sokratous daimoniou* (De genio Socratis) is a fairly complex work, probably written at about 95 A.D.[12] As Aristoula Georgiadou has stated in a recent article, it is "the meeting point of his various skills as historian, philosopher, storyteller and dramatist."[13] Or in the words of Philip Hardie: "a mixture of philosophical and political thriller that continues to intrigue and puzzle Plutarchans."[14] The

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[8] Cf. also Apuleius' famous, self-professed wide interest in religion in *Apol.* 55.8–9.

[9] The team of scholars, who are now editing the two volumes of the *Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius* dealing with the tale, will argue that a strictly allegorical reading is not the best way to approach the text. The tale invites the reader on many points to take a Platonic and "spiritual" look on the narrative, but it does so as part of a wider literary play at many other levels.

[10] For Plutarch's treatise, the most convenient edition is that by Philip de Lacy and Benedict Einarson in the Loeb series (volume 7, p.361–509). See also Plutarque, *Oeuvres morales* tome VIII, texte établi et traduit par Jean Hani (Paris 1980) 37–129.

[11] The standard editions are: Moreschini (1991) and Beaujeu (1973). For a recent English translation with notes, see S.J. Harrison, in: Harrison a.o. (2001) 185–216. An important German translation with notes is Bingenheimer (1993).

[12] For literature and further discussion concerning the date of composition, see: Georgiadou (1996) esp. 116 n. 13.

[13] Georgiadou (1996) 117.

[14] Hardie (1996) 123.

dialogue is mainly concerned with historical events in Plutarch's native Boeotia, the liberation in 379 B.C. of Thebes from Spartan domination by Epameinondas (a historical character much admired by Plutarch).

Between the parts of the dialogue dealing with *praxeis*, are some passages dealing with *logoi*, philosophical discussions on Socrates' daimonion, that take place in the house of Simmias. The exact relationship between these parts of Plutarch's dialogue is, to put it mildly, not very clear and has accordingly given rise to numerous, widely diverging interpretations. For example, Plutarch's aim has been seen as a "synthesis" of these two elements, with Socrates functioning more or less as a model for Epameinondas,[15] or by contrast as an "antithesis" suggesting a systematic contrast between distinguished thinkers and the common people.[16] Others have highlighted special themes in the dialogue, such as the role of time.[17]

It is not my concern here to add to the discussion on the structure of Plutarch's treatise, but only to compare the sections dealing with Socrates' *daimonion* (579F f.; 588B f.) with Apuleius' account of the subject in *De deo Socratis*. A reading of both texts does not produce very much that meets the eye as a clear parallel between the Greek and the Latin author.

For one thing, both texts are clearly very different in nature. On the one hand we have the "political-historical-philosophical-novelistic" dialogue by Plutarch, on the other there is the popular-philosophical epideictic speech by Apuleius. Plutarch's message, whatever it precisely is, seems to be accessible to a very small group of intellectual readers, whereas Apuleius addresses a fairly large audience,[18] and accordingly conveys a fairly easily understandable morale: everyone should cultivate his or her demon and try to lead a good life. I briefly add that Apuleius' speech is distinctively Roman in colour, especially through its use of Roman names and examples. Inevitably, one can hardly expect any influence of Plutarch here.[19]

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[15] Thus e.g. Georgiadou (1996).

[16] Babut (1984) 60.

[17] Brenk (1996). Further literature on the dialogue and its purpose may be found Brenk (1998), p.30 n. 6.

[18] There are good reasons to believe that Apuleius delivered the speech, as several of his *Florida*, in a Roman theatre, possibily in Carthage; cf. notably *Flor.* 5; 9 and 18.

[19] Meanwhile, it is worth noting that Apuleius really tries to be as much non-Greek here as he can: if we detect any Greek influences at all, it is decidedly not what the author wishes us to pay attention to.

But even if we leave aside those generic differences and only concentrate on the demonological content, it is the differences rather than the general parallels that meet the eye. In Plutarch's account, the first part of the Boeotians' discussion on the *daimonion* is dominated by the theory that Socrates merely observed common signs, such as occasional sneezes (the "*ptarmós*"-element). The theory is immediately refuted, but it is at least taken seriously. In *De deo Socratis* it does not earn more than one or two casual, scornful remarks, in which the typical *ptarmós* element is not even mentioned.[20]

As to the more central theme of the various types of demons, Apuleius distinguishes three basic categories (every human soul; demons that have become free of bodies; demons that never came into contact with bodies), much as Plutarch's protagonists seem to do, but the subdivision is different: the lowest Apuleian class does not correspond to the one in Plutarch's dialogue, and there seems to be nothing negative about it, as for instance in the myth of Timarchus which is told in Plutarch's text. The highest category in Apuleius includes *Somnus* and *Amor*, but here we do not find a reference to a specific connection with the divine philosophers such as Socrates, as was suggested by Plutarch. In fact, Apuleius even suggests that the demon that appeared visually to Socrates can be compared to Minerva appearing to Achilles,[21] and one may ask whether this Minerva belongs to the highest category of demons at all (Apuleius is not clear on this issue).

To mention one final, but significant point: according to Plato[22] Socrates' sign always held him back from doing something, but never urged him forward. The point is duly made by Apuleius, as we have seen, but in *De genio Socratis* we also see the suggestion (made by Polymnis) that Socrates was both deterred *and* prompted (*kôlúon ê keleûon*).[23] It has been observed that in another work, Plutarch himself too refers

[20] "… just in case anyone should think that he was in the habit of taking omens from ordinary conversation". "Add further, if he was in the habit of merely observing omens, he would surely have sometimes also experienced some encouragement to positive action from them. We see this happen in practice to many, who feel excessive reverence for omens and are directed not by their own heart but by anothers words, and creep through alleyways gathering their wisdom from the chance utterances of others" (*De deo Socr.* 19) Translation S.J. Harrison in Harrison a.o. (2001) 211.

[21] "This sign may have been a visual form of the *demon* itself, which only Socrates could see, just as with Homer's Achilles and Minerva." *De deo Socr.* 20, translation S.J. Harrison, in Harrison a.o. (2001) 212.

[22] *Apol.* 31D.

[23] *Gen.Soc.* 581B.

to a "divine and spiritual cause which guided or instructed Socrates to examine others",[24] in other words: something that prompted him to do something. According to Hershbell, this would be consistent not so much with Plato as with Xenophon's reports, in which Socrates' inner voice always tells him what he should or should not do.[25] So Plutarch's account may very well have been influenced by Xenophon,[26] unlike that of Apuleius.

Demonology and Socrates' *daemonion* were simply "in the air", as is proved by [e.g.] two Greek discourses on Socrates' *daemonion* by Maximus of Tyre, more or less a contemporary of Apuleius.[27]

Apart from general correspondences, due to the general state of philosophy (i.c. middle Platonic demonology as such),[28] or the fact that Socrates plays a surprisingly marginal role in both Plutarch's and Apuleius' works that bear his name, there is, in the end, little reason to assume a special influence of Plutarch on Apuleius here, however likely it might seem.[29] And if Apuleius did not follow Plutarch on this subject, where else would he? In my view, the positive survey of Plutarchan influences on Apuleius by Walsh does not stand the test of the texts. It remains tempting to assume such an influence, but we just do not have any solid proof.[30]

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[24] *Quaest.Plat.* 999E.

[25] Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.12; 1.1.4.; *Apol.* 12–13; see further Hershbell (1989) 379.

[26] There would be a certain irony here, for Xenophon was known for his pro-Spartan attitude. He would then, in a way, represent the side of the Spartan oppressors in the account of the liberation of Thebes in 379 B.C., of which Plutarch was evidently proud. After Epameinondas defeated the Spartans at Leuktra in 371 B.C., Xenophon was forced to abandon his Spartan estate near Olympia.

[27] See Trapp (1997) esp. p.67–83. In his oration nr. 8, Maximus argues at some length that Socrates was actually worthy of such a demon, and that demons really exist, and have different functions. Oration 9 concentrates on the crucial point of their intermediate nature: they partake of the divine through their immortality, and of human nature through their passions.

[28] For a convenient list of correspondences between the demonological accounts in Apuleius and Plutarch (*De def. orac.*, *De Is. Et Os.* and *De gen. Soc.*), see Moreschini (1978) 25–26.

[29] Regen (1971) 19–20 denies influence of Plutarch on Apuleius, if only for lack of a coherent system of demonology in Plutarch. Cf. also Bingenheimer (1993) 55: "Er [sc. Plutarch] war der Polyhistor der zeitgenössischen Dämonologie—Apuleius war ihr Dogmatiker".

[30] Cf. Brenk (1986) notably 2135: "In general it is fair to say that there is a world of difference betweren this treatise and Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*". See further: Moreschini (1989) esp. 280 "È da escludere, naturalmente, una dipendenza di Apuleio da Plutarco (tale rapporto viene spesso posto, ma rimane quasi sempre un fantasma)".

Plutarch's relative

There is one point, however, for which we do have such proof: the name of Plutarch was known to Apuleius and it occurs in his works. But for this we must turn from his philosophical works to his famous novel *Metamorphoses*.

Here we encounter the name of Plutarch almost right from the start. After the opening paragraph, the much discussed "prologue",[31] the first paragraph of the actual narrative opens as follows:

> "I was travelling to Thessaly, where the ancestry of my mother's family brings us fame in the persons of the renowned Plutarch and later his nephew, the philosopher Sextus (*a Plutarcho illo incluto ac mox Sexto philosopho nepote eius*). Thessaly, I say, is where I was heading on business." (*Met.* 1.2)[32]

One may still have doubts about who exactly had been speaking in the prologue,[33] but here we unmistakably see the protagonist of the story, Lucius of Corinth, who presents himself as a relative by his mother's side of Plutarch and Sextus.

At the beginning of book 2, Plutarch is named once more, in an address to Lucius by his aunt Byrrhena:

> "Lucius, I raised you with these very hands of mine; naturally, since not only am I a close relative of your mother, but I was even reared with her. We were both descendants of Plutarch's family, we were suckled together by the same wetnurse, and we grew up together in the close bond of sisterhood." (*Met.* 2.3)[34]

This reference to Plutarch almost certainly did not occur in Apuleius' Greek model,[35] and so requires some comment and explanation.

In her commentary on the latter passage, Danielle van Mal-Maeder[36] first describes what seems now to be the commonly accepted view, namely that Apuleius inserted the reference to Lucius as a tribute to Plutarch in order to point to his own spiritual ascendance and the philosophical orientation of his novel.

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[31] Cf. recently: Kahane/Laird (2001).

[32] Translation: Hanson (1989) I, 5.

[33] In the twenty-four discussions in the volume mentioned in the previous note, a majority of contributors supports the view that it is Lucius who is speaking there.

[34] Translation: Hanson (1989) I, 63.

[35] It is absent from the Greek *onos* tale, and we may safely assume that it was also absent in the more extensive text that served as Apuleius' model.

[36] Van Mal-Maeder (1998) esp. 91–92.

There are two main objections to this theory: first, it confuses, as so often, the biographical person Apuleius and his protagonist Lucius. More seriously, it does not do justice to the humour of the novel, notably the sharp contrast between the low pitched and humiliating adventures of Lucius, who is a silly and quite un-philosophical creature for most of the novel, and the lofty reputation of the respected philosopher Plutarch. One may wonder: what would Plutarch have thought about these scandalous adventures?

Van Mal-Maeder also mentions some interesting minor theories: (1) The name Plutarch in the opening book alludes to Isis in the final book 11. (2) The reference only serves to sharpen the suggestion of realism in the novel, since a figure such as Lucius might in reality well have been related to a famous Greek family. This theory (by Mason) is accepted by Van Mal-Maeder herself and others.

The first of these theories may be a bit too far-fetched to be convincing, but the latter finds some support in the fact that the text of the novel does not mention names of authors and philosphers, except for some names from recent history.

This consideration brings me to a final suggestion which I have not yet come across in the various comments on the passages.

In the text of this richly intertextual novel, we meet surprisingly few names of ancient authors: Vergil, Plato, Cicero, Sophocles, Plautus, to mention some of Apuleius' favourites, are all left entirely unmentioned. The text of the *Met.* quite consistently *alludes* to such names, rather than that it explicitly names them. The exceptions here are Homer (once in 10.30) and Pythagoras (once in 11.1).

The many names we do see, are either "realistic" (Sulla, Caesar), or, in the great majority of cases, fictitious. A special characteristic of names in the novel, which has already been observed by many scholars, is that they are often "speaking names",[37] names that show off their etymological roots. We meet *Lucius* and *Photis* ("light" in Latin en Greek), women like *Pamphile*, *Byrrhena*,[38] men like *Barbarus*, *Myrmex*, *Philesitherus*, *Thelyphron*, *Tlepolemus*, and *Philebus*, to say nothing of the robber *Haemus* ("Bloody"). The speaking names sometimes obtain an ironic colour, but this is not the rule.

So what if we go one step further and assume that *Plutarchus*, mentioned twice as Lucius' ancestor, can be taken as a speaking name too?

[37] Cf. Hijmans (1978).

[38] Possibly to be connected with Gr. *búrsa* "Frau Leder"; cf. Hijmans (1978) 110.

Lucius and his aunt Byrrhena[39] would then be able to boast about the ancestry of a famous philosopher who "Ruled by riches" or was simply "Rich and mighty". Surely, this is the impression that Lucius himself wishes to give: he presents himself as a man from a good family and a relatively high social class.[40] Apparently, he is known as such by others as well: one may observe the highly polite way in which he is addressed by a magistrate later in the novel.[41]

The name Plutarch was, of course, a famous name too, and Apuleius surely relished this element as well. The "real Plutarch" brought in at least the associations of a Greek background, which seems more or less suitable for a tale set in Thessaly,[42] and the name also carried the associations of philosophy[43] and sound learning, which another nice point for this novel. But here again, one cannot help contrasting the world of the novel with the wisdom of Plutarch: Thessaly is the land of witchcraft, and philosophy is neglected or scorned by most characters, including Lucius. There is at least some irony here.

The irony may even go somewhat further still. In the novel, Lucius is characterized by various bad habits, notably his curiosity (*curiositas*), a dominant motif in the structure of the tale. He himself calls this

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[39] Hijmans (1978) 110 observes that Plutarch disapproved of whipping, but advised that *unbridled* indulgence in one's pleasures was inadvisable. He acutely adds that Lucius first has to admit that he does not know his aunt. All this would add to the significance of her name *Byrrhena*.—Curiously, Hijmans himself nowhere considers the possibility that Plutarch, too, might be used as a name with an added significance.

[40] Inevitably, this also raises questions as to his journey "for business matters" (*Met.* 1.2). Had he gradually descended to a lower rung on the social ladder, so that he was forced to earn his money abroad?

[41] "We are not unaware, master Lucius, of either your high position or your family's origins. Indeed the high repute of your famous family embraces the entire province." (3.11) Translation: Hanson (1989) I, 147.

[42] It may be noted, meanwhile, that Plutarch did not come from Thessaly but from Boeotia. To Apuleius and his protagonist Lucius, it may have been "Greek" enough to make the point. However, it could also be taken as a teasing pun at the expense of Plutarch, who was so proud of his Boeotian origin.

[43] It is curious that in *Met.* 1.2 Plutarchus is called "that famous Plutarch", whereas his nephew Sextus (a teacher of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius) is given the epithet "the philosopher". It might even be taken as a further teasing element that the title "philosopher", of which Apuleius himself was so proud, seems to be denied to the venerable Plutarch. I owe this point to a discussion with André Lardinois.

Curiously, some translators of Apuleius seem to deliberately restore the honour of Plutarch, by moving the epithet "philosopher" to his name. Thus e.g. "…the prominence lent to it by the famous philosopher Plutarch, and later by his nephew Sextus."; Walsh (1984) 1. Similarly, Kenney renders "the distinguished philosopher Plutarch and his nephew Sextus"; Kenney (1998) 7.

curiosity *familiaris*, *ingenita* and even *genuina*.[44] But if this characteristic of Lucius is innate, and the reader starts thinking about possible relatives from whom Lucius may have inherited the characteristic, who else but *Plutarchus ille inclutus* would come to mind? So the Greek writer, who was so much opposed to curiosity himself, would ironically come to be associated with this very vice.

One may wonder whether Apuleius would not feel any scruples to use the name of a distinguished philosopher in such a jocular, ironic way. I guess he would not. For, two pages after we have seen the name Plutarch appear in the novel, we meet a poor beggar, who turns out to be one of the protagonists of the horror stories in book 1. Surprisingly, his name is *Socrates* (*Met.* 1.6 and further).

To be sure, such jocular use of famous names does not necessarily imply any lack of respect. For how could the Platonist Apuleius not respect Socrates, the very model of virtue in his treatise *De deo Socratis*? Analogously, there is no reason to assume that the ironical references to "Plutarch" imply serious criticism or enmity towards Plutarch. The references are rather intended as teasing puns to be appreciated by the learned reader.

To sum up: the mention of Plutarch in the *Met.*, the only real proof of familiarity of Apuleius with Plutarch, may be much less serious than is often assumed. It is, for one thing, yet another "speaking name" which functions in the text in this new, fictional sense. Secondly, it is a famous philosopher's name jokingly drawn into a world of magic, deceit, gluttony, sex, and crime. Nothing of this is intended as serious criticism against Plutarch, anymore than Socrates is attacked by the use of his name in *Met.* 1. Apuleius is just playing one of his numerous literary and intertextual games. In the context of the Roman novel, much as in Roman satire or Greek comedy, rather more seems to be permitted than some readers might think appropriate.

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[44] Cf. *Met.* 3.14.1; 9.12.2; 9.13.3; 9.15.3. I owe the references to Wytse Keulen.

LUCIUS' KINSHIP DIPLOMACY: PLUTARCHAN REFLECTIONS IN AN APULEIAN CHARACTER

W.H. Keulen

At the outset of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, after the programmatic statement of the prologue, Lucius, the hero of the novel, who is also the main narrator, boasts descent from the famous philosopher Plutarch, and his nephew, the philosopher Sextus, linking them falsely to the destination of his travels, Thessaly (1.2.1; cf. 2.3.2):

> 1.2.1: *Thessaliam—nam et illic originis maternae nostrae fundamenta a Plutarcho illo inclito ac mox Sexto philosopho nepote eius prodita gloria⟨m⟩ nobis faciunt—eam Thessaliam ex negotio petebam.* To Thessaly—for there too are the foundations of my ancestry on my mother's side, which, established by the famous Plutarch and next by his descendant, the philosopher Sextus, bring me glory—to this Thessaly I was headed, in pursuance of my business.[1]

Lucius' connection with Plutarch is meaningful on more than one level. At one level, the narrator uses his "kinship diplomacy" to present himself as a distinguished intellectual, participating in the excellent cultural tradition founded by Plutarch.[2] As scholars have observed, this was an actual strategy of intellectuals of Apuleius' time.[3] Parallel to the Apuleian allusion to Plutarch in this prominent passage, Plutarch's standing in Antonine culture may also be demonstrated by Gellius' interest in him as a source of information and a teacher of morality; notably, Plutarch's name is the first word of the opening chapter of Gellius' *Attic Nights*.[4]

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[1] Translations of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* are my own unless stated otherwise.

[2] For Lucius' characterisation as a man of culture in the *Metamorphoses* see Mason (1983); Harrison (2000) 216f.; Keulen (2003c). For the term "kinship diplomacy" cf. Jones (1999).

[3] Descent from Plutarch was something to boast of in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. (see Jones [1971] 11f.; Mason [1983] 138). In IG 2^2, 3814 the 3rd century sophist Nikagoras, who was professor of rhetoric in Athens and Sacred Herald at Eleusis called himself a "Πλουτάρχου καὶ Σέξτου φιλοσόφων ἔκγονος"—the parallel is especially striking given Lucius' double function as priest of Isis and pleader in Rome in the eleventh book of the *Metamorphoses*.

[4] See Holford-Strevens (1988) 209. As he was for Gellius, and as he would be for

At a different level, Lucius' credentials may suggest a satirical portrayal of a pseudo-intellectual, and this suggestion is confirmed by Lucius' performance in the following chapters. Since Plutarch did not come from Thessaly ("witch-country") but from Boeotian Chaironeia, Lucius' credentials are overtly fictional, and expose him as an inventor of fiction. That Lucius inherited a great deal from his famous ancestor, or rather, from his writings, becomes apparent not only through the cultural baggage he displays, while posing as a sophisticated intellectual, but also, and perhaps even more interestingly, through his characterisation. Paradoxically, Lucius appears to suffer the very psychological and moral ailments of which Plutarch in his ethical writings wants to cure his readers, like curiosity (πολυπραγμοσύνη), boorish gluttony, compliancy (δυσωπία), and superstition (δεισιδαιμονία). The present paper explores Apuleius' indebtedness to Plutarch's moral satire in bringing out the immoral character of his novel's hero.

Scholars have struggled with the fact that Apuleius connects his low-life hero, who will turn into an ass because of his unholy curiosity for magic, with a famous philosopher belonging to his own philosophical school.[5] We see, however, as a general pattern in the *Metamorphoses* that the author lends traits and concerns of his own to his hero, who notably speaks in the first person, but nevertheless makes him the object of his satire. In my view, the close identification of the narrator Lucius, who also poses as the writer of this text, with the concrete author Apuleius, a much-discussed theme in Apuleian studies, is an essential part of the humour of the text.[6] In discussions of the role of Plutarch in the *Metamorphoses*, I think too much emphasis has been laid on Apuleius being a *philosophus Platonicus*. In my opinion, we should not treat this text in the first place as a vehicle for the ideas of a Platonic philosopher, but as a work of comic fiction, bearing many traits of Roman Satire, and written in the same tradition as the only earlier—at least partly—surviving work of Latin prose fiction, the *Satyrica* of Petronius.

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centuries afterwards (see Russell [1972], especially 6f.; 143f.; Holford-Strevens [1997] 104f.), Plutarch must have been an authority in his own right for Apuleius.

[5] See Van Mal-Maeder (2001) 83f. on 2.3.2 *nam et familia Plutarchi ambae prognatae sumus* for a survey of the many different views on this issue; see also Hunink in the present volume.

[6] On the deliberate association between Lucius and the author Apuleius in the *Metamorphoses* (cf. 11.27.9 *Madaurensem*) see Van der Paardt (1981); Penwill (1990) 15f.; on various parallels between Lucius and Apuleius see Junghanns (1932) 14; Harrison (2000) 217f. (with refs.).

Various characters that appear in Apuleius' novel, including Lucius himself, seem to be emblematic of some corrupt form of behaviour, such as curiosity, scandal mongering, boorishness, gluttony, or superstition. As it appears, Apuleius follows Roman Satire in the use of stock characters such as we know them from Theophrastus' *Characters* and from Plutarch's *Moralia* for the depiction of personality types which are limited in ethical value and potentially dangerous to the community.[7] We know that Romans emphasised the didactic use of the form of the Character, which they called *ethologia* or *characterismos*, both for moralising ends and for delineating human characters.[8] These types can often be compared with characters from the comic stage.[9]

Since we are talking about stock characters, with which Romans in Apuleius' time could be familiar in more than one way, such as through their rhetorical education, or their visits to the theatre, or perhaps even real life experience, it seems problematic to think of Plutarch's writings as an exclusive literary paradigm for the Apuleian characters. However, given the important role of Plutarch in Roman *paideia* of the second century A.D., a role to which—as we have observed above—Gellius, too, testifies, it seems conceivable that the Plutarchan character sketches of immoral types have influenced Apuleius in his depiction of the dubious personalities that feature in his story.

How the Plutarchan background functions to add to the satire in Lucius' characterisation may especially be highlighted by Apuleius' affinity with the form of the intellectual symposium, or "*quaestiones convivales*", an affinity he shares with Gellius.[10] In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*,

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[7] On the influence of the Theophrastan *Characters* on Roman Satire see e.g. Witke (1970) 34, 111; Coffey (1976) 57f.

[8] Cf. Cicero, *De oratore* 3, 205: *morum ac uitae imitatio uel in personis uel sine illis, magnum quoddam orationis et aptum ad animos conciliandos uel maxime, saepe autem etiam ad commouendos*; *Orator* 138: *ut hominum sermones moresque describat*. Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 95.65; Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* 1.9.3.

[9] For the affinities between Theophrastus' character sketches and types from comedy and satire see the Introduction in the Loeb edition of Theophrastus' *Characters*, Rusten, *et al.* (1993) 15–17, with further references. The Plutarchan Superstitious Man (δεισιδαίμων) possibly resembled types from the comic stage; see Kindstrand (1976) 232–235 and cf. Menander, *frg*. 631.4–5 K-A (on the cult of Atargatis). On Plutarch's indebtedness to comedy (especially Menander) and the works of Theophrastus (ethical writings, *Characters*), see Russell (1993), Introduction, xx.

[10] On Gellius' familiarity with Plutarch's *Quaestiones Convivales* ("Table Queries") and his use of the form of the "erudite symposium" as a dramatic setting for several scenes in his miscellany *Attic Nights* see Beall (1999) 58f. On Plutarch's use of the symposium as a literary genre see Mossman (1997) 119–127.

narrative and storytelling are often implicitly or explicitly presented as a form of dinner entertainment; especially in the first book, we see a clear use of the literary conventions of the symposium and the Socratic dialogue.[11] The symposium-like context of conversation and storytelling (*sermo*) evoked by the prologue seems to be continued by the *sermones* between the characters in the narrative.[12] The *sermones* during Lucius' journey to Thessaly, which we may call his "*Iter Thessalicum*", especially recall travel-*sermones* such as we know from Latin satire, the *Iter Brundisinum* of Horace (*Sermones* 1.5) and its model, the *Iter Siculum* of Lucilius (*Saturae* 3.97ff.).[13] Apart from the literary homage to the genre of Roman Satire, the Apuleian *sermones* may contain elements of contemporary satire. The form of the "*quaestiones convivales*" was not only a viable literary tradition, as it still provided vehicles for Plutarch and Athenaeus, but it also constituted a vital part of the literary society of Fronto and Gellius,[14] to which Apuleius too may have belonged.[15]

Apuleius seems to underpin important symposiastic themes of conviviality, friendship and good manners by emphasising the complete lack of them in the opening scene of the narrative in *Metamorphoses* Book 1. From the very beginning, when we hear the boisterous scorn of the sceptic (1.2.5), the conversation during the *Iter Thessalicum* seems to consist of verbal attack (cf. 1.3.2–3; 1.20.1). The absence of genuine affability and companionship in the interactions between the three travelling companions is very conspicuous, especially in comparison to the Greek abridged version of the ass-story, the *Onos*, where it is stated that the companions "shared the salt" (1.2), a proverbial phrase for living in close companionship.[16] By contrast, we do not see Lucius and the

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[11] This topic is treated in full detail in the second chapter ("Dubious storytellers at a degraded symposium") of the Introduction in Keulen (2003a) 25ff.

[12] Cf. 1.1.1: *at ego tibi sermone isto … uarias fabulas conseram*; 1.2.5: *ac dum ausculto, quid sermonis agitarent*; 1.2.6: *immo uero … impertite sermones*; 1.3.2: "*heus tu … qui sermonem ieceras priorem*"; 1.7.4: *iam adlubentia procliuis e[s]t sermonis et ioci*; 1.11.2: *sermones istos nostros*; 1.17.7: *in alium sermonem intentionem eius denuo deriuo*; 1.21.1: *is finis nobis et sermonis et itineris communis fuit*.

[13] The closure of the Apuleian "*Iter Thessalicum*" (1.21.1: *is finis nobis et sermonis et itineris communis fuit*) echoes the closing verse of the Horatian *Iter Brundisinum* (*Sermones* 1.5.104: *Brundisium longae finis chartaeque uiaeque est*). On the influence of the Socratic dialogue and the symposium on the structure and the contents of Lucilius' *saturae* see Coffey (1976) 57f.

[14] See Champlin (1980) 48f. See also above, n. 4 and n. 10.

[15] On the possibility that Gellius and Apuleius were acquainted see Holford-Strevens (1988) 16f.; Sandy (1993).

[16] Cf. *Onos* 1.2 ἁλῶν ἐκοινωνοῦμεν (see Van Thiel [1972] II, 4 with further references;

two travelling companions bound by any ties of hospitality, nor do they share any meal. The conduct of the Apuleian characters seems a blatant contradiction of a central point in the Roman system of values, namely that sharing is the essence of conviviality, an idea reflected in the supposed etymology of *cena* from Greek κοινωνία, "fellowship", which is reported by Plutarch in his *Quaestiones Convivales*.[17] Although Lucius wishes to share the conversation of his two travelling companions (1.2.6: *impertite sermones*), and offers to share lunch (1.4.6: *prandio participabo*), he will share these things only for calculated and purely utilitarian reasons. He is curious (1.2.5; see below) and wishes to be distracted by storytelling to make his travelling lighter (1.2.6; 1.20.6). His motivation is no genuine hospitality; his offer is nothing more than a business deal.

Lucius' willingness to share today's lunch (1.4.6) is ironically underplayed by his own anecdote about the competition for food during yesterday's dinner:

> 1.4.1: *ego denique uespera, dum polentae caseatae modico secus offulam grandiorem in conuiuas aemulus contruncare gestio,* … "Why I myself, yesterday evening, in competition with my table companions was eager to devour not much more than a largish chunk of barley-groats caked with cheese …"

Behaving thus, Lucius reveals his boorish eagerness, acting against the norms of true conviviality and companionship discussed by Plutarch in his *Quaestiones Convivales* (2.10.2, *Mor.* 644A). There, Hagias criticises Lamprias, who was in favour of dividing food and drink according to appetite and capacity. Hagias rejects this, arguing that true conviviality and companionship would perish by a boorish eagerness to obtain as much as possible from what is common to all.[18]

Plutarch's moral writings, then, including his *Table Queries*, seem to be an invaluable frame of reference to understand and judge both the

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LSJ s.v. ἅλς). Moreover, a secondary, metaphorical, meaning of ἅλες playing along there, viz. "fun" (LSJ s.v. ἅλς IV: cf. Latin *sales*) may suggests the picture of jovial comrades ("we had fun together").

[17] Plutarch, *Quaestiones Convivales* 8.6.5 (*Mor.* 726E–F); cf. S. M. Braund (1996) 304–307.

[18] Teodorsson (1989) 272 ad loc. compares *De tuenda sanitate* 20 (*Mor.* 133B), where Plutarch states that by their literary diversions men of letters should be able to control the "canine and bestial element in their appetites", τὸ κυνικὸν καὶ θηριῶδες τῶν ὀρέξεων. In Apuleius' time, the topic of gluttony is taken up by the satirising of pseudo-philosophers, who are portrayed in Socratic dialogues set in debased symposium situations; compare especially Lucian's *Symposium*. For Lucius' characterisation as a pseudo-philosopher see also Keulen (2003c).

symposiastic settings in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* and the immoral characters performing in those settings. As it appears, the moral ailments displayed by the Apuleian characters seem often to relate to their function as inventive storytellers. This applies particularly to the central character Lucius. Already in his first scene Lucius reveals traits of the Plutarchan busybody (the πολυπράγμων). Although Lucius is secretive about his true motives for travelling to Thessaly, the enigmatic expression *ex negotio* (1.2.1, quoted above) may indicate that he is impelled by the πολυπραγμοσύνη known from his ancestor's famous treatise, a notion for which Gellius (*Noctes Atticae* 11.16) coined the Latin term *negotiositas*. Perhaps we should explain by Lucius' glorious family background the fact that later on in his story he more than once calls his own *curiositas* "inborn".[19]

However, in this first scene, Lucius, appears as yet to flinch from calling a spade a spade, stating explicitly that he is *not* curious:

> 1.2.6: *Isto accepto*, sititor *alioquin* nouitatis, *"immo uero", inquam, "impertite sermones* non quidem curiosum, *sed qui uelim scire uel cuncta uel certe plurima."*
> When I caught this, being generally athirst for novelty, I say "no, on the contrary, please inform me about the topics of your conversation; for indeed I am not curious, but would like to know everything or at least most things."

This evasiveness may point to Lucius' obliviousness to his own faults, which Plutarch considers one of the characteristics displayed by the πολυπράγμων.[20] On the other hand, he immediately unmasks this false modesty by identifying himself as someone who thirsts for novelty (*sititor nouitatis*), and by saying that he "would like to know everything or at least most things". Thus, through the first quotation in direct speech of himself as a character in the story, Lucius presents us with a vivid self-portrayal, which allows us to form a picture of his personality, although we do not know anything about his external features.[21] Identifying him-

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[19] Cf. 3.14.1: *familiaris curiositatis*; 9.12.2: *familiari*; 9.13.3: *ingenita*; 9.15.3: *genuina*. On *curiositas* as a coinage that attempts to capture in Latin the meaning of the Greek terms περιεργία and πολυπραγμοσύνη, which are themselves sometimes treated as synonyms (e.g. Plutarch, *De curiositate* 2, *Mor*. 516A; 8, *Mor*. 519C) see De Filippo (1990) 479f.

[20] Cf. Plutarch, *De curiositate* 2 (*Mor*. 516A); see Cooper (1980) 457 with lit.

[21] In the *Florida* (2.1), Apuleius quotes an anecdote of Socrates saying to an attractive boy "If I am to see you, say something" (*ut te uideam … aliquid et loquere*). Portraying characters through their words, without describing their visual appearance, belongs to the genre of the Socratic dialogue; see Holford-Strevens (1997) 96. Later on in the *Metamorphoses*, we learn a bit more about Lucius' features (cf. 1.23.3; 2.2.7–8); see below, n. 36.

self as a *sititor nouitatis*, Lucius recalls imagery[22] from Plutarch's treatise on the very vice that keeps governing Lucius' behaviour throughout the *Metamorphoses*.

The numerous studies on Lucius' *curiositas* focus mainly on his unholy curiosity for magic, which eventually leads to his metamorphosis into an ass.[23] However, another important aspect of Lucius' *curiositas* is its close link with his central role as a storyteller and his passion for hearing and divulging various tales, which is reflected in the programmatic announcement in the prologue (1.1.1 *at ego tibi … uarias fabulas conseram*). This characteristic of Lucius seems to reflect a vice of curious people as depicted by Plutarch (*De curiositate* 9, *Mor.* 519C):

> ἃ γὰρ ἡδέως ἀκούουσιν ἡδέως λαλοῦσι, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων σπουδῇ συλλέγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐκφέρουσιν. For what the curious delight to hear they delight to tell, and what they zealously collect from others, they joyously reveal to everyone else.[24]

Lucius' underlying motive for his "*Iter Thessalicum*", then, turns out to be his search for novelty. Thessaly meets Lucius' curious expectations (cf. *Metamorphoses* 2.1), and the result of his "business-trip" is eventually the book we have in our hands. Gellius' Latin paraphrase of the Plutarchan definition of πολυπραγμοσύνη may shed light on Lucius' character and activities, interpreting it as a "haphazard, promiscuous and unnecessary planning and pursuit of such a multitude of things."[25] We may compare this definition with the many marvellous and various

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[22] Cf. *De curiositate* 2 (*Mor.* 516C): πλεύσας Ἀθήναζε διψῶν καὶ διακεκαυμένος ἠρύσατο τῆς πηγῆς (on Aristippus' "thirst" for Socratic philosophy). Apuleius uses *sitire* metaphorically with reference to philosophy in *De deo Socratis* 22 p. 172 *uerae beatitudinis … esurit et sitit.*

[23] See e.g. Walsh (1981) 24–26; Walsh (1988) 73–78; Schlam (1992) 49. Cf. Hijmans in Hijmans, *et al.* (1995) 362–379, Appendix III, Curiositas (on Lucius' *curiositas* see pp. 372–375). Recent additions to the extensive bibliography on *curiositas* are Tasinato (1994); Bös (1995).

[24] Translations from Plutarch's *Moralia* are from the Loeb edition (F.C. Babbitt). For a similar description cf. *De garrulitate* 12 (*Mor.* 508C). Lucius perhaps also resembles what Plutarch calls a φιλομύθος, one who loves what is novel and unusual aspects of stories: cf. *de audiendis poetis* 11 (*Mor.* 30D); Van der Stockt (1992) 125f. Cf. Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 2.6.5: *ex uoto diutino poteris fabulis miris explere pectus*, with Van Mal-Maeder (2001) 134f. ad loc.

[25] Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 11.16.8 (Plutarchus) *deterret nos … a* uaria promisca*que et non necessaria* rerum *cuiusquemodi* plurimarum *et cogitatione et petitione*. Cf. Plutarch, *De curiositate* 11 (*Mor.* 520F) ἐπὶ πᾶν θέαμα καὶ πᾶν ἄκουσμα τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἐκδρομὰς καὶ περιπλανήσεις.

experiences of Lucius that the seer Diophanes foretells as the results of this business-trip to Thessaly, which form, in a way, a synopsis of the novel (2.12.5):

> *mihi denique prouentum huius peregrinationis inquirenti* multa *respondit et oppido* mira *et satis* uaria: *nunc enim gloriam satis floridam, nunc historiam magnam et incredundam fabulam et libros me futurum.* When I asked him about the outcome of this trip of mine, he told me all sorts of different things, all equally marvellous: that I should win a brilliant reputation and become a legend, an incredible romance in several volumes.[26]

Lucius seems to take a particular pleasure in stories of a tragic nature in which characters are driven to ruin, of which Aristomenes' tale about Socrates is the first example, the story that Lucius eagerly enjoys during his *Iter Thessalicum*. This also characterises Lucius as a Plutarchan πολυπράγμων, who has a penchant for tragedy and whose "ears … attract the most evil stories" (*De curiositate* 6, *Mor.* 518B).[27] According to Plutarch (*De curiositate* 5, *Mor.* 517E–F), the πολυπράγμων takes pleasure in "deaths of men …, seductions of women, assaults of slaves, slanders of friends, compounding of poisons, envies, jealousies, shipwrecks of households…", which sounds like a list of ingredients of the narratives in the *Metamorphoses*.

Lucius shares this propensity with the character who narrates the first inset tale in the *Metamorphoses*, the cheese-monger Aristomenes. Like Lucius, Aristomenes turns out to be a curious collector of miraculous tales, with a liking for calamities and misfortunes as ingredients of his stories. Aristomenes' appeal to the "talk of the town" to back up the incredible story he is going to tell (1.5.2) reveals that he may not only be a cheese-monger but is also a rumour-monger like the Theophrastan λογοποιός (*Characters* 8). The trade of this character consists of inventing untrue reports and events (*Characters* 8.1), and if someone asks him whether he believes his own report, he will say that he does, because it is the unanimous talk of the town (8.6). His own contribution to these rumours, however, is considerable (8.9). The same may go for the merchant Aristomenes, whose busy travelling across Thessaly and visits to the market of Hypata may have involved other pursuits besides the cheese trade (*Metamorphoses* 1.5.3–4). Aristomenes'

[26] On this passage see Graverini (2001).

[27] Lucius' repeated emphasis on the ears of his audience (1.1.1: *aures … beniuolas … permulceam*; 9.14.1: *fabulam denique bonam … ad auris uestras adferre decreui*) and on his own ears (1.20.6: *non dorso illius, sed meis auribus peruecto*) may be inspired by Plutarch's emphasis on the ears of the πολυπράγμων in *De curiositate* 6 (*Mor.* 518A–B).

restless movements (cf. 1.5.3 *ultro citro discurrens*) seem to live up to the Theophrastan paradigm, who runs up to everyone with his news (*Characters* 8.9). Aristomenes may also reflect the Plutarchan πολυπράγμων, who is always looking for news at the market place, hoping to find a "good crop of calamities, a good haul of difficulties, novelties, and changes" (*De curiositate* 7, *Mor.* 519A–B).

As I have argued in detail elsewhere, Lucius is also paralleled by the main character in Aristomenes' story, with the name Socrates.[28] This Socrates appears to be a devious and cunning kind of storyteller, whose characterisation, outward appearance, and histrionics seem clearly inspired by the Plutarchan portrayal of the Superstitious Man, the δεισιδαίμων.[29] In the light of his Plutarchan model, we see how Socrates as narrator of his own misfortunes assumes the shape of a δεισιδαίμων, who confesses his ills in public.[30] As such, Socrates is a programmatic figure who parallels other notoriously superstitious figures in the *Metamorphoses*, such as the mendicant priests of the Dea Syria, whose frenzied rites are explicitly condemned by the narrator Lucius in a moralising statement not unworthy of his so-called ancestor Plutarch.[31] However, being a programmatic figure, Socrates also prefigures the superstitious frenzy with which Lucius himself succumbs to Isis in the 11th book.[32]

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[28] In Keulen (2003b).

[29] For the Apuleian Socrates' resemblance to the Plutarchan δεισιδαίμων cf. e.g. 1.6.1: *humi sedebat scis⟨s⟩ili palliastro semiamictus*; Plutarch, *De superstitione* 7 (*Mor.* 168D): ἔξω κάθηται σακκίον ἔχων καὶ περιεζωσμένος ῥάκεσι ῥυπαροῖς. Superstitious histrionics: *Metamorphoses* 1.7.4–5: … *cum ille imo de pectore cruciabilem suspiritum ducens dextra saeuiente frontem replaudens: "me miserum", infit* …; cf. Plutarch, *De superstitione* 7 (*Mor.* 168A). See also above, n. 9, and below, n. 30.

[30] Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 1.7.1: *"sine, sine", inquit, "fruatur diutius trophaeo Fortuna, quod fixit ipsa."* ("Please, leave", he said, "Fortune to enjoy her triumphal monument, which she set up herself."). Plutarch, *De superstitione* 7 (*Mor.* 168C): "ἔα με', φησίν, 'ἄνθρωπε, διδόναι δίκην, τὸν ἀσεβῆ, τὸν ἐπάρατον, τὸν θεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσι μεμισημένον" ("Oh sir", he says, "leave me to pay my penalty, impious wretch that I am, accursed, and hateful to the gods and all the heavenly host.").

[31] Cf. Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 8.27.6: … *de imis praecordiis anhelitus crebros referens uelut numini⟨s⟩ diuino spiritu repletus simulabat sauciam uecordiam prorsus quasi deum praesentia soleant homines non sui f⟨i⟩eri meliores, sed debiles effici uel aegroti.* ("… repeatedly heaving deep sighs from his chest as if he were filled with the heavenly inspiration of a deity, he pretended to be stricken with madness—as if the presence of the gods does not usually raise people above themselves, but makes them weak and ill."). Translation by Hijmans et al. (1985) 242; see the commentary ad loc. on p. 244.

[32] Lucius' superstitious behaviour in Book 11 may be illustrated by his repeated dips in the ocean (11.1.4: *purificandi studio marino lauacro trado septiesque summerso fluctibus capite … deam praepotentem lacrimoso uultu sic adprecabar*), which recall superstitious purifying rit-

Thus, Lucius seems to embody the paradox of being a satirical voice, exposing superstition to ridicule in the vein of Plutarch's moral satire, and of being an object of satire at the same time. On the one hand, he poses as a biting satirist, fulminating against the superstitious performance of the effeminate priests of the Dea Syria. On the other hand, he is not able to live up to his own morals, and succumbs to superstition himself as the devotee of the goddess Isis, thus becoming an object of his own satire.

Lucius' paradoxical and unreliable nature, assuming an arrogant attitude of moral invective that is completely at odds with his own corrupt behaviour as a character in the story, already becomes apparent in the first book, to which we now return. The final scene of this book, in which Lucius has arrived in Hypata and is received by his stingy and boorish host Milo, again features a dramatic setting of table conversation and storytelling (cf. 1.22.6–7; 1.26), in which dubious character types make their appearance. On his way to his host, Lucius had already been informed by an old lady innkeeper that this Milo is very wealthy, but also an unequalled miser (1.21.5–6). During his stay at Milo's house, Lucius reveals his calculating nature, exposing himself as a flatterer, who wants to ingratiate himself with his wealthy host by showing consideration for his avarice (1.24.1ff.).[33] He refuses any supplies offered by Milo, decides to buy his own dinner at the market, and gives Milo's slave girl money to buy hay and barley for his horse.

Although no exact motive is given for Lucius' calculating behaviour towards Milo, his attitude seems very suspicious; later on in the novel, when Lucius describes the invasion of Milo's house by a band of robbers, it appears that he knows exactly where Milo hides his treasures (3.28). Moreover, the suggestion of suspicious motives behind Lucius' attitude recurs in the account of the same burglary by one of the robbers (7.1). This man reports that the people consider Lucius

uals satirised by Plutarch (*De superstitione* 3, *Mor.* 166A): βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλατταν; see Lozza (1980) 82. Compare also Lucius' exaggerated prostration in 11.24.7: *prouolutus denique ante conspectum deae et facie mea diu detersis uestigiis eius, lacrimis obortis, singultu crebro sermonem interficiens et uerba deuorans aio*, which recalls the contemptible behaviour of the Superstitious Man criticised by Plutarch, *De superstitione* 3 (*Mor.* 166A): ῥίψεις ἐπὶ πρόσωπον … ἀλλοκότους προσκυνήσεις. Compare the corresponding superstitious Character in Theophrastus, *Characters* 16.5: καὶ ἐπὶ γόνατα πεσεῖν.

[33] Cf. 1.24.1: *his auditis, mores atque parsimoniam ratiocinans Milonis uolensque me artius ei conciliare … inquam …* ("When I heard this I realised Milo's character and stinginess, but since I wished to get further into his good graces, I said to him …" [transl. Hanson]).

as the evident perpetrator of the crime "on the ground of probable arguments" (*rationibus probabilibus*), i.e. Lucius' suspicious ingratiating behaviour toward his host,[34] and his mysterious disappearance after the crime (7.2.1).

Lucius' insincere attitude is vividly dramatised in his first encounter with his boorish host, who insists that Lucius sits down next to him on his couch. Milo's insistence and Lucius' reluctance create an amusing scene, which seems to be taken directly from a comedy. What is more, both characters seem to embody types from Plutarch's moral writings, that of the compliant man and the shameless boor:

> 1.23.1–3: *Et cum dicto iubet uxorem decedere utque in eius locum adsidam iubet meque etiam nunc* uerecundia *cunctantem adrepta lacinia detrahens: "adside", inquit "istic". … "ego te", inquit, "etiam de ista corporis speciosa habitudine deque hac* uirginali *prorsus* uerecundia, generosa stirpe proditum *et recte conicerem*". And with that he told his wife to get up and invited me to sit down in her place. I still hesitated out of modesty, but he grasped the hem of my tunic and pulled me towards him. "Sit here beside me", he said. "[…] In itself your attractive personal appearance and your quite virginal modesty would lead me to conjecture, and quite rightly, that you come of a noble family." (transl. Hanson)

By his inability to withstand Milo's importunity, Lucius seems to reveal a form of compliancy (δυσωπία), which Plutarch satirised as a form of false modesty (*De vitioso pudore*, *Mor.* 528C ff.). Plutarch defines this vice as an excess of shame, which especially occurs when the compliant person is at the hands of someone shamelessly insistent, and emphasises the effeminacy in the compliant man's countenance, which may be reflected in Lucius' "virginal modesty":

> *De vitioso pudore* 1 (*Mor.* 528F): ὁ δ' εὐδυσώπητος … ἄγαν τὸ θῆλυ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρυφερὸν ἐμφαίνει διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναισχύντων ἧτταν αἰσχύνην ὑποκοριζόμενος. the compliant man … betrays only too clearly in his countenance the effeminacy and flabbiness of his spirit, giving his surrender to the shameless the fair name of 'modesty'.[35]

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[34] 7.1.5: *nec argumentis dubiis, sed rationibus probabilibus congruo cunctae multitudinis consensu Lucius auctor manifestus facinoris postulabatur, qui proximis diebus fictis commendaticiis litteris Miloni sese uirum commentitus bonum artius conciliauerat* ("They had decided, not on the basis of dubious evidence, but on very likely grounds and by unanimous agreement of the whole crowd, to prosecute somebody named Lucius as the obvious perpetrator of the crime. He had recently made use of counterfeit letters of introduction representing him as a gentleman to insinuate himself closely into Milo's favour" [transl. Hanson]). The wording clearly echoes 1.24.1 (see previous note).

[35] Cf. also *De vitioso pudore* 5 (*Mor.* 530F); *Brutus* 6.5.

Ironically, in the same sentence that seems to identify Lucius as the effeminately compliant man, in the spirit of Plutarch's moral satire (1.23.3), Milo emphasises Lucius' noble origin, which calls to mind Lucius' initial statement on his noble descent from Plutarch (cf. 1.2.1: *prodita* … 1.23.3: *proditum*).[36]

This comic situation repeats itself in the concluding scene of the first book, where Milo completely disregards his guest's need of sleep and food, and obstinately forces him to have a dinner conversation with him at his empty table:

> 1.26.2–3: *ac dum cunctor, dum* modeste *renitor, "non prius", inquit, "discedam, quam me sequaris". et dictum iure iurando secutus iam* obstinationi*[s]* suae *me ingratis* oboedientem *perducit ad illum suum grabattulum*. When I hesitated and resisted discreetly, he asserted, "I will not leave until you come with me," and capped this with an oath. He was so stubborn that I had to obey him against my will, and he led me to that little cot of his and sat me down. (transl. Hanson)

Lucius' attitude is indicated by the words *modeste* and *oboedientem*, which recall his earlier *uerecundia*, while the noun *obstinatio* clearly refers to Milo's vice of boorish insistence. That Lucius' genuine feelings towards Milo are neither modest nor compliant, but rather full of disgust, is suggested by his biting satire in the last sentence of the book, where he states that he "at long last escaped the nauseating old man's talkative, famished banquet" (1.26.7: *Euasi aliquando rancidi senis loquax et famelicum conuiuium*). Lucius' modesty turns out to be a tactic of working on his host (cf. 1.24.1), very unlike someone truly *modestus*. Moreover, in the ensuing books Lucius' affair with Milo's kitchen maid (2.6ff.) and insatiable curiosity for magic are in no sense modest or inhibited.

To conclude: in his moral writings, Plutarch tried to be a physician of the soul, to cure his audience of vices such as curiosity, superstition, boorishness, gluttony, or false modesty. Lucius in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* seems to embody the very moral ailments of which his so-called ancestor wanted to cure his readers. Various aspects of his characterisation are reflected in other dubious figures in the *Metamorphoses*, who often appear to be cunning inventors and entertaining storytellers as well, performing in a symposium-like setting, like the rumour-monger Aristomenes, and the superstitious confessor Socrates. Perhaps, the edu-

[36] Similarly, Lucius' shyness (2.2.7: *rubore suffusus*) and Byrrhena's elaborate eulogy of his noble stature in 2.2.8 are juxtaposed, shortly before Byrrhena refers to their shared descent from Plutarch (2.3.2: *nam et familia Plutarchi ambae prognatae sumus*).

cational role of Plutarch as the physician of his audience may help us to come to grips with the relation between author and audience in Apuleius' fictional work. As it seems, Apuleius playfully exposes his readers to various cases of contagious illnesses such as curiosity and superstition, which often seem related to invention and storytelling. Perhaps, then, we could view this as a metapoetical play, possibly reflecting Plutarchan ideas on poetry and literature. It seems that the author behind the text alerts his audience to the fictional nature of his work, making them aware of the fact that they are reading mere falsehoods, which are constructed to please and to astonish. By turning his story into a stage for stock personality types who reveal the symptoms of frauds and charlatans, including his *alter ego* Lucius, Apuleius implicitly points to his own deceptive literary strategy, in the vein of Gorgias' *Doctrine of Deception*.[37]

[37] See Keulen (2003c) on Apuleius' allusions to Gorgias' theories on literature and on the intermediary role of Plutarch (cf. *De audiendis poetis* 2, *Mor.* 15C; *Bellone an pace* 5, *Mor.* 348C; see also Jeroen Bons in this volume).

THE FIRST PRINTING OF THE *LIVES* IN 1517. A POSSIBLE LINK WITH THE DISTANT PAST

Yitzhak Dana

Prof. Dr. Klaus Bringmann zum 65. Geburtstag.

The modern Classical scholar, who wishes to study an ancient text, turns today as a matter of course to the respective critical edition that appeared in one of the famous series of Greek and Latin texts, such as the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Oxford Classical Texts* and the *Collection Budé*. Those critical editions offer a possible restoration of the ancient text that has been provided by the modern editor on the basis of the testimony of such manuscripts, which according to the recent principles of textual criticism have been considered to possess the best textual authority. Below the restored text the editor placed a critical apparatus that contains variant readings, which were selected from the extant manuscripts. In addition to the variants, the editor included in the apparatus possible emendations, which in his view should be regarded as significant for the understanding of the text. Therefore, to a considerable extent our interpretation of the ancient text is influenced by the approach of the modern editor to the text. Thus the study of an ancient text today necessarily depends on the critical edition that the scholar consults for his work. Moreover, the Classical student at present may be misled to believe that the ancient text that lies in front of him was always transmitted in the same form and contents, which have been assigned to it in the recent critical edition. Hence, although we meet the ancient text through the mediation of the modern editor, it should be taken into account that the extant text in fact is a joint production of numerous and previous generations of scribes, scholars, printers and editors. The last link in this long chain is represented by the modern scholar, who inherited a text that has been shaped by many centuries of transmission, both in the manuscripts and in the printed Greek and Latin editions.

A comparison of the modern critical editions with the respective codices may raise the inevitable question: to what extent have the critical editions, for instance the Teubner editions of the *Lives*, faithfully preserved the essence of the ancient text that was entrusted to them?

As far as I have been able to find out, the linkage between the modern critical editions and the manuscripts up to the present has been taken for granted, and consequently remained unquestioned.[1] This lack of attention to the problem of textual continuity may be explained by the attitude, which has been typical of many modern works on the Greek and Roman worlds, and regards the ancient text on the whole as an historical document. Since the authors of such works for the most part are interested in the relevant information that their sources may yield, they too often tend to ignore the simple fact that in the case of the *Lives*, for instance, their sources are first and foremost literary works[2] that may possess historical data, not the other way round. Moreover, modern literary theories that developed additional ways of interpretation with regard to the ancient texts seem to have remained outside the scope of historical studies. Those theories focus on the interdependence between the form and contents of a literary work, and on the significance of these two central and closely interrelated literary aspects for the interpretation of the ancient text. Nonetheless, despite the possible[3] contribution of those theories to the historical study of the literary sources, such methods seem to have infrequently been employed by modern students of the Greek and Roman worlds.

With respect to this proposed approach, a philological study of the ancient text ought to be a prerequisite to any further interpretation of this text, whether literary, historical, philosophical etc. Thus, in order to assist this kind of scholarly work, the examination of the ancient text should take into account its transmission, that is, the various decisive phases through which the ancient text passed, and which contributed to the shaping of the present text. Hence, since form and contents are two aspects of the same literary substance, the long process of transmission cannot be separated from any study of the text. Therefore, at this stage

[1] So far a study of the transmission of an ancient text in the printed editions has been provided only once. In 1962 the Belgian scholar A. Severyns published in Brussels his inclusive review of nearly three centuries (1640–1922) of the printed Greek editions of Proclus, the famous Neoplatonist philosopher of the fifth century C.E. (Severyns 1962).

[2] As a result of this approach, in the hundred years, which passed since the first study of the Plutarchan *Life* by Leo (1903), the literary aspects of the Biographies seem to have received relatively less attention than they merit.

[3] A new contribution in this field seems to be a work by Th. A. Schmitz that appeared just a few months ago. As the book arrived only recently, I am still unable to comment on it.

I would like to present some of the conclusions of my study[4] of the transmission of two *Lives*, those of L. Aemilius Paullus and Timoleon, with which I have been engaged since the early nineties. Although the following results primarily concern one pair of *Lives*, that of the *Aemilius-Timoleon*, they are nevertheless applicable to the other six pairs that traditionally were placed in the second *volume*, namely, those of *Phocion-Cato Minor, Dio-Brutus, Sertorius-Eumenes, Philopoemen-Flamininus, Pelopidas-Marcellus* and *Alexander-Caesar*.

As may be inferred from a review of the transmission of the *Aemilius-Timoleon*, during the well-nigh five centuries of the printed transmission (1517–1996) some essentials of the Greek text of these two *Lives*, and possibly of the other twelve *Lives* of the second *volume*, are likely to have been considerably, and in some cases even arbitrarily, altered. Yet, such changes that in the meantime were introduced into the Greek text, and hence may reasonably be considered vital for any restoration of that text, so far remained disregarded. Due to limitations of space, at this point I would like to put forward just—in my view—one of the most important results, at which I have been able to arrive. Hence, as may safely be inferred from the first printed Greek edition of the *Lives*, the *Iuntina* of 1517, an early textual arrangement of the *Aemilius-Timoleon* was transmitted in our oldest manuscript, to be described below. That sequence of the paragraphs seems to have been established already in the fourth or fifth centuries C.E., and survived for more than a thousand years. However, for reasons to be explained soon, since the appearance of the third printed Greek edition of the *Lives*, the *Basileensis* of 1533, the ancient tradition has altogether been abandoned. Though the logic that stands behind that textual division still remains unclear, it is evident that every study of the text is dependent on the inner division of the words into sentences and of the sentences into paragraphs. Thus, during the five hundred years of the printed transmission of this pair, its inner division appears to have been subjected to several changes that necessarily affected the interpretation of the text. Therefore, this proposed approach to the text does not deny the validity of other possible[5] interpretations of these two Biographies or of the other twelve

[4] See Dana (2003) 381–388.

[5] As a matter of fact, the pair *Aemilius-Timoleon* for the most part seems to have remained outside Plutarchan scholarship. The sole commentary on the *Timoleon* by Holden appeared in 1889, while the *Aemilius* was studied by Liedmeier nearly half a century later (1935). Despite their potential assistance to the study of both *Lives*, after so many years the two works have necessarily become outdated, and ought to be replaced.

Lives of the second *volume*. On the contrary, this complementary course of research may offer us an insight into an unknown tradition of the Greek text that appears to have been preserved in the inner division of the text, which was transmitted in our oldest codex. Hence the story of this manuscript that we shall soon outline, may serve as an adequate illustration of the transmission of the *Lives*, both in the hand-copied manuscripts and in the printed Greek editions.

Plutarch appears to have composed his *Lives* between[6] the last quarter of the first century C.E. and the first quarter of the second century. For the next seven hundred and fifty years, that is, till the mid-ninth century, hardly any evidence survived with regard to the transmission of the text. However, if we are to judge from the known process of the transmission that may be partly documented from the mid-ninth century onwards, during the first seven and a half centuries the text passed through many unknown hands that very likely may have interfered with both its form and contents. About the mid-ninth century, in the capital of the Byzantine Empire, there gathered a literary circle that for the first time showed a genuine interest in ancient Greek literature. The key figure in that small group of Byzantine scholars seems to have been Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople. Despite his leading position in the Eastern Church, Photius was well acquainted[7] with ancient Greek literature, which had been formed in an entirely different world of a pagan nature. Among his many works, Photius left us his *Bibliotheca*, an anthology of Greek works, some of which were later altogether lost. In codex Nr. 245 of the *Bibliotheca* Photius included selections[8] from several of the *Lives*. Although those abstracts are the first surviving testimony of some of the Biographies, due to the fragmentary nature of Photius' work its possible contribution to the study of the textual history of the *Lives* seems to be limited. Thus, our review of the conclusive process of the transmission begins with the first extant codex, which may be dated to the mid-tenth century, that is, about a hundred years later.

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[6] This view has been put forward by Jones in 1966. According to his study of the *Lives*, the writing of Plutarch's works went on during most of his life. Thus the early *Lives* were written after 68, while the later *Lives* were composed before 116 C.E. Delvaux (1995), however, dates the whole corpus to the years 110 and 115. At any rate, his conclusions appear to be unconvincing. If one takes into account the enormous work that the writing of the *Lives* demanded from Plutarch, it may reasonably be argued that he devoted to the composition of such a huge corpus much more than a few years.

[7] For Photius' vast scholarship see Wilson (1996) 89–119.

[8] The several extracts (393B–400A) from the *Lives* are to be found in vol. 6 (pp.174–194) of Henry's critical edition of Photius' *Bibliotheca*.

The earliest manuscript of the second *volume* of the *Lives* that contains the *Aemilius-Timoleon*, represents a significant turning-point in the history of the Greek texts. The revival of Greek literature in the East seems to have begun already in the ninth century, in the days of Photius, and reached its height in the tenth century, particularly in the first half of that century, under the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Constantinus VII Porphyrogenitus (912–959). The renewed interest in the ancient codices launched a significant phase in the transmission of the Greek texts that is commonly called the Constantinian recension. During those decades all the available Greek texts, either in the form of rolls or in the form of codices, were first collected, and then gradually transliterated from the previous majuscular script to the recently developed minuscular script. As shown by Konrat Ziegler nearly a hundred years ago (1907),[9] on account of that transliteration in some cases more faults were introduced into the Greek text, in addition to the already existing ones.

The Byzantine scholars, who apparently by order and at the expense of the imperial court were authorized to transliterate the Greek text of the *Lives*, seem to have been at a loss, while looking for a suitable archetype to copy from that codex the seven pairs of the *Lives* that were later placed in the second *volume*. Finally they found just an old manuscript that appears to have been produced in the fourth or fifth century. The copy of that archetype, the Codex *Laurentianus Conventuum Suppressorum* 206 of the mid-tenth century, is a fine sample of the devoted work of those scholars. This manuscript appears to have been one of the three codices of the mid-tenth century that respectively contained the three *volumes* of the *Lives*. Thus it may reasonably be argued that the Tripartite arrangement of the *Lives* seems to have been introduced for the first time about the mid-tenth century by the Constantinian scholars. As is evident in the *Laurentianus* 206, its old archetype had been seriously damaged particularly in the *Aemilius*, though some defects may be traced in the *Timoleon* as well.[10] In the *Aemilius*, it ought to be noted, not only single words but also whole sentences had already become illegible by the mid-tenth century. However, out of his respect for the ancient text, the first scribe, who produced

[9] See Ziegler's basic—and still indispensable—introduction to the transmission of the *Lives*: Ziegler (1907), for instance, 122–125, 135, 141, 144.

[10] Ziegler (1933) X, (zu *Aemilius-Timoleon*) 35–58.

the *Laurentianus* 206, did his utmost to preserve the text exactly as it had been handed down to him.[11]

Thus the Greek text of the *Aemilius* bears witness to those numerous efforts of the early scribe. As pointed out for the first time by Ziegler in 1932, and again in 1964, whenever the scribe was confident of his reading, he restored the letter or letters that were missing in the damaged words, and copied the whole word. Moreover, in other cases only a letter or two had been left of a whole word or words, so that the meaning of those words remained obscure. Nonetheless, the scribe copied just the readable letter or letters, and left an empty space for the missing letters.[12]

Thus, although the first scribe fulfilled his mission in a most trustworthy manner, some words and several paragraphs still remained unintelligible. This is a clear example of the way in which the transmission changed both the form and meaning. Since those damaged places hindered any further study of the text, such a textual obscurity could not last long. Accordingly, as is evident from the several additional handwritings in the codex that may be dated from the eleventh till the fourteenth century, later generations of Byzantine scholars again and again reviewed and—to the best of their ability—filled in the missing[13] Greek text. Hence, as early as the eleventh century, the Codex *Parisinus* 1678 contained a corrected text of the first two pairs of the second *volume*,

[11] Idem, *Praefatio* to *Plutarchi Vitae Parallelae*, vol. II, fasc. 1–1932 (= *Teubneriana* I), p. III; vol. II, fasc. 1–1964 (= *Teubneriana* II), p. V.

[12] *Teubneriana* I, III; and *Teubneriana* II, V. See below, note 13.

[13] For reasons of space, at this point one typical example may be provided: *Aem.* 9.3. See Ziegler (1933) X, 36; cf. *Teubneriana* I, 277, lines 19–20; and *Teubneriana* II, 191, lines 12–13): "… τὰς δ'ἄλλας ***** σίτου γεμούσας ********* ⟨πεν⟩τηρικὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ************σεν" [Similarly to the *Teubneriana* I and II (*ibidem*), the missing letters in this paragraph were represented by asterisks]. Hence already by the mid-tenth century very little survived of the original sentence. Accordingly, a later hand (Ziegler [1933] X, 36) restored this obscure passage as follows: "…τὰς δ'ἄλλας σίτου γεμούσας [κατέδυσεν]. [ἐκράτησε δὲ] καὶ ⟨πεν⟩τηρικὰ τεσσάρα [καὶ μάχην ἐπολέμη]σεν". This interpolated text may be translated thus: "… And the other [Roman ships] that were loaded with corn [he, namely, Perseus] sank. [And he captured] as well four war-ships of five rows of oars, [and won the (naval) battle]". What had been meant in the original remained unclear already by the mid-tenth century. Yet, since the text could not be left in that poor state, some kind of restoration was called for, and indeed was introduced at a later stage of the transmission of the Greek text. Whether after nearly a thousand years this restoration still resembles the lost original, cannot be decided at present; see Ziegler (1933) X, *ibidem*. This is just one example of the manner in which the transmission shaped the extant text. For similar and even more complicated cases of corrupted passages in the A*emilius-Timoleon*, see *ibidem*, 35–47.

namely, of *Phocion-Cato* and *Dio-Brutus*.[14] Therefore, if we are to judge from the many corrections and remarks that were introduced in the *Laurentianus* 206 in the East during the Middle Ages, it seems that by the eleventh century this manuscript had already become the master-copy of the second *volume* of the *Lives*, and was held there in high esteem. The authority that was attributed to the *Laurentianus* 206 may be explained by the early date of this codex, which, in the absence of any previous manuscripts, provided the contemporary Byzantines with the sole link[15] to the Hellenic heritage. Probably for this reason, and on account of the numerous later annotations that may be traced in our codex, it may reasonably be assumed that the Byzantine scholars were much more familiar with the *Laurentianus* 206 than with the two additional codices of the eleventh century that transmitted the other two independent textual traditions of the second *volume*. Those manuscripts seem to have been less known, and consequently were much less studied and consulted. Yet, despite the outstanding reputation of our codex, a review of the Greek manuscripts of the *Lives* that were produced in the East between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries shows that the order of the Biographies, as established by the mid-tenth century in the *Laurentianus* 206, was hardly observed.[16]

Another turning-point in the transmission of the *Lives* took place at the turn of the thirteenth century. After nearly sixty years of Western occupation in the course of the Fourth Crusade (1204–1261) that resulted in enormous political, military, financial and cultural dam-

[14] *Teubneriana* I, III–IV; and *Teubneriana* II, V–VI.

[15] See Dana (2003) 381–388.

[16] Due to limitations of space, I am unable to enter into details about the main and interesting problem of the order of the *Lives* as reflected by the transmission; see, for instance, Dana (2003) 134–159. Yet, considering its significance, at this point a brief account of this question seems to be appropriate. The Constantinian recension of the mid-tenth century appears to have been based on a double basis—chronological and ethnic. Hence the extant twenty-three pairs of the *Lives* were divided among three *volumes*: The first contained nine pairs, while the second and the third were respectively assigned seven pairs to each. However, a review of the codices that were produced between the eleventh and thirteenth century shows that the Tripartite order of the *Lives* was hardly kept. Thus, in those manuscripts pairs of *Lives*, or even single Biographies, as a rule were relocated at the discretion of the editors. In the late thirteenth century the Tripartite order was reestablished by the Planudean recension, but relatively few subsequent editors seem to have been aware of it. Consequently, the arbitrary arrangement of the *Lives* prevailed in the next six centuries, and has finally been replaced with the traditional one by Ziegler in his first critical edition of the Plutarchan Biographical corpus (1914–1939).

ages, the Byzantines began to recover their Empire. Byzantine scholars, as part of the general effort, set out to save all that was left of ancient Greek literature. One of those scholars was the monk Maximus Planudes.[17] Under his instructions, all the available codices of the *Lives* were collected and reviewed. For the first time in the textual history of the Biographies, different readings of the same text were compared and studied. A similar philological work on the Greek text of the *Lives* was to be carried out by the famous French printer and editor Henricus Stephanus nearly three hundred years later, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century (1572). Accordingly, the revision of the *Lives* in the last years of the thirteenth and in the first years of the fourteenth century is called after its initiator the Planudean recension. Unlike the Constantinian recension of the mid-tenth century that produced a separate manuscript for each *volume*, the Planudean scholars for the first time placed all the extant Biographies in one huge codex. The location of all the *Lives* in one manuscript instead of three separate ones may be explained by the urgent wish of those Byzantine scholars to restore and preserve the Plutarchan Biographical corpus, and to prevent a possible loss of one or more of the extant pairs, as indeed happened before to some other pairs of the corpus. Since in the meantime the traditional Tripartite order of the *Lives* had already been disregarded, those scholars consulted the *Laurentianus* 206 for both the text and correct order of the Biographies in the second *volume*. Thus, two additional copies of this manuscript may be dated to that period, one to the year 1296, and the other some time later.

A hundred years passed, and with the successful introduction of regular Greek studies in the West in 1397, the *Laurentianus* 206 arrived in Italy. It may reasonably be assumed that a Byzantine scholar, who was well aware of the high authority of this manuscript, and wished to save it from any damage, brought it over, probably to Florence. Thus the codex became the property of the *Badia Fiorentina* that was located near Fiesole.[18] A few years later, since the year 1400, the first Latin translations of the *Lives* by Western scholars began to appear. Though no study of the Greek manuscripts, from which the Latin translators borrowed their text, has ever been conducted, it may plausibly be assumed that our codex was likely to have been one of those manuscripts.

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[17] See Wilson (1996) 220–241 for Planudes' great contribution to the further transmission of ancient Greek literature.

[18] *Teubneriana* I, IV; and *Teubneriana* II, VI.

In my view, the most decisive turning-point in the history of the Greek text of the second *volume* of the *Lives* came with the first printing of the Plutarchan Biographical corpus in Florence in the year 1517. Although nearly five centuries passed since that date, the editor of the first edition still remains unknown. However, from his work it seems that he was a professional editor, who was well acquainted with the Byzantine codices. Like the modern Classical scholars, who may create and shape the computerized text with the help of a word processor, the new invention of printing provided the first editor with additional options that until that time did not exist. From the mid-tenth century till the first quarter of the sixteenth century the form and contents of the text seem more or less to have been preserved by the various copyists. However, the first printing presented the editor with the problem of textual continuity. Should the traditional inner division of the transmitted text be followed, or ought a new division to be introduced? This was not an easy problem, and as we shall see, various answers were given later on to the same question. Similarly to the first scribe, who produced the *Laurentianus* 206 about the mid-tenth century, the editor of the Florentinian *Iuntina* of 1517, out of his respect for the past, preserved the Greek text of the second *volume* of the *Lives* exactly as it had been handed down to him. Thus, the *Iuntina* bears clear witness to his devotion.

As he was unaware of the Tripartite order of the *Lives*, in his edition he simply reproduced[19] the Greek text of the manuscripts that were available to him. Fortunately for the subsequent Greek editions of the *Lives*, the editor borrowed the text of the second *volume* from our manuscript that happened to be within his reach. Thus, a close look at the *Iuntina* reveals that the text of the second *volume* resembles that of the *Laurentianus* 206. From the similar number of the sub-units in the second edition of the *Lives* it may conveniently be concluded that the Venetian *Aldina* of 1519 adopted the same inner division with minor corrections.[20] As stated on the front-page of the *Aldina*, that decision seems to have been taken by the editor, Franciscus of Asola whose name, unlike his predecessor's, was explicitly recorded in the second

[19] Hence the order of the *Lives* in the *Iuntina* follows the manuscripts from which the Greek text was borrowed. Unlike the arbitrary arrangement of the Plutarchan Biographical corpus in the second edition of 1519 and in the third edition of 1533, the Iuntine order reflects the sincere devotion of the first editor towards the Hellenic legacy, cf. above, note 15.

[20] Dana (2003) 381–388.

Greek edition. However, with regard to the arrangement of the *Lives*, the second editor, who likewise was unaware of the Tripartite order himself, introduced a wrong order of his own. Owing to the high reputation of the Aldine press, that sequence of the *Lives* survived for the next four centuries. Fourteen years later (1533), the third printed Greek edition of the *Lives* appeared in Basle. Though Simon Grynaeus, the editor, adopted the "new" order of the *Lives* of his predecessor, for unknown reasons he decided to completely abandon the traditional inner arrangement, and to print the Greek text in one bulk with hardly any paragraphs. Thus, in the *Basileensis* of 1533 Grynaeus deliberately disassociated himself from the ancient textual tradition of the second *volume*.[21] The short-lived dialogue with the past (1517–1533) was thus discontinued. Consequently, a new phase in the history of the Greek text began in that year (1533), and clearly merits a separate study. In the two subsequent centuries after Grynaeus entirely abandoned the traditional inner division of the second *volume* of the *Lives* (1533–1723), a few more divisions of the text of the *Lives* were proposed. Yet, the last division into chapters that has later been adopted by all critical editions of the *Lives*, was introduced in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, that is, nearly two hundred years after the "new" order of the *Lives* had been established for the first time in the *Aldina* (1519). Hence the Aldine order of the *Lives* prevailed for the subsequent four hundred years. Only seven years after the founding of modern Plutarchan studies in the first decade of the twentieth century (1907), Ziegler began the restoration of the forgotten Tripartite order of the *Lives* (1914). Due to various reasons, that enormous project required twenty-five years, and was completed only in 1939. Nevertheless, the ancient traditional inner division of the second *volume* of the *Lives*, that may be dated to the fourth or fifth centuries, and has been overlooked in the last five hundred years, still awaits to be restored.

Thus, in a retrospect of nearly five centuries, the much-less studied *Iuntina*, and not the prestigious *Aldina*, provides us with that exclusive link to the distant past, which appears to be most significant for any study of the text. While the *Iuntina* followed both the textual tradition and the order of the *Lives*, as transmitted by the *Laurentianus* 206, the second and third Greek editions gradually departed from the past. Hence the order of the Biographies was changed in the *Aldina*, while the

[21] *Ibidem*, 423–437.

inner arrangement of the paragraphs was mostly retained. Then the inner sequence was entirely disregarded in the *Basileensis*, and the order of the *Lives* was further changed. Thus the long hand-copied transmission of the *Lives* clearly reached its end in the *Iuntina*. This conclusion, which so far has been overlooked, may explain the significant contribution of the *Iuntina* to the textual study of the Biographies. On the other hand, the second and third printed Greek editions opened a new phase, of a much shorter duration, that of the printed transmission of the *Lives*, which still seems to be going on.

DEATH OF A STATESMAN: POUSSIN'S PHOCION[1]

Joseph Geiger

Enjoying, as we all do the hospitality of our Dutch friends, I should feel it incumbent on me to discuss a Dutch connexion of the Nachleben of Plutarch's *Phocion*. In 1784, during the Patriot Revolution, Duke Ernst Ludwig of Braunschweig, erstwhile guardian and close friend and advisor of the Stadhouder Willem V, was forced to leave the Netherlands. The Göttingen Professor August Ludwig Schlözer, who was very handsomely recompensed for his pains, published a book, in which the ungratefulness of the Dutch burghers was compared to that of the Athenians to Phocion, whose virtues were of course equated with those of the Duke: the cover carried a purported portrait of Phocion. Schlözer's colleague, the great philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne retorted in criticising some of Schlözer's scholarship concerning Phocion, carefully questioning his strongly anti-democratic views. But since this incident has been thoroughly discussed by a far greater scholar than one would ever aspire to become[2] I shall move back from the eighteenth century to the seventeenth.

Some years ago I had the opportunity to discuss "The Death of Socrates" and "The Death of Cato", a pair of large oil paintings—now in Budapest—by the eighteenth century Veronese painter Giambettino Cignaroli.[3] In that study I attempted to show that the numerous depictions of the death of Cato from the Renaissance on fall into two distinct categories: one, where the emphasis is on the ideological or philosophical meaning of the very act of suicide, and consequently no great attention is paid to the details of its performance, and those painters whose approach was literary, textual, as a rule depending on

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[1] I am indebted to Professor Richard Verdi for advice and criticism; I alone am to blame for remaining faults.

[2] Bernays (1881) 1–20; cf. also Gehrke (1976) 198–216 and the appreciation of Momigliano (1969) 170 = 167; Hirzel (1912) 162 points out the importance of Plutarch for the appreciation of Phocion in the eighteenth century and criticises Bernays for the exaggerated weight he accords Nepos. For the reception of Bernays' book see Bach (1974) 225–226; Bollack (1996). For the historical background see, e.g., Schama (1977) 74–100; Israel (1995) 1098–1112.

[3] Geiger (1996).

Plutarch, and who depicted to various degrees of faithfulness the scene as described by the biographer. These culminated in the pictures of Cignaroli, who not only insisted on rendering the details of the text of Plutarch's *Cato*, but who—or the commissioner of the pictures—also grasped the implied comparison with the death of Socrates, which was painted on a pendant of equal size.

Now Plutarch pairs Cato the Younger with Phocion. Though this is one of the pairs that are not compared in a formal *synkrisis*, in fact their comparison is certainly among the subtlest, most sophisticated, and perhaps most successful in the entire series. I shall not repeat at length what I discussed from various points of view elsewhere[4] and would like to restate only my cardinal argument: Plutarch finishes the first half of the book, devoted to the life of Phocion, with an explicit comparison of the Athenians wrongfully putting him to death as they did Socrates; the second half, dealing with Cato the Younger, ends in a lengthy description, one of the finest of the biographer, in which allusions to the death of Socrates abound, including Cato's reading, twice, the *Phaedo* before his suicide. The entire book is interwoven with the fine web of a triple *synkrisis*, with Socrates the *tertium comparationis* for the two nominal protagonists.[5]

From the Renaissance on both the death of Cato and the death of Socrates have been the subject of a great number of paintings, many of them major works of the first rank—I would only mention the magnificent "Death of Socrates" by David in the Metropolitan in New York—as well as of drawings, sketches etc. On the other hand it seems that the death of Phocion did not enjoy anything like a similar popularity; in fact it is the subject of a major work by one great master only.[6]

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[4] Geiger (1979); Geiger (1988); Geiger (1993); Geiger (1996); Geiger (1999).

[5] Though the comparison of Phocion with Socrates is explicit at the end of the biography, it should be noted that some editions of the Amyot translation—perhaps also used by Poussin—such as that at Lyons 1587 carry a four-line verse motto starting with the address "O second Socrates". Such editions also add rather lengthy comparisons of Phocion and Cato, as they do of the other pairs where Plutarch "neglected" to compose one. See also Trapp (1999); Duff (1999) 253–255.

[6] Nicolas-André Monsiau (1755–1837), who painted such pictures as "Alexander Breaking in Bucephalus" (1787) "The Death of Agis" and "The Death of Cleopatra" (1789) also exhibited drawings such as "The Triumph of Aemilius Paullus", "The Death of Cato of Utica", and also "The Death of Phocion", see Verdi (1996). Michael Trapp very kindly drew my attention to Joseph Denis Odevaere (1778–1830), whose "Death of Phocion" won the Prix de Rome in 1804, see under http://www.culture.fr/documentation/joconde/pres.htm.

Nicolas Poussin (1594–1665) painted in 1648 two scenes from the subject: “The Funeral of Phocion”, now in Cardiff (fig. 1), and its pendant, “The Ashes of Phocion Collected by his Widow”, now in Liverpool (fig. 2).[7] It has been shown, by perhaps the most prominent Poussin scholar of the twentieth century, that this pair of paintings is central not only to the work of Poussin, but to the development of European landscape painting.[8] I shall endeavour to show, that these paintings also constituted, at least to a certain way of thinking, a culmination of Poussin’s engagement with Antiquity. But before discussing these great works of Poussin’s maturity I would like to mention briefly some other works of the master concerned with classical history.

First, it should be noted that Poussin did not ignore the theme of the death of Cato. In a drawing in Windsor Castle[9] predating the Phocion paintings by about a decade, Cato transfixes his body with his sword. Though there is an open book next to him, obviously the *Phaedo*, this is not a study towards a faithful reproduction of the Plutarchan death scene, but rather a study of the true Stoic overcoming death.[10] Second, it is appropriate to mention briefly Poussin’s most important death scenes as well as his themes derived from Plutarch. It is customary to group together four paintings depicting death scenes, “The Death of Germanicus” (fig. 3), the two versions of “The Extreme Unction” (parts of the two Sacraments series), and “The Testament of Eudamidas”.[11] Of these the first and the last are evocations of clearly defined moments from scenes in ancient literature, Tacitus, *Annals* 2.71–72 and Lucian, *Toxaris* 22–23 respectively. The “Germanicus”, at one time, at least, perhaps Poussin’s most admired and certainly one of his most often copied pictures,[12] dates to 1626–1628, early in the artist’s stay in Rome. The

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[7] Blunt (1966) 124 nr. 173; 125 nr. 174. The first picture is on loan from the Earl of Plymouth in the National Museum of Wales, Cardiff; the second, formerly belonging to the Earl of Derby, is now in the Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool. Wild (1980) I 135; II 162–163, nrs. 175, 176, would prefer to put the pictures, on stylistic grounds, and in face of the evidence, in the early fifties. Figures 1–5 can be found at the end of this article.

[8] Blunt (1944).

[9] Friedlaender (1949) II 13 nr. 124; Blunt (1956) 42 nr. 206; Rosenberg- Prat (1994) 270 nr 139.

[10] Cf. Geiger (1996) 272. Another drawing in Windsor Castle, more of a full-scale study of the death scene, is by a French follower of Poussin, see Friedlaender (1949) II 13, nr B21; Blunt (1956) 53 nr. 278; Rosenberg- Prat (1994) II, 1134 nr. R1324.

[11] Poussin never painted the death of the Stoic most congenial to him, Seneca. This deficiency has been redressed by the brilliant red herring in John Banville’s novel *The Untouchable*.

[12] Rosenberg-Butor (1973) 3, 26–44; Blunt (1966) 113–114 nr. 156.

date of the "Eudamidas" is debated, though certainly much later.[13] Of the Plutarchan motifs there are a number beside the two "Phocions" that should be considered. A subject probably derived from Plutarch is "Theseus Finding his Father's Arms", (from Plut., *Thes.* 6) painted ca. 1638.[14] A great number of Plutarchan themes, like the suicide of Cato, were subjects of drawings but never executed as paintings. The others are themes that appear in Plutarch as well as in other writers.[15] "Camillus and the Teacher of Falerii", painted twice by Poussin, is a story repeated in Livy 5.27, Valerius Maximus 6.5.1 and in the Plutarchan Life (*Cam.* 10).[16] The highly popular theme of "The Continence of Scipio" could be taken from Livy 26.50, Valerius Maximus 4.3.1 or Plut., *Reg. imp. apophth.* 196B.

The pair of Phocion paintings is unique among the classical themes of Poussin in that they are pendants painted at the same time for the same patron and represent two consecutive stages of a story.[17] Moreover, this is a story very carefully observed and related in its details. But the most remarkable fact, perhaps, is the relative obscurity, or shall we say lack of popularity, of the story.[18] There exists no evidence as to whether the painter himself or the Lyons silk merchant Cerisier (or Sérisier), who commissioned the pictures, decided on the subject, and we know too little of the latter even to guess his attitude.[19] On

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[13] Blunt (1966) 111; the painting is now assigned to ca. 1645–1650, see Verdi (1995) 259–260.

[14] Now in Chantilly. Blunt (1966) 129–130 no. 182: it is perhaps inspired by a relief of the story seen on the Acropolis by Pausanias (1.27.8).

[15] Blunt (1967) 161.

[16] Recently it has been argued by Kimura (1996) that Poussin's design was inspired by a woodcut in the 1516 first Latin edition of the *Lives*; he may have had other sources as well.

[17] This is different from Poussin returning to the same subject in different periods of his life or painting various incidents of a story at various times, as the Tasso paintings "Rinaldo and Armida" (Dulwich Gallery, London) and "Armida carrying off Rinaldo" (Berlin—doubtfully original, though from original composition), or the "Exposure of Moses" in the Ashmolean, Oxford, and the "Finding of Moses" (Louvre).

[18] There are three modern biographies of Phocion: Gehrke (1976), Bearzot (1985) and Tritle (1988, based on a Chicago dissertation of 1978; he ignores his two predecessors); the bilingual edition Bearzot-Geiger (1993) contains a good introduction and notes by Bearzot (as well as modern evaluations). Gehrke (1976) 198–216 devotes some discussion to the figure in the eighteenth century and modern research; Tritle starts his preface (and the book) with a reference to "Nicholas Poussin's painting of the burial of Phocion". He also is the author of a survey and analysis of the Plutarchan biography, Tritle (1991), only slightly more generous to Phocion's other biographers than in the book; for a discussion à propos the last great Poussin exhibition see Verdi (1996).

[19] For the little we know see Thuillier (1995).

the other hand, as we have seen, Poussin was a painter of historical pictures, a reader of Plutarch and, moreover, recognised as a "painter-philosopher", to whom the philosophical message of the story and the comparison with Socrates would naturally appeal. Thus, though no explicit evidence is to be found, we may assume as a working hypothesis that the idea of the subjects of these pictures originated with Poussin.[20]

Art historians as a rule posit these pictures among the landscapes of Poussin,[21] with a major authority indeed making them the cornerstone of his influential distinction between "ideal" and "heroic" landscapes.[22] How can and should we reconcile these two apparently contrary notions of landscapes on the one hand and the faithful following of a narrative text on the other? Moreover, even a cursory inspection of the pictures reveals three rather than two main elements, careful archaeological research into architectural landmarks playing a no lesser part than the nature components of the scenery.

Poussin's admiration for classical antiquity, his youthful striving for Rome and his (with the exception of a period of two years) successful reluctance to leave her once he settled there, are among the most basic facts of the painter's biography. An admiration for Rome's antiquities is a factor that can hardly be disregarded in any study—an obvious example would be the appearance of the Castel Sant' Angelo as part of the scenery (though never given central place or specific significance) in about half a dozen different paintings.[23] Now in the Phocion paintings, especially in the Cardiff "Burial", a number of exactly copied works of ancient architecture, as perceived at the time, have been identified.[24] It is important to repeat here a very simple and basic truth: for Poussin, as for his contemporaries, and indeed for everybody prior to Winckelmann, ancient art was of one piece, Greek and Roman alike, so that the Castel Sant' Angelo was in its place in Athens as was, as

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[20] Cf. Puttfarken (1999) 59: "In his letters he insisted again and again that it was he, Poussin, who worked out the *matière*, the subject-matter, either by finding it himself or, if the theme was commissioned, transforming it in his mind into a *belle pensée*", and the evidence adduced there.

[21] For insightful analyses see Verdi (1990) 35–36, 42.

[22] Blunt (1944).

[23] Blunt (1967) 273: "evidently one of his favourite monuments". On top of its appearance in the Cardiff "Phocion" it can be also seen in the Ashmolean "Exposition of Moses", in the Chicago "Landscape with St John on Patmos", the "magnificent drawing" (Blunt [1967] 319) in Stockholm of the "Rape of Europa", and in the Edinburgh "Ordination" (cf. Cropper-Dempsey [1996] 142).

[24] Cropper-Dempsey (1996) 284.

we shall presently see, the Pantheon in Jerusalem, as the Temple, or the Roman interior in the Antiochia of Germanicus' death-scene. A recent discovery should modify our view of Poussin's attitude to classical architecture as it developed following his first encounter with Rome and her buildings and ruins. It was well-known that long before the 1638 "Titus' Destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem", now in Vienna (fig. 4), Poussin's very first major commission in Rome, in 1625–1626 by Cardinal Fr. Barberini, involved a picture on the very same theme.[25] Now that this picture, long lost, has been discovered[26] and found its home, very appropriately, in Jerusalem (fig. 5), one can see the overwhelming impression of Rome on the recently arrived painter: the Temple is an exact copy of the Pantheon, one of the soldiers is carrying the seven-branched candalabrum, carefully copied from the Arch of Titus,[27] and the prince himself and his horse are deeply indebted to the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius. It is quite instructive to compare this with the Vienna version: the side view of the Temple, though retaining the same Corinthian columns and capitals, is less easily recognisable as the Pantheon, but classical ruins obviously representing the Antonia[28], occupy the background; the reproduction of Antiquity is more subtle, less immediate.

The use of elements from classical art and architecture is common to the history paintings of Poussin, and comes to the fore in the Death of Germanicus, the two versions of the Destruction of Jerusalem as well as the two Phocion pictures. What singles out the Phocion paintings is their closeness to the Plutarchan text that is of a different degree from the painter's dependence on Tacitus or even Josephus. Tacitus' account of the death of Germanicus (*Annals* 2.71–72) lacks in graphic detail and is made up chiefly of the dying man's speech. The one graphic detail—"*iuravere amici dextram morientis contingentes spiritum ante quam ultionem amissuros*" ("his friends, touching the right hand of the dying man, swore to forsake their lives before they forsook vengeance")—is left out, though drawn in the preparatory studies.[29] The very generalness of the scene

[25] The two pictures have been juxtaposed in an exhibition in the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, 8.2.-13.5.2001, see Seipel (2001).

[26] The story of the discovery is well worth reading: Mahon (1998).

[27] It did not prevent Sotheby's from auctioning the picture as "Destruction of Carthage" by an anonymous painter, see Mahon (1998) 50.

[28] Emmerling (1939) 43; cf. also Bätschmann (1990) 123, writing before the discovery of the earlier "Titus".

[29] Rosenberg-Prat (1994) 27, 146.

allowed for using the sarcophagus with the death of Meleager as a model for the scene.[30] Another interesting point is the choice of theme. One would think of "The Death of Germanicus" as hardly an appropriate subject to paint for the nephew of a reigning pope, a Renaissance ruler with worldly power and interests, but this would be of course contrary to seventeenth century thinking, when the Macchiavellian Tiberius was admired as an ideal prince and the doing away with Germanicus as a sublime example of statecraft.[31] Our picture however, could, but for the caption, illustrate the death of any Roman—indeed, any ancient—person of rank.

The relationship between the Destruction of Jerusalem pictures and the text of Josephus (*BJ* 6.251–287) is interesting. Here particulars of the lengthy and detailed description are compressed to the best effect, with facts added or adjusted according to the painter's fancy. According to Josephus (6.254) when Titus was told in his tent of the conflagration he leapt up (ἀναπηδήσας) and ran (ἔθει) to the Temple; Poussin could not resist from sitting the Prince on a white horse modeled on the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, though of course good use could be made of the gesture of the right hand of the statue to illustrate Josephus' assertion (6.256) of Titus using both his voice and his right hand (τῇ τε φωνῇ καὶ τῇ δεξιᾷ) to signal to stop the fire. (For reasons of composition in the first Jerusalem picture the gesture is transferred to the left hand). While Josephus relates only later, and in general terms, the plunder of the treasures of the Temple (271) and enumerates these treasures, headed by the seven-branched candlestick and the table of shew-bread only while narrating the triumph in Rome (7.148–149) Poussin faithfully reproduced these—of course from the Arch of Titus rather than from the text of Josephus. The conflagration and the carnage are depicted in both versions of the picture by artistic considerations. As has been shown,[32] both versions of the picture may have reflected political situations of the time relevant to the respective commissioners or recipients.

The two Phocion pictures are of a different mould altogether. As I have already stated, the story seems to have been much less famous than either Tacitus' narration of the end of Germanicus or that of the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem by Titus as told by Josephus.

[30] Rosenberg-Butor (1973) 7–8.
[31] Van Helsdingen (1968–1969) 156–158.
[32] Van Helsdingen (1968–1969) 158–161; Solinas (2001) 13–14.

This very relative obscurity of the text will hardly of itself account for its punctilious rendition. Indeed, the course and meaning of the events—though of course not the beauty of the landscape and the harmonious composition—will be lost on the viewer not acquainted with the text of Plutarch. Moreover, to render the story in an adequate manner, two pictures were needed—the commission of two pendants of equal size may have played a considerable part in Poussin's picking his theme.

Poussin retells closely Plutarch's story. In the foreground of the first picture the body of Phocion is being carried out from Athens. The background is the ancient city: as I have mentioned, for Poussin, as for his contemporaries, there was no distinguishing between different periods of Greek art, or between Greek and Roman, so that for instance the Castel Sant' Angelo—Hadrian's Mausoleum—could feature as part of fourth-century BC Athens. Also the classical models of other buildings have been identified in the picture[33] and generally the background is to be identified with the Athenian Acropolis—for Poussin and his contemporaries known only from literature and devoid of specific features. More notably the story of the procession of the festival of Zeus is part of the scene—the small figures in the background can be seen only from close by the attentive viewer and their significance will be utterly lost on the spectator unfamiliar with Plutarch. Other allusions to the text of Plutarch are even more recondite. The structure in the middle ground is a tomb (on very close inspection an inscription-like feature can be seen). This is not a general juxtaposition with Phocion, whose body was denied a burial in Athens, but a reference to Plutarch's text (23): Leosthenes challenged Phocion to tell what good he did his city as a general and Phocion replied: "No small thing, that the citizens are buried in their own tombs."[34]

As for the second picture, again it can be fully appreciated only by a viewer familiar with the story of Plutarch. Again, a number of ancient structures, among them one recalling Palladio's illustration of the Corinthian Temple at Trevi have been identified among Poussin's models.[35] One example that will, I think, suffice to prove Poussin's striv-

[33] Bätschmann (1990) 128; Cropper-Dempsey (1996) 284.

[34] This reference to the text of Plutarch makes the already very questionable identification of the tomb as that of Hippolytus (Cropper-Dempsey [1996] 284, following Dempsey [1963] 121) also superfluous; Bätschmann (1990) 128 draws attention to the compositional function of the tomb (analogous positions of corpse and tomb), an interpretation that is in no way in conflict with the reference to the textual source.

[35] Blunt (1944) 162–163; Bätschmann (1990) 128; Cropper-Dempsey (1996) 284.

ing for accuracy, as understood by him: Megara in the background is identified by the most famous feature of that city, its double acropolis.[36]

Once we realise the dependence of Poussin on the story of Plutarch there remains still the question of the painter's motif for choosing his subject. Two different spheres have influenced this choice. One, the political circumstances. The year 1648, though the date of the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia, was a year of violent internal disturbances and turbulence throughout Europe: in Naples there was a popular uprising against the king, in England civil war was rampant—Charles I was to be beheaded in January 1649—and in Poland the Cossacks rebelled. Most importantly for our painter, in his mother country the civil disturbance under the minority of Louis XIV, known as the Fronde, was raging.[37] Cerisier, the wealthy commissioner of the pictures must have felt threatened.[38] Little wonder, then, that the choice fell on a story with a message exemplifying the fickleness of the ungrateful mob and the sad fate of the steadfast hero.[39]

This brings us to our second point. Despite their tragic subject the two Phocion paintings reflect perfect serenity and exhibit remarkable harmony of composition. The painter chose to depict his pictures in a way that the distressing fate of the hero nevertheless does not break our hearts for a good reason. As is well known, Poussin was an adherent of

[36] See Pausanias 1.40.6; 42.1.

[37] Blunt (1944) 158–160; Bernstock (2000) does not discuss the Phocion landscapes.

[38] Blunt (1944) 160; Bruhn (2000) 104–110.

[39] Olson (2002), which appeared (or at least came to my attention) after the conference, offers a radically new, though far from convincing interpretation of Poussin's attitude to France and his and his patrons' position vis-à-vis the Fronde in particular (71–99, and see esp. 86–87, where he fails to demolish the thesis that "the subject of the Phocion landscapes Poussin painted for the silk merchant Sérizier during the Fronde has been aligned with political order.") His discussion of the two pictures at 217–218 and 225 borders on the grotesque and seriously raises the question whether he has read his pages of Plutarch, thus e.g. 217–218: "Far from depicting the clash of a disorderly crowd or the neglect of the corpse, the careful removal of the body represents a ritual that is compatible with the extramural burial of the Romans (witnessed by the tombs Poussin would have known along the via Appia Antica)." He concedes (218) that he "would be hard pressed to speak of Poussin's landscapes as entirely devoid of history." 225: "In the *Landscape with the Body of Phocion* the simple bier in the foreground contrasts with the pomp and fanfare of a procession in the distant, polluted city." *Ibidem* on the second picture: "Above the huddled woman who places the remains in the folds of her garment, a companion turns, responding to the sound of another solitary flute player lying in the shade of a birch." (The usual interpretation is that the servant of Phocion's wife fears to be discovered by a spy). One could go on—but who would wish to do so?

the then flourishing school of Neo-Stoicism:[40] it was Phocion's bearing his misfortune with philosophical composure, as indeed behooved a disciple of Plato, that must have been the real morale of the story.[41] Poussin's Phocion was the ideal statesman, the philosopher-king painted by the *peintre-philosophe*. The thread that bound Poussin to his source is even stronger than it appears on first sight. It is not only the details of the story that are taken from Plutarch, but more significantly still their moral and political import. In the two Phocion pictures Poussin not only faithfully reproduces a story from Antiquity and illustrates it with the remains of the age, but also illuminates the intellectual climate of Antiquity—all, of course, according to his lights.

[40] For the background see, e.g., Morford (1991); McCrea (1997) 5–31, and for Poussin and Stoicism, Blunt (1967) 157–176 with the reservations of Kitson (1999).

[41] For the moralistic aim and the overall plan of Poussin in these paintings see Verdi (1982), cf. Bruhn (2000) 114–118.

FIGURES 1–5



Figure 1. N. Poussin, 'The Funeral of Phocion', The Earl of Plymouth, National Museums & Galleries of Wales, Cardiff.

Figure 2. N. Poussin, 'The Ashes of Phocion Collected by his Widow', National Museums Liverpool (The Walker).

Figure 3. N. Poussin, ‘The Death of Germanicus’, The Minneapolis Institute of Arts.

Figure 4. N. Poussin, 'Titus' Destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem', Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna.

Figure 5. N. Poussin, ‘Titus’ Destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem’, The Israel Museum, Jerusalem.

John Addington Symonds. *A Problem in Greek Ethics*.[1] Plutarch's *Eroticus* Quoted Only in Some Footnotes? Why?

Pau Gilabert Barberà

It should be recognized that, although the conferences of the International Plutarch Society always devote a section to "Plutarch and the Classical Tradition", my contribution, such as it has been conceived, might seem both insignificant and extemporaneous. Notwithstanding, I think that I shall be capable of proving that, in a book which was pioneer and audacious in the study of the Greek pederasty in the age of Queen Victoria such as J.A. Symonds' (1840–1893) *A Problem in Greek Ethics*, Plutarch's *Eroticus* could not be a minor reference for a scholar who aimed at affirming the paradoxical ethical nature of the Greek "vice".[2] Indeed, Symonds suggests that medical psychologists and jurists should pay attention to the fact that Greece is the sole example of a great and highly developed race not only tolerating homosexual passions but deeming them of spiritual value, and attempting to use them for the benefit of society. In his opinion, it is a phenomenon belonging to one of the most brilliant periods of human culture and, as a consequence, with regard to it both jurists and psychologists should be open-minded (1).

What does "homosexual passions" mean in Symonds' thought? Symonds hastens to explain that in the Homeric poems, in the heroic period, no trace of this passion is found, but he adds immediately that historical Greeks already chose the friendship Achilles-Patroclus as an

[1] 1971 (first published 1901); the number of the page or pages in parenthesis will always correspond to this edition. Symonds privately printed an edition of ten copies of his book in 1883, which was later revised and added to the first edition of Ellis' *Sexual Inversion* in 1897. In 1901 appeared an edition of one hundred copies and bore the following subtitle: *An Enquiry into the Phenomenon of Sexual Inversion Addressed Especially to Medical Psychologists and Jurists*.

[2] This is the term used by Clive Durham in E. M. Forster's *Maurice*, when he despises all those who are incapable of understanding the noble nature of his attachment to Maurice Hall: "I'm a bit out of law, I grant, but it serves these people right. As long as they talk of the unspeakable vice of the Greeks they can't expect fair play" (London: Penguin Books Edition, 1972 p. 84).

ideal of the masculine love. Under the protection, then, of this noble model, no one, even in the Victorian period, should be shocked by its definition:

> It was a powerful and masculine emotion, in which effeminacy had no part, and which by no means excluded the ordinary sexual feelings. Companionship in battle and the chase, in public and in private affairs of life, was the communion proposed by Achilleian friends—not luxury or the delights which feminine attractions offered. The tie was both more spiritual and more energetic than that which bound man to woman (3).

Nevertheless, concerning sex, Greece is not only known as a spiritual country, so that Symonds does not hesitate to add that very early in Greek history, boy-love, as a form of sensual passion, became a national institution. This has been proved by mythological traditions and legendary tales related both to the birth of some Greek cities and the customs of the Dorian tribes (4). After having affirmed that the prevalent opinion among the Greeks ascribed the origin of pederasty to Crete -where the legend of Zeus and Ganymede was localised[3]-, spreading from Crete to Sparta, and thence through Hellas. Symonds thinks of an oriental transmission to the Greeks of pederasty in its crudest form, since Crete, together with Cyprus, formed one of the principal links between Phoenicia and Hellas (5). In any case, Symonds' main interest is to analyse the influence exerted by the Dorian section of the Hellenic family on the development of pederasty. He propounds a theory but, at the same time, he acknowledges that "the position thus stated is, unfortunately, speculative rather than demonstrable" (18). According to his thesis, the Dorians, in their migration to Lacedaemon and Crete, brought with them the heroic pederasty. The Dorian warriors for whom the camp became their country, without sufficiency of women, inspired by the memory of Achilles and venerating their ancestor Herakles, had special opportunity for elevating comradeship to the rank of an enthusiasm:

> These circumstances, by bringing the virtues of sympathy with the weak, tenderness for the beautiful, protection for the young, together with corresponding qualities of gratitude, self-devotion and admiring attachment…may have tended to cement unions between man and man no less firm than that of marriage… Fighting and foraging in company (17).[4]

[3] This is the exact reference given by Symonds: "*Laws*, I. 636. Cp. *Timaeus*, quoted by Ath., p. 602. Servius. *ad. Aen.* X. 325" (4).

[4] See as well p. 62.

Furthermore, Symonds does not deny the existence of forms of masculine love, which in his opinion are not honourable.[5] Therefore, one could think that he goes back on the above-mentioned ethical nature of the Hellenic pederasty, but, as seen before, pederasty in Hellas assumed precisely Hellenic characteristics, and it cannot be confounded with any merely Asiatic form of luxury (5). Indeed, there are two forms of masculine passion, a noble one and a base one,[6] just in the same way that there are also a Uranic and a Pandemic Eros—and there are two Aphrodites as well. The aim of *A Problem in Greek Ethics* is clearly as pedagogic as it is apologetic, so that Symonds hastens once more to emphasize that "with the baser form of *paiderastia* I shall have little to do in this essay" (7) and that he will write on the "Greek Love" (8) understood as "a passionate and enthusiastic attachment subsisting between man and youth, recognised by society and protected by opinion, which, though it was not free from sensuality, did not degenerate into mere licentiousness" (8).

Notice that, from this second part of a same definition, the previous reference to the "delights which feminine attractions offered" as well as to the nature "more spiritual and more energetic" which makes the homosexual love preferable to the conjugal one has completely disappeared. It is useless saying that this is a positive change, but I should like to comment on the biased interpretation with which Symonds—perhaps unconsciously- analyses and takes advantage of some Greek texts such as Plutarch's *Eroticus*. In fact, he has still not quoted it, but the traditional and arbitrary binomials luxury-woman and spirituality-man are much similar to those ones belonging to the Protogenes' brutal *apologia pro* pederastic love that must be remembered now:

> Genuine love has no connexion whatsoever with the women's quarters… there normally exists in men and women a need for the pleasure derived from each other; but when the impulse that drives us to this goal is so vigorous and powerful *(dyskáthekton)* it is a mistake to give the name Love to it. Love, in fact, it is that attaches himself to a young and talented soul and through friendship brings it to a state of virtue *(eis aretên)*; but the appetite for women *(epithimíais)*… has for net gain only an accrual of pleasure in the enjoyment of a ripe physical beauty… If, however, such a passion must also be called Love, let it at least be qualified as an effemi-

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[5] His theories, of course, should be contrasted now with a classic on Greek homosexuality such as Dover (1978), but also with Buffière (1980); Dowling (1994); Flacelière (1971); Halperin (1990); Marrou (1948) and Sergeant (1984).

[6] The proof is found by Symonds in "Max. Tyr., *Dissert*, IX" (7).

> nate *(thêlyn)* and bastard love… there is only one genuine Love, the love of boy *(ho paidikós)*… You will see it in the schools of philosophy, or perhaps in the *gymnasia* and *palestrae*… But that other lax and housebound love *(hýgron… kài oikouròn)*, that spends its time in the bosoms and beds of women *(en kólpois… kaì klinídiois)* ever pursuing a soft life *(tà malthakà)*, enervated amid pleasure devoid of manliness and friendship and inspiration *(hêdonaîa anándrois kaì aphílois kaì anenthousiástois)*, it should be proscribed… For friendship is a beautiful and courteous relationship *(kalòn… kaì asteîon)*, but mere pleasure is base and unworthy of a free man.[7]

Nowadays very few dare to put on the same level homosexuality and effeminacy. Consequently, the image of a Victorian homosexual such as Symonds appearing completely fascinated by the strong virility of the Greek Love -to the extent of seeing himself as a reflection of it and feeling protected by it- is as credible as it is logical. He despises the *malachía* but accepts undoubtedly this noble love defended by Protogenes, which is simple, unspoiled, hostile to the *gynaeceum* and capable of creating virtue by means of friendship. In this simple way, furthermore, he does not look suspicious to society about connivance with that quota of femininity that nowadays can be perfectly assumed by any man. And the suspicion, which caused that previous quotation, was certainly rhetorical, since, after having read all sorts of texts—coming from Greek tragedy, comedy, poetry, philosophy, etcetera- which make him maintain: a) the existence among the Greeks of a code of honour, distinguishing the noble form from the baser forms of pederasty, b) the decided preference of male over female love, c) the belief in the possibility of permanent affection between pederastic friends, etcetera presents repeatedly the sociological reasons for such a preference:

> It is sufficient for the present purpose to remember that free Athenian women were comparatively uneducated and uninteresting… While men transacted business and enjoyed life in public, their wives and daughters stayed in the seclusion of the household… They were treated throughout their lives as minors by the law… marriages at Athens were usually matches of arrangement between the fathers of the bride and the bridegroom, and that the motives which induced a man to marry were less the desire for companionship than the natural wish for children and a sense of duty to the country. Demosthenes, in his speech against Neaera, declares: "We have courtesans for our pleasures, concubines for

[7] 750C–751B. Translated into English by W. C. Helmbold (1969). All the quotations in English of Plutarch's *Eroticus* will correspond to this edition. See also p. 57 when he refers to Lucianus' *Amores* in which Callicratides propounds a very similar theory. He insists on the same idea with regard to Greek art on page 66.

> the requirements of the body, and wives for the procreation of lawful issue". If he had been speaking at a drinking-party, instead of before a jury, he might have added, "and young men for intellectual companions" (33) (and, close to "country", there is the number 1 of the footnotes which says: "See the curious passages in Plato, *Symp.*, p. 192, Plutarch, *Erot.*, p. 751; and Lucian, *Amores*, c. 38").[8]

Consequently, Symonds has certainly read the *apologia pro* pederasty. A *lógos*, which is highly misogynist, defended by Protogenes in Plutarch's *Eroticus*, and, besides, this is the dialogue that provides him with several noble examples of heroic masculine love throughout *A Problem in Greek Ethics*. Such as Herakles whose love stories always exhibit martial comradeship (10)[9]; Antileon of Metapontum, fighting against tyranny because of his attachment to a handsome boy (12)[10]; Epaminondas who loved two young men, Asopicus and Cephisodorus, the latter dying with him at Mantineia and being buried close to him (20),[11] or one of the sons of Niobe in Sophocles' play who, after having been shot and being about to die, calls for help no other ally than his lover (29),[12] etcetera. Concerning all these examples and adopting his language we could affirm that "effeminacy had no part". But it is also true that, although Symonds says nothing about it—which would confirm his biased reading- Plutarch adds many other instances of feminine heroic love. That is to say, great feminine attachments to their husbands such as the story of the Galatian Camma who died in order to revenge on Sinorix for having killed her husband Sinatus,[13] or the story of Empone whom the emperor Vespasianus ordered to execute on account of having continued to live with his husband, Civilis, who stirred up a revolt against him in Gaul,[14] or the well-known instance of Alcestis.[15]

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[8] See also pages 51, 53–54 and 68–69.

[9] In a footnote: "Plutarch, *Eroticus*, cap. XVII, p. 761, 40, Reiske" (761E).

[10] In fact, this is the only time Symonds quotes Plutarch's *Eroticus* not in a footnote but in the text; he says: "In order to illustrate the haughty temper of Greek lovers, the same author, in his *Erotic Dialogue*, records the names of Antileon of Metapontum, who braved a tyrant in the cause of a boy he loved (Cap. XVI, p. 760 21)" (12) (760C).

[11] 761D.

[12] 760D.

[13] 768B–D.

[14] 770D–771E. Only at the end of his study Symonds warns the readers of the fact that "it does not follow from the facts which I have discussed that, either at Athens or at Sparta, women were excluded from an important position at home… The women of Sophocles and Euripides, and the noble ladies described by Plutarch warn us to be cautious in our conclusions on this topic" (64).

[15] 761F.

Therefore, the influence of Protogenes' words can be detected in Symonds' abhorrence of what he considers "effeminate love"[16] as well as in his appreciating the nature "more spiritual and more energetic" of masculine love. But, on the other hand, he is apparently not conscious of the logical consequences of such a view. Indeed, if only the pederastic love is a true one, since it is a noble feeling which is peculiar to free citizens who attempt to "hunt" boys for the cause of virtue, we should conclude that, as far Protogenes is concerned, the conjugal love, which is necessary for "producing children", is not a noble passion—which in its turn means that it is unnatural *(parà phýsin)* and should be even considered illegal *(parà nómon)*. It is true that Protogenes seems not to speak about Ethics but he distinguishes the noble masculine love from the base one, and nobleness is firm and lives in masculine areas where body-strength is cultivated: *gymnasia* and *palestrae*, as well as mind-strength: schools of philosophy. Masculine bodies and minds are strong—Protogenes *dicit*-, unlike feminine bodies which are soft and smooth. Consequently, the features of masculine anatomy become the means by which the ethical nobleness is defined, just in the same way the feminine features, after having been capriciously stigmatized, become synonymous in their turn of ethical and moral softness. Did Symonds notice that western culture has "sexualised" ethics or, even worse, has "masculinised" it, when it is obvious that ethics has no gender? I do not think so, since the Victorian exaltation of women, who are seen as honourable wives and mothers—bearing in mind the instance of Queen Victoria-, prevents men from discovering in themselves a centuries old intellectual vice: misogyny.

At any rate, given that he believes in the singularity of the Greek Love, as well as in its ethical nature and sociological value, it is logical that Symonds uses Plutarch's *Eroticus* in order to provide examples with which a true virile experience of masculine love—his experience, in the end, besides the conjugal one[17]- can be illustrated. However, Plutarch is far away from the Platonic exaltation of philosophical pederasty[18] and, although his dialogue presents once more a Platonic understanding of love,[19] it is also certain that it was written between the end of

[16] As on the pages 35–36 regarding Lucianus' *Amores*.

[17] See for example Grosskurth (1964 and 1984).

[18] Although Symonds thinks that such an exaltation corresponds in fact to Socrates (48).

[19] See for example 765B.

the first century and the beginning of the second one, so that Aristotelian Logics cannot be forgotten. Indeed, Plutarch's main interest is to demonstrate the incoherence consisting in assigning *eros kaì philía* to pederastic love, when both men and women have the same virtue and, as a consequence, absurd discriminations must not be admitted. In fact, Plutarch gives preference to the values of conjugal love to those ones of pederasty, which means that his *Eroticus* contains much more information than that quoted by Symonds in the footnotes. Or, in other words: although he maintains that "with the base form of *paiderastia* I shall have little to do in this essay", Plutarch, who does not show such a tendency to distinguish the noble love from the base one, denounces the most miserable aspects of pederasty—*i. e.* he does not hide them- in order to be impartial. Indeed, the advocates of conjugal love in Plutarch's *Eroticus* to whom Symonds pays little attention maintain that: a) the masculine love is also soft and effeminate[20]; b) pursues pleasure[21]; c) implies *hýbris*[22]; d) causes terrible vengeances[23]; e) is inconstant[24] and f) its incontinences are even worse than those of feminine love.[25]

The impartial use of Plutarch's *Eroticus* as a source of information in a study on Greek Love demanded that all these doubts about its ethical nature were enumerated. Symonds may have thought that the fact of admitting the existence of "base forms of *paiderastia*" exempts him from giving more details, but it is quite evident that Plutarch's aim is to correct both the unfair and illogical assignment of *eros kaì philía* to pederasty. He does not speak, of course, about the social relegation of women using the terms that are peculiar to contemporary sociology, but he does regret their intellectual relegation. He already thinks of them as educators of society, since their virtue *(aretê)*—such as it was already affirmed by Cynicism and Stoicism—, and we should bear in mind now that virtue is in Plutarch's time, and long time ago, a science to be learnt and taught—and obviously talent is essential. The logical aim is, then, to transform *gynê* into a true intellectual interlocutor and comrade of men, both in search of common wealth and educating the young citizens. This is his thesis:

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20 751E.
21 752A.
22 768E.
23 768F.
24 770B.
25 769B.

> So it is ridiculous to maintain that women have no participation in virtue. What need is there to discuss their prudence and intelligence, or their loyalty and justice, when many women have exhibited a daring and great-hearted courage which is truly masculine? And to declare that their nature is noble in all other relationships and then to censure it as being unsuitable for friendship alone, that is surely a strange procedure. They are, in fact, fond of their children and their husbands; their affections are like a rich soil ready to receive the germ of friendship; and beneath it all is a layer of seductive grace.[26]

Plutarch does not compromise about what Symonds would consider "circumstances"; on the contrary, he takes up the intellectual challenge of returning to women and to the love and friendship they offer the dignity of which they were always worthy. As far as he is concerned and according to his Platonic view of love, both men and women generate *eros;* the trails of the soul can be followed both in masculine and feminine bodies, and both men and women arouse those beautiful and sacred reminiscences—the Platonic *anámnêsis*- which lead human beings, once again with their wings, towards the divine beauty:

> In the play, the pleasure-lover is asked whether *To women more than men is he inclined?* And he answers *Where there is beauty, he is ambidextrous*…it is no less true that the noble lover of beauty engages in love wherever he sees excellence and splendid natural endowment without regard for any difference in physiological detail... will not the lover of human beauty be fairly and equably disposed toward both sexes, instead of supposing that males and females are as different in the matter of love as they are in their clothes?… they say that beauty is the "flower of virtue"; yet it would be absurd to deny that the female produces that flower or gives a "presentation" of a "natural bent for virtue".[27]

For a scholar who, as Symonds, intends to explain the nobleness of the Greek Love to his contemporary Victorians, considering it equal to conjugal love and even reasoning the fact that in Greece pederasty was really appreciated, the reference to Plutarch's *Eroticus*, where precisely both pederastic and conjugal love were compared, was inevitable. Why does he leave unmentioned, then, Plutarch's main thesis? Why does he quote Plutarch's *Eroticus* only in some footnotes and, after having left it aside, does he insist on the logical pre-eminence of masculine love, a sort of logic that was already called in question in Antiquity? Nobody calls precisely in question Symonds' intellectual value and his

[26] 769B–C.
[27] 767A–B.

nobleness is evident if the memoirs of his secret homosexual life are read with open mind. Why, therefore, does *A Problem in Greek Ethics* show such a biased interpretation? In my opinion, as in the case of Clive Durham in E.M. Forster's *Maurice*, Symonds reads with such an enthusiasm and emotion the examples of noble and unselfish masculine love, which are one of the legacies of Antiquity appearing in excellent literary texts, that he renders with romanticism to its remembrance and indulgent analysis—since those noble instances are, furthermore, ancient esteemed models of his contemporary personal experience.

Indeed, his case does show the tendency to use Greece in order to sanction personal experiences. Shelley had said: "We are all Greeks"[28] and Symonds proclaimed that all civilized nations were "colonies of Hellas".[29] Notwithstanding, the decadence of the Hellenic dream during the twentieth century together with the brilliant results of the social sciences made it clear that, according to the Greeks, pederasty was the result of social circumstances but not of a true sexual identity. Symonds wrote precisely on the Greek "circumstances" which transformed women into "uneducated and uninteresting" human beings. He also understood the incoherence of an education-system, such as the contemporary British one, which was based on boarding schools and colleges where Plato's dialogues were read and explained, apostatizing, however, from the homoerotic content of his philosophy. Indeed, these boarding schools and colleges were in fact masculine worlds in many aspects perfectly comparable to the Greek ones and, as a consequence, love-stories among students or among teachers and students were not infrequent.[30] Does Symonds complain about the Victorian relegation of women, a true one although they were "adored" both as mothers and as august and honourable beings?[31] Not explicitly, since those "circumstances", if we bear in mind Charlotte Barlett's words in E. M. Forster's *A Room with a View*, seem certainly immovable:

> It was not that ladies were inferior to men; it was that they were different. Their mission was to inspire others to achievement rather than to achieve themselves. Indirectly, by means of tact and a spotless name, a lady could accomplish much. But if she rushed into the fray herself she would be first censured, then despised, and finally ignored… There

[28] *Hellas*, preface.
[29] Symonds (1876) 2, 383.
[30] See for example Cruzalegui (2002) 448–465.
[31] On Victorian women see among others Hellerstein (1981); Castero (1982) and Lewis (1991).

> is much that is immortal in this medieval lady. The dragons have gone, and so have the knights, but still she lingers in our midst. She reigned in many an early Victorian castle, and was queen of much early Victorian song. It is sweet to pay her honour when she has cooked our dinner well… Men, declaring that she inspires them to it, move joyfully over the surface, having the most delightful meetings with other men, happy, not because they are masculine, but because they are alive.[32]

Nevertheless, it is quite sure that Symonds is conscious of the fact that, if women's education and social status—both in Ancient Greece and Contemporary England- had been a different one, he would have had in his turn a much better conjugal experience. At any rate, the aim of *A Problem in Greek Ethics* does not correspond to the one of Plutarch's *Eroticus*.[33] To sum up: Symonds, as many others before and after him, discovered that, in difficult and risky times when homosexuality was despised and considered as a sin, a psychological disorder or a crime punished by law, he had the opportunity of explaining, understanding, and redeeming himself by presenting the Greek model. And having such a great opportunity the strict rules of interpretation are relegated, in my opinion, from an intellectual exercise that is much more naive than a severe contemporary critic—which is not my role—might guess.

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[32] London: Penguin Books Edition (1990) 60–61.

[33] See Holliday & Kemp (2000) 81–101 and 55–61.

THE POET AND THE STATESMAN: PLUTARCHAN BIOGRAPHY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

Susanne Gippert

The English translation of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives of the Greek and Romans* by Sir Thomas North (1579), itself taken from a French version by Jacques Amyot (1559), was widely read in England and had a significant influence, not only on Shakespeare, for whom it provided great inspiration. In the Seventeenth Century, North's translation of Plutarch's biographies served as a model for Izaak Walton's *Lives* of John Donne (1641), George Herbert (1670), and others. In 1683, John Dryden introduced an English version of *Plutarch's Lives*, and supplied an analysis of their style and structure in his *Life of Plutarch*, which was prefixed to the translations. It is noteworthy that Dryden's *Life of Plutarch*, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, provides the very first instance in English literature of the term "biography" as "the history of the lives of individual men, as a branch of literature".[1]

However, Plutarch's *Lives* were most widely celebrated throughout the eighteenth century as the ideal biographical model. The tradition of eighteenth century biography commenced with the publication in the 1740's of many literary lives of Alexander Pope after his death in 1744. Some years later, the *Biographia Britannica* (1747–1766) began to publish the lives of eminent personalities of the English nation. The *magnum opus* of the time, however, is James Boswell's *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791), particularly praised for its liveliness and intimacy. But Johnson himself provided a highly influential biographical work, to which I shall return: *The Lives of the English Poets* (1779–1781).

As a literary genre, biography soon became the subject of eighteenth century literary criticism. Yet in the early eighteenth century, biographical and autobiographical theory was mainly voiced in prefaces and reviews rather than in separate essays. Critical comments were further interspersed in criminal accounts, anecdotes, memoirs, legal documents, newspapers, and fictional biographies. Similarly, biography itself also interacts with other genres, like novels, diaries, and letters.[2]

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[1] *OED* s.v. "biography" 1).

[2] For the development of biographical and autobiographical theory in eighteenth

An early instance of discrete biographical criticism, however, was an essay by Joseph Addison in his political newspaper *The Freeholder* (1715–1716). Among other things, Addison's text is remarkable in that it presents the first occurrence of the term "biographer" in English literature.[3] The motto prefixed to this early eighteenth century essay (Freeholder No. 35) is significantly taken from Sallust, *Catilinae Coniuratio* 8.2–4, where Sallust deals with the relationship between historical facts and the way they are represented in historiography. It is evident from the choice of quotation that Addison regards biography as a species of history, *i.e.* the history of commendable men and their achievements. In the subsequent essay, the terms "biography" and "history" as well as "biographer" and "historian" are used interchangeably. Addison, in Freeholder Nr. 35, laments the absence of good historians in England and the poor quality of contemporary biography, which he thinks has mainly been written for commercial advantage. "These are Grub Street biographers", he says,

> who watch for the death of a great man, like so many undertakers, on purpose to make a penny of him. He is no sooner laid in his grave, but he falls into the hands of an historian; who, to swell a volume, ascribes to him works which he never wrote, and actions which he never performed; celebrates virtues which he was never famous for, and excuses faults which he was never guilty of.[4]

To avert this kind of writing, Addison recommends impartiality, accurateness, and discretion. Yet all this he believes can only be realized if the biographer does not know the subject of a life personally. Moreover, he requires that there should have passed some time after the person's death, before the biography of a great man should appear in public.

Addison's essay for *The Freeholder* does certainly not apply to the later eighteenth century as far as the status of biography in England is concerned, but it anticipates some of the main issues in eighteenth century biographical criticism: truth and objectivity, the relationship between the biographer and his subject, the relative qualities of biography and autobiography. These were matters in which Samuel Johnson, almost half a century later, took a special interest and to which he made frequent contributions in his critical prose.

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century literary criticism, see Nussbaum (1997) 302ff.

[3] "A writer of biographies or of the life of a particular person", *OED* s.v. "biographer" 1).

[4] "The Freeholder No. 35", 167f.

Like Addison, Johnson was familiar with the biographies of classical antiquity, but he was particularly inspired by Plutarch's *Lives*. He even considered to translate these biographies and to compose *Lives of Illustrious Persons as well as of the active as the learned in imitation of Plutarch*. Although he does not explicitly refer to Plutarch's "Life of Alexander" he agrees with the sentiments voiced in the introduction of this biography:

> It must be borne in mind that my design is not to write histories, but lives. And the most glorious exploits do not always furnish us with the clearest discoveries of virtue or vice in men; sometimes a matter of less moment, an expression or a jest, informs us better of their characters and inclinations, than the most famous sieges, the greatest armaments, or the bloodiest battles whatsoever.[5]

It appears that the poets of Johnson's *Lives* considerably differ from Plutarch's soldiers and statesmen. Yet the passage from Plutarch's "Life of Alexander" seems to confirm the English biographer's emphasis on the morality of his subjects, especially in the private and domestic realm.[6]

Johnson's theory of biography was articulated in two essays he contributed to the periodicals *The Rambler* and *The Idler*. In Rambler Nr. 60, dating from 1750, Johnson is mainly concerned with the distinction between history, tragedy, and biography. Whereas histories and tragedies do not affect the reader, Johnson argues, the narrative of the life of a particular person moves our passions more strongly "in proportion as we can more readily adopt the pains or pleasures proposed to our minds, by recognizing them as once our own, or considering them as naturally incident to our state of life."[7] Johnson follows Plutarch in putting emphasis on the private man and on small detail: "The business of the biographer", he says,

> is often to pass slightly over those performances and incidents, which produce vulgar greatness, to lead the thoughts into domestic privacies, and display the minute details of daily life, where […] men excel each other only by prudence and by virtue.[8]

[5] *Alex.* 1.1.
[6] Folkenfink (1978) 98f.
[7] "The Rambler Nr. 60", 319.
[8] *Ibidem*, 321.

This statement certainly evokes Plutarch's comparison between the biographer and the portrait painter in the "Life of Alexander":

> […] as portrait painters are more exact in the lines and features of the face, in which the character is seen, than in the other parts of the body, so I must be allowed to give my more particular attention to the marks and indications of the souls of men.[9]

Plutarch's attention to detail is also revealed in the introduction to his "Life of Nicias":

> And such things as are not commonly known, and lie scattered here and there in other men's writings, or are found amongst the old monuments and archives, I shall endeavour to bring together; not collecting mere useless pieces of learning, but adducing what may make his disposition and habit of mind understood.[10]

As an example of what he calls "invisible circumstances", Johnson puts forward the passage from Sallust's *Catilinae coniuratio* (15.5), where the author describes Catiline's walk as "an indication of the mind revolving something with violent commotion": *citus modo, modo tardus incessus* ("His walk was now quick, and again slow").[11]

It appears from Sallust's characterization of Catiline that the subject of biography is not necessarily a noble character. It is noteworthy that Johnson, in his lifetime, had witnessed a considerable development of the genre, from the gentle and admiring biography of Izaak Walton to a more realistic form, which Johnson appreciates.[12]

Hence, Johnson, in distinction to biographers like Walton or his classical model Plutarch, insists on immediacy. As opposed to Addison, he explicitly requires that a life should be written shortly after the person's death:

> If a *Life* be delayed till interest and envy are at an end, we may hope for impartiality, but must expect little intelligence; for the incidents which give excellence to biography are of a volatile and evanescent kind, such as soon escape the memory, and are rarely transmitted by tradition.[13]

Yet, if the biographer writes from personal knowledge, he should not conceal faults and failings of a person in favour of a panegyric. By

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[9] *Alex.* 1.2.
[10] *Nic.* 1.5.
[11] "The Rambler Nr. 60", 321.
[12] Korshin (1997) 56.
[13] "The Rambler Nr. 60", 322f.

contrast, Johnson particularly demands the revelation of weakness and vices, as required by Plutarch in his introduction to the *Life of Demetrius*.

Hence, the moral purpose of biography significantly governs the biographer's portrayal of a "living acquaintance". In an essay he contributed to *The Idler* (Nr. 84) some years later, Johnson is mainly concerned with the distinction between biography and autobiography. But he also deals with the distinctive nature of the biographical genre, which describes "not how any man became great, but how he was made happy; not how he lost the favour of his prince, but how he became discontented with himself."[14] Johnson's emphasis on morality, which is also implicit throughout the *Rambler* essay, yet again calls to mind Plutarch's ideas of biography. The moral purpose of Plutarchan biography—the improvement of the author as well as the reader—is most clearly voiced in the introduction to the *Life of Aemilius Paullus*.

Johnson's theory of biography was put into practice in his *Lives of the English Poets* (1779–1781). The writer's career in this genre had begun in 1740 with brief biographical works, including the lives of Blake, Drake, and Barretier. His subsequent *Life of Richard Savage* (1744)—later included in his *Lives of the Poets*—was probably the first biography of a very unsuccessful man. In 1777, Johnson was requested to provide biographical forewords for an edition of the works of various English poets, a project launched by a number of London booksellers. However, the biographer at work was so fascinated by the lives and works of the English poets that he provided a complex work of biographical, but also historical and critical matter. When the work was completed, Johnson's fifty-two prefaces were published without the texts in 1781 as *The Lives of the English Poets*. Johnson's *Lives* include the most influential literary personalities of the time: Milton, Dryden, Pope, Addison, Swift, and Gray.[15]

To illustrate the relationship between Samuel Johnson's biographical criticism and Plutarch's ideas of biography, I shall compare in brief Johnson's *Life of Addison* with Plutarch's *Life of Solon*. For these lives provide a similar subject: the poet and the statesman.

The biography of Addison mingles poetry and politics because his literary success advanced his political career and his performances in

[14] "The Idler Nr. 84", 262.
[15] For the genesis of *The Lives of the English Poets*, see Clingham (1997) 161f.

both realms were of great importance in his life.[16] Similarly Solon's poetry, which initially served as a diversion, later comprised philosophical maxims and introduced his political performance.[17] This interplay between poetry and politics notably determines the structure of both lives.

In Johnson's *Lives*, a biographical and chronological section on the author's life and writings usually precedes a critical study of his works. Only the more complex lives incorporate an intermediate part, in which Johnson gives an account of the author's character illustrating his intellectual performance. In a portrayal of a character who was a poet and a statesman at the same time, however, the biographer has to take into account the miscellaneous continuities and discontinuities between life, literature, and politics. In the "Life of Addison", the political achievements are interspersed in Johnson's chronological account of the poet's life and work, but Addison's political success features prominently in the intermediate section on the intellectual character. "Of his virtue", Johnson says about Addison,

> it is a sufficient testimony, that the resentment of party has transmitted no charge of any crime. He was not one of those who are praised only after death; for his merit was so generally acknowledged, that Swift, having observed that his election passed without a contest, adds, that if he had proposed himself for king, he would hardly have been refused.[18]

Similarly, Plutarch interrupts his account of Solon's political performance, which he regards as one of the highest forms of activity available to men, to praise his poetry:

> The poem is called Salamis; it contains an hundred verses very elegantly written; when it had been sung, his friends commended it, and especially Peisistratus exhorted and incited the citizens to obey his directions […].[19]

It appears from both *Lives* that their biographers, ancient and modern, despite their original emphasis on either poetry or politics, recommend the interplay between the two realms. For in both cases, the person's respective activities in the one or the other field seem to accomplish his character, which seems to serve the moral purpose of Johnsonian as well as Plutarchan biography.

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[16] Folkenfink (1978) 108f.
[17] Wardman (1974) 198.
[18] "Life of Addison", 423.
[19] *Sol.* 8.3.

Nevertheless, Johnson's representation of Joseph Addison considerably differs from Plutarch's account of Solon. For the political achievements of the Greek legislator, which significantly reflect his character, are simply illustrated and highlighted through his poetry. In the case of Addison, however, Johnson recognizes that he is principally supposed to write a life of a poet, and that "to write and to live are very different".[20] Johnson is reluctant to rank Addison among the greatest writers—like Milton, Dryden, and Pope. Therefore his account of Addison's literary performance rather emphasizes the moral values of the writer's public life:

> It is justly observed by Tickell, that he [Addison] employed wit on the side of virtue and religion. He not only made the proper use of wit himself, but taught it to others; and from his time it has been generally subservient to the cause of reason and truth. [...] He has restored virtue to its dignity, and taught innocence not to be ashamed.[21]

In the subsequent section on his subject's works, however, Johnson significantly emphasizes Addison's strengths and weaknesses as a writer. These are most evident, Addison's biographer believes, in the essays he contributed to the periodical paper *The Spectator*:

> His prose is the model of the middle style; on grave subjects not formal, on light occasions not groveling; pure without scrupulosity, and exact without elaboration; always equable, and always easy, without glowing words or pointed sentences. Addison never deviates from his track to snatch a grace; he seeks no ambitious ornaments, and tries no hazardous innovations. His page is always luminous, but never blazes in unexpected splendour.[22]

The alleged limitations of Addison's prose essay is revealed in the modesty and mediocrity that Johnson's words convey. They are even more evident when compared, for instance, with Johnson's account of Dryden's prose. Yet, despite this judgment of Addison's literary performance, Johnson's "Life of Addison" significantly implies the idea that the *decorum* of Addison's political and intellectual life redresses his work and reveals him as being a "literary character, above all Greek, above all Roman fame."[23]

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[20] "Life of Addison", 427.
[21] *Ibidem*, 427f.
[22] *Ibidem*, 448f.
[23] *Ibidem*, 428.

Plutarch and Johnson each write a biography of a person who was a poet and a statesman at the same time. Whereas Plutarch is interested in the statesman, Johnson is mainly concerned with the poet. Both biographers, however, use that part of their hero's achievements which is not their main interest respectively for their account of the other part: Plutarch, who deals with an undoubtedly great statesman, refers to Solon's poetry to elucidate his politics and to emphasize their moral and emotional background through his own poetical voice. Yet Plutarch's *Vita Solonis* remains the biography of a statesman and is not converted into the life of a poet. Johnson, however, has to help the poet Addison with the statesman Addison. Like an advocate, he puts forward Addison's qualities as a statesman in order to redeem the supposed weaknesses in his writings. In favour of Addison, Johnson seems to follow the Plutarchan and Addisonian idea of writing a *Life*, hence not—as he says himself in the passage I quoted earlier—to simply accept imperfections, but to describe them conscientiously and with moderation as a friend—following the *locus classicus* of this kind of biography, the introduction to Plutarch's *Life of Kimon*.

PLUTARCH IN DEN DEUTSCHEN LANDEN IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT

Guillaume van Gemert

Einleitung

In der sogenannten Schedelschen Chronik, der prachtvoll illustrierten Weltgeschichte, die 1493 gleichzeitig in einer lateinischen wie in einer deutschsprachigen Ausgabe in Nürnberg erschien und eine Glanzleistung der frühen Buchdruckerkunst darstellt,[1] wird Plutarch zwar als Geschichtsschreiber gelobt, vor allem aber wird seine Autorität in moralischen Dingen herausgestellt: im Bereich der Sitten sei er, heißt es dort, ein großer „wilkürer" gewesen, eine Bezeichnung, die damals noch im Sinne von „Schiedsrichter" zu verstehen ist.[2] Gerade diese Eigenschaft des Schiedsmannes *in moralibus* habe ihn dazu befähigt, die Erziehung des Kaisers zu übernehmen. Seinem Schüler Trajanus habe er dabei viererlei ans Herz gelegt: daß der Fürst zuallererst die Ehre Gottes anzustreben habe, daß er weiter die eigene Ehrsamkeit nicht hintansetzen dürfe, daß er drittens unter den Amtsinhabern Disziplin wahren und schließlich die Untertanen beschützen und sich ihre Liebe erwerben müsse:

> Plutarchus ein naturlicher maister vnd außsprechender geschichtbeschreiber ein gepieter vnd anrichter des kaisers Trayani ist zu diser zeit an sinnreichmütigkeit vnd glawbwirdigkeit in fast großer achtung gewest. von dem Policrates in seinen historien also setzt Plutarch der naturlich maister ist ein mensch in den beschreibungen warhaftig. in den worten lawtter verstentlich. vnd in dem heiligthumb schrein der sitten ein so großer wilkürer gewest das er leichtlich ein gepieter des kaisers hat mügen erkannt werden. Diser Plutarchus tet sundern fleiß dem kaiser seinem iunger vier ding einzepilden. nemlich gottes erwirdigkeit, seinselbs ersamkeit. der ambtlewt zucht vnd der vnderthanen lieb vnnd beschützung. vnnd er hat als ein hochgelerter man gar vil bücher von mancherlay materien vnnd sachen in kriechischem vnd lateinischem

[1] Rücker (1973); Wilson (1976).
[2] Grimm (1960) 213.

> gezüng gar treffenlich beschriben vnnd mit seiner tapfferheit bey Trayano angename begabung erlangt.[3]

Der Kontext dürfte deutlich sein: Hartmann Schedel, der Verfasser der Chronik, nimmt für seinen Abschnitt über Plutarch Bezug auf die apokryphe *Institutio Traiani*, eine (lateinische) Fälschung, die Plutarch, wohl im Hochmittelalter, untergeschoben worden war.[4]

Fast vierzig Jahre später übernahm der große Verfechter des Spiritualismus im Zeitalter der Reformation, Sebastian Franck, der die institutionalisierte Kirche durch die des Geistes im Herzen der wahren Gläubigen ersetzen wollte,[5] Schedels Einstufung des Plutarch fast wortwörtlich in seiner *Chronica, Zeytbuoch und Geschycht Bibel* von 1531. Er erweiterte sie allerdings um den vielsagenden Satz, daß Plutarchs Bücher, die dessen ausgezeichnetes Renommee belegen, noch greifbar seien:

> Plutarchus ein gebieter vnd anrichter Traiani/ hat dise zeit geschinen/ in den beschreibungen warhafftig/ als Policrates von jm zeüget in den worten lauter/ verstentlich. Er fliß sich dem keyser seinem jünger iiij. ding ein zubilden/ Nemlich Gottes erwirdigkeit/ sein selbs ehrsamkeit/ der amptleüt zucht/ vnd der vnderthonen lieb vnd beschützung. Er war mit seiner dapfferkeit Traiano angenem/ seiner bücher die von seinem stand zeügen/ seind noch vor augen.[6]

Nochmals 80 Jahre später—zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts—erscheint Plutarch erneut in einer deutschen Weltgeschichte. Der bayerische Hofratssekretär Aegidius Albertinus, ein ausgewiesener Verfechter der Gegenreformation,[7] gedenkt seiner in seinem Geschichtswerk in Einzelleben *Der Teutschen recreation oder Lusthauß* von 1612–1613. Plutarch tritt auch hier dem Leser vor allem als Philosoph und Fürstenerzieher entgegen. Daß er auch Historiker war, wird gleichsam nur noch beiläufig erwähnt:

> Plutarchus ein fürtrefflicher Philosophus/ vnnd der allerberühmbteste Historienschreiber deß lebens der allerfürnembsten Griechischen vnnd Lateinischen Männer. Er ward deß Traiani Meister vnd dedicirte demselben das Buch deß guten Regiments der Fürsten/ [...].[8]

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[3] Schedel (2001) 111 recto. Die Zeichensetzung der Originalausgabe von 1493 wurde beibehalten, Abbreviaturen und Ligaturen wurden, wie in den nachfolgenden Zitaten aus frühneuzeitlichen Werken auch, stillschweigend aufgelöst.

[4] Ziegler (1951) 824–825.

[5] Hegler (1892).

[6] Franck (1966) 174 recto.

[7] Gemert (1979).

[8] Albertinus (1612) 552.

Eine explizite Bezugnahme auf die *Institutio Traiani*, wie sie sich bei Hartmann Schedel und Sebastian Franck fand, fehlt hier, wenn Albertinus auch ohne weiteres annahm, daß Plutarch der Präzeptor Trajans gewesen sei. Die weiteren Ausführungen zu Plutarch bestehen hier zum größten Teil aus Zitaten aus dessen (vorgeblichen) Schriften zur Regierungspraxis und zur Fürstenerziehung, wobei allerdings die Vorlagen noch nicht im einzelnen ermittelt werden konnten. Soviel mag der kursorische Blick auf die Plutarch-Abschnitte in den drei deutschsprachigen Chroniken der Frühen Neuzeit ergeben haben, daß sein Bild, wie es einem breiteren Publikum vermittelt wurde, in den knapp 120 Jahren zwischen der Schedelschen Weltchronik und Albertinus' Sammlung sich durch profunderes Wissen über ihn, auch außerhalb des Gelehrtentums, vertieft hat. Das scheint wesentlich das Verdienst der Übersetzungstätigkeit im 16. Jahrhundert gewesen zu sein.

Problemaufriß und Anliegen

Die Art und Weise wie Plutarch in den zeitgenössischen deutschsprachigen Chroniken präsentiert wird, legt aber auch den Schluß nahe, daß er in den deutschen Landen in der Frühen Neuzeit einem breiteren gebildeten, aber nicht gelehrten Publikum, das nicht über die Voraussetzungen verfügte, sich seine Werke in der Originalsprache bzw. in lateinischer Übersetzung anzueignen, in erster Linie als Verfasser der *Moralia* und viel weniger als der der *Vitae parallelae* bekannt geworden sein muß. Er mag einer solchen Leserschaft, die auf die landessprachliche Rezeption angewiesen war, damals vor allem als Moralphilosoph, und zwar besonders in der praktischen Ausprägung des Fürstenerziehers, gegolten haben. Das braucht nicht zu befremden: setzen doch die *Vitae* umfassendere Kenntnisse der Antike voraus, während diese zum Verständnis der *Moralia* in der Regel weniger vonnöten sind, wo ja ein gehöriges Maß an populärpsychologischem Einfühlungsvermögen durchweg ausreicht. Zudem gab es in den deutschen Landen nicht eine eigens auf ein breiteres Publikum ausgerichtete Debatte über die Glaubwürdigkeit des Historikers Plutarch, wie sie in Frankreich im 16. Jahrhundert zwischen Michel de Montaigne und Jean Bodin ablief,[9] die die Aufmerksamkeit auf eben diese Seite von Plutarchs Schaffen hätte richten können.

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[9] Montaigne (1969) 356–359 (Zweites Buch, Essai 32).

Die Vermutung einer Präponderanz des *Moralia*-Autors Plutarch als Sittenlehrer bzw. als Präzeptor von Fürstlichkeiten im Bewußtsein der damaligen Zeitgenossen, wie sie sich von seinem Stellenwert in den deutschsprachigen Chroniken der betreffenden Epoche her gleichsam anbietet, wurde noch nicht an konkreten deutschen Plutarch-Übersetzungen der Zeit unter Berücksichtigung von deren Entstehungskontext sowie von deren Funktionszusammenhang erhärtet. Überhaupt ist die deutsche Plutarch-Rezeption in der Frühen Neuzeit noch weitgehend Brachland. Die bis jetzt vorliegenden Untersuchungen setzen mit dem 18. Jahrhundert ein und befassen sich vorwiegend mit der Literatur der deutschen Klassik, namentlich mit Schiller, der aufgrund eines nie verwirklichten Plans, eine Sammlung deutscher Lebensbilder nach dem Muster von Plutarchs *Vitae* zu veröffentlichen, sogar als deutscher Plutarch bezeichnet wurde.[10]

Im folgenden soll der Blick gerichtet werden auf zwei frühe deutsche Übersetzungen von *Moralia*-Traktaten, und zwar auf solche aus der Zeit um 1520, die eine gewisse Breitenwirkung erzielten, indem sie auch zum Druck gelangten. Dabei gilt die Aufmerksamkeit besonders dem Vermittlungsweg in die deutschen Lande, dem Funktionsrahmen, für den sie gedacht waren, und dem Plutarch-Bild, das sie evozieren. Es kann nicht darum gehen zu eruieren, wie im einzelnen übersetzt wurde; nur insofern der Textvergleich Aspekte der zentralen Fragestellung erhellt, soll er durchgeführt werden.

Deutschsprachige Plutarch-Rezeption im 16. Jahrhundert

Der Schwerpunkt der frühen deutschsprachigen Plutarch-Vermittlung nach der Erfindung der Buchdruckerkunst scheint in den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren des 16. Jahrhunderts anzusetzen zu sein,[11] eben um die Zeit somit, als Sebastian Franck in seiner *Cronica* den deutschen Leser darauf hinwies, daß die Schriften des Chaironeiers noch ohne großen Aufwand erreichbar seien: 1534 wurden in Augsburg acht *Vitae* in der Übersetzung Hieronymus Boners gedruckt; sieben Jahre später, 1541, ließ derselbe Übersetzer in Kolmar sämtliche *Vitae* in einer Ausgabe erscheinen, die 1547 noch einmal als Titelneuauflage auf den

[10] Sadée (1911); Howard (1970).

[11] Zu den im folgenden genannten Plutarch-Ausgaben aus dem 16. Jahrhundert vgl. Worstbrock (1976) 117–125.

Markt gebracht wurde. Boner griff, wie er selber hervorhebt, auf eine lateinische Vorlage zurück. Bereits 1535 war in Straßburg ein Sammelband mit 21 Traktaten aus den *Moralia*, übersetzt von Michael Herr und Heinrich von Eppendorf, aus der Presse gekommen, die 1544 noch einmal als Titelauflage reaktualisiert wurde. Auch hier dürften sich die Übersetzer auf eine lateinische Vorlage gestützt haben.

Vor 1530 waren nur vereinzelt Schriften des Plutarch dem deutschsprachigen Leser zugänglich gemacht worden: 1507 hatte Matthias Ringmann in Straßburg eine Übersetzung von Caesars *De bello gallico* und *De bello civili* veröffentlicht und ihr Plutarchs Caesarbiographie angehängt—ein offensichtlich recht beliebtes Werk, das bis in die dreißiger Jahre noch drei Neuauflagen erlebte—und 1508 wurde in Augsburg Johann Pfeifelmanns nach einer lateinischen Vorlage angefertigte deutsche Fassung von *De liberis educandis*, der unechten Schrift, die den *Moralia* zugeordnet wurde, gedruckt. Dann blieb es lange still um Plutarch, bis der bekannte Luther-Gegner Hieronymus Emser[12] (1478–1527) eine deutsche Fassung von *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* vorlegte, die 1519 in Leipzig zum Druck gelangte, und im Jahr darauf der Mitstreiter Luthers Georg Spalatin[13] (1484–1545) seine Übersetzung von *De discernendo adulatore ab amico* ohne Ortsangabe drucken ließ. Beide Übersetzungen sollen hier näher berücksichtigt werden, da sie sich in recht aufschlußreicher Weise kontextualisieren lassen.

Emser und Spalatin als Plutarch-Übersetzer

Emser und Spalatin legten beide ihren Übersetzungen die lateinische Fassung des betreffenden Plutarch-Traktats zugrunde, die Erasmus kurz zuvor, 1514, in einem Sammelband mit dem Titel *Opuscula Plutarchi nuper traducta Erasmo Roterodamo interprete* bei Froben in Basel veröffentlicht hatte.[14] Die *Opuscula*-Ausgabe enthielt acht Abhandlungen aus den *Moralia*, 1525–1526 übersetzte Erasmus noch drei weitere. An der Wiederbelebung des Interesses in Westeuropa für Plutarchs Schriften und namentlich für die *Moralia* war Erasmus maßgeblich beteiligt. Bis in die zweite Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts war Plutarch im Westen nahezu vergessen; als nach dem Fall von Konstantinopel, 1453, griechische

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12 Grimm (1959).
13 Müller (1893); Volz (1958); Höss (1989).
14 Zu den folgenden Ausführungen über Erasmus und Plutarchus vgl. Koster (1977).

Gelehrte nach Italien kamen und sein Werk dort verbreiteten, galt die Aufmerksamkeit zunächst vor allem den *Vitae*, da hier das große Individuum, das dem Menschenbild der Renaissance besonders entsprach, recht ausgeprägt hervortrat. Aus den *Moralia* wurde in eben diesem Zusammenhang im Grunde nur der unechte Traktat *De liberis educandis* rezipiert, in dem die Zeit die Voraussetzungen der großen Individualität angelegt glaubte. Erst 1509 erschien dann in Venedig bei Aldus Manutius die große Gesamtausgabe der *Moralia* in der griechischen Originalfassung. Erasmus war hier mit involviert, insofern er dem Herausgeber Demetrius Ducas bei der Korrektur des Textes geholfen hatte. Den Anstoß zur eigenen Übersetzungsarbeit an Plutarchs *Moralia*, die Erasmus in England, wo er sich von 1509 bis 1514 aufhielt, vornahm, könnte mehreres gegeben haben: Es ist durchaus anzunehmen, daß Erasmus in der Auseinandersetzung mit der fremden Vorlage nach dem Dreischritt von *translatio*, *imitatio* und *aemulatio* seine Übersetzungstechnik habe verfeinern und seine Beherrschung des Latein habe vervollkommnen wollen. Auf das Ergebnis kann hier nicht eingegangen werden, da das Verhältnis von griechischem Original und Erasmus' lateinischer Fassung für den vorliegenden Kontext eher unerheblich ist: Erika Rummel hat hinreichend nachgewiesen, daß Erasmus zwischen Übersetzung und Paraphrase schillert und daß ihm eine gewisse Weitschweifigkeit nicht abzusprechen ist, wohingegen er aber auch Stellen zusammenstreicht, die ihm etwa anstößig anmuten.[15] Ein zweiter Auslöser von Erasmus' Plutarch-Übersetzungen könnte die Geldnot gewesen sein, die er in den englischen Jahren besonders gespürt haben muß, vielmehr aber noch dürfte er namentlich in Plutarch als Verfasser der *Moralia* einen verwandten Geist gefunden haben, und zwar besonders aufgrund von dessen Ansichten über Fürstenerziehung und Regierkunst.

In der *Institutio Principis Christiani* von 1515 empfiehlt Erasmus Plutarch als Pflichtlektüre für den angehenden Fürsten unmittelbar nach den Weisheitsbüchern Salomons aus dem Alten Testament und nach den Evangelien. Dabei rangieren bezeichnenderweise die *Moralia* vor den *Vitae*:

> An dritter Stelle [d.h. nach Salomon und den Evangelien] sind die „Aussprüche" des Plutarch zu lesen, hernach seine „Moralia". Es kann

[15] Rummel (1985) bes. 71–87.

> nämlich nichts Ehrwürdigeres gefunden werden, und ich möchte lieber, daß auch seine Biographien vorgenommen werden als etwas irgendeines anderen Autors.[16]

Es braucht denn auch nicht zu verwundern, daß in der Folgezeit mehrere Plutarch-Traktate der *Opuscula* wiederholt gemeinsam mit der *Institutio* in ein und derselben Sammelausgabe gedruckt wurden. Das gilt besonders für *De discernendo adulatore ab amico*, für *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* sowie für *In principe requiri doctrinam* und *Cum principibus maxime philosophum debere disputare*.

Der zuerst genannte Traktat, *De discernendo adulatore ab amico*,[17] wurde 1520 von dem kursächsischen Prinzenerzieher und damaligen Hofkaplan sowie Geheimschreiber Friedrichs des Weisen Georg Spalatin, der als Vertrauter des Hofes die Reformation in Sachsen maßgeblich mitgestaltete, verdeutscht unter dem Titel *Eyn fast guots vnd sittlichs büchlein Plutarchi/ von der vnderscheyde des freundts vnd schmeychlers/ allen fürsten herren/ regirern dienstlich tütsch.*[18] Der zweite, *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate*,[19] war kurz vorher, noch im Jahre 1519 von einem anderen Geistlichen im Hofdienst, dem Hofkaplan Georgs von Sachsen und katholischen Kontroverstheologen Hieronymus Emser mit dem knappen Titel *Plutarchus wie ym eyner seinen veyndt nutz Machen kan* auf deutsch ans Licht gegeben.[20]

Die unterschiedlichen Anliegen der Übersetzer werden schon an den Titeln augenfällig: Spalatin hat seine Übersetzung eindeutig für regierende Fürsten gedacht, die Plutarchs Ausführungen über falsche und wahre Freunde und über den Schaden, die erstere als Schmeichler verursachen, bei der Amtsführung beherzigen sollen. Emser scheint dagegen kein spezifisches Zielpublikum anzusprechen: er schickt seiner Übersetzung vielmehr einen vierzeiligen Reimspruch voraus, dem zu entnehmen ist, daß Plutarchs Abhandlung jedermann, wo immer er tätig sein mag, nutzen könne:

> Welch man/ myth veynden ist bestrickt/
> Vnd sich nach dyßem buchlein schickt/

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[16] Erasmus (1968) 243.
[17] Erasmus (1977) 117–163 (Hier unter dem Titel: „Quo pacto possis adulatorem ab amico dignoscere").
[18] Plutarchus (1520). Exemplar: Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, Sign.: Li Sammelbd. 219 (3).
[19] Erasmus (1977) 165–184 (Hier unter dem Titel „Quo pacto quis efficiat ut ex inimicis capiat utilitatem").
[20] Plutarchus (1519). Exemplar: Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, Sign.: Li Sammelbd. 219 (6).

Dem mögent veyndt offt nutzer seyn/
Dann frundt/ alleyn mit bloßem scheyn.[21]

Spalatins Plutarch-Übersetzung, auf die hier zunächst kurz eingegangen sei, ist Teil eines umfassenden Übersetzungsprogramms, dessen Schwerpunkte in den Jahren zwischen 1519 und 1523 eindeutig Luther und Erasmus bilden. Von den insgesamt sechs Erasmus-Schriften, die Spalatin verdeutschte, befassen sich nicht weniger als vier mit der Fürstenerziehung und der fürstlichen Regierungsführung: neben dem Plutarch-Traktat und den Erläuterungen zum Adagium „Aut regem aut fatuum nasci oportere", das auf die Fürstentugenden bezogen wird, sind hier eine deutsche Fassung der *Institutio* sowie der *Querela pacis* anzutreffen.[22] Die kurze Widmungsvorrede, in der Spalatin die Plutarch-Übersetzung seinem ehemaligen Zögling Johann Friedrich von Sachsen zueignet, stellt noch zusätzlich den Wert von Plutarchs Lehren für den Fürsten heraus:

> Das büchlein Plutarchi/ vonn der vnderscheid des freundts vnd schmeichlers/ etwan von dem hochgelerten hern Erasmus Roterodamus auß dem Kriechischen in das Lateynisch getzung gezogen/ hab ich aus dem lateynisch in das teutsch geandert/ angesehen das es einem jeden Fürsten ser guot zuo wissen ist. Derhalben E.F.G. ich solch mein verteutschung vnterteniglich zuoschreiben/ [...].[23]

Die Beibehaltung von Erasmus' Widmung an den englischen König Heinrich VIII. unterstreicht schließlich noch zusätzlich, daß der Funktionszusammenhang, dem Spalatin seine Plutarch-Verdeutschung zuordnet, die Fürstenerziehung ist. Spalatins Übersetzung ist, wie die der *Institutio* und der *Querela*, fast wortwörtlich und recht genau; sie gibt daher für eine nähere Zuordnung des Textes kaum etwas her.

Anders bei Emser: Obwohl auch er sich eng an die lateinische Vorlage hält, übersetzt er freier als Spalatin. Er unterdrückt manchmal gelehrte Anspielungen und Bezugnahmen auf die Literatur der Antike. Obendrein fügt er gelegentlich Erläuterungen hinzu. Als das Wort „Satyr" fällt, ergänzt er z.B. in Klammern:

> das ist eyn thier wye ein mensch/ dann das es auff allen vyeren/ vnd in den wilden walden vmbgehet.[24]

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21 Ebd., Aj recto (Titelblatt).
22 Volz (1958) 92–94, 98–100; Herding (1968).
23 Plutarchus (1520) Aj verso.
24 Plutarchus (1519) Aij verso.

Emser richtet sich deutlich an eine breitere Leserschaft, über den Hof hinaus, denn für Hofangehörige hätte sich eine solche Erläuterung erübrigt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es bezeichnend, daß er auch Erasmus' Widmung an Thomas Wolsey, den späteren Lordkanzler und Kardinal, unterdrückte. Stattdessen eignet er die Übersetzung Georg von Wedenbach, „Landt Rentmeister vnnd Hauptmann" in Leipzig, zu, wobei er hervorhebt, daß er den Traktat „allenn deutschen/ dye was frembdes oder nawes tzu lesen begirig [sind]/ tzu nutz vnd frommen" verdeutscht habe.[25]

Schluß

Der summarische Vergleich von Spalatins und Emsers Plutarch-Übersetzungen in ihrem jeweiligen Kontext scheint nahezulegen, daß sich hier bereits in Ansätzen zwei Bildungsziele abzeichnen, die in den deutschen Landen eigentlich erst im Laufe des 17. Jahrhunderts, gerade auch im Wechselbezug, zum Tragen kamen: das der *prudentia politica*, die dem Staatsmann eignen sollte, und das der *prudentia civilis*, das sich von ersterem ableitete.[26] Sie war für den mündigen Bürger gedacht, der sich aus seiner beruflichen und ständischen Einbindung heraus für das Wohl von Staat und Gesellschaft einsetzen wollte. Falls diese Beobachtung stimmt, dann eignet Plutarch in deutscher Gestalt seit dem 16. Jahrhundert eine zukunftsträchtige Bildungspotenz, die noch nicht mal in Umrissen erforscht worden ist.

Sollte sich dies aber als allzu voreiliger Schluß erweisen, so dürften die Ausführungen auf jeden Fall gezeigt haben, daß das Bild, das die deutschen Chroniken nahelegen,—daß Plutarch nämlich vom breiteren Publikum in den deutschen Landen wohl in erster Linie als Fürstenerzieher und Moralphilosoph angesehen wurde—sich an konkreten Texten festmachen und erhärten läßt, ja von der Autorität des Erasmus mit verbürgt wird. Die deutsche Plutarch-Rezeption scheint obendrein nicht von den konfessionellen Auseinandersetzungen beeinträchtigt oder auch nur irgendwie in Mitleidenschaft gezogen worden zu sein. Plutarch blieb in den deutschen Landen derart bekannt und beliebt, daß der Verfasser des Plutarch-Artikels im 28. Band von Zedlers *Universal-Lexicon* noch 1741 behaupten konnte, daß trotz aller

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[25] Ebd., Aj verso.

[26] Frühsorge (1974) bes. 10–123.

Bedenken, die die Forschung mittlerweile gegen Plutarch, seinen Stil, seine Geschichtskenntnisse und das von ihm vermittelte Griechenbild vorgebracht habe, seine Schriften weiterhin aufgrund ihrer Nützlichkeit so sehr zu loben seien, daß es Leute gebe, die gerne auf den ganzen Kanon antiker Literatur verzichten würden, wenn sie nur seine Werke behalten könnten:

> […], so bleibet nichts desto weniger denen Schrifften des Plutarchus ihr ungemeines Lob, das sie wegen ihrer grossen Nutzbarkeit verdienet, und welches durch die sonderbare Hochschätzung vor selbige nicht wenig bestärcket wird, da manche viel lieber alle derer Alten, als des Plutarchus Schrifften allein haben missen wollen, […].[27]

[27] Zedler (1741) 881.

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